[Cite as Chilcoat v. Grey, 2026-Ohio-3592.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MERCER COUNTY
SHAWNDALE CHILCOAT, ET AL.,
CASE NO. 10-26-12
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
JEFF GREY, FORMER SHERIFF OF OPINION AND
MERCER COUNTY, OHIO, JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court
Civil Division
Trial Court No. 26-CIV-024
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 14, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Shawndale D. Chilcoat and Donald E. Chilcoat, Appellants
Amy B. Ikerd for Appellee
Case No. 10-26-12
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Shawndale Chilcoat and Donald Chilcoat (“the
Chilcoats”), appeal the April 1, 2026 judgment of the Mercer County Court of
Common Pleas dismissing their petition for amercement filed against defendantappellee, Jeff Grey (“Grey”). On appeal, the Chilcoats argue that the trial court
erred in granting the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss filed by Grey. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On February 11, 2026, the Chilcoats filed a pro se petition for
amercement in the trial court against Grey, the former Sheriff of Mercer County. In
the petition, the Chilcoats asserted that Grey is liable under Ohio’s amercement
statutes for his alleged failure to “receive, process, and maintain lawful custody of
arrested persons and seized property on Mercer County soil, and to supervise and
ensure deputies and task-force participants under his command complied with those
duties.” (Petition for Amercement, Docket No. 3).
{¶3} On February 20, 2026, Grey filed a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6),
seeking to dismiss the Chilcoats’ petition on the basis that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
{¶4} On March 3, 2026, the Chilcoats filed a response in opposition to
Grey’s motion to dismiss.
-2-Case No. 10-26-12
{¶5} On April 1, 2026, the trial court filed a judgment entry granting the
motion to dismiss filed by Grey.
{¶6} On April 29, 2026, the Chilcoats filed this appeal, in which they raise
six assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by dismissing the Petition under Civ.R.
12(B)(6) after resolving disputed factual issues concerning
custody, control, responsibility, transfer, officer identity, warrant
verification, agency participation, notice, and legal duty against
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by reframing Plaintiffs-Appellants’
statutory Petition for Amercement as a simple present-possession
dispute instead of addressing the pleaded theory concerning
accountability, seizure, custody, accounting, arrest processing,
detention consequences, extradition consequences, transfer,
retention, supervision, return, officer identification, and
mandatory ministerial duties.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by accepting Defendant’s federal-only
narrative without identifying any federal law that expressly
preempted, displaced, suspended, or nullified Ohio-law duties.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by treating missing or unresolved process,
returns, custody records, transfer records, officer-identification
records, warrant-verification records, and accountability
documents as defeating the Petition where Plaintiffs-Appellants
pleaded that the failure to create, preserve, identify, file, return,
-3-Case No. 10-26-12
certify, reconcile, or produce those records was itself part of the
breach.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by permitting Defendant’s res judicata and
vexatious-litigator narrative to collapse distinct proceedings even
though this case was preserved as a statutory Petition for
Amercement and paid under protest.
Sixth Assignment of Error
The trial court’s dismissal deprived Plaintiffs-Appellants of
meaningful access to judicial review under Ohio Constitution,
Article I, Section 16, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Analysis of Assignments of Error
{¶7} In the six assignments of error, which this Court shall collectively
address, the Chilcoats assert that, for various reasons, the trial court erred in
dismissing their petition for amercement pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Civ.R. 12(B) provides in relevant part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion:
***
(6) [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]
{¶8} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the legal sufficiency of the
-4-Case No. 10-26-12
complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey County Bd. of Comm’rs., 1992-Ohio73, ¶ 9. For a trial court to dismiss a complaint on that basis, “it must appear beyond
doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to
recovery.” O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242,
syllabus (1975).
{¶9} If there is a set of facts consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint that
would allow for recovery, the court must not grant the motion to dismiss. York v.
Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). In considering
a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the court’s review is limited to the four corners
of the complaint. State ex rel. New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio
School Facilities Comm., 2017-Ohio-875, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.).
{¶10} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of trial court decisions
granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Perrysburg Twp. v. City of Rossford,
2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. “On review, ‘[t]he allegations of the complaint must be taken
as true, and those allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them must
be construed in the nonmoving party’s favor.’” Faber v. Seneca Cty. Sheriff's Dept.,
2018-Ohio-786, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.), quoting Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley,
2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. However, a court need not accept as true any unsupported
and conclusory legal propositions advanced in a complaint. Bullard v. McDonald’s,
2021-Ohio-1505, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co.
-5-Case No. 10-26-12
LPA, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Dismissing an action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted may be warranted “when a complaint is
frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the
complaint.” State ex rel. Scott v. City of Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 14.
{¶11} In the instant case, following this Court’s de novo review of the
Chilcoats’ petition and upon application of the law relevant to the Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
dismissal, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that dismissal
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was warranted.
{¶12} This case involves the dismissal of a petition for amercement, which
is a special remedy outlined in R.C. Chapter 2707. “To amerce is to punish.” Ryan
v. Carter, 67 Ohio St.3d 568, 569 (1993), citing 1 Oxford English Dictionary 396-397 (2d Ed. 1989). In Ryan, the Supreme Court of Ohio characterized amercement
as a “seldom-used remedy”, and noted that “it is questionable why this archaic
procedure remains[.]” Id., at 569. However, the Ohio Supreme Court further stated
that Ohio courts “will enforce R.C. Chapter 2707 until the General Assembly
removes it from the books.” Id.
