UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RENEE COBB,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-cv-3015 (TSC)
HUNG CAO, ACTING SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Renee Cobb brings this action against Defendant Hung Cao in his official capacity
as Acting Secretary of the Navy, alleging unlawful employment discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment on the bases of race, sex, color, and age in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 633a, as well as disability discrimination in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791. 1 The court granted in part and denied
in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF Nos. 55, 56, and Defendant now moves for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, ECF No. 63. For the reasons explained below,
Defendant’s motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Employment and Supervisors
Plaintiff, a Black woman over 40 years old, joined the Navy in April 2010 as a General
1
Hung Cao became Acting Secretary of the Navy on April 22, 2026, and is automatically substituted as Defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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Engineer at the Naval Sea Systems Command (“the Command”). Def.’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts (“Def.’s SMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 63-2. Until late September 2016, she worked on
Virginia-class systems in the Command’s Electrical Section, Def.’s Ex. A (EEOC Hr’g Tr.) at
15:13–16, ECF No. 63-3, a position that required a security clearance, Def.’s SMF ¶ 55.
Plaintiff reported to a succession of supervisors over her 14 years at the Command. When
she arrived, Matthew Schmidt was her second-level supervisor; he retired in March 2015 and was
succeeded by Robert Bassett. Def.’s Ex. C (Report of Investigation (“ROI”)) at 7–8, 21, ECF No.
65-1. 2 Marc DeAngelis, who had been Plaintiff’s co-worker since 2010, became her first-level
supervisor in October 2015 and served in that role until September 2016. Id. at 194. In late
September 2016, Katherine Brock became Plaintiff’s first-level supervisor and Crawford
Henderson her second-level supervisor. Id. at 8, 1390. Charles Fink served as Plaintiff’s firstlevel supervisor from March 2018 through July 2019. Def.’s Ex. T (Fink Decl.) ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No.
63-20.
B. Schmidt Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that between 2011 and 2014, Schmidt insulted and physically abused her,
including by pouring hot coffee on her in front of male colleagues, telling her to take her head out
of the “Virginia Class bubble,” and calling her “stupid.” Def.’s Ex. Q (2024 Cobb Tr.) at 51:16,
55:2–3, ECF No. 63-17. Defendant claims Schmidt has a disability causing physical instability
2
Plaintiff objects that the ROI “was not properly lodged” and that “ROI-dependent assertions cannot establish undisputed facts.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 70. The court already determined that the ROI was properly filed. See Min. Order, Oct. 8, 2025. And Plaintiff’s Rule 56(c)(2) objection falls short because at this stage, the court asks only whether the evidence is “capable of being converted into admissible evidence.” Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). It is. The affidavits can be offered through live witnesses and the agency records through a custodian, and the travel-investigation findings are considered not for their truth but as the basis on which the deciding officials acted.
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and that the coffee spill was accidental. ROI at 959. Plaintiff testified that it was intentional—
that Schmidt’s impairment affected his legs and feet rather than his hands, 2024 Cobb Tr. at 53:17-19, and that Schmidt placed the cup on a ledge while “tilting” it toward her and then “pushed the
coffee” and “smirked,” id. at 51:20-24, 55:22-23. In October 2013, Plaintiff and Schmidt
participated in a voluntary informal mediation with a certified mediator. ROI at 957. Plaintiff
took no EEO action concerning Schmidt before February 2016, roughly eleven months after his
retirement. Def.’s Ex. S (2016 and 2019 EEO Compls.) at 7, ECF No. 63-19.
C. DeAngelis Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that DeAngelis told her, five or six times while she was under his
supervision, “I’m going to make you pay for being a Black female now that I have the authority to
do so.” Am. Compl. at 14, ECF No. 5; Def.’s Ex. B (2019 Cobb Tr.) at 107:7–108:2, ECF No.
63-4; EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 24:7–12. Plaintiff declares that these comments were “threatening,
discriminatory, and made in the context of work-related tensions,” and that she reported the
conduct internally without any remedial response. Cobb Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 70-2. Plaintiff’s
March 2016 EEO pre-complaint intake form cites additional statements from DeAngelis, including
that her “Performance Appraisal will drop to an unacceptable.” 2016 EEO Compl. at 10.
D. 2015 Hawaii Assignment and Travel Card Suspension
Plaintiff was approved to travel to Hawaii on temporary duty from March 11 to 19, 2015.
