[Cite as State v. Rodriguez, 2026-Ohio-3578.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NOS. 2025-L-142
CITY OF PAINESVILLE, 2025-L-143
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeals from the
Painesville Municipal Court
- vs -RACHEL ASHLEY RODRIGUEZ, Trial Court Nos. 2025 CRB 00718 A
2025 CRB 00718 B
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 14, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Matthew A. Lallo, Lallo & Feldman Co., L.P.A., 4230 State Route 306, Suite 240, Willoughby, OH 44094 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
William C. Livingston, Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Devan, 55 Public Square, Suite 2200, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Rachel Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), appeals from the
judgment of the Painesville Municipal Court sentencing her to a $25 fine and court costs
following a jury trial where she was found guilty of one count of criminal trespass, a fourthdegree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(4).
{¶2} On appeal, Rodriguez alleges that her conviction is against the manifest
weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence
adduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the City of Painesville (“City”),
was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, we do not find that the jury delivered such a manifest miscarriage of
justice warranting a new trial.
{¶3} Accordingly, the judgment of the Painesville Municipal Court is affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶4} On May 17, 2025, Painesville City Police responded to a reported incident
of approximately 200 individuals fighting in the street and blocking traffic. After diffusing
that situation, police received a report that a group of people were gathered at a Sheetz
gas station fighting and punching vehicle windows. It was believed that the individuals
involved at the Sheetz incident were some of the same individuals from the earlier matter.
Officer Parkomaki learned that some of that group had left the scene, planning to go to
Rec Park.1 Accordingly, police went to Rec Park to investigate.
{¶5} Upon arriving at Rec Park, the individuals there began getting into cars and
fleeing the scene. Officer Parkomaki initiated a traffic stop on one of the vehicles
containing approximately eight passengers on the basis that the occupants were
trespassing in the park because Rec Park closes at sunset. Signs are posted at the
entrances that the park hours are sunrise to sunset. At the time of the stop, it was
approximately 11:00 p.m., and sunset had occurred hours earlier.
{¶6} Rodriguez is employed with Painesville City Schools where she teaches
coping skills to children having difficulty with regulating their emotions. Rodriguez
received a telephone call from two of her students who informed her that they were being
detained by police in Rec Park and needed her help. The students on the phone informed
Rodriguez that one additional student and one recent graduate were also on scene.
1. Rec Park is commonly used as a shortened name for the Kiwanis Recreation Park located in Painesville.
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{¶7} Rodriguez testified that she knew one of the students on scene had a history
of seizures that can be caused by stressful situations. Another student was scheduled to
leave for the military, and legal trouble could jeopardize the student’s eligibility. Ultimately,
Rodriguez testified that she was concerned that police could be questioning the juveniles
because “they had no representation” and “no one advocating for them.”
{¶8} Rodriguez and her husband got out of bed and drove to Rec Park. Officer
Parkomaki saw Rodriguez’s vehicle arrive, and he informed Rodriguez that the park was
closed and that she was trespassing. Rodriguez exited her vehicle, and Officer Parkomaki
told her that she was interfering with his traffic stop and needed to leave. Officer
Parkomaki testified that in response, Rodriguez began yelling and recording him.
{¶9} Officer Parkomaki testified that Rodriguez claimed she was there to pick up
her child. Officer Parkomaki asked which child was hers and did not receive a response,
but he understood Rodriguez to mean that she was a legal parent of one of the occupants.
Rodriguez’s husband requested permission to move the vehicle closer to the entrance to
wait for the children, which Officer Parkomaki permitted. Officer Parkomaki testified that
he permitted them to park close to the entrance waiting for the traffic stop to conclude so
that they could collect their juvenile when the stop was finished. Had Officer Parkomaki
known that Rodriguez was not a parent, he testified that he would not have permitted
them to remain at the entrance and instead would have required them to leave.
{¶10} Rodriguez and her husband drove to the park entrance, and Officer
Parkomaki continued his traffic stop. Meanwhile, Officer Frederico had another vehicle
with approximately six passengers detained on the same trespassory basis. Rodriguez
exited her vehicle and walked up to Officer Frederico’s traffic stop and asserted that,
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although she was not a parent to any child on scene, she was present to ensure nobody’s
rights were being trampled on. Officer Frederico told Rodriguez that because she was not
a parent, she had no right to be there and that she needed to step away from the stop.
Rodriguez refused. Instead, she remained next to the stopped vehicle until the stop was
concluded, parents had picked up several of the juveniles, and Officer Frederico released
the driver of the car. Rodriguez and her husband then left with four students.
{¶11} Rodriguez was not arrested on scene or otherwise issued a summons.
However, the following day, the State filed a complaint against Rodriguez charging her
with one count of obstructing official business, a misdemeanor of the second degree, in
violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), and one count of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor of the
fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(4). Rodriguez pleaded not guilty and chose
to have a trial by jury, rejecting the City’s offer for diversion.
