NUMBER 13-26-00395-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF E.T. AND J.T., CHILDREN
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2
OF SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to
her biological children Eddie and Joey. 1 By two issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s
findings regarding statutory grounds for termination and the children’s best-interest. We
affirm.
1 We refer to appellant as Mother and to the children and other related individuals by aliases. See
TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
I. BACKGROUND
A bench trial was held on March 20, 2026. At the time of trial, Eddie was four years
old and Joey was two. Mother has two other children, Xaden and Ivan, who are not subject
to this appeal.
A. Joseph Matthews
Joseph Matthews testified that he is a case worker with the Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services (Department). Matthews stated Mother first became
involved with the Department in 2006 and had a lengthy history with the Department
thereafter. Ivan, then four years old, and Xaden, then ten months old, were living in
Mother’s residence at the time when law enforcement discovered marijuana in proximity
to Ivan’s crib. In 2009, another fifteen-month-old child in Mother’s home “was found [with]
pills inside of his mouth.” Mother did not allow the Department access to herself or the
children at this time.
In 2013, there were allegations of physical abuse and negligent supervision
regarding Xaden and Ivan. There was also a drug raid in Mother’s home, and Mother
tested positive for methamphetamines. In 2014, there were allegations of physical abuse
and negligent supervision by Mother against Ivan and that Mother was using “crack,
cocaine, and marijuana.” Mother was still uncooperative with the Department.
On July 20, 2014, the Department received an allegation that Ivan was exposed to
alcohol, heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, methamphetamine, crystal meth, ecstasy,
prescription medications, and hallucinogens. Mother was uncooperative throughout the
Department’s investigation. There was another allegation that Mother had left Ivan and
Xaden in the care of his maternal grandmother (Grandmother), which was not allowed
2
because Grandmother was alleged to be abusing prescription drugs.
In November 2020, the Department received another report of neglectful
supervision, alleging that Mother was arrested for evading arrest and human smuggling.
In March 2023, Mother tested positive for amphetamines while she was pregnant with
Joey and was still uncooperative with the Department. There was another report
regarding neglectful supervision of Ivan, Eddie, and Xaden that year.
Matthews testified that in February 2024, “it was found” that Xaden was “not doing
well,” had “mental issues,” “was bouncing from place to place, staying with various
friends,” and “had been suspended and later expelled from school.” It was alleged that
Mother was not an appropriate caregiver for Xaden, and it was unknown if she had thrown
him out or did not report him running away. Again, Mother was uncooperative with the
Department. According to Matthews, because Mother was uncooperative regarding all
these allegations, the Department had to close the previous cases as “unable to
complete.”
On November 29, 2024, the Department received a report alleging neglectful
supervision of Eddie, then three years old, and Joey, then one year old. Matthews learned
that Aransas Pass police found Eddie “shivering alone outside of a laundromat” around
8:00 a.m. and had found Joey alone and strapped to his car seat. The children were filthy,
and their diapers were covered in urine and feces. 2
According to Matthews, Mother explained that at 7:00 a.m., she buckled Joey into
his car seat while Eddie was sleeping. She then left her children alone at her apartment
to paint an apartment nearby. Mother stated she was unaware Eddie had left the
2 Law enforcement clothed Eddie at the station. Matthews noticed Joey had a small mark on his
left eye and Eddie had a cut on his chest about one inch long.
3
apartment and was at the laundromat but clarified that she only left the children
unattended for about “ten to fifteen minutes.” Mother was arrested for child abandonment,
the Department moved forward with the “exigent removal” of Eddie and Joey, and the
children were placed in the home of Juan Cruz Galvan, a family friend and Mother’s
landlord.
B. Shauna Robinson
Department caseworker Shauna Robinson testified that in February 2025 she
discussed Mother’s family plan of service with Mother, which included a psychosocial and
psychological assessment, random drug testing, substance abuse and parenting classes,
and employment. Robinson explained to Mother that if she did not undergo a scheduled
drug test, the result would be treated as a failed drug test, which meant no visits with the
children. Robinson stated that Mother understood the requirements.