Def.’s Ex. F (CBCA Op.) at 1–2, ECF No. 63-6. After Plaintiff reported that her March 19 return
flight was scheduled to depart too early to finish her work, Henderson authorized her to remain an
extra day. Id. at 2. Plaintiff did not return until March 23—three days after the authorized
extension—charging additional accommodation costs to the government. Def.’s SMF ¶ 30; CBCA
Op. at 3. She explains that her late departure resulted from flight availability and cancellations
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outside her control, and that her supervisor instructed her not to pay a premium to secure an earlier
flight. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 68:9–20. Command investigators concluded that Plaintiff gave
“misleading and contradictory statements” during the ensuing travel-voucher investigation, Def.’s
SMF ¶ 31; ROI at 386–87, 918; though the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals later determined
that it could not “find, based upon the existing record, that . . . Cobb made any intentional
misrepresentations,” CBCA Op. at 7.
The same year, Plaintiff’s government travel card was suspended after she failed to pay the
balance within 60 days. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 58:5–8; ROI at 966. The card was reinstated, and
Plaintiff used it to attend a training in Connecticut in December 2015. ROI at 592–93. Between
March 2015 and February 2017, Plaintiff submitted one travel request for the training, and it was
approved. Id. at 364.
E. 2016 Storage Violation and Letter of Reprimand
In February 2016, Bassett reminded his team that “Confidential material cannot be left
unattended at your desk—not in a drawer, not in an overhead, nowhere,” and announced that “there
will be a spot check in the near future to ensure compliance.” ROI at 1060. When Bassett
conducted the spot check the next day, he observed confidential documents improperly stored in
Plaintiff’s unsecured cubicle. Id. at 1025–26. Plaintiff attested in 2019 that she understood the
importance of securing classified material and should have secured her cabinets. See 2019 Cobb
Tr. at 85:9–19. In her declaration opposing summary judgment, she maintains that the cabinet
lock was broken and incapable of securing its contents. Cobb Decl. ¶ 6. She also identifies two
colleagues who she claims mishandled material without consequence: Farzana Chowdhury, who
in April 2016 left confidential material on Plaintiff’s desk, and Amy Bryant, who in June 2019 left
a binder designated as Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals there. Cobb Decl. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Exs. 14–
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15, ECF Nos. 70-21–22.
In April 2016, following an investigation of both the Hawaii travel and the stowage
incident, Bassett issued Plaintiff a letter of reprimand citing her failure to depart Hawaii on the
authorized date, inaccurate accounting of the trip, improperly stored confidential documents, and
failure to take responsibility for the security violations. ROI at 1025–26.
F. 2016 Performance Evaluations
DeAngelis initially rated Plaintiff “unacceptable” on her 2016 interim evaluation based on
her handling of classified information, but revised her rating to “acceptable” after learning that the
rating standards precluded such a rating on those facts. EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 116:6–117:6. For her
2016 year-end evaluation, DeAngelis gave her an overall contribution score of 84 against an
expected score of 85 for her salary level. ROI at 1250. Under the Command’s compensation
system, a score below the expected figure bears directly on an employee’s pay because it means
the employee is compensated above the level her contribution warrants. Id. at 1224. In his review,
DeAngelis explained that some of her deliverables and communications “required rework”; that
she did not “possess the technical and managerial skills necessary to support, direct and supervise
other engineers as they deal with complex problems”; and did not set a good example when it came
to compliance with office policies. Id. at 1252–53. Plaintiff’s second-level supervisor at the time,
Henderson, described the rating as “a fair assessment of [Plaintiff’s] performance for the rating
period.” Id. at 1369.
G. 2016 Clearance Revocation and 2017 Restoration
In October 2016, Plaintiff received a letter of intent to revoke her eligibility for a security
clearance from the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility; in December
2016, her clearance was revoked. ROI at 1200. Because she could not perform her duties without
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a clearance, Henderson placed her on paid administrative leave on January 9, 2017. Id. at 1208.
Her clearance was restored and she returned to duty on January 23. Id. at 1378–79.
H. March 2019 Laptop Incident and the Drumbeat Reassignment
On March 11, 2019, Plaintiff traveled to Florida with her government-issued laptop for
work-related training. See 2024 Cobb Tr. at 109:21–110:6; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 57–58. While
deplaning, Plaintiff realized that her laptop was missing. Id. at 110:7–8. Plaintiff notified the
flight attendant, who “said someone must have taken it by mistake.” Id. at 110:9–10. Plaintiff
filed a claim with the airline, directing that the laptop be released only to her. Def.’s Ex. G at 1,
ECF No. 63-7.
