NUMBER 13-25-00002-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
MONICA MICHELENA, Appellant,
v.
RONALD MICHELENA AND
RICK MICHELENA, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 92ND DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Monica Michelena appeals the trial court’s granting of summary
judgment in favor of appellees Ronald Michelena and Rick Michelena. By four issues,
appellant argues the trial court erred: (1) by “holding that [Ronald’s] homestead property
categorically falls outside the definition of an ‘asset’ under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act” (TUFTA); (2) appellant’s “summary judgment proof established that there is
a question of fact as to whether the subject property was an ‘asset’ that was ‘not generally
exempt under non-bankruptcy law’”; (3) by “failing to recognize that ‘sham’ transfers of
homestead property . . . to evade creditors constitute an established exception to
homestead protection”; and (4) because there is a question of fact as to whether the
transfer of the 6.213 acre-tract of land was a sham transfer to evade appellee. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Following a divorce proceeding, appellant obtained a judgment against Robert
Michelena, her former husband, on June 1, 2016, in the amount of $937,041 (property
division judgment). On March 4, 2019, Robert filed for bankruptcy, and on December 1,
2021, Robert received an order of discharge from the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy
court found the property division judgment was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because
the property in dispute was Robert’s homestead, and, as a result, exempt from execution
to satisfy the property division judgment.
On June 14, 2022, appellant filed an abstract of judgment on the property division
judgment. On March 15, 2023, Robert conveyed his interest in the homestead property
to appellees for $200,000 and purchased a new homestead for $179,000.
In 2024, appellant filed suit alleging that Robert’s transfer of the homestead
property to appellees was fraudulent because she is considered a judgment creditor, and
1 The parties and proceedings related to this appeal have been before our Court at least five times.
See Michelena v. Michelena, No. 13-09-00588-CV, 2012 WL 3012642 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg June 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Michelena, No. 13-14-00052-CV, 2014 WL 2462851 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 17, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Michelena v. Michelena, No. 13-13-00036-CV, 2015 WL 525182 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Michelena v. Michelena, No. 13-17-00572-CV, 2017 WL 6379834 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg Dec. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Michelena v. Michelena, No. 13-16-00349-CV, 2020 WL 1303234, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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the transfer was made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her. Appellant further
asserted civil conspiracy based on the alleged fraudulent transfer and sought a
declaration that the transfer was a violation of the TUFTA. Appellant sought actual and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and costs.
On June 21, 2024, appellees moved for partial summary judgment, stating that
appellant’s claim for relief under the TUFTA fails as a matter of law because the property
is homestead property. Appellant responded, arguing that the property is not exempt from
the property division judgment and is considered an “asset” because:
if [Robert] would have sold the property at the listed price or appraised
value, upon the sale of the property, his share of the proceeds of the sale
would have been $1,500,000.00 minus the cost of the sale . . . . It is
therefore likely that Robert . . . would receive a net amount of approximately
$1,300,000.00, which he would have 6 months to invest in a new
homestead . . . . If he did not, then that portion of the sale proceeds that he
did not use to buy a new homestead would be subject to seizure.
Therefore, according to appellant, she has a direct interest in the homestead property.
Appellees replied, stating that homestead property is exempt from the TUFTA;
therefore, Robert’s transfer of his homestead is exempt from the seizure of creditors
pursuant to section 41.001 of the Texas Property Code. In fact, appellees argued that
Robert could have conveyed his interest in the homestead property for nothing in return,
and appellant would still have no right to the property.
After several summary judgment replies between the parties, the trial court granted
appellees’ motion for summary judgment and ordered that appellant take nothing on her
claim against them. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by
operation of law. This appeal followed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
We review the trial court’s granting of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). The movant has the burden to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). We view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting
evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc.
v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).
The Texas Constitution protects the homestead from a forced sale for the payment
of most debts. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms,
Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“Real property qualifying as
a homestead is property ‘generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law.’”). The property
code further protects a homestead “from seizure for the claims of creditors except for
encumbrances properly fixed on homestead property.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.001(a).
“Property may lose its homestead character only by the claimant’s death, abandonment,
or alienation.” Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied).