On February 14, 2025, Mother’s hair follicle tested positive for methamphetamine.
Mother then “no-showed” to scheduled drug tests on February 21, 27, and March 7.
Mother tested negative on urinalysis tests on March 21, and 27, and April 11, 18, 24, and
30. Mother was also participating in her family plan of service and was employed at a
supermarket. In May, the trial court returned the children to Mother’s care with the goal of
reunification.
On June 10, 17, and 25, and July 9, 17, and 21, Mother refused drug testing.
Robinson informed Mother that if she continued to refuse to drug test, it equaled a failed
drug test, and the Department would have to inform the trial court of Mother’s positive
results. The Department became concerned with Mother’s drug test refusals and had
growing concerns the children were living with Galvan despite being returned to Mother.
4
For example, Mother’s work schedule was from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; however, the
children were with Galvan even during evening hours. When the Department visited with
the children, it would be at Galvan’s residence.
On August 8, 2025, when no one was at Mother’s residence, Robinson questioned
Galvan. Galvan informed Robinson the children had been dropped off with him on August
5, 2025, and Mother had not returned. The Department attempted to contact Mother but
was unable to reach her. Robinson then contacted Joey’s daycare, and it informed her
that Galvan was the person that would drop off and pick up Joey, and Galvan was the
person who enrolled the children. Robinson then drove to Mother’s workplace, and the
manager informed Robinson that Mother was terminated at least three weeks prior.
On August 11, 2025, the children were “removed” from Mother’s care and placed
with Galvan. Mother was still not cooperating with the Department and refused to submit
to drug tests on August 1, 8, and 11, and September 24, October 20, November 10 and
14, and December 5, 2025. Mother tested positive for methamphetamines and
amphetamines on January 5, February 4 and 23, and March 12, 2026. At the time of trial,
Mother had not visited the children since August 2025.
Robinson testified that in January 2026, there was an unknown man in Mother’s
apartment. Although Mother claimed the man was her sponsor, he was unable to provide
Robinson with identification. Mother became argumentative with Robinson, forcing
Robinson to leave the residence. Robinson testified that earlier that month, teenagers
Xaden and Ivan got into a physical altercation at Mother’s residence, requiring law
enforcement to intervene.
According to Robinson, Eddie and Joey formed a close bond with Galvan because
5
they had been in his care most of their lives. Robinson testified that Galvan was a constant
person in the children’s lives, and in her opinion, it would hurt the children if they were
returned to Mother. Robinson stated that Galvan was able to provide for the children, and
the Department recommended Galvan be designated the children’s permanent managing
conservator.
C. Mother
Mother testified she was taken to court once for Xaden skipping school. Mother
stated that she was “not aware” about a drug raid at her house. Mother acknowledged
the fight at her home and stated she advised Xaden to call the police.
According to Mother, Xaden and Ivan reside at Grandmother’s house and have
been living “on and off” with Mother their entire lives. Mother explained that Ivan “has his
own room [at Grandmother’s house], and he’s got his own privacy there” while Xaden is
currently incarcerated.
Mother stated that after Eddie and Joey were released to her in May, she
requested assistance for groceries from the Department in June. Mother claimed she was
employed, earning $22 an hour plus a per diem of $100 per day. Mother stated that she
provided Galvan with $200 weekly. Her criminal history included a misdemeanor charge
for resisting arrest, which is currently pending; a driving while intoxicated conviction; and
felony charges for abandonment of children and human smuggling, which are currently
pending.
Mother testified she stopped using methamphetamine “continuously” in December
2025. Mother explained, “the only reason I went to the rehab or used meth is so I could
get dirty to enter into a rehab” because “[t]hat’s what the Judge and the Department
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recommended me to do.” She clarified that “in order to check [her]self into rehab, [she]
had to be dirty.” The trial court asked Mother where she obtained the methamphetamine
from, but Mother declined to answer.