On March 12, Fink informed Plaintiff that a Command agent would collect the laptop the
following day. Def.’s Ex. H at 10, ECF No. 63-8. Plaintiff asked whether the airline would release
it to the agent, and Fink answered that he expected so given the asset tag and serial numbers. Id.
at 11. On March 13, after the agent was turned away, Chief of Staff Margaret Zuanich-Bunker
emailed Plaintiff and asked her to have the release restriction lifted. Def.’s Ex. I, ECF No. 63-9.
Plaintiff did not contact the airline about the laptop; the next time she called the airline was on
March 15 to ask about personal belongings. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 129:2–6; Def.’s Ex. G at 2.
Around the same time, Plaintiff was removed from her informal duties supporting the
“Drumbeat” meetings. Fink Decl. ¶ 6. At those meetings, Command leadership “received reports
on the progress made and provided direction concerning a special project.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s
role, which was collateral to her engineering duties, was “to take notes and record action items
during the meetings.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. In April 2019, Fink reassigned Plaintiff from those duties, citing
her “difficulty completing routine tasks,” including “updating the action items tracker” and
“drafting and routing official correspondence,” and explaining that Plaintiff’s work product
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“routinely required numerous corrections.” Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff disputes that characterization, noting
that she was never counseled or placed on a performance plan for the task, that she performed
duties as directed, and attributing any delay to shifting leadership inputs and undefined workflows.
Cobb Decl. ¶ 18.
I. 2019 Security Actions and 2024 Removal
On July 11, 2019, following an investigation, Fink proposed a five-day suspension without
pay for Plaintiff’s failure to maintain control of her laptop, her interference with its retrieval, and
her lack of candor during the investigation. Def.’s Ex. J at 1–2, ECF No. 63-10. On August 15,
the Command’s Security Director issued a notice of intent to suspend access to classified
information due to Plaintiff’s “failure to properly handle protected national security information
through the loss of control of a laptop computer containing sensitive Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI), [and] Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI).” Def.’s Ex. K at 1, ECF
No. 63-11. As a result, Defendant placed her on paid administrative leave on August 19 and
indefinitely suspended her without pay on November 4 for failure to maintain a security clearance.
Def.’s Exs. L, N, ECF Nos. 63-12, 63-14. The Merit Systems Protection Board sustained the
indefinite suspension in March 2020. Def.’s Ex. R at 2, ECF No. 63-18.
In April 2024, the Command proposed removing Plaintiff for failure to maintain her
security clearance, a condition of employment. Def.’s Ex. O at 2, ECF No. 63-15. On May 11,
2024, she was notified of the removal decision, effective later that month. Def.’s Ex. P at 1–2,
ECF No. 63-16.
J. Administrative and Procedural History
On February 17, 2016, Plaintiff contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
counselor concerning the matters underlying this case, filing a formal EEO complaint
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encompassing the Hawaii investigation, the April 2016 letter of reprimand, and the 2016
performance evaluation. See 2016 EEO Compl. at 2. Following the March 2019 laptop incident,
Plaintiff filed a second formal EEO complaint on April 24, 2019, covering the subsequent security
and personnel actions. See 2019 EEO Compl. at 13. An EEOC Administrative Judge held a
hearing on Plaintiff’s 2016 and 2019 complaints in June 2020. See Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 63-5.
In October 2020, Plaintiff filed this action pro se, ECF No. 1, and filed an Amended
Complaint the following month, ECF No. 5. Counsel entered an appearance in June 2021. ECF
No. 21. In September 2023, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to
dismiss her Amended Complaint, dismissing the age-based hostile work environment claim and
the retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and otherwise allowing Plaintiff’s
discrimination, retaliation, and race- and sex-based hostile work environment claims to proceed.
See Cobb v. Del Toro, No. 20-cv-3015 (TSC), 2023 WL 6215037 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2023) (Cobb
I); ECF No. 37. In June 2024, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Complaint adding allegations
concerning the 2021 letter of intent to revoke her clearance, the 2023 and 2024 clearance
revocations, the April 2024 notice of proposed removal, and the May 2024 removal, and adding a
disability discrimination claim. 3 Suppl. Compl., ECF No. 42. In March 2025, the court granted
in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint, dismissing
for failure to exhaust the claims arising from the February 2021 letter of intent, the July 2023
3
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Complaint alleges discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Suppl. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 42. But the ADA provides no remedy to federal employees, as “the federal government is not considered an ‘employer’ under the ADA.” Williams v. Brennan, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Ahmed v. Napolitano, 825 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2011)). The court therefore construes the Supplemental Complaint as asserting a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, which is “the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging disability discrimination.” Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F. Supp. 3d 212, 222 (D.D.C. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 791.
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eligibility revocation, and the March 2024 clearance revocation, and dismissing the supplemental
hostile work environment claim. See Cobb v. Del Toro, No. 20-cv-3015 (TSC), 2025 WL 858795
(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2025) (Cobb II); ECF No. 55.