The TUFTA operates to prevent debtors from defrauding creditors by placing
assets beyond their reach. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.002. It “delineates the types
of transfers and obligations that are fraudulent; enumerates the remedies available to a
creditor; prescribes the measure of liability of a transferee; and lists defenses and
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protections afforded a transferee.” Nat’l Cleaners, LLC v. Aron, No. 14-21-00549-CV,
2022 WL 3973591, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 24.005–.006, 24.008–.009). To obtain relief under
the TUFTA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that it is a creditor with a claim against (2) a debtor;
(3) that the debtor transferred assets after, or a reasonable time before, the plaintiff’s
claim arose; and (4) that the transfer was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
the plaintiff creditor. Luminex Corp. v. Hiller, No. 02-23-00256-CV, 2024 WL 4293381, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
A transfer is “every mode . . . of disposing of or parting with an asset.” TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE § 24.002(12). The definition of an “asset” expressly excludes “property to the
extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law,” which encompasses homestead
property. Id. § 24.002(2)(b). Therefore, homestead property is not an “asset” within the
meaning of the TUFTA. See id.; Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 843. Without an asset, there can be
no actionable transfer under the TUFTA. See id. § 24.002(12).
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In their motion for summary judgment, appellees argued that appellant’s TUFTA’s
cause of action fails as a matter of law because the Texas Constitution and the Texas
Property Code exempt a person’s homestead from judgment liens. Appellant does not
dispute that the property was Robert’s homestead. See Basley v. Adoni Holdings, LLC,
373 S.W.3d 577, 582–83 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (providing that a
homestead was not considered an asset for purposes of insolvency under the TUFTA);
Fairfield Fin. Group, Inc. v. Synnott, 300 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.) (“Under Texas law, judgment liens that have been properly abstracted cannot attach
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to a homestead while that property remains a homestead.”); Duran, 71 S.W.3d 833, 842
(“Charles Duran had the power and the right to convey title to his homestead property to
the Duran Family Trust free of any claim of his creditors.”); see also Hewitt v. Nocona
Hosp. Dist., No. 07-25-00334-CV, 2026 WL 1188712, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 30,
2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A debtor’s homestead is properly exempt from seizure.”);
Frankel v. Butler, No. 05-21-01122-CV, 2022 WL 17883798, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The definition of ‘asset’ under TUFTA does not
include ‘property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law’ such as
the debtor’s homestead.”).
Instead, she argues that the homestead was nonetheless an “asset” because
Section 41.001(c) of the property code provides that “[t]he homestead claimant’s
proceeds of a sale of a homestead are not subject to seizure for a creditor’s claim for six
months after the date of sale.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.001(c). Appellant states that, “Had
Robert . . . sold his 60 percent share of the 6.213[-]acre tract for $1.5 million dollars,
purchased a $200,000 home with the proceeds of the sale and gifted or transferred the
remaining $1.3 million to his brothers (Appellees), this would unquestionably be a
fraudulent transfer under TUFTA.” However, those are not the facts of this case. Robert
did not sell 60% of his share for $1.5 million, purchase a home, and then gift the remaining
$1.3 million to appellees. 2 Thus, Section 41.001(c) does not apply.
2 In several instances, appellant continues to recite hypothetical facts that did not occur here:
Applying Section 41.001(c) to the facts of this case, if Robert Michelena sold the 6.213 acre tract
of land that had been designated as a homestead, he had six months to reinvest the entire sales
price in another homestead. If he failed to do so, Appellant Monica Michelena could seize all of the
proceeds of the sale of the homestead or that portion of the proceeds of the sale of the homestead
that was not reinvested by Robert Michelena in the purchase of another homestead.
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Because conveyances of Robert’s homestead could not constitute a fraudulent
transfer under the TUFTA, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in
appellees’ favor. See Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 843 (“[B]ecause the law already has removed
the homestead property from the reach of creditors, the conveyance of the property,
whether fraudulent or not, does not deprive the creditors of any right they had against the
property.”); Frankel, 2022 WL 17883798, at *11 (“Under TUFTA, if the property
transferred is exempt, a defrauded creditor is not afforded any relief.”). We overrule
appellant’s issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of September, 2026.
Under Section 41.001(c), Appellant Monica Michelena had a right to seize the excess proceeds
from the sale of the property, as her claim under the [property division judgment] had [it] not been
discharged in Robert Michelena’s bankruptcy.
Under the facts of this case, if Robert Michelena were to sell his interest in the subject property for
its true value of $1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand dollars), Section 41.001(c) of the
Texas Property Code would require that he use the entire $1.5 million to purchase a new
homestead; or if he purchased the new homestead for less than the $1.5 million that he received
for his interest, the balance of the money from the sale of the homestead would be subject to
seizure by Appellant Monica Michelena.
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