Regarding the allegations that the children were living with Galvan after they were
released back to her care, Mother said that was merely a “miscommunication” because
the children were not living with him. Mother also said she was sick with the flu and could
not care for the children, so she left them in Galvan’s care temporarily. Additionally,
Mother testified that Robinson was lying when Robinson accused Mother of not identifying
the unknown male in Mother’s apartment when Mother became argumentative. Mother
claimed she identified the man yet became argumentative with Robinson because
Robinson was supposed to be helping Mother get her children back.
Regarding the children’s removal on November 29, 2024, Mother acknowledged
that she left Joey strapped to his car seat and Eddie alone in her apartment but claimed
that it was only for fifteen minutes and that she was close by.
Photos of the children from that day were admitted into evidence. When Mother
was questioned regarding the soaked diaper after only allegedly leaving the children
unattended for fifteen minutes, Mother responded: “Are you going to tell me in the report
that I had a box of diapers and a box of wipes too that the cops took, but yet, their Pampers
are soaked?” Following an admonishment from the trial court, Mother agreed Joey had a
“soaked pamper.” Nonetheless, Mother stated that she was “going to stop using drugs for
sure” and “will never leave [the children] by themselves, again, ever again.” Mother
testified, “I want my visitation rights back.” When asked if she wants to share custody with
Galvan, Mother stated “that’s fine for right now.” Mother understood that Galvan was a
7
big part of the children’s lives and did not want to take them from him.
D. Galvan
Galvan testified that the children have been living with him for a year and a half.
When Mother left the children in Galvan’s care, he did not think this was odd because he
has “known them since [they were] babies,” has “always been there for them,” and Mother
would often leave the children in Galvan’s care, including overnight. Although the children
were in Mother’s custody and were, in fact, staying with Galvan, he did not report this to
the Department because the children “were like [his] own” and “were in good hands” with
him. Galvan stated Mother has never financially provided for the children; however, he
acknowledged that starting in January, Mother had been giving him $200 a week for rent.
Although Galvan is 71 years old, he stated he is in excellent health and would love to
continue raising the boys.
E. Trial Court’s Order
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Eddie and Joey, finding by
clear and convincing evidence that she had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the
children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical and
emotional well-being; that she had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional wellbeing, and that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the
children was in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),
(b)(2). 3 The trial court removed the care of Galvan—the only adult they have known and
3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of E.T.’s and J.T.’s father, who is not a party to
this appeal.
8
bonded with their entire lives—due to Galvan’s age. Instead, it named the Department as
permanent managing conservator. Subsequently, Galvan filed a petition in intervention
and a separate petition to modify the parent-child relationship.
F. Motion to Reconsider
On May 12, 2026, Mother’s attorney filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider
its decision to remove the children from Galvan’s care and to place the children back with
Galvan.
At a hearing on May 12, 2026, Robinson testified that the children “were very
comfortable” with Galvan, “they had a loving relationship” with him and were “very familiar
with” him. Since the children were removed from Galvan, they have not had any contact
with him. They were placed with a foster family, and since then Eddie has been
experiencing behavioral issues. For example, he hits himself, wakes up in the middle of
the night, and has not adjusted to the foster family’s home rules. In fact, the current foster
family has requested that Eddie and Joey be split up so that the foster family will be able
to keep Joey. The children’s ad litem testified it was concerning that the current foster
family wanted to “discharge [Eddie] with their hands up after three weeks.” The
Department felt that Galvan’s absence “cold turkey” may be contributing to the sudden
behavioral changes Eddie is experiencing. The Department reiterated that the children
have been in Galvan’s care for eighteen months, he is “fictive kin,” “takes care of the
boys,” and “makes sure they have what they need.”
Galvan testified that he is in excellent health. During his eighteen months with the
children, Galvan stated that Eddie has not acted out. Galvan has always been cooperative
with the Department, has raised these two boys, and has always done what was required
9
of him to keep the children. He requested that the trial court not consider his age in
removing the children from his care because he is very healthy, his mother lived to be 99
years of age, and he goes to the doctor every three months for regular check-ups. He
explained he maintained a routine with the children. During his care, Eddie did not miss
a single day of daycare, was never late one day, and the children attended all their
doctor’s appointments. Galvan asserted that he would like to adopt the children and loves
the boys as if they were his own. He explained that he cut all ties with Mother and would
never let the children see her again. Whenever Galvan needed assistance with the
children, such as when he attended medical appointments, he relied on a friend, Linda.
