[Cite as State v. Bressler, 2026-Ohio-3590.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-T-0009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
DOUGLAS BRESSLER, JR.,
Trial Court No. 2025 CR 00179
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 14, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., P.O. Box 609151, Cleveland, OH 44109 (For DefendantAppellant).
MATT LYNCH, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Douglas Bressler, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a mandatory indefinite prison term of
three years up to four and one-half years on one count of aggravated vehicular assault,
and three days in jail on one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol (“OVI”). Bressler challenges his felony sentence as contrary to law
and claims his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. After a careful review
of Bressler’s arguments, the record, and the pertinent law, we determine his assignments
of error are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} In April 2025, a Trumbull County grand jury indictment was filed charging
Bressler with three counts: (1) aggravated vehicular assault, a second-degree felony, in
violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(a); (2) OVI, a first-degree misdemeanor, in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(a)(i); and (3) OVI, a first-degree
misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) and (G)(1)(a)(i).
{¶3} In November 2025, Bressler pleaded guilty to the first two counts,
aggravated vehicular assault and OVI. As relevant to the instant appeal, Bressler
acknowledged in a written plea form that aggravated vehicular assault carried “[a]n
indefinite prison term of a minimum of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 years, up to a maximum of 12
years, which the maximum is the minimum term actually imposed at sentencing plus ½
of the imposed term.” The trial court orally reviewed the penalties, including the possible
prison term, fine, and driver’s license suspension. Bressler indicated he understood
“prison is presumed necessary and is mandatory on this offense.”
{¶4} After which, the court explained judicial release in the following colloquy:
[The Court:] Do you understand that you are not guaranteed any judicial
release in this case and, in fact, the State will oppose judicial release?
[Bressler:] What does that mean?
[The Court:] That means when you are in jail or prison that if you ask to be
released early, they’re going to object.
[Bressler:] Yes, ma’am.
[The Court:] Do you understand that?
[Bressler:] So I do the two years completely?
[The Court:] Well, they’re going to object to judicial release, yes, and there
is a mandatory term here anyway. Correct?
[The State:] Yes.
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[Defense counsel:] Yes, Your Honor.
[The Court:] All right. Do you understand that?
[Bressler:] So there would be, like, no good behavior getting off early?
[The Court:] No, that’s a different thing. This is just early release.
[Bressler:] Okay.
[The Court:] Saying you’ve done enough time you should get out early and
not have to serve all your time. That’s what that is. Do you understand?
[Bressler:] Not a thing?
[The Court:] It’s not a thing in this case? Well, I am just advising you that
if you do that, if you make that request, they’re going to object to it.
[Bressler:] Yes.
[The Court:] Do you understand that they’re going to object?
[Bressler:] Yes.
{¶5} The State presented the underlying facts, which reflect that Bressler failed
to stop at a red traffic light and struck two motor vehicles in an intersection. The
passenger of one of the motor vehicles, a motorcycle, was thrown off and broke a bone
in her foot as a result of the impact. The officers on the scene determined Bressler was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Bressler agreed to submit to a breath test to
determine the level of alcohol in his system, and he registered .149 grams of alcohol per
210 liters of his breath. Bressler was under a license forfeiture suspension at the time of
the crash.
{¶6} After engaging Bressler in a Crim.R. 11(C)(2) colloquy advising him of his
constitutional and nonconstitutional rights, the trial court accepted his pleas and set the
matter for a presentence investigation (“PSI”) and a sentencing hearing.
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{¶7} In January 2026, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. Defense
counsel asked the court to consider imposing the minimum sentences given Bressler’s
lack of a criminal history and low risk of reoffending. The State informed the court it had
agreed to stand silent at sentencing and the victim did not wish to be heard.
{¶8} Before imposing sentence, the court stated it considered the “overriding
principles and purposes of felony sentencing and has further considered all relevant
seriousness and recidivism factors contained in 2929.11 and 2929.12.” The court also
reviewed that the count of aggravated vehicular assault carries a minimum mandatory
sentence of two to eight years and found “a sentence of community control would demean
the seriousness of this offense and a prison sentence is consistent with the purposes and
principles of sentencing.” The court noted Bressler “has no prior criminal convictions,” a
“moderate risk to re-offend,” and “a prison sentence is consistent with similarly situated
offenders and proportional” to his conduct. The court sentenced Bressler, on the count
of aggravated vehicular assault, to an indefinite prison term of a minimum of three years
up to a maximum of four and one-half years and suspended his driver’s license for five
years, and on the OVI count, to a three-day jail sentence.
{¶9} Bressler timely appealed and raises two assignments of error for our review:
{¶10} “[1.] Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law.
{¶11} “[2.] The trial court erred by accepting appellant’s guilty plea when it was
not knowingly or intelligently made.”
Sentence as Contrary to Law
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Bressler contends his indefinite prison
sentence is contrary to law. He concedes the trial court sentenced him within the statutory
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range but contends the trial court could not have considered the principles and purposes
of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set
forth in R.C. 2929.12 because he does not have a criminal record and the court imposed
more than the minimum sentence.
{¶13} The standard of review for felony sentences is governed by R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). See State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 16. Pursuant to R.C.
2953.08(G)(2):
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section
shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or
modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s
standard of review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.
The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it
clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶14} “‘“A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory
range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of
felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12.”’” State v. Lamb, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Shannon,
2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).
That said, “this court has frequently noted that ‘even though a trial court is required to
consider the R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 factors, it is not required to make specific
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findings on the record to comport with its statutory obligations.’” Lamb at ¶ 10, quoting
Shannon at ¶ 17.
