Filed 9/14/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B348938
(Super. Ct. No. 2023029813)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
KAVI MICHAEL SINGH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Kavi Michael Singh violently raped a university freshman in her dorm room. A felony information charged appellant with forcible rape (Penal Code, 1 § 261, subd. (a)(2)), oral copulation against victim’s will by force, duress, menace, or fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)), sexual penetration with force, violence, duress, menace, or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)). He pleaded guilty to one count of forcible rape. Singh received a low term sentence of three years, with the trial court awarding him nearly two years of custody credit. It ordered him to pay his victim, among other
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
things, $20,000 in restitution to compensate her for the four-year scholarship she lost after leaving the institution where he sexually assaulted her.
Singh, presumably since released, now seeks to lighten the financial burden of his crime. He contends: (1) restitution is “punishment” under Ellingburg v. United States (2026) 607 U.S. 163 [223 L.Ed.2d 446] (Ellingburg), so all restitution amounts must be pled and proved to a jury; and (2) there is no rational basis for the $20,000 awarded to his victim.
We will affirm. Ellingburg does not create a right to trial by jury on the issue of restitution in California. If it did, Singh waived the right. There is also a rational basis for the award, i.e., to restore his victim’s ability to fund the education cut short by Singh’s sexual violence. We will, however, affirm the trial court’s order to the extent it stayed accrual of interest on the award pending appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Crime
Jane Doe entered a four year university her freshman year as a pre-nursing major. 2 Singh messaged Doe on Instagram after briefly meeting her at a Halloween party. They agreed to meet at a retail mall, where he worked. After walking around the mall together, Singh recommended they return to Doe’s dorm room to watch a movie. Doe agreed because she knew her roommate would be present.
The roommate left before the movie finished. Appellant promptly raped and assaulted Doe—at one point threatening to impregnate her if she made noise. He also pushed her head down
2 We take the facts from the reporter’s transcript of the
preliminary hearing.
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to his penis and forced her to orally copulate him several times. A sexual assault nurse later documented symptoms consistent with rape and strangulation. Doe developed bruising around her neck.
Doe was psychologically unable to return to college. She arranged for “incompletes” in her fall semester classes. She enrolled in spring semester classes, switched dorms, and adopted a service dog, but was only able to return to college for two nights. Her anxiety attacks were so severe that her therapist and psychiatrist recommended she stop attending.
Plea and Sentencing
Singh signed a felony disposition statement acknowledging, “I will be ordered to pay restitution to the victim(s). I understand that I am entitled to a judicial determination of the amount of restitution and that, unless otherwise ordered, the probation and sentencing hearing will constitute the hearing on the amount of restitution.” Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
The court sentenced appellant to the low term of three years in state prison with 736 days of custody credit. He stipulated to pay $3,865.04 in restitution for Doe’s medical costs, counseling, and the cost of her therapy dog. The court ordered him to pay additional restitution “in an amount to be determined” and scheduled a restitution hearing.
Restitution Hearing and Order
The People sought an additional $20,000 in restitution at the hearing. Doe’s mother testified that the university awarded Doe $6,000 for her first academic year (2023-2024). The scholarship would be renewed each year, up to a maximum of
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$20,000, if Doe carried at least 12 units each semester and maintained a minimum grade point average.
Doe’s mother testified at trial about how Doe’s trauma symptoms prevented her from returning to the university after the crime. Defense counsel objected, then stipulated that Doe “couldn’t go back [because of] the rape . . . .” Doe’s mother explained her daughter took time off from college then applied to a two-year respiratory therapist program. The program cost $20,000 to complete and no scholarships were available. Even if Doe returned to the university, she no longer qualified for the original scholarship because it was available only to first-time freshman.
Defense counsel argued there was no rational basis to award the additional $20,000. She highlighted that section 1202.4 does not list scholarships as recoverable loss and described the amount as “speculative.” The court disagreed. It analogized the lost scholarship to future lost wages. It noted section 1202.4’s list of economic losses was not exhaustive and rejected defense counsel’s description of the amount as speculative. “[I]n this particular case,” the court remarked, “the amount of economic loss is specific. She had a $20,000 scholarship and then she did not. She would not qualify even if she tried to reapply, and the law does not require her to reapply to prove she lost what she lost to begin with.”