And if the trial court would not give him back the children, he requested that it place the
children with Linda, so he could continue to have contact with the children. Galvan stated
that he believed the children needed to have contact with him because he is all they have
ever known.
Following the testimony, Mother’s attorney and the children’s ad litems requested
that the trial court place the children back in Galvan’s care. Mother’s attorney argued:
I don’t believe being 70 should be a full-blown factor when that would
preclude many grandparents of not being able to take care of their own
children’s kids . . . . [T]hese two young children . . . have been placed with
him for 18 months[,] . . . [h]e was a good caretaker[,] and he can do it . . . .
I’m asking the Court to be guided by the Family Code, to be guided by the
Austin Court of Appeals, and to be guided by Mr. Galvan’s heart.
The current ad litem informed the trial court that Galvan is in better shape than he is. He
added that the children’s former ad litem said the same thing when they recommended
placement with Galvan. He expressed that the children are reacting to being removed
from their “father figure.” The ad litem stated that it was “disturbing” for the current foster
family to want to separate the children and that it was in the best interest of the children
10
to be removed from the foster home immediately because the placement had completely
set Eddie back. Alternatively, the ad litem expressed that Linda has passed a preliminary
assessment and could be considered a placement for the children so they could
experience “some semblance of normalcy.”
Despite recommendations from the Department, Mother’s counsel, the children’s
previous and current ad litems, and Galvan himself, the trial court denied the motion to
reconsider. In an unprecedented and unusual reliance on “biology,” and not based on any
evidence, it expressed the following:
I’ve had 18 months to think about this. And what I’m hearing over
and over again is today. He’s fine today. It’s in the best interest today. Well,
what about 12 years from now, when he’s 82 and he’s got teenage boys?
This is about biology. There is a reason why we don’t have children—
I realize men can, but throughout the history of humanity, women have
taken care of the children. Women stop being able to have children by age
50, normally. Biologically, the world has decided that that is what is in the
best interest of children is to have young parents. That’s biology. There is a
reason why 70-year-old women are not having children because they can’t
be the better parent. That’s biology.
I’ve had 18 months to think about this, and it tears me up. And I told
Mr. Galvan. He stood right here and told me how much he loves those boys.
Number one, it’s not about him. It is about the best interest of these children.
And I struggle to this day to believe that it is better for them, in 12 years, to
be with an 82-year-old man instead of a 40-year-old parent. It can’t be. It
just can’t be.
I realized today he is in good health, but we don’t have a crystal ball.
So we have to go by what we know, and the science tells us. Biology tells
us that 80-year-olds aren’t supposed to be raising teenagers . . . .
As a 35-year-old, I struggled with a 15-year-old. I had a 15-year-old
at age 35, and it was hard. I can't imagine doing it now at age 56, and I
certainly can’t imagine having a 15-year-old in my 80s . . . .
So I can only go by what history and science and common sense
tells this Court. Eighty-year-olds are not supposed to be raising teenagers.
And there are alternatives. And I chose the alternative.
11
Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. Mother does not challenge
the conservatorship order, and no other party to the case filed a notice of appeal. 4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A suit involving the potential termination of a parent’s right to a child is of
constitutional import. In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017,
pet. denied). But a parent’s rights “are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for courts to
recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also
essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to
preserve that right.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). Striking that balance, the
Legislature has provided that a trial court may terminate a parent-child relationship,
pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 161.001, only if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence of at least one predicate ground enumerated in subsection (b)(1) and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)–(2). Clear and
convincing evidence will produce in the factfinder’s mind “a firm belief or conviction as to
the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. When the standard
of proof is clear and convincing evidence, an appellate court reviews the legal sufficiency
of the evidence and considers “all evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to
4 This Court finds it disturbing, to say the least, that the trial court named the Department managing
conservator despite apparently undisputed evidence that placement with Galvan was in the children’s best interests as of the date of the order. Instead, the ruling was speculative and based on the trial court’s personal intuition—unmoored to any evidence in the record—about how the children’s best interests may evolve many years in the future. This was arguably an abuse of discretion. See In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting a trial court abuses its discretion if it “act[s] without reference to any guiding rules or principles”); In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (“The material time to consider is the present . . . .”). Nevertheless, because no party has challenged the trial court’s ruling in this regard, we are not at liberty to review it here. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (noting “the courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error”).
