FIFTH DIVISION
BROWN, C. J.,
MERCIER, P. J., and EPPS, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
September 14, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1612. STATE v. EAGLE.
BROWN, Chief Judge.
Marques Khalil Eagle pled guilty to various sexual crimes against a minor
victim. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it deviated from the mandatory sentencing requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2.
As more fully set forth below, we vacate Eagle’s sentence and remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
“Whether or not to downwardly deviate under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the requirements under the statute are
met. However, if the sentencing issue turns on the proper interpretation of OCGA § 17-10-6.2, it is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Carter, 378 Ga.
App. 378, 378 (926 SE2d 71) (2026) (punctuation omitted).
In December 2022, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Eagle
alleging various sexual crimes against a minor. Count One of the indictment charged
Eagle with aggravated child molestation (OCGA § 16-6-4(c)), Count Two charged
Eagle with enticing a child for indecent purposes (OCGA § 16-6-5), Counts Three and
Four charged Eagle with statutory rape (OCGA § 16-6-3(a)), and Count Five charged
Eagle with child molestation (OCGA § 16-6-4(a)). The indictment alleges that Eagle
was older than the age of 21 and the victim was under the age of 16 at the time of the
offenses.
The State’s proffer at the plea hearing, which Eagle does not dispute, showed
that between September 2021 and September 2022, Eagle “engaged in a sexual
relationship of sort with the ... victim in this case ... when the child was under the age
of 16[.]” These acts included messaging the minor child on social media and through
text in order to discuss and plan sexual acts as well as engaging in sexual acts,
including intercourse, with the minor child.
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On July 1, 2025, Eagle entered a guilty plea subject to an agreed-upon maximum
sentence or “cap.” At the plea hearing, the State agreed to reduce Count One from
aggravated child molestation to child molestation in exchange for recommending a
“capped” aggregate sentence of thirty years, with five years to be served in custody.
Eagle’s defense counsel then agreed that he would be “entering a plea as well to be 30
do 5.”
At the July 11, 2025 sentencing hearing, the trial court reflected that this was
“not a negotiated plea,” but instead was a “plea with a cap.” The State again
recommended that Eagle be sentenced to a total sentence of “30 serve 5.” Defense
counsel then changed its initial recommendation and instead requested “a probated
sentence given the mitigating factors” that were described during the sentencing
hearing.
The trial court sentenced Eagle to the following concurrent terms: twenty years
on Count One (child molestation); thirty years on Count Two (enticing a child for
indecent purposes); twenty years on Count Three (statutory rape), twenty years on
Count Four (statutory rape); and twenty years on Count Five (child molestation) for
a total sentence of thirty years. The trial court ordered that “170-180 days” of the
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sentence would be served in a probation detention center, with the remainder to be
served on probation. After the oral pronouncement of the sentence, a colloquy ensued
wherein the State argued that the sentence imposed was void because it did not
comply with the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by OCGA § 17-10-6.2. The
trial court stated that it would allow the parties to “brief it out,” but that it would
“leave this as the sentence” and allow the parties to appeal if necessary.
On July 11, 2025, the trial court entered an “Order to Deviate from Sentence
Requirements.” The order stated that under OCGA § 17-10-6.2, “the minimum
portion of the sentence may not be probated, absent an agreement by the State and
Defense or certain findings by the Court.” The order made no finding that the parties
had come to an agreement regarding sentencing and instead, it acknowledged that the
State requested “a total of thirty years with five to be served in confinement” and that
Eagle requested a “probated sentence.” The order then stated that the trial court
intended to downwardly deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence required by
OCGA § 17-10-6.2, and found that Eagle had no prior convictions, did not use a
deadly weapon during the commission of the crime, did not cause intentional physical
harm to the victim, and there were no relevant similar transactions. However, the trial
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court’s order does not address whether the victim was transported or physically
restrained during the commission of the offense. The State appeals from that order.
1. The State argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is void as a
matter of law because the trial court improperly deviated from the mandatory
sentencing requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(a) without making all of the written
findings required to support such a deviation under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F).
