Appellate Case: 25-1147 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 14, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-1147
GARRYN JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00398-REB-1)
Justin A. Lollman, of GableGotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant.
Marissa R. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney (Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BACHARACH, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves a pat-down search following the detention of
Mr. Garryn Jackson. The pat-down led the police to find a gun, which
resulted in Mr. Jackson’s conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm
Appellate Case: 25-1147 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 2
and ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Jackson appeals, and the
overarching issue is whether the police had a reasonable basis to suspect
criminal activity. The district court answered yes, relying on Mr. Jackson’s
furtive movements in an SUV parked in a high-crime area at roughly 1:50
a.m., with three to four individuals nearby. We agree with the district
court’s answer and the reliance on these circumstances.
I. The police stop Mr. Jackson based on suspicion of drug dealing.
While patrolling in a police car, two officers—Emmett Hurd and
Jonathan Moran—saw an SUV in a parking lot. The lot was next to a bus
stop and a check-cashing store; but the buses weren’t running, and the
check-cashing store had been closed for hours. So the officers decided to
investigate.
They entered the lot and parked, blocking the SUV. Inside the SUV
were Mr. Jackson and two women. The officers got out of the police car
and asked Mr. Jackson to get out. He did, and the officers started to
conduct a pat-down. A struggle took place and led the officers to find a gun
in Mr. Jackson’s pants.
II. Mr. Jackson challenges the pat-down.
In district court, Mr. Jackson sought suppression of evidence about
the gun, arguing that the officers had detained him without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. The district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing, and the officers testified. Based on the testimony, the court denied
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Mr. Jackson’s motion to suppress, concluding that the police had
reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
III. We apply different standards for the district court’s factual
findings and legal conclusions.
For the court’s legal conclusions, we conduct de novo review. United
States v. Rosenschein, 136 F.4th 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 2025). For findings
of fact, however, we apply the clear-error standard and view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Pettit, 785
F.3d 1374, 1378–79 (10th Cir. 2015).
IV. The district court’s factual findings aren’t clearly erroneous.
The officers conducted the pat-down after stopping the SUV with
Mr. Jackson inside. He argues that the pat-down was tainted because the
stop was unlawful. The stop would have been lawful only if the police had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Samilton, 56
F.4th 820, 827–28 (10th Cir. 2022).
When considering whether the police had reasonable suspicion of a
crime, the district court found that
• three or four people had stood outside the SUV and
• Mr. Jackson had made furtive movements when the police car
entered the lot.
Mr. Jackson challenges both findings as clearly erroneous. “A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous ‘if it is without factual support in the record or if,
after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm
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conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Hafen v. Howell, 121 F.4th
1191, 1207 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hamric v. Wilderness Expeditions,
Inc., 6 F.4th 1108, 1119 (10th Cir. 2021)).
A. The district court didn’t clearly err in finding that people
had stood around the SUV.
The district court found that three or four people had stood around
the SUV. For this finding, the district court relied on testimony by both
Officer Moran and Officer Hurd; but Mr. Jackson challenges only the
reliance on Officer Moran’s testimony, arguing that it conflicted with
Officer Hurd’s written accounts. This challenge is misguided.
Officer Moran’s testimony matched what he had said in his written
account. Granted, Officer Hurd hadn’t mentioned the people in his own
written statement or in his written explanation of probable cause. 1 But the
district court had discretion to assess Officer Moran’s credibility against
the backdrop of the written statements. See United States v. McCane, 573
F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the district court had
discretion to credit a police officer ’s testimony when ruling on a motion to
1
Officer Moran testified that
• the written explanation of probable cause was designed to
identify “the important details” and
• he had tried to provide the specific details in his own written
statement.
R. vol. 3, at 67–68.
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suppress). The district court acted within that discretion when crediting
Officer Moran’s testimony even though Officer Hurd’s written statements
hadn’t mentioned the people outside the SUV.
We thus conclude that the court didn’t clearly err in finding that
three or four people had stood around the SUV.
B. The district court didn’t clearly err in finding furtive
movements.
The district court also found that the police had observed
Mr. Jackson making furtive movements inside the SUV. But the parties
disagree on the timing of those observations. According to Mr. Jackson, the
court relied on the officers’ observations after the SUV had been blocked.