{¶12} At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury acquitted Rodriguez of obstructing
official business, but found her guilty of criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced
Rodriguez to a $25 fine and court costs. Rodriguez timely appealed.
The Appeal
{¶13} On appeal, Rodriguez raises the following two assignments of error for
review:
[1.] The evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the elements
of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt and
[Rodriguez’s] conviction is in violation of her constitutional
rights secured under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article I, Sections 10 of the Ohio
Constitution.
[2.] The jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
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{¶14} In her two assignments of error, Rodriguez argues that the City did not
prove its criminal trespass case beyond a reasonable doubt as the City did not present
evidence that the City owned Rec Park. She further argues that she had privilege to be
there granted by Officer Parkomaki, and that the City did not show Rodriguez acted with
criminal negligence.
{¶15} On appeal, where an appellant challenges both the sufficiency and the
manifest weight of the State’s evidence, the appellate court need only address the
manifest weight argument. State v. Dykes, 2023-Ohio-4378, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), quoting State
v. Masters, 2020-Ohio-864, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). The determination that a verdict is not
against the manifest weight necessarily includes a finding that the conviction was
supported by sufficient evidence. Id. Thus, we address Rodriguez’s arguments together.
{¶16} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing
belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52,
¶ 24 “‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶17} “The choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony
rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986),
citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984); Henkle v. Salem Mfg.
Co., 39 Ohio St. 547 (1883); accord State v. Huertas-Alicia, 2024-Ohio-2214, ¶ 51 (11th
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Dist.). In other words, “[a]ppellate courts ‘should not reverse a decision simply because it
holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence
submitted before the trial court….’” Stiles v. Bugno, 2024-Ohio-1262, ¶ 82 (7th Dist.),
quoting Seasons Coal Co. at 81. “It is well established that the jury is in the best position
to weigh the evidence placed before it.” State v. Dubois, 2024-Ohio-6115, ¶ 77 (11th
Dist.).
{¶18} “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a
“‘thirteenth juror’” and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting
testimony.” Id. ¶ 68, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). However, this court
may only sit as the thirteenth juror “when evidence contradicts a fact-finder’s findings . . .
or when a witness’s testimony is so inconsistent as to material facts, so impeached, or so
fantastical as to make it patently unbelievable.” State v. Reillo, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 3, citing State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Therefore, “‘[t]he
discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting
Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175.
Rec Park Ownership
{¶19} Rodriguez first argues that the City did not prove that she was “on the land
or premises of another” because there was no testimony that the City owned Rec Park.
We disagree. Rodriguez was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of R.C.
2911.21(A)(4) which provides:
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the
following:
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(4) Being on the land or premises of another, negligently fail
or refuse to leave upon being notified by signage posted in a
conspicuous place or otherwise being notified to do so by the
owner or occupant, or the agent or servant of either;
{¶20} The statutory element here only requires a defendant to be “on the land or
premises of another.” Id. R.C. 2911.21(E)(2) states that “‘Land or premises’ includes any
land, building, structure, or place belonging to, controlled by, or in custody of another, and
any separate enclosure or room, or portion thereof.” In other words, the land or premises
need not be owned by any particular person, entity, or jurisdiction to trigger the statute.
Rather, it must belong to someone other than the defendant. The City was “not required
to present the testimony of the actual owner. It had to prove that [Rodriguez] had no
privilege to be on the property.” State v. Janson, 2009-Ohio-3256, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Thus,
if a reasonable juror could conclude that Rec Park was owned by any person or entity
other than Rodriguez herself, the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
for this factual finding.
{¶21} “When drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, jurors are ‘free to
rely on their common sense and experience.’” State v. Dunn, 2024-Ohio-5742, ¶ 32,
quoting State v. Allen, 1995-Ohio-283, ¶ 45. Here, the park was referred to by name as
“Rec Park” throughout the duration of trial. By repeatedly stating the name of a public
park in the community, a jury could reasonably infer that Rodriguez does not own it. It is
common knowledge in any community that public parks typically belong to a
governmental entity, not to a private individual standing before the court. Accordingly, we
do not find the jury’s apparent conclusion that Rodriguez is not the owner of Rec Park to
be a manifest miscarriage of justice.
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Privilege
{¶22} Rodriguez next claims that she was granted privilege to be at Rec Park, so
she could not be convicted under R.C. 2911.21(A)(4). We disagree. Although the record
reveals that Rodriguez may have been temporarily granted privilege by Officer
Parkomaki, Rodriguez apparently obtained that privilege by deception. Thereafter, she
exceeded the scope of that privilege and refused to leave after the privilege was
subsequently revoked by Officer Frederico.