Eagle argues that the trial court was not required to make these findings because the
parties had agreed to the sentence. As this issue turns on the proper interpretation of
OCGA § 17-10-6.2, “it is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal.”
State v. McKnight, 367 Ga. App. 633, 634 (887 SE2d 68) (2023).
It is undisputed that the sentence imposed by the trial court fell under the
mandatory minimum sentences set for the offenses of child molestation, enticing a
child for indecent purposes, and statutory rape.1 However, a trial court retains the
1
Under OCGA § 16-6-4(b)(1), any person convicted of a first offense of child molestation “shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than five nor more than 20 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10-6.2. Under OCGA § 16-6-5(b), any person convicted of enticing a child for indecent purposes “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10-6.2. Under OCGA § 16-6-3(b), any person over the age of 21 that is convicted of statutory rape “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than
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discretion under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) to deviate from the mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements set out in subsection (b) under two scenarios. See State v.
McCauley, 353 Ga. App. 94, 96 (834 SE2d 567) (2019) (“whether or not to
downwardly deviate under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court, so long as the requirements are met”). Specifically, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)
provides: “[i]n the court’s discretion, the court may deviate from the mandatory
minimum sentence as set forth in subsection (b) of this Code section, or any portion
thereof, [1] when the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have agreed to a sentence that
is below such mandatory minimum or [2] provided that” certain conditions set forth in
OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) are met. (Emphasis added.) These conditions include
that: (A) the defendant not have a prior conviction for a sexual offense; (B) the
defendant did not use a deadly weapon or object during the commission of the crime;
(C) the trial court has not found evidence of a relevant similar transaction; (D) the
20 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10-6.2. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b), in turn, mandates a person convicted of a sexual offense be sentenced to a split sentence that includes the minimum term of imprisonment as specified for the offense and an additional probated sentence of at least a year. However, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) clarifies that “when a court imposes consecutive sentences for sexual offenses, the requirement that the court impose a probated sentence of at least one year shall only apply to the final consecutive sentence imposed.”
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victim did not suffer intentional physical harm during the commission of the crime;
(E) the offense did not involve transportation of the victim; and (F) the victim was not
physically restrained during the commission of the offense. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F). If the trial court exercises sentencing discretion, it must make
written findings supporting the deviation. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(2); Hedden v. State,
288 Ga. 871, 874 (708 SE2d 287) (2011).
(a) The parties’ agreement. Eagle argues that the trial court did not need to make
the written findings set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) in order to exercise
its discretion to downwardly deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence because
the parties had agreed to a sentence below the mandatory minimum. Under the facts
of this case, we disagree.
In construing a set of statutory provisions, this Court looks at the “terms, giving
words their plain and ordinary meaning, and where the plain language of the statute
is clear and susceptible of only one reasonable construction, we must construe the
statute according to its terms.” Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 382(2) (punctuation omitted).
Further, when “construing language in any one part of a statute, a court should
consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent
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from the statute as a whole.” Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127, 129 (739 SE2d 423)
(2013) (punctuation omitted).
As noted above, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c) does not require a trial court to make the
findings of fact set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) if “the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory
minimum[.]” OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1).2 The use of the indefinite article “a” before
the word “sentence” means that the phrase refers to a single, particular sentence and
not a range of sentence possibilities. See Pavlov v. State, 362 Ga. App. 831, 836(1)(b)
(870 SE2d 449) (2022) (finding that each distinct act of sodomy constitutes a unit of
prosecution for the crime of aggravated child molestation when the relevant statute
stated that “an offense of child molestation which act ... involves an act of sodomy”
and the phrase “an act” referred “unambiguously to a single act”) (citation
modified). See also McFadden v. United States, 576 US 186, 191(11)(A) (135 SCt 2298,
192 LE2d 260) (2015) (“When used as an indefinite article, ‘a’ means ‘some
2
See Roberts v. State, 376 Ga. App. 816, 826(3) (921 SE2d 71) (2025) (“[T]he plain language of [OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)] provides that a trial court may deviate from the mandatory minimum period of incarceration either upon the consent of both parties or upon the trial court’s own motion, provided that the requisite findings set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (F) are made by the trial court.”) (emphasis in original).