If Mr. Jackson is right, his furtive movements couldn’t have justified the
detention. See United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264, 1274 n.7 (10th Cir.
2013) (explaining that certain evidence “cannot factor into the reasonable
suspicion analysis because it was not seen until after [the officer] extended
the detention”).
But the government says that the court relied on observations of
furtive movements when the police car had entered the parking lot. We
agree with the government’s interpretation because the district court stated
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that the officers had seen movement when “they approached in the police
car.” R. vol. 1, at 84. 2
The resulting issue is whether this finding was clearly erroneous. See
pp. 3–4, above. For this finding, the court relied on testimony by both
officers. Id. at 92. Mr. Jackson acknowledges the officer ’s testimony about
furtive movements before the stop, but argues that the officers didn’t see
furtive movements until after they had blocked the SUV. This testimony
was implausible based on
• inconsistencies in the officers’ narratives and
• body-camera footage suggesting that the officers couldn’t have
seen Mr. Jackson.
When considering the officers’ credibility, we give “due deference” to the
district court’s assessment. United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th
Cir. 1999).
2
Despite this statement, Mr. Jackson argues that the district court didn’t find that the officers had seen movements prior to the stop because
• the district court relied only on Officer Hurd’s testimony about
the timing of the movements and
• Officer Hurd had testified that he didn’t see the movements
until after the stop.
But the district court found that “both officers [had] testified credibly that they observed Mr. Jackson making furtive movements when they first arrived at the scene.” R. vol. 1, at 92 (emphasis added). And Officer Hurd testified that he had seen movements before making the stop. See p. 7, below.
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In a written statement, Officer Hurd said why he thought probable
cause existed to arrest Mr. Jackson, but this explanation didn’t include
furtive movements. R. vol. 1, at 26–28; see also id. vol. 3, at 36, 160, 176
(testimony by the officers about the purpose of the statement). Hours later,
Officer Hurd and Officer Moran provided additional written statements. Id.
at 67, 156, 178–79. In those statements, the officers described
Mr. Jackson’s movements. R. vol. 1, at 29, 32. The district court could
reasonably assess the officers’ credibility based on the differences between
their testimony and the written explanation of probable cause.
Mr. Jackson disagrees, arguing that the district court couldn’t rely on
the officers’ testimony because Officer Hurd had spotted the furtive
movements only after the police car blocked the SUV. But this argument
rests on a misunderstanding of Officer Hurd’s testimony. In that testimony,
he described seeing the movements “immediately” when he and Officer
Moran had pulled into the parking lot. R. vol. 3, at 188; see also id. at 190
(Officer Hurd explaining that he had seen the movements “as soon as we
pull[ed] in [the parking lot]”). Officer Hurd didn’t say that he had seen the
movements only after Officer Moran had parked in front of the SUV.
Similarly, Officer Moran testified that he had seen the movements
before parking the police car. Id. at 16. Mr. Jackson points out that Officer
Moran’s written statement suggested that he hadn’t seen the movements
until he parked the police car. The district court could have used this
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inconsistency to question Officer Moran’s testimony. United States v.
Lemon, 497 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1974). But we don’t assess credibility
in the first instance. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.
1990).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this distinction in
United States v. Abdallah, 911 F.3d 201, 208–209, 220 (4th Cir. 2018).
There the issue was whether the district court had erred in crediting an
officer’s testimony at a suppression hearing despite inconsistencies with
his earlier testimony before a grand jury. In the grand jury proceedings, the
officer had testified that the defendant
• started talking slowly after getting the Miranda warnings and
• waived his Miranda rights orally and in writing.
Id. at 208. At a later suppression hearing, the officer testified differently,
stating that
• the defendant had interrupted the Miranda warning to say that
he wouldn’t talk and
• the officer hadn’t obtained a written waiver of Miranda because
the defendant started talking “a mile a minute.”
Id. at 207–08. Relying on the officer ’s testimony at the suppression
hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress. United States v.
Abdallah, 196 F. Supp. 3d 599, 600, 604 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d &
remanded, 911 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2018).
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The defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the officer ’s
testimony at the suppression hearing had contradicted his testimony before
the grand jury. 911 F.3d at 208. The district court acknowledged an
inconsistency, but declined to reconsider its denial of the motion to
suppress. United States v. Ritchie, No. 15-cr-18 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2017).