12
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true.” In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2024); In re R.R.A., 687
S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex. 2024) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266) (providing an
appellate court must “view the facts in a light favorable to the findings of the trial judge,
who heard the testimony, evaluated its credibility, and dealt the closest with the evidence
at hand”). “Courts ‘must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its
finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so,’ but courts ‘should disregard all evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.’” In
re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 308 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).
Evidence is factually insufficient if considering the entire record, the disputed evidence
contrary to the judgment is so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not have
resolved that disputed evidence in favor of the ultimate finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at
266. A core function of the factfinder is to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence,
and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id.
III. TERMINATION GROUNDS
A. Applicable Law
To terminate parental rights pursuant to subsection (D), the Department must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent knowingly placed the child in or
allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s
physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). “Conditions or
surroundings” establishing endangerment include “[i]nappropriate, abusive, or unlawful
conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to
associate on a regular basis.” In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort
13
Worth 2009, no pet.). An environment that endangers the child may be created by the
physical living conditions in the child’s home or by the conduct of a parent living in the
home, or both. In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 108–09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no
pet.). A parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in an endangering
environment when the parent is aware of the potential danger but disregards it. M.R.J.M.,
280 S.W.3d at 502. A child may therefore be endangered when the home environment
creates a potential for emotional or physical injury even where the injurious conduct is not
directed at the child and the child does not suffer injury. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.
Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
Under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Department must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed
the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The focus is on the
effect of the parent’s conduct, which must be the result of a conscious course of conduct
rather than a single act or omission. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.). “It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child
or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment
or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware
of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 110 (quoting In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d
472, 477 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)); see also In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (“[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed
towards the child.”). Only one predicate violation under Section 161.001(b)(1) is
necessary to support a termination order. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.
14
2003).
B. Discussion
There was evidence Mother had a long history with the Department regarding
allegations of abuse and neglect of Xaden and Ivan, yet Mother argues those allegations
are not relevant because Eddie and Joey were not born yet. We disagree. “[R]elevant
conduct may occur before or after a child’s birth,” In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 832 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied), and “[e]vidence of past misconduct or
neglect can be used to measure a parent’s future conduct.” In re Z.M., 456 S.W.3d 677,
689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting In re I.R.K.–N., No. 10-13-00455-CV,
2014 WL 2069281, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco May 14, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). The
factfinder “may infer that past conduct endangering the well[-]being of a child may recur
in the future if the child is returned to the parent.” In re B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 17 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). Here, there was evidence that Mother’s conduct
regarding her parenting in 2006—including several allegations of physical abuse and
negligent supervision, a drug raid in Mother’s home, testing positive for
methamphetamines, evading arrest, human smuggling, testing positive for drugs while
pregnant—was the start of a pattern of behavior that continued up until the time of trial.