The claims that remain relate to Schmidt’s alleged insults and physical abuse between 2011
and 2014; DeAngelis’s “pay for being a Black female” statement; the 2015 denial of Hawaii travel
and suspension of her government travel card; the April 2016 letter of reprimand and 2016 yearend performance evaluation; the December 2016 revocation of her security clearance and resulting
January 2017 administrative leave; the April 2019 removal of her Drumbeat meeting duties; the
July 2019 proposed five-day suspension, August 2019 notice of intent to suspend her access to
classified information and resulting administrative leave, and November 2019 indefinite
suspension; and the April 2024 notice of proposed removal and May 2024 removal.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court may grant summary judgment if “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit”; a dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving
party may defeat this showing by pointing to evidence in the record—more than “a scintilla”—
creating a triable dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or
is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
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dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Title VII and ADEA Discrimination and Retaliation
“Title VII prohibits the federal government from discriminating against employees on the
basis of race [or sex], 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a), or retaliating against them because they opposed
an unlawful employment practice or made a charge under the statute, id. § 2000e–3(a).” Walker
v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The ADEA contains a parallel provision
prohibiting discrimination and retaliation based on age as to employees at least 40 years old. 29
U.S.C. § 633a(a); see Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (holding that section
633a(a) covers both discrimination and retaliation claims).
When a plaintiff offers indirect evidence of discrimination, the court applies the burdenshifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): the plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, after which the burden shifts to
the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged action,
and then back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was but “a pretext for
discrimination.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981)). “To state a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must allege she is part of a protected class under Title VII, she suffered
a cognizable adverse employment action, and the action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1091. A prima facie case of retaliation requires showing that
she “engaged in statutorily protected activity,” “suffered a materially adverse action,” and “that a
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causal link connects the two.” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
But when “an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and the employer has
asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not—and
should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of
Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “Assuming the employer proffers such a
reason, the ‘central question’ at summary judgment becomes whether ‘the employee produced
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory or
non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated
or retaliated against the employee.’” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Allen v. Johnson, 795
F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). In resolving that question, the court weighs “all relevant evidence
presented by the plaintiff and the defendant,” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495, including “the plaintiff’s
prima facie case” and “any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered
explanation for its action,” Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Courts look to
evidence that the employer treated “similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected
group” better, “deviat[ed] from established procedures or criteria,” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1092, or
“is making up or lying about the underlying facts that formed the predicate for the employment
decision,” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. 4 “[I]f the employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is
reasonable in light of the evidence . . . there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude
4
To the extent Plaintiff advances Schmidt’s threats and coffee-spill or DeAngelis’s “pay for being a Black female” statement as standalone disparate-treatment claims rather than as evidence of a hostile work environment, they are not actionable. Title VII reaches only conduct affecting an employee’s “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and offensive remarks alone effect no change in the terms or conditions of employment, see Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354–55 (2024).
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the employer is lying about the underlying facts.” Id. at 496.
1. Hawaii Travel, Suspension of Travel Card, “Drumbeat” duties
As discussed above, claims of discrimination and retaliation against federal employees
under Title VII and the ADEA require an adverse action by the employer. For discrimination
claims, a plaintiff must identify “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of
employment,” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024). For retaliation claims,
cognizable harm is “not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of
employment”; a plaintiff must show that the employer’s action “could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
As a preliminary matter, Defendant urges the court to treat as conceded that the limitation
on Hawaii travel, suspension of Plaintiff’s corporate credit card, and removal of her Drumbeat
meeting duties were not adverse personnel actions, as Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Def.’s
Reply at 3–4, ECF No. 71. But a summary judgment motion “cannot be ‘conceded’ for want of
opposition,” and the burden remains on Defendant to show that judgment is warranted. Winston
& Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court therefore reaches each
of Defendant’s arguments below. But it does so without constructing arguments Plaintiff has not
advanced and treats as undisputed facts Plaintiff has failed to properly address. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2).
Neither the limitation on Hawaii travel nor the temporary suspension of Plaintiff’s
government-issued travel card constituted an adverse action for purposes of her discrimination or
retaliation claims. Plaintiff alleges that she was “not allowed to travel to Hawaii” for work after
March 2015, Am. Compl. at 10, but travel to Hawaii was not part of Plaintiff’s position description,
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ROI at 360–61, 593, no-one from her branch traveled there during the period in question, 2024
Cobb Tr. at 63:3–6; ROI at 361, and Plaintiff submitted no subsequent travel requests, ROI at 364.