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undetermined or unspecified particular[.]’”); Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting &
Hauling, LLC, 997 F.3d 1356, 1362 (III) (11th Cir.) (2021) (concluding that the “use
of the indefinite article ‘a’ before the word ‘farm’” means that the phrase “work
performed ... on a farm” refers to a single farm). Thus, the plain language of OCGA
§ 17-10-6.2(a)(1) refers to an agreement to a particular sentence and not to a possible
range of sentences to be imposed by the trial court.
Here, the record in this case shows that Eagle and the prosecuting attorney
agreed to reduce the aggravated child molestation count to child molestation as part
of a plea deal where they agreed to a “capped” aggregate sentence as to all five counts.
However, the parties did not come to an agreement on the specific sentence to be
rendered on each count. Indeed, although Eagle initially agreed at the plea hearing to
a plea “capped” at thirty years with five to serve, it is clear that he had changed his
request by the date of the sentencing hearing. At sentencing, Eagle sought a sentence
with no time spent in custody. The fact that the parties initially agreed that the trial
court should impose a “capped” sentence of a certain range does not show that they
have agreed to a specific “sentence that is below such mandatory minimum” as
contemplated by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1).
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Furthermore, this Court has held that an agreement as to an aggregate sentence
for a multi-count indictment does not constitute such an agreement “to a sentence
that is below ... mandatory minimum” as contemplated by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1).
Mejia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 837, 838–39(b) (884 SE2d 423) (2023) (remanding for
resentencing on an incest charge because although OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)
“authorized the trial court, with the agreement of [the defendant] and the prosecuting
attorney, to deviate from the split-sentencing requirement [of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b)],
the record contains no evidence that the parties negotiated anything beyond the
aggregate sentence to be served”). Here, to the extent that it can be said that the
parties reached any agreement about the sentence to be imposed, such agreement was
only to a “capped” aggregate total sentence as to all five counts of the indictment and
did not constitute an agreement as to the specific sentences to be imposed for each
count. As noted above, the trial court in this case did not follow either party’s
recommendation when sentencing Eagle. Instead, it sentenced Eagle to a much
shorter period of incarceration than recommended by the State.3
3
As a result of this holding, we conclude that Eagle’s argument that the State lacked jurisdiction to bring this appeal is without merit. See OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(2) (authorizing the State to file an appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 from the trial court’s order deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence “unless the sentence
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(b) The sufficiency of the trial court’s order. Based upon the above, we conclude
that the trial court was required to make the written specific findings required by
OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) in order to issue a downward deviation from the
minimum mandatory periods of confinement established for sexual offenses.
However, as noted by the State, although the trial court made some of these written
findings in its “Order to Deviate from Sentence Requirements,” it failed to make
specific findings regarding subsections (E) and (F). See Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 382(1)
(“Under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1), all of the conditions must be met in order for the
trial court to deviate from the mandatory sentencing requirements absent an
agreement between the State and the defendant.”) (emphasis supplied). These
subsections required the trial court to make findings that “the offense did not involve
the transportation of the victim” and that the “victim was not physically restrained
during the commission of the offense.” OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(E)-(F). Accordingly,
we vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court to make these
determinations in the first instance and to enter a new sentence that complies with the
imposed was pursuant to an agreement by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant”). See also OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(10) (State may appeal “[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment issued pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 17-10-6.2”); Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 380–81(1).
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requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2. See Mejia, 366 Ga. App. at 839(b) (vacating trial
court’s sentence that deviated from mandatory minimums for failure to comply with
requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 and remanding for imposition of a compliant
sentence).
2. The State next argues that, based upon the facts presented during the plea
hearing and sentencing hearing, the trial court’s downward deviation cannot be
sustained. However, the question of whether the State met its burden of showing that
there was an absence of facts from which the trial court could grant a downward
deviation is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court. See, e.
g., Maddox v. State, 374 Ga. App. 736, 739 (913 SE2d 856) (2025) (State bears the
burden to present evidence of the absence of any statutory factor that would prohibit
a downward deviation under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)).
Judgment vacated and case remanded. Mercier, P.J. and Epps, J. concur.
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