“Subsection (E) allows termination not only based upon the direct result of parental course
of conduct, but also upon conduct not specifically directed at the child, or cause actual
injury to the child, or even be a ‘concrete threat’ of injury to the child.” J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t
of Family & Protective Servs., 511 S.W.3d 145, 160 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
Therefore, we will not disregard Mother’s prior allegations and conduct in our analysis: a
parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
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child’s physical and emotional well-being. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). See A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 394
S.W.3d 703, 712‒13 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (“[E]vidence of criminal conduct,
convictions, or imprisonment is relevant to a review of whether a parent engaged in a
course of conduct that endangered the well-being of the child.”); In re Z.T., No. 12-18-00078-CV, 2018 WL 4474050, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (concluding that mother’s long history of Department involvement, alcohol abuse
during pregnancy, failure to protect the children from violence, and drug abuse weighed
in favor of termination under subsections (D) and (E)). Because there was evidence
Mother’s past actions were endangering, the trial court could have inferred that similar
endangering conduct could recur in the future if the children were returned to her. See In
re E.A., No. 13-06-503-CV, 2007 WL 2471459, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Aug. 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Throughout the pendency of this trial, Mother continually tested positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamines and had a long history of drug use. See In re
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009) (providing that “a long history of drug use and
irresponsible choices” supports termination). In fact, Mother tested positive just eight days
before termination proceedings began. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
(noting mother’s continued narcotics use after child’s removal and in face of drug testing
jeopardized her relationship with her child). “[A] parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug
use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child,
supports a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical
16
or emotional well-being.” In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2011, pet. denied) (quoting In re J.A.G., No. 02-10-0002-CV, 2010 WL 4539442, at *1
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re D.R., 631
S.W.3d 826, 835 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (noting Mother’s drug use after
completing inpatient treatment “suggested a substantial likelihood that she would be a
danger to the children in the future or put them in a possibly harmful situation”).
Mother reiterated her most recent drug tests showed that her use levels were
coming down, and the Department did not prove she used drugs in the children’s
presence. However, a parent’s drug use can be endangering even if it occurs outside the
child’s presence. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617 (holding that illegal
drug use “exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or
imprisoned”). Moreover, Robinson continually informed Mother that positive drug tests
could be a reason the children were kept from her “permanently,” and Mother continued
to test positive or repeatedly refused to drug test throughout the pendency of this case.
See In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (“A parent’s
engaging in illegal drug activity after agreeing not to do so in a service plan for
reunification with her children is sufficient to establish clear and convincing proof of
voluntary, deliberate, and conscious conduct that endangered the well-being of her
children.”).
Nonetheless, Mother argues the trial “court cannot infer by clear and convincing
evidence that her [drug test] refusals [were] due to Mother using methamphetamine, or
marijuana, or any type of drug.” To the contrary, “[t]he trial court could reasonably infer
[Mother] avoided taking the drug tests because she was using drugs.” In re C.R., 263
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S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A factfinder reasonably could infer that
Aja’s failure to submit to the court-ordered drug screening indicated she was avoiding
testing because she was using drugs.”); see also In re M.M., No. 13-13-00543-CV, 2014
WL 895514, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“A fact finder may reasonably infer from a parent’s repeated failure to attend scheduled
drug screenings that the parent avoided testing because the parent was using drugs.”);
In re N.T., No. 02-24-00067-CV, 2024 WL 2066375, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9,
2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Mother’s pattern of drug use, her refusal to submit to drug
testing—presumably because she would have tested positive—and her refusal to
acknowledge her drug habit posed a danger to the Children’s well-being if they were
returned to her care.”). Mother’s refusal to abide by the trial court’s drug test requirements
reflects a dysfunctional parent-child relationship because Mother was either unwilling or
unable to maintain the sobriety necessary to provide for her children’s physical and
emotional needs, even though she knew her parental rights were in jeopardy. See In re
R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279 (“[A] pattern of illegal drug use in such a context is evidence
from which a factfinder may infer endangerment.”).
There was also evidence Mother abandoned both children. Joey was found
strapped in a car seat for an unknown amount of time while Eddie was alone and shivering
at a laundromat, having left Mother’s apartment and crossed a two-lane street near an
intersection without supervision. The children were dirty, they were found with feces and
urine, and Mother’s home was filthy. “[N]eglect can be just as dangerous to the well-being
of a child as direct physical abuse.” In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996) (per
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curiam); see also In re S.L.G., No. 11-23-00120-CV, 2023 WL 6883452, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Oct. 19, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[E]xposing children to unsanitary
living conditions endangers their physical and emotional well-being.”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we
conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Mother
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endanger them and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers them. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001 (b)(1)(D), (E). Moreover, we conclude the evidence is such that a factfinder
could reasonably form “a firm belief or conviction about the truth” regarding the
Department’s allegations. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We overrule Mother’s first
issue.
IV. BEST INTEREST
Mother argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest.