On appeal, the defendant challenged the court’s reliance on the
officer ’s testimony at the suppression hearing. The Fourth Circuit rejected
this challenge, explaining that the district court could credit the officer ’s
hearing testimony despite the inconsistencies with the grand jury
testimony. Abdallah, 911 F.3d at 220.
The same is true here. Regardless of whether Officer Moran’s
testimony at the suppression hearing had conflicted with his written
statement, the district court could resolve the inconsistency in assessing
the officer ’s credibility. United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1293–
94 (10th Cir. 2006). So the district court didn’t err in crediting Officer
Moran’s testimony on when he had seen the furtive movements.
C. The body-camera footage doesn’t show clear error.
According to Mr. Jackson, the footage from body-camera shows that
the officers couldn’t have seen the movements from the police car. From
the footage, Mr. Jackson makes two arguments:
1. It would be difficult to see Mr. Jackson in the low lighting.
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2. The SUV’s front seats and headrests prevented anyone from
seeing movement in the backseat.
For the first argument, Mr. Jackson relies primarily on a still image
from Officer Hurd’s footage, captured while Officer Hurd was walking
toward the SUV. In this image, it is difficult to see Mr. Jackson.
But Officer Hurd’s footage doesn’t necessarily show what the
officers would have seen. 3 After all, the human eye can often observe more
than what is captured on camera. See Martinez v. Hinojosa, 177 F.4th 654,
661 (5th Cir. 2026) (stating that “a video may not display exactly what a
person would have seen from the same location as the camera”); see also
Gabaldon v. New Mexico State Police, 139 F.4th 1207, 1211 (10th Cir.
2025) (noting that a police officer could have seen events even though
“dash-cam footage” didn’t “show every detail in [the officer ’s] report”).
And the footage itself is grainy. So the district court could credit the
officers’ testimony despite the difficulty of seeing movement in the bodycamera footage. 4
3
Mr. Jackson insists that the officers couldn’t have seen the furtive movements when walking toward the SUV. But Mr. Jackson doesn’t address whether the police could have seen the furtive movements when pulling into the lot.
4
Mr. Jackson also relies on visual images showing Officer Moran standing next to the SUV. Based on these images, Mr. Jackson argues that the back seat would have been dark. But these images came from footage taken after the stop and at an angle different from the one that existed when the officers saw the movement. So these images don’t show clear
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Mr. Jackson also argues that the police couldn’t have seen furtive
movements because the front seats and headrests would have prevented
anyone from seeing movement in the back seat. In support, Mr. Jackson
relies on body-camera footage showing
• what Officer Hurd would have seen when standing in front of
the SUV and
• what Officer Moran would have seen when standing next to the
SUV.
This argument is new because Mr. Jackson didn’t rely in district
court on the presence of the front seats and headrests. And we typically
require a showing of good cause before considering an argument omitted in
a motion to suppress. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), 12(c)(3); see United
States v. Fernandez, 24 F.4th 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 2022) (stating that
absent “good cause for the delay,” we consider an argument waived when it
was omitted in a motion to suppress).
For the sake of argument, we can assume the existence of good cause.
Even with this assumption, however, Mr. Jackson’s new argument wouldn’t
suggest clear error in the district court’s finding of furtive movements.
Mr. Jackson suggests that the officers couldn’t have seen furtive
movements when parking the police car nose to nose with the SUV. But the
officers testified that they had seen furtive movements when entering the
error in the district court’s findings on when the officers saw the movement.
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lot. See p. 7, above. The district court could reasonably infer that the
officers would have viewed the SUV at an angle when entering the lot. 5
Given the angle, the court could reasonably find that the SUV’s front seats
and headrests wouldn’t have blocked the officers’ sight line into the back
seat. 6
Moreover, the front seats didn’t cover the middle of the back seat;
and Officer Hurd testified that Mr. Jackson had moved “throughout the
vehicle.” R. vol. 3, at 188–89, 196–97. As a result, the district court could
reasonably credit the officers’ testimony even if the front seats and
headrests might have obscured the officers’ view of part of the back seat.
In sum, Mr. Jackson hasn’t shown that the district court clearly erred
in finding furtive movements before the stop.
5
The officers testified that they had approached the lot while going south. R. vol. 3, at 40, 187. Officer Moran added that he
• had entered the lot facing west and
• had first seen the movements while facing west.