The trial court initially ordered that the restitution award “shall include interest and shall be enforceable as if it were a civil judgment.” Defense counsel objected to the assessment of interest during the time between sentencing and the restitution hearing (which had been continued through no fault of appellant). The court stayed interest accrual for one year,
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stating, “We’ll do it one year just to make sure the appeal runs its full course.” The People agreed to the stay.
DISCUSSION
Restitution in California
Courts must order a convicted wrongdoer to pay restitution in every case in which a crime victim suffers a loss. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) implements this requirement, providing that “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.”
While section 1202.4 requires full restitution of victims’ economic losses, it “does not authorize direct restitution for noneconomic losses. [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 656.) “[D]irect victims of crime have a statutory right to restitution on the full amount of their losses without regard to the full or partial recoupment from other sources (except the state Restitution Fund). [Citations.]” (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468.)
At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss. (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 690-691.) “Once the victim has made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 691.)
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No Right to a Jury Trial on Restitution
Appellant contends he had a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on restitution under Ellingburg and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (Apprendi) because victim restitution increases the punishment for a crime. The People contend appellant forfeited this argument because he did not raise it below. We reach the merits because Ellingburg was decided after his restitution hearing. We review constitutional issues de novo. (California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.)
California courts have held uniformly that restitution does not constitute punishment and, therefore, does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35-36 (Millard); People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 44, 65; People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 433.) Appellant argues Ellingburg overturned this precedent when it held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) constitutes criminal punishment under the ex post facto clause. Apprendi error thus occurred because his punishment exceeded the statutory maximum. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490 [“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond reasonable doubt”].) We disagree for two reasons.
First, victim restitution is not criminal punishment. (See People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 (Pangan) [“neither Southern Union [nor] Apprendi . . . have any application to direct victim restitution, because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty”]; People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398 (Foalima); People v. Wasbotten (2014) 225
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Cal.App.4th 306, 308-309; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184; Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 35.) “[D]irect victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits.” (Pangan at p. 585.)
Second, direct restitution is not subject to any statutory maximum. (Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 585-586; see Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398 [“Section 1202.4 imposes no statutory limits on the amount of direct restitution a court may order.”].) Federal courts have rejected Apprendi challenges to restitution for the same reasons. (See, e.g., United States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys., Inc. (7th Cir. 2006) 466 F.3d 585, 593 [“[R]estitution is not a penalty for a crime for Apprendi purposes since ‘restitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy’”]; U.S. v. Sosebee (6th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 451, 461 [“restitution orders are not affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi . . . because the restitution statutes do not specify a statutory maximum”].)
Ellingburg did not change either of these long-held rationales for denying defendants jury trials on restitution in California. It analyzed the “text and structure” of the MVRA and found that Congress intended the statute to be criminal punishment. (Ellingburg, supra, 607 U.S. at p. 169.) In so doing, the Court identified several features of the MVRA which “ma[de] abundantly clear” that, when “viewed as a whole,” the act imposed punishment. (Id. at p. 167.) This included: (1) “label[ing] restitution as a ‘penalty’ for a criminal ‘offense’”; (2) imposing restitution at the time of sentencing; (3) identifying the government, not the victim, being the party adverse to the defendant when restitution is ordered; (4) allowing restitution for
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misdemeanors to be imposed “‘in lieu of’” other punishments, such as imprisonment, making it the “sole punishment” for those offenses; (5) allowing noncompliance with restitution payments to result in a court modification of supervised release, probation, or even imprisonment; and (6) codifying the MVRA in the criminal code. (Id. at p. 166, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).)
California’s restitution framework shares some of these features but lacks others. Section 1202.4 does not mention imposing restitution “in lieu of” other punishments or describe it as a penalty. It speaks of compensating crime victims for “economic loss” and “fully reimburs[ing]” them. (§ 1202.4, subds. (a)(1) & (f)(3).) Restitution is enforceable “as if the order were a civil judgment.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B), italics added.) Indeed, the Legislature enacted section 1202.4 to implement Marsy’s Law, a successful ballot initiative guaranteeing crime victims certain legal rights. One of those rights is to “seek and secure restitution” for losses resulting from criminal activity. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) This constitutional guaranty is designed to compensate victims, not punish defendants. When “viewed as a whole,” the features of restitution under section 1202.4 do not indicate punitive intent.