A. Applicable Law
In determining the child’s best interest, the factfinder should consider the Holley
factors: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional
needs of the child; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child;
(4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to
assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the
home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
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existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parents’
acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors
are non-exclusive, and the best interest finding does not require proof of any unique set
of factors. See In re J.J.C., 302 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,
pet. denied). Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children. In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “There is a
strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by keeping the child with
its natural parent, and the burden is on [the Department] to rebut that presumption.” In re
D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
B. Discussion
1. The Desires of the Children
“When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider
whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and
whether the children have spent minimal time with a parent.” In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.);
In re K.J., No. 02-25-00093-CV, 2025 WL 1600219, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 5,
2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The evidence at trial provided that the children had been
in Galvan’s care most of their lives, and Mother has spent “minimal time” with the children
and has not visited the children since August 2025. Furthermore, the children were well
bonded with Galvan and were “well-cared for” by him, and Galvan expressed an interest
in adopting the children.
2. Present and Future Physical and Emotional Needs of the
children and the Present and Future Emotional and Physical
Danger to the Children
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While Eddie was found alone outside a laundromat shivering, Joey was found
alone strapped to a car seat. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119 (“A parent’s inability to
provide adequate care for her children, unstable lifestyle . . . lack of parenting skills, and
poor judgment may be considered when looking at the children’s best interest.”); In re
T.M.J., 315 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (considering the fact
that children were outside unsupervised in conducting a best interest analysis). There
was evidence the children were in soiled diapers, not clothed, and shivering when they
were found. See In re J.C.D.Y., No. 01-23-00713-CV, 2024 WL 1334334, at *28 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“This evidence that
Mother neglected her children’s personal hygiene also supports the trial court’s best
interest findings.”); In re Z.G., No. 11-11-00078-CV, 2012 WL 745090, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Mar. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the parent was unable to provide safe
environment for children where the children’s hygiene was poor). Mother had not visited
the children since August 2025. “[A] parent’s lack of significant contact with a child may
endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re K.J., No. 02-25-00093-CV,
2025 WL 1600219, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 5, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Just two weeks before trial, there was violence occurring in Mother’s home against
her other children. In re J.H., No. 01-22-00629-CV, 2023 WL 2169952, at *20 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A child’s exposure to violence
in the home undermines the safety of the home environment and is relevant when
considering the best interest of the child.”). A parent’s past performance as a parent is
relevant to a determination of her present and future abilities to provide for a child. See
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see also Schaban-Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d
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815, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“[T]rial courts [have] relied on evidence
of past violence as an indicator of future behavior in parental termination and child custody
cases.”). Lastly, the evidence concerning Mother’s recurrent drug use also supports the
finding that Mother poses a present and future risk of danger to the children’s emotional
and physical wellbeing. See In re D.R., 631 S.W.3d at 835 (“Mother’s use of
methamphetamine during the pendency of the case, even after being released from
inpatient treatment, showed that she lacked the parental abilities necessary to care for
the children, that she failed to learn from the programs available to assist her, and that
the existing parent-child relationship was not a proper one.”); In re L.T., No. 02-22-00197-CV, 2022 WL 15053329, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(considering mother's pattern of drug use and refusal to submit to drug tests as evidence
supporting best-interest finding). The trial court could have determined that Mother is
unable to provide for the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. See In re
S.Y., No. 07-23-00206-CV, 2023 WL 5209104, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 14, 2023,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
3. Parental Abilities of the Persons Seeking Custody and the Programs
Available to Assist Those Persons Seeking Custody in Promoting the
Best Interest of the Children
Here, the children’s ad litem testified he was very hopeful and excited when the
trial court returned the kids to Mother. However, the ad litem noted it did not take long for
Mother to leave the kids with Galvan again, and he recommended termination even
though he “rarely” finds himself in that position. See In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d 83, 97 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (“Although Mother was successful in completing her
court-ordered services and gaining a monitored return of the children, that return only
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lasted approximately three months due to Mother's continued drug use.”). Although
Mother stated that she left the children in Galvan’s care due to her having the flu, the trial
court disbelieved Mother’s testimony: “You’ve lied to this Court about the mother that
you’ve been to these boys. And you may believe your lies, but this Court does not.” See
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing appellate court defers to
factfinder on witness credibility issues). There was evidence the children would spend the
night with Galvan, and he would pick them up and drop them off at daycare. In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Stability is important
in a child’s emotional and physical development.”). Galvan testified that Mother did not
financially provide for the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (providing that the
failure to financially support the children “is one of the factors that is to be considered in
ascertaining the best interest of the child”). Thus, the evidence supports a finding that
Mother abandoned the children when she left them with Galvan.