{¶23} “It is well established that a trespass can occur on public land.” City of
Warren v. Owens, 1997 WL 401536, *2, fn. 1 (11th Dist. June 27, 1997), citing Adderley
v. Florida., 385 U.S. 39, 46 (1966). “It is no defense to a [criminal trespass] charge . . .
that the land or premises involved was owned, controlled, or in custody of a public
agency.” R.C. 2911.21(B). Privilege may also be conditional in nature. See generally
State v. Lyons, 18 Ohio St.3d 204, 206 (1985). “[R]egardless of an individual’s initial
privilege to enter and be upon the public areas of public property, ‘the statute for criminal
trespass states at R.C. 2911.21(A)(4) that an owner or agent may revoke consent to
remain on the premises.’” Cleveland v. Dickerson, 2016-Ohio-806, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. Carr, 2012-Ohio-1679, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.).
{¶24} Here, when Rodriguez first arrived at Rec Park, she entered through a main
entrance despite posted signs that the park was closed at sunset. It was after 11:00 p.m.
and sunset occurred several hours earlier. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could have
found Rodriguez lacked privilege.
{¶25} After traveling past the signage, Officer Parkomaki observed Rodriguez’s
vehicle driving through the park towards his traffic stop. When Rodriguez first
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encountered Officer Parkomaki, she was informed that she was trespassing and needed
to leave. Officer Parkomaki testified that Rodriguez’s response was to yell and begin
recording him. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could have found Rodriguez lacked
privilege.
{¶26} Thereafter, Rodriguez informed Officer Parkomaki that she was there for
“her kids.” Officer Parkomaki asked Rodriguez for her child’s name, and she refused to
answer the question or otherwise provide a name. Rather, the record shows that
Rodriguez asked Officer Parkomaki for his name and badge number. Believing that
Rodriguez was a parent, to one of the detained juveniles, Officer Parkomaki permitted
Rodriguez to go back to the entrance and wait while he concluded his traffic stop.
{¶27} By refusing to answer which juvenile Rodriguez was there to collect, it is
clear from the record that Rodriguez deceptively caused Officer Parkomaki to believe that
she was a parent or guardian to one of the juveniles on scene. “It is no defense to a
charge under [R.C. 2911.21] that the offender was authorized to enter or remain on the
land or premises involved, when such authorization was secured by deception.” R.C.
2911.21(C).
{¶28} After moving the vehicle back to the entrance, Rodriguez did not wait
patiently. Instead, she got out of the vehicle and approached Officer Frederico’s traffic
stop. The jury was shown Officer Frederico’s dash camera footage which clearly depicted
Rodriguez walking up to his traffic stop from the direction of the main entrance. It appears
from the video that Officer Frederico’s traffic stop was the closest stop to the entrance of
Rec Park relative to the other officers on scene. However, the stop was located beyond
the main entrance and parking area inside the park. A reasonable juror could have
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concluded that Rodriguez exceeded the scope of any limited privilege she may have been
granted to wait in her car by the entrance.
{¶29} However, upon approaching Officer Frederico’s traffic stop, Rodriguez was
told for the second time that she needed to leave as she was not a parent to any child on
scene. At that point, any such privilege that Rodriguez once had was affirmatively
revoked. Rodriguez refused to leave and remained next to the stopped vehicle for the
duration of the stop—approximately one hour—asserting that her presence was
necessary to ensure “nobody’s rights were being trampled on.”
{¶30} Accordingly, we do not find the jury’s factual findings that Rodriguez lacked
privilege to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. There are numerous
independent and reasonable grounds for concluding that Rodriguez lacked privilege. The
jury was in the best position to weigh the evidence before it. Dubois, 2024-Ohio-6115, at
¶ 77 (11th Dist.).
Criminal Negligence
{¶31} Lastly, Rodriguez argues that the City did not prove she was criminally
negligent. Rodriguez’s argument rests on a misreading of the statute. R.C. 2911.21(A)(4)
criminalizes two distinct activities. The statute reads, in relevant part, “Being on the land
or premises of another, negligently fail or refuse to leave upon being notified by signage
posted in a conspicuous place or otherwise being notified to do so by the owner or
occupant. . .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2911.21(A)(4). Thus, criminal negligence was not
a required finding.
{¶32} Indeed, “R.C.2911.21(A)(4) only requires that the alleged trespasser
refuses to leave the premises when told to do so.” Dickerson, 2016-Ohio-806, at ¶ 26 (8th
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Dist.), quoting State v. Gish, 1994 WL 693921, *1 (4th Dist. Dec. 1, 1994). A reasonable
juror on these facts could have found that Rodriguez refused to leave when she was told
to do so, and the jury did not lose its way to create such a manifest injustice.
{¶33} Accordingly, Rodriguez’s two assignments of error are without merit.
Conclusion
{¶34} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Painesville Municipal
Court is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Painesville Municipal Court is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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