Finally, Apprendi applies only to determinate punishments. “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose based solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303 [159 L.Ed.2d 403], italics omitted.) There is no statutory maximum to restitution in California. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f) [“The court shall order full restitution”].) Section 1202.4 is an indeterminate framework for imposition of restitution. Apprendi and therefore
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Ellingburg do not apply for this reason. (See United States v. Zafaranchi (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2026) 2026 U.S. Dist.Lexis 48144 [no right to a jury trial on restitution under the MVRA, even after Ellingburg]; United States v. Carruth (8th Cir. 2005) 418 F.3d 900, 905 [Apprendi does not prohibit judicial factfinding for restitution orders because there is no statutory maximum for restitution].)
Appellant Waived His Right to a Jury Trial
on the Issue of Restitution
The People contend appellant waived his right a jury trial assuming he were entitled to one. We agree. Appellant acknowledged in his felony disposition statement that he would be ordered to pay restitution after a “judicial” determination of the amount—not a “jury” determination. He waived his rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses on the next page.
Rational Basis for the $20,000 Award
Appellant contends the court’s $20,000 award for the lost scholarship is speculative and lacks a rational basis. We review the decision for abuse of discretion. (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) “‘“‘When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’”’” (Ibid.) “‘Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] “If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,” the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient
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evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact. [Citations.]’” (Ibid.)
Appellant argues the restitution order has no rational basis because: (1) the People offered no psychological evidence showing why Doe could not return to the university to claim the scholarship; (2) the People did not call Doe to testify about her plans to attend trade school instead of returning to the university; and (3) Doe did not suffer any loss or incur any expense because she “elected” not to return to the university. Appellant also argues the court should have reduced the $20,000 award by the $6,000 Doe received her first year. None of these arguments are persuasive.
The restitution order placed Doe in the position she would have been in but for appellant’s criminal conduct. At the restitution hearing, the trial court considered Doe’s mother’s testimony about the specifics of the $20,000 scholarship and why Doe could not use it. The court received documentation about the scholarship as well as Doe’s victim impact statement. Appellant stipulated Doe “couldn’t go back [to the university] based on the rape itself.” Even if she could return, it was too late to claim the remainder of the scholarship.
Appellant failed to rebut this prima facie showing of loss. The Court compared the lost scholarship money to lost wages and found it was not “speculative” to believe Doe would have met the minimum requirements to maintain the scholarship year to year. The order gives Doe the same ability to fund her education that she had before appellant committed the crime. “[D]irect victims of crime have a statutory right to restitution on the full amount of their losses.” (People v. Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.)
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Lastly, we decline to credit appellant for the portion of the scholarship Doe received shortly before he raped her. He cites no evidence Doe received $6,000 in cash. Doe’s mother testified this amount went towards tuition. We can infer she received a tuition credit. Regardless, Doe received no benefit from the scholarship because she received no academic credits for the year.
Stay on Interest Accrual
The People stipulated at the restitution hearing to stay the accrual of interest accrual on the $20,000 award. They now contend the trial court should have imposed interest immediately despite the stipulation because section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G) requires imposing interest “as of the date of the sentencing or loss . . . .” We disagree.
The People cite People v. Gross (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1318 to argue that “[a] victim’s right to restitution is . . . constitutional [and] cannot be bargained away or limited.” Gross held only that restitution survives dismissal under section 1203.4. It does not prohibit the People from stipulating to a temporary stay on the accrual of interest.
The People assert an unauthorized sentence is “subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.) However, “the ‘unauthorized sentence’ concept constitutes a narrow exception to the general requirement that only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. [Citations].” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) We are not persuaded the award of interest on restitution is the type of criminal “sentence” that falls within this “narrow exception.”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Catherine Volker, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Patricia Rosman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.