Mother admitted that she has had several referrals to the Department beginning in
2006 regarding allegations of abuse and neglect, which according to the Department
could not be investigated due to Mother uncooperating. In fact, there was evidence of a
drug raid at Mother’s home. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10) (stating that willingness
and ability “to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision” is
relevant consideration in deciding whether parent can provide child with safe
environment). This calls into question Mother’s ability to parent the children. See In re
C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied) (“If a parent abuses
or neglects . . . other children, that conduct can be used to support a finding of
endangerment even against a child who was not yet born at the time of the conduct.”).
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Appellate courts may “measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct to
aid in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best
interest of the child.” A. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704,
717 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (citing In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.)).
After the children were released to Mother, she left the children in Galvan’s care,
necessitating the children’s removal again in August. Thus, Mother was still not able to
provide the children with a stable environment even after the children were returned to
her, demonstrating a lack of understanding or inability to meet the children’s basic needs.
4. Plans for the Children by the Individuals or Agency Seeking Custody
and Stability of the Home or Proposed Placement
The evidence demonstrated Galvan had been the children’s primary caregiver. In
this regard, there was evidence that even after the children were returned to Mother’s
care, Galvan was the person dropping off and picking up Joey from daycare, and they
were spending the night with him. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(12)(F) (providing
court may consider whether the family understands the child’s needs and capabilities).
Robinson also testified that Galvan—not Mother—enrolled Eddie in daycare, and Mother
agreed Galvan has been the one constant person in the children’s lives.
Although Mother’s ostensible “plan” was to stop using drugs and “never ever” leave
the children unattended again, “[a] continuing pattern of illegal drug use . . . implicates
most of the Holley factors and will support a finding that termination of parental rights is
in a child’s best interest.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2023, pet. denied). Meanwhile, Mother was facing criminal charges, demonstrating
uncertainty in her future. Id. (“A factfinder may reasonably find that the possibility of
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incarceration and the accompanying instability in the home are more than mere
theoretical possibilities when a parent continues using drugs after a drug-related criminal
prosecution.”). When Robinson visited Mother’s home one month before trial, Mother did
not have bedding for the children in her home.
5. Any Excuse for the Parent’s Acts or Omissions
Mother’s history of non-cooperation with the Department permits the factfinder to
reasonably infer her indifference toward the goal of reunification. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667
S.W.3d 813, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). In this regard, Mother’s
termination proceeding began on December 5, 2025; however, Mother did not appear,
and the trial was reset for February 2026. See id. (noting “when a parent fails to attend
trial in a parental-termination case without a valid excuse for his or her failure to do so,
the factfinder may reasonably infer that the parent is indifferent to the outcome”). From
August 2025 until March 2026, Mother had not visited the children. See Wilson v. State,
116 S.W.3d 923, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (providing that a parent’s lack of
motivation in improving parenting skills is evidence to support a finding that termination
is in the child’s best interest).
Mother testified she needed to use methamphetamine in December,
demonstrating her inability to prioritize reunification with the children and effect personal
change for the betterment of her children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(11)
(providing “the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental
and personal changes within a reasonable period of time” is a relevant consideration in
the best interest determination); § 263.307(b)(12)(D) (considering whether the parent
demonstrates adequate parenting skills in the best-interest finding); In re G.M.G., 444
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S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (providing that a parent who
lacks ability to provide child with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child’s
emotional and physical needs).
Based on the foregoing, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. We overrule Mother’s second issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of September, 2026.
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