Id. at 16, 40, 72. Mr. Jackson was seated on the right side of the SUV, which would have been the side closest to Officer Moran when he entered the lot. Id. at 15, 43; Appellant’s Opening Br. at 33.
6
Mr. Jackson argues that the officers didn’t have a clear view into the SUV when entering the parking lot. But the body-camera footage suggests that the officers could have seen inside the SUV.
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V. Reasonable suspicion existed.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees a right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. But “a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Such a stop must be “justified at its inception.”
United States v. Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
An investigatory stop is justified when “the specific and articulable
facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a
reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States
v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009)). For reasonable suspicion,
“[o]fficers only need ‘some minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop.’” United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 822 (10th Cir.
2023) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
The reasonableness of an officer ’s suspicion is based on the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Daniels, 101 F.4th 770, 776 (10th
Cir. 2024). We “evaluate each factor alleged to support an inference of
reasonable suspicion separately and in the aggregate.” United States v.
Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 2019).
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The district court focused on five circumstances:
1. the location’s reputation as a high-crime area,
2. the time of the incident,
3. the parking of the SUV in reverse,
4. the presence of people standing around the SUV and their
dispersal as the police approached, and
5. Mr. Jackson’s furtive movements.
R. vol. 1, at 89–90. These factors combined to create reasonable suspicion.
First, the court could consider the location’s high crime rate when
combined with other factors. United States v. Conner, 699 F.3d 1225, 1231
(10th Cir. 2012); United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.
2009); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir.
2011) (considering the location’s reputation and past calls regarding
possible criminal activity). The officers testified that
• the location was a hotspot for crime, including drug dealing,
• employees of a nearby check-cashing store had complained
about trespassing and drug use, and
• nearby residents had complained about violence and drug
activity.
R. vol. 3 at 9−14, 184−85. 7
7
Mr. Jackson concedes the relevance of the location of the stop. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–2. But he criticizes the concept of a “highcrime area,” arguing that we should assign “minimal relevance” to the location. But we’ve considered the volume of crime in the face of similar criticism. United States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012).
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Second, the court could reasonably consider the time of the incident
as part of the totality of the circumstances. See Conner, 699 F.3d at 1231
(“Another factor in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion is
the time of night.”); McHugh, 639 F.3d at 1257 (stating that the fact that
the incident “occurred late at night or early in the morning” can be relevant
to the analysis). 8 The incident took place at approximately 1:50 a.m. R.
vol. 1, at 83–84, 90. The timing could suggest drug dealing.
Third, the SUV was reverse-parked. Officer Hurd testified that drug
dealers often reverse-park at this location so that they can leave quickly. R.
vol. 3, at 187; see also id. at 189 (testimony by Officer Hurd that
“individuals that are selling street-level narcotics will back into that spot
and will conduct open-air drug sales out of motor vehicles such as that”).
Granted, people often reverse-park for innocent reasons. But the SUV was
parked at 1:50 a.m. in a location known for drug-dealing. And neither the
nearby business nor the bus service were open. Given the time and
frequency of crime in the area, the district court could reasonably question
why an innocent person would take the time to reverse-park.
Fourth, the officers testified that they had seen three or four people
standing around the SUV, adding that their presence suggested drug
8
Mr. Jackson concedes the relevance of this factor. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–2.
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dealing. Id. at 14–15, 188–90. And the people quickly dispersed once the
police car entered the lot, which the officers viewed as a sign of possible
drug-dealing. Id. at 15, 38–39, 190.
The people could have dispersed because they didn’t want to talk to
the police, but “the existence of a plausible innocent explanation does not
preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Pettit, 785
F.3d 1374, 1381 (10th Cir. 2015). Even if the presence and dispersal of the
people weren’t enough in themselves to suggest criminal activity, they
could have contributed to the officers’ reasons to suspect criminal activity.
Finally, the officers testified that Mr. Jackson had made furtive
movements, and those movements contribute to reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 2013); United
States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200–1201 (10th Cir. 2009).
Given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. So the police didn’t violate the Fourth
Amendment when stopping the SUV. And Mr. Jackson rests his challenge
on the stop itself rather than the subsequent pat-down. 9 Because the stop
was permissible, the district court didn’t err in denying the motion to
suppress. So we affirm the conviction.
9
A pat-down requires reasonable “suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous.” United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
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