Plaintiff’s government-issued travel card was suspended after she failed to pay her balance within
the allotted time—a task she acknowledges was her responsibility. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 58:5–8, 14–
21; ROI at 966. It was reinstated in time for her December 2015 training travel, and the single
travel request she submitted during the relevant window was approved. ROI at 364, 592–93.
As to the reassignment of Plaintiff’s “Drumbeat” meeting notetaking duties, she points to
no effect on her pay, grade, duties, or advancement or other material harm. Her assertion that
reassignment cost her “visibility,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, is not tied to any identifiable term or condition
of employment; nor is it serious enough to “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination,” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57. And in any case, Fink
articulated a facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the reassignment: consistent with
DeAngelis and Henderson’s previous assessments, ROI at 1252–54, 1369, Fink determined that
Plaintiff was “ineffective in accomplishing her responsibilities,” “had difficulty completing
routine tasks,” and that her drafts “routinely required numerous corrections,” Fink Decl. ¶ 6. While
Plaintiff “dispute[s] this characterization,” Cobb Decl. ¶ 18, she offers no evidence that Fink
disbelieved these reasons and that they were merely a cover for a discriminatory motive.
Summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation
claims based on her Hawaii travel, the suspension of her travel card, and her “Drumbeat” duties.
2. Letter of Reprimand
As to the letter of reprimand, Plaintiff fails to identify evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that Defendant’s facially legitimate reasons were pretextual. The reprimand
cites Plaintiff’s three-day overstay past the authorized extension of her Hawaii trip and inconsistent
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accounting of the trip to investigators, as well as her failure to safeguard classified information
after confidential documents were found improperly stored in her cubicle. ROI at 1025–26.
Plaintiff does not deny that she remained in Hawaii until March 23, 2015, past her authorized
departure date, 2024 Cobb Tr. at 67:6–11, or that the confidential materials were in her cubicle on
February 12, 2016, Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 30, 38, 40–41. She instead offers context, noting
that Schmidt’s retirement left her without transition support in Hawaii, that the cabinet lock was
broken, that the reprimand improperly “bundled” the voucher and storage matters, that other
employees mishandled materials without discipline, and that the Civilian Board of Contract
Appeals ruled partly in her favor on the voucher matter. Cobb Decl. ¶¶ 5–7. She attributes her
late departure to flight availability and cancellations and to her supervisor’s instruction not to pay
a premium for an earlier flight. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 67:14–24.
None of this raises a triable dispute as to whether the reprimand was a product of
discrimination or retaliation. Her claim that she lacked support is difficult to square with her
testimony that the extension itself was authorized, 2024 Cobb Tr. at 67:14–15, and flightscheduling difficulties do not change the fact that she departed after the authorized date. As to her
broken cabinet lock, Bassett’s email directed that confidential material could not be left unattended
in any form—“not in a drawer, not in an overhead, nowhere.” ROI at 1060. The “bundling”
objection is refuted by the reprimand itself, which separately addressed the two charges and
expressly acknowledged the Board’s decision and its partial restoration of travel compensation.
ROI at 1026. The Board’s refusal to find intentional misrepresentation in the voucher investigation
does not necessarily show that Bassett disbelieved the Command’s other investigative findings or
that his reliance on them was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Brady, 520 F.3d at
496; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[A] reason cannot be proved to
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be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.”).
Plaintiff points to Chowdhury and Bryant as comparators, Cobb Decl. ¶ 8, but neither was
similarly situated. The reprimand rested on two charges—the travel voucher misconduct and the
security violation—and neither comparator was subject to a travel-related charge. Bryant’s
conduct also occurred years later under a different supervisor. Pl.’s Ex. 15 at 1, ECF No. 70-22.
“[C]omparators must have been charged with offenses of comparable seriousness and all of the
relevant aspects of their employment situations must have been nearly identical.” Burley v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 33 F. Supp. 3d 61, 73 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). The comparator evidence
therefore does not permit a reasonable jury to infer pretext.
Summary judgment will be granted as to Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims
based on the letter of reprimand.
3. Contribution Score
For Plaintiff’s 2016 year-end evaluation, DeAngelis assigned her an overall contribution
score of 84, one point below the expected figure of 85. Performance evaluations that “could affect
[an employee’s] position, grade level, salary, or promotion opportunities” constitute adverse
actions. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The 2016 contribution
score qualifies: the score was tied to compensation and formally indicated that Plaintiff’s
contribution did not warrant the compensation she received. ROI at 1224.