{¶13} R.C. Chapter 2707 contains two sections setting forth the
circumstances under which amercement is available as a remedy to be imposed
against an officer.
R.C. 2707.01 provides:
-6-Case No. 10-26-12
If an execution or order of sale directed to an officer comes to his
hands to be executed, and he neglects or refuses to execute it; or if he
neglects or refuses to sell property of any kind which, by a writ or
order, he is directed to sell; or fails to call an inquest, or to return to
the clerk’s office a copy of the certificate of appraisement made by
the inquest; or neglects to return to the proper court an execution or
order of sale to him directed on or before the return day thereof; or
neglects to return a correct inventory of personal property taken on
execution unless he returns that the amount of the judgment, including
costs, has been paid to him; or neglects, on demand, to pay to the
person entitled thereto, money by him collected or received for the
use of such person; or neglects or refuses, on demand, to pay the
judgment debtor all money by him received on sale made, beyond
what is sufficient to satisfy the writ or order of sale, with interest and
costs, on motion in court, and notice thereof, in writing, as provided
in section 2707.02 of the Revised Code, such officer shall be amerced
in the amount of such judgment, including costs, with ten per cent
thereon, to and for the use of the plaintiff or defendant.
R.C. 2707.03 provides:
If an officer fails to execute a summons, order, execution, or other
process directed to him, or to return it, as required by law, unless he
makes it appear, to the satisfaction of the court, that he was prevented
by unavoidable accident from so doing, he shall be amerced, upon
motion and notice, as provided in sections 2707.01 and 2707.02 of the
Revised Code, in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and be
liable to the action of any person aggrieved by such failure. Such
officer is not liable to an action or amercement for a failure to execute
such process directed to him from a county other than that in which
he was elected, unless his fees are deposited with the clerk who issued
the process, and an indorsement is made and subscribed by such clerk
thereon at the time of its issue, in these words: “Funds are deposited
to pay the sheriff on this process.”
{¶14} “The amercement statute is highly penal in nature.” Takacs v. Baldwin,
106 Ohio App.3d 196, 204 (6th Dist. 1995), citing Ryan v. Carter, supra, at 569;
Langdon v. Summers’ Admr., 10 Ohio St. 77, paragraph two of the syllabus
-7-Case No. 10-26-12
(1859); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 74 Ohio App. 3d 580, 583 (1991). “Because the
amercement statute is penal in nature, it must be construed in favor of the execution
officer.” Takacs at 206, citing Webb v. Anspach, 3 Ohio St. 522 (1854); Borst v.
Donnelly, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 21 (1924). “Before a sheriff can be subjected to the
statute’s penalties, it must be proven that the sheriff’s alleged neglect falls not only
within the letter but also the spirit of the statute.” Takacs at 206, citing Langdon v.
Summers’ Admr., supra, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶15} In the case before us, the Chilcoats’ petition for amercement reads as
follows, omitting the caption and signatures:
PETITION FOR AMERCEMENT
R.C. 2707.01, 2707.03, 2707.05
Shawndale Chilcoat and Donald Chilcoat ask the Court to amerce Jeff
Grey, Sheriff of Mercer County at the time, individually.
Respondent had statutory duties imposed by law, including but not
limited to R.C. 311.07, Crim.R. 4, and Crim.R. 41, to receive, process,
and maintain lawful custody of arrested persons and seized property
on Mercer County soil, and to supervise and ensure deputies and taskforce participants under his command complied with those duties.
He failed.
Those duties were ministerial, mandatory, and non-discretionary.
Penalty: full value of the matter neglected – including custody,
processing, detention, and property withheld – plus ten percent
thereon and interest, pursuant to R.C. 2707.03; liability up to the full
amount of Respondent’s official bond, R.C. 311.02.
-8-Case No. 10-26-12
(Petition for Amercement, Docket No. 3).
{¶16} Thus, a review of the petition reflects that it alleges merely that Grey,
at some unspecified time when he was the Sheriff of Mercer County, failed “to
receive, process, and maintain lawful custody of arrested persons and seized
property on Mercer County soil, and to supervise and ensure deputies and task-force
participants under his command complied with those duties.” That allegation sets
forth no facts falling within the criteria for amercement found in R.C. 2707.01 or
R.C. 2707.03, supra. Put another way, the petition does not allege, pursuant to R.C.
2707.01, the existence of any writ of execution or order of sale directed at Grey that
he failed to execute as ordered, any failure on his part to call an inquest, any failure
to return a correct inventory of personal property taken on execution of judgment,
or any other failure to comply with an order relating to an execution of judgment.
Nor does the petition allege, pursuant to R.C. 2707.03, that Grey failed to execute a
summons, order, execution, or other process directed to him, or to return it, as
required by law.
{¶17} As the Chilcoats’ petition for amercement fails to allege, much less
identify supporting facts with any particularity, that Grey breached any duty set
forth in the amercement statutes, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
-9-Case No. 10-26-12
{¶18} The six assignments of error are overruled.
Conclusion
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the plaintiffs-appellants in the
particulars assigned and argued, the April 1, 2026 judgment of the Mercer County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.
-10-Case No. 10-26-12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellants for which judgment is
hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of
the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
-11-