{¶15} “[A] trial court ‘fulfills its duty under the statutes by indicating that it has
considered the relevant sentencing factors.’” State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 243,
quoting State v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-1520, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). Further, even where the record
is silent as to R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, there is a presumption that the court
considered the required factors; that is, consideration of the appropriate factors set forth
in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively
shows to the contrary. State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-29, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). And, significantly,
“[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the
evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the
sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones,
2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. Accord State v. Norman, 2026-Ohio-779, ¶ 90-93 (11th Dist.).
{¶16} We agree with the State’s contention that we review Bressler’s assignment
of error for plain error because he failed to object at the sentencing hearing.
{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “‘otherwise contrary to law’
means ‘“in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.”’” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, at ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th Ed. 1990). Thus, a sentence that is contrary to law rises to the level of plain error.
See, e.g., State v. Aikens, 2016-Ohio-2795, ¶ 65 (11th Dist.) (failure to make findings
required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences on multiple
offenses is contrary to law and constitutes plain error); State v. Efford, 2023-Ohio-3360,
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¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (“It is well settled that a sentence that is contrary to law is plain error and
an appellate court may review it for plain error.”).
{¶18} Bressler was convicted of aggravated vehicular assault, a second-degree
felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(a). Pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(A)(2)(a):
For a felony of the second degree . . . the prison term shall be an indefinite
prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three,
four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined
pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code . . . .
{¶19} The trial court sentenced Bressler to a mandatory term of imprisonment of
three years, which is in the lower statutory range for a second-degree felony. Before
doing so, the trial court stated it considered the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11
and the seriousness/recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. The court also reviewed
on the record Bressler’s lack of a criminal history and his moderate risk of reoffending as
found in the PSI report. The court found a prison sentence was consistent with the
purposes and principles of sentencing, consistent with similarly situated offenders, and
proportional to Bressler’s conduct. Bressler’s “conduct” involved driving while intoxicated
at almost twice the legal limit for alcohol, causing a motor vehicle accident in which one
person was severely injured.
{¶20} As this court succinctly stated in State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-339 (11th Dist.):
Appellant’s argument essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence
and determine that his sentences are inconsistent with R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12. Pursuant to Jones, this Court is not permitted to do so. A “trial
court is not required to give any particular weight or emphasis to a given set
of circumstances; it is merely required to consider the statutory factors in
exercising its discretion.” State v. DelManzo, 2008-Ohio-5856, ¶ 23 (11th
Dist.). A sentencing court fulfills its duties under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
by stating that it considered them. State v. DeLuca, 2021-Ohio-1007, ¶ 18
(11th Dist.).
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Id. at ¶ 21. Accord State v. Lucero, 2026-Ohio-1414, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).
{¶21} Bressler’s sentence is not contrary to law since the trial court fulfilled its duty
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and his sentence is within the statutory range.
{¶22} Accordingly, Bressler’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Knowing and Intelligent Guilty Plea
{¶23} In his second assignment of error, Bressler contends his guilty plea was not
knowingly and intelligently made because he was under the impression the trial court
would impose the minimum term of imprisonment at the plea hearing.
{¶24} “‘“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution.”’” State v. Patton, 2026-Ohio-780, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), quoting State
v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, ¶ 52 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,
527 (1996). “Crim.R. 11 was adopted to give trial courts detailed instructions on the
procedures to follow before accepting guilty pleas.” Id., citing State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio4130, ¶ 9.
{¶25} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In felony cases the court ... shall not accept a plea of guilty ... without first
addressing the defendant personally . . . and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty
involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or
for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty . . . and that the court, upon
acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
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(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶26} “This court reviews de novo whether the trial court accepted a plea in
compliance with Crim.R. 11.” Willard at ¶ 51.
{¶27} In State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained,
“[w]hen a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the
traditional rule is that he must establish an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings
and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶28} There are limited exceptions to the prejudice component. “When a trial
court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or
no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no
showing of prejudice is required.” Id. at ¶ 14. Similarly, “a trial court’s complete failure to
comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show
prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15; State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22 (trial court
completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requirement to explain the maximum
penalty when it made no mention of defendant’s mandatory term of postrelease control
in the plea colloquy).
{¶29} On appellate review, the questions to be answered are “(1) has the trial
court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied
fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the
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burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the
defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17.
{¶30} We start with the premise that a guilty plea is deemed to have been entered
knowingly and voluntarily when, as is the case here, the record demonstrates the trial
court complied with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Wilmington, 2023-Ohio-512, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.).
Thus, Bressler is required to make a showing of prejudice. “The test for prejudice is
‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16,
quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
{¶31} Contrary to Bressler’s contention, which he argues for the first time on
appeal, the trial court’s advisement of judicial release does not indicate Bressler was
under the impression he would be sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment of two
years on the count of aggravated vehicular assault. As our thorough review of the
transcript reveals, the trial court previously advised Bressler of the statutory range for a
second-degree felony, and he acknowledged he understood the possible penalties, orally
and in writing. “[T]here is no easy or exact way to make such a determination, i.e., to
determine what someone subjectively understands. If the defendant receives the proper
information, then we can ordinarily assume that he understands that information.” State
v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38 (1979).
{¶32} In short, “prejudice must be established ‘“‘on the face of the record.’”’” State
v. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, ¶ 20, quoting Dangler at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa
Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 2014-Ohio-1913, ¶ 26, quoting Wagner v. Roche
Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 462 (1999). Bressler has failed to make such a showing
here.
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{¶33} Accordingly, Bressler’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶34} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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