Plaintiff has produced direct evidence that this rating was a product of race and sex
discrimination: DeAngelis repeatedly told her he would make her “pay for being a Black female
now that [he had] the authority to do so.” Am. Compl. at 14; Def.’s Ex. B (2019 Cobb Tr.) at
107:7–108:2; EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 24:7–12. Direct evidence of discriminatory intent renders the
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McDonnell Douglas framework unnecessary because such “evidence will ‘generally entitle a
plaintiff to a jury trial.’” Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Such evidence includes
“expressions by the decision maker that [provide] evidence of discriminatory intent without any
need for inference,” Francis v. Perez, 970 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62 (D.D.C. 2013), such as a “statement
that itself shows racial or gender bias in the decision,” Vatel, 627 F.3d at 1247.
DeAngelis’s statement does exactly that. It expressly references Plaintiff’s race and sex,
declares an intent to penalize her on that basis, and ties that intent to the authority he had just
acquired—“now that he had the authority to do so.” 2024 Cobb Tr. at 33:16. He made the
statement as Plaintiff’s supervisor, and the challenged evaluation was the first and only annual
contribution score he assigned her in that role. On this record, a reasonable jury could find that
DeAngelis’s stated intent to make Plaintiff “pay” because she was a Black woman was carried out
in the below-expectations rating he gave her.
Defendant counters with a statement from Henderson—a Black man over 50—that “the
rating provided by Mr. DeAngelis is a fair assessment of [Plaintiff’s] performance for the rating
period.” ROI at 1369. But Henderson was not Plaintiff’s rater, DeAngelis was. Id. at 1250. And
unlike DeAngelis, whose supervision spanned the entire rating year, Henderson did not begin
supervising Plaintiff until the rating period was nearly over. Id. at 1390. His endorsement was
not a contemporaneous review, but affidavit testimony offered months later during the EEO
investigation. Id. at 1369. A post hoc endorsement by an official who supervised Plaintiff for
only a matter of weeks does not eliminate the factual dispute over DeAngelis’s motivation.
Defendant also notes that Plaintiff failed to report DeAngelis’s statement until her 2019
deposition. Mot. for Summ. J. at 35, ECF No. 63. That delay may bear on Plaintiff’s credibility
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and ultimately persuade a jury, but “credibility determinations” and “weigh[ing] the evidence” are
not the functions of a judge at summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a trial on her claim that her 2016 review
was the product of unlawful discrimination.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim stands on different footing. The rating occurred more than
seven months after Plaintiff’s February 2016 EEO contact—too long a gap to support an inference
of causation based on timing alone. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74
(2001) (citing cases holding that three- and four-month gaps were insufficient to establish
causation based on temporal proximity). Moreover, although DeAngelis’s statement supports a
triable discrimination claim, it reflects an intention he formed upon becoming Plaintiff’s supervisor
in October 2015, months before her February 2016 EEO contact. That evidence undermines any
inference that the rating was retaliatory. See Salak v. Pruitt, 277 F. Supp. 3d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2017)
(explaining that causation is defeated where the employer was merely proceeding “along lines
previously contemplated”); Batson v. Powell, 912 F. Supp. 565, 576 (D.D.C. 1996) (declining to
infer causation where the alleged harassment and hostile work environment predated the plaintiff’s
protected activity).
The court will therefore deny summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s race and sex
discrimination claim based on the contribution score but grant it as to her retaliation claim. It will
also grant summary judgment insofar as she alleges age discrimination; DeAngelis’s statement
makes no reference to age, and Plaintiff has identified no circumstantial evidence suggesting that
her age bore on the rating.
4. Five-Day Suspension in 2019
A suspension without pay plainly qualifies as an adverse action for purposes of Plaintiff’s
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discrimination and retaliation claims; it both inflicts “harm respecting an identifiable term or
condition of employment,” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354–55, and “could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57.
Fink articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the suspension: Plaintiff’s failure to
maintain control of her government-issued laptop, her interference with its retrieval, and her lack
of candor during the ensuing investigation. Def.’s Ex. J at 1–2.
The question, then, is whether Plaintiff has produced evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that those reasons were not the actual reasons for the suspension and that Fink
instead acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. She has not.
Plaintiff disputes only the significance of the relevant events, not whether they occurred. Pl.’s
Resp. to Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 65–66. She does not dispute that she instructed the airline to release the
laptop only to her, Def.’s Ex. G at 1; that, when Fink told her a Command agent would retrieve it
the next day, she asked whether the airline would release it but did not disclose the restriction she
had placed on the device, Def.’s Ex. H at 11; Def.’s SMF ¶ 65; or that, after the agent was turned
away and Zuanich-Bunker asked her to lift the restriction, she did not contact the airline about the
laptop, 2024 Cobb Tr. at 130:2–7; Def.’s Ex. G at 2. In any event, the question is not “the
correctness or desirability of the reasons offered . . . but whether the employer honestly believes
in the reasons it offers.” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(cleaned up). Plaintiff identifies no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Fink’s
stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
Summary judgment will therefore be granted as to Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation
claims based on the five-day suspension.
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5. Security Clearance-Related Actions
Several of the actions Plaintiff challenges—the December 2016 revocation of her security
clearance and January 2017 paid administrative leave, the August 2019 notice of intent to suspend
access and paid administrative leave, the November 2019 indefinite suspension without pay, the
April 2024 notice of proposed removal, and the May 2024 notice of removal—were security
clearance actions or direct downstream consequences of clearance actions. Because “no one has
a ‘right’ to a security clearance,” courts generally lack authority to review the merits of a clearance
decision. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). Thus, courts are precluded “from
resolving a discrimination claim based on an adverse employment action resulting from an agency
security clearance decision.” Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “[C]laims that
[the agency] denied a clearance based on an impermissible motive necessarily involve reviewing
the merits of [the agency’s] decision, which Egan prohibits.” Lee v. Garland, 120 F.4th 880, 894
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
In Rattigan v. Holder, the D.C. Circuit recognized a narrow exception permitting a Title
VII claim to proceed if the plaintiff “can show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or
discriminatory motive in reporting or referring information that they knew to be false” to the
agency’s security division. 689 F.3d 764, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2012). This exception preserves claims
based on “harm caused when a coworker fabricates security concerns in retaliation for statutorily
protected activity” or because of a discriminatory animus, without which “Congress’s purpose in
enacting Title VII would be frustrated.” Id. at 771.
Plaintiff invokes that exception with respect to the August 2019 notice of intent to suspend
access, arguing that Command personnel falsely reported that her laptop contained both sensitive
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Controlled Unclassified Information and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information. 5 Def.’s Ex. K at
1. Plaintiff maintains that the laptop was an unclassified Navy Marine Corps Intranet (“NMCI”)
device incapable of processing Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, and that it had in any event
been “wiped and placed in dormant status.” Cobb Decl. ¶ 10. She points to an email from ZuanichBunker asserting that the laptop contained Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, Def.’s Ex. I at
1, which she juxtaposes against a June 2016 email from DeAngelis describing the computer as
having been placed in “dormant status” to prevent data loss, Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 1, ECF No. 70-16, and
a January 2017 email from Katherine Brock referencing an NMCI account on the computer, Pl.’s
Ex. 27 at 1, ECF No. 70-41.
But this evidence does not create a genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s supervisors knew the
laptop classification information was false and nonetheless reported it to the Command’s security
officials. See Webster v. Dep’t of Energy, 443 F. Supp. 3d 67, 84 (D.D.C. 2020). ZuanichBunker’s email describing the laptop as an NNPI device is not the kind of reporting contemplated
by Rattigan: it was sent to Plaintiff, not to the Command’s security office. DeAngelis’s 2016
“dormant status” email and the email about re-establishing the NMCI account—both predating the
2019 incident by years and addressing circumstances unrelated to the lost-laptop investigation—
likewise do not create a genuine dispute that Command actors knowingly reported false
information. At most, the evidence shows that Command personnel had previously referred to the
5
Plaintiff does not appear to invoke a Rattigan exception as to claims arising out of the 2016 or 2024 clearance revocation decisions. Those claims are therefore barred by Egan. At the motionto-dismiss stage, the court declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s race- and sex-based clearance claims under Rattigan, reasoning that DeAngelis’s statements about making her “pay” for being a “Black female” permitted an inference that he falsely blamed her for a security violation. Cobb I, 2023 WL 6215037, at *8. That inference was drawn on the pleadings; Plaintiff has not pressed the theory at summary judgment or identified evidence that DeAngelis knowingly made a false referral to security officials.
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laptop in ways that were inconsistent with the 2019 classification, not that any Command employee
knew the 2019 information was false, reported that information to security officials anyway, and
did so with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive.
Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s discrimination and
retaliation claims arising from the agency’s security clearance actions.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII also prohibits employers from “requiring people to work in a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To prevail
on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that her workplace was permeated with
“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d
at 1201 (cleaned up). The conduct must be “one that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). The court “looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” Graham v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 210, 216 (D.D.C.
2009).
Such claims are “usually characterized by a series of events that cumulatively give rise to
a claim, although each individual component might not be actionable on its own.” Craig v. District
of Columbia, 881 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2012). But “those actions must be adequately linked
such that they form a coherent hostile environment claim.” Shanks v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers
& Allied Craftworkers, 134 F.4th 585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Acts are adequately
linked where, for example, they “involve the same type of employment actions, occur relatively
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frequently, and are perpetrated by the same managers.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1251
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim rests on two sets of allegations. In the first, she
alleges that Schmidt intentionally poured hot coffee on her, 2024 Cobb Tr. at 55:2–3; told her to
get her head out of the “Virginia class bubble,” id. at 51:16, and called her “stupid,” id. Plaintiff
testified that she understood the “Virginia class bubble” remark as a sexual and racist reference to
her anatomy. 2024 Cobb Tr. at 133:3–6, 40:9–12. The second concerns DeAngelis’s statement,
“I’m going to make you pay for being a Black female now that I have the authority to do so.” Am.
Compl. at 14; 2019 Cobb Tr. at 107:7–108:2; EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 24:7–12. Plaintiff testified that
DeAngelis made this comment five or six times between October 2015 and September 2016, while
he was her supervisor. EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 51:19–21.
DeAngelis’s statements—standing alone—carry the claim past summary judgment. A
supervisor’s explicit, repeated statement that he intends to make a subordinate “pay” for being a
Black woman, coupled with an assertion about his authority to do it, is not a stray remark or an
ordinary workplace slight. Plaintiff found these comments “threatening” and “discriminatory,”
and explained that they occurred in the context of “work-related tensions.” Cobb Decl. ¶ 3.
Indeed, DeAngelis’s comment was a direct, racially and sexually targeted threat from a person
with power over Plaintiff’s rating, assignments, and continued employment. She reported the
conduct internally to no avail, id., and worked with DeAngelis for nearly a year while he repeated
this comment to her. A reasonable jury could find DeAngelis’s statements were sufficiently severe
or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment. Cf. Ayissi-Etoh, 712 F.3d at 577 (recognizing
that a single sufficiently severe racial epithet from a supervisor might be sufficient to establish a
hostile work environment).
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Because the DeAngelis statements carry the claim past summary judgment, the court need
not decide whether the Schmidt allegations would independently support a hostile work
environment claim, or whether that conduct is adequately linked to the DeAngelis conduct such
that the two form a single coherent claim. See Baird, 662 F.3d at 1251; Shanks, 134 F.4th at 597.
Summary judgment will be denied on Plaintiff’s race- and sex-based hostile work environment
claim. 6
C. Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with
disabilities in federal employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 791. To succeed on a disparate-treatment
theory of discrimination, a plaintiff must show “(1) that she has a disability as defined in the . . .
Rehabilitation Act, (2) that she was qualified for her position, and (3) that
she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Congress v. Dist. of
Columbia, 324 F. Supp. 3d 164, 169 (D.D.C. 2018). The “Act has a clear ‘but-for’ causation
standard.” Montgomery v. McDonough, 682 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2023).
Plaintiff’s disparate-treatment claim rests on the allegation that the Command “perceived
her as disabled” and that this perception “formed an additional basis for” her termination. Suppl.
Compl. ¶ 10 n.11. She points to occasions on which she was taken from work to the hospital by
ambulance, Cobb Decl. ¶ 11, and to her December 2019 diagnosis with post-traumatic stress
disorder, id. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 1, ECF No. 70-11. But the April 2024 notice of proposed removal
and the May 2024 removal rested on Plaintiff’s inability to maintain the security clearance her
position required, Def.’s Ex. O at 1–2; Def.’s Ex. P at 1–2, and for the reasons explained above,
6
Plaintiff’s age-based hostile work environment claim was dismissed in Cobb I, and the supplemental hostile work environment claim was dismissed in Cobb II; neither is revived here.
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Egan bars review of the clearance determination underlying them, see 484 U.S. at 528. In any
event, Plaintiff identifies no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any
decisionmaker acted because of a perceived impairment rather than the absence of a clearance. 7
Summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 63, will
be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. A separate Order will accompany this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date: September 14, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
7
To the extent Plaintiff also invokes a failure-to-accommodate theory, that theory is no longer in this case. The Amended Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was “[d]enied reasonable accommodations” by Fink. Am. Compl. ¶ 10(j). In Cobb I, the court found that allegation unexhausted and dismissed it, and it does not appear among the eleven allegations the court identified as remaining. 2023 WL 6215037, at *6. The claim before the court is the one pled: that the Command “perceived her as disabled,” Suppl. Compl. ¶ 10 n.11, which Cobb II permitted to proceed as to the April 2024 notice of intent to remove her and the May 2024 termination, 2025 WL 858795, at *5.
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