UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CATO INSTITUTE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-3338 (JEB)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this Freedom of Information Act suit, Plaintiff Cato Institute sought documents about
itself from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After the Court initially granted summary
judgment for the Bureau, Cato found a declaration in another case that called into question the
adequacy of the agency’s search and moved for relief from judgment, which the Court granted.
The FBI then conducted a supplemental search and located more responsive documents, many of
which it withheld under various FOIA exemptions. In competing renewed Motions for Summary
Judgment, the parties dispute whether the supplemental search was adequate and whether the
Bureau’s withholdings were proper. The Court holds that the FBI adequately searched for
responsive documents, properly relied on Exemptions 3 and — in part — 7(E), reasonably
segregated information, and identified foreseeable harm. It also holds, conversely, that the FBI
did not justify certain withholdings under Exemption 7(E). It will therefore grant in part and
deny in part both Motions.
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I. Background
In December 2019, a policy analyst at Cato submitted a FOIA request to the FBI for “any
records regarding the Cato Institute.” ECF No. 66-2 (Def. SMF), ¶ 1. That request asked that
the FBI search for several variations on the term “Cato,” and it also specified search terms to be
used in a separate hunt for responsive documents, including “Cato” in combination with other
terms like “Wikileaks,” “Immigration,” and “Encryption.” Id. Cato also asked the FBI to search
specific locations — namely, field offices and “the FBI Guardian database or any related or
successor systems.” Id. The Bureau determined, however, that “all records responsive to
Plaintiff’s request would reasonably be found” in its Central Records System (CRS). See ECF
No. 30-1 (Second Declaration of Michael G. Seidel), ¶ 5. Following its search of CRS, the FBI
produced 78 responsive pages to Cato and withheld another 88. See ECF No. 26-2 (Exhibits to
Def. MSJ) at 15–17 (Exemption Index). Believing that the search should have uncovered more
documents, Cato sued the Bureau and the Department of Justice.
After an initial round of briefing, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendants.
See Cato Inst. v. FBI, 638 F. Supp. 3d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2022). It concluded that the FBI had met
its burden to show that the search was adequate, id. at 19–21, and had properly withheld
information under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 21–23. In the process of appealing that
decision, Cato discovered in another docket an FBI declaration that seemingly contradicted the
agency’s assertion that a CRS search would in fact identify all responsive records. See Cato Inst.
v. FBI, 2024 WL 95198, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2024). Agreeing that the declaration “likely would
have prevented a grant of summary judgment in the FBI’s favor had it been presented,” the Court
granted Plaintiff relief from judgment. Id. at *4; see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b).
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Returning to the drawing board and electing to use a broader search term, the FBI then
conducted supplemental searches in various locations, locating 959 pages of potentially
responsive records. See ECF Nos. 66-3 (Decl. of Amie Marie Napier), ¶ 7; 70-2 (Decl. of
Christina L. Driver), ¶ 26. The FBI released 372 pages in full and 76 pages in part, withheld 243
pages as duplicates, and withheld 268 pages in full, invoking FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7(A),
7(C), and 7(E). See Napier Decl., ¶ 4. Plaintiff challenges only the withholdings under
Exemptions 3, 7(A), and 7(E).
The parties now cross-move for summary judgment, as Cato still disputes the adequacy
of the FBI’s search and the propriety of some of its withholdings. Because some of the Bureau’s
explanations for withholding certain documents were difficult to evaluate in the abstract, the
Court ordered it to produce in camera redacted and unredacted copies of the disputed materials
withheld in whole or in part under Exemptions 3, 7(A) or 7(E). See Minute Order of Aug. 27,
2026. Having reviewed those records, the Court now considers the parties’ legal arguments.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986);
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). An issue of material fact is one that
would change the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 248; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. “A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish
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the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, “[t]he evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). On a
motion for summary judgment, the court must “eschew making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). When both
parties move for summary judgment, the court shifts the beneficiary of the factual inferences.
Once it “determines that one party is not entitled to summary judgment, it changes tack on the
cross motion and gives the unsuccessful movant all of the favorable factual inferences that it has
just given to the movant’s opponent.” Clark v. Vilsack, 2021 WL 2156500, at *2 (D.D.C. May
27, 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.
See Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). In a FOIA case,
the agency bears the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate the adequacy of its search and that
it properly withheld any records. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142,
n.3 (1989); Defs. of Wildlife, 623 F. Supp. at 91. The court may grant summary judgment based
solely on information provided in an agency’s affidavits or declarations when they “describe the
justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information
withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary
evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d
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857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Such affidavits or declarations “are accorded a
presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the
existence and discoverability of other documents.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. Analysis
In the course of their briefing, the parties have narrowed the issues in this dispute to four:
(1) the adequacy of the FBI’s search for responsive records, particularly whether it was obligated
to further expand its search to include Sentinel Gold and FBI SharePoint sites, two locations that
Cato insists might contain relevant records; (2) the propriety of the Bureau’s withholding of
certain records in whole or in part pursuant to Exemptions 3, 7(A), and 7(E); (3) whether the FBI
has shown that foreseeable harm would result from disclosure of materials withheld under
Exemptions 7(A) and 7(E); and (4) whether there exists any further non-exempt responsive
information that can be reasonably segregated and released. The Court addresses them in turn.
A. Search
“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material
doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” ValenciaLucena v. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897
F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any
other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those
documents was adequate.” Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The adequacy of an agency’s search “is judged by a standard of reasonableness and
depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.” Id. To meet its burden, the agency may
submit affidavits or declarations that explain the scope and method of its search “in reasonable
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detail.” Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The affidavits or declarations
should “set[] forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and aver[] that all files
likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” Oglesby v. U.S.
Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Absent contrary evidence, such affidavits or
declarations are sufficient to show that an agency complied with FOIA. See Perry, 684 F.2d at
127. “If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search,
summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542.
To demonstrate the adequacy of its search here, the FBI has submitted declarations from
Amie Marie Napier, Section Chief of the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination Section,
Information Management Division, and Christina L. Driver, Assistant Section Chief. The Napier
Declaration asserts that “the FBI has searched all locations and files reasonably likely to contain
responsive records, and there is no basis for the FBI to conclude that a search elsewhere would
reasonably be likely to locate responsive records.” Napier Decl., ¶ 24; see also Driver Decl.,
¶ 27 (“The FBI considers both the original search and subsequent targeted search adequate for
finding all potentially responsive records to Plaintiff’s FOIA request.”). The Napier Declaration
also details the search terms used, the types of searches performed, and the location of the
searches. See Napier Decl., ¶¶ 7–28; see also Driver Decl., ¶¶ 26–27 (same).
Notwithstanding the FBI’s search of numerous databases beyond CRS and its assertion
that it searched all locations reasonably likely to contain responsive records, Plaintiff insists that
Defendants “have not expanded [their search] far enough.” ECF No. 67-1 (Pl. Cross MSJ) at 16.
First, Cato presses that they should have searched “Sentinel Gold,” a repository for “Top Secret”
material. Id. Because the FBI’s supplemental searches returned classified records designated
“Secret,” Cato contends that another classified system “could very well contain more such
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records.” Id. Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants should have searched “FBI SharePoint
sites” operated by FBI headquarters divisions and field offices. Id. at 17.
An agency must continually “revise its assessment of what [constitutes a] ‘reasonable’
[search] in a particular case to account for leads that emerge during its inquiry.” Campbell v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But Cato’s “[m]ere speculation” that the
Sentinel Gold and SharePoint databases might contain additional responsive information “does
not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard
Servs., Inc. v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Rather, “a search
is generally adequate where the agency has sufficiently explained . . . why the specified record
systems are not reasonably likely to contain responsive records.” Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568,
582 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The FBI did exactly that here. As the Driver Declaration explains, the
Bureau searched Sentinel, a database that contains placeholders indicating that a related record is
stored in Sentinel Gold. That search of Sentinel produced “no indication that any records
responsive under the FOIA to Plaintiff’s request exist within [Sentinel] Gold.” Driver Decl.,
¶ 28. The declaration also explains that SharePoint sites “do not contain investigatory records,”
and that no information contained on the SharePoint sites would be “relevant to Plaintiff’s FOIA
request.” Id., ¶ 30. As the FBI has met its burden to pursue all leads and clearly explain the
scope of its search, the Court finds summary judgment for Defendants proper on this question.
B. Exemptions
Nine categories of information are exempt from FOIA’s broad rules of disclosure. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9). Those exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See Dep’t of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). The Government must furnish “detailed and specific
information demonstrating ‘that material withheld is logically within the domain of the
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exemption claimed.’” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 30 (quoting King v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 830 F.2d
210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). As this Circuit has emphasized, the Government cannot justify its
withholdings on the basis of summary statements that merely reiterate legal standards or offer
“far-ranging category definitions for information.” King, 830 F.2d at 221. Against this
backdrop, the Court will now separately assess Plaintiff’s challenges to Defendants’
withholdings.
1. Exemption 3
The FBI has withheld 59 pages under Exemption 3. That exemption allows agencies to
withhold records “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” provided that such statute
either “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue” or “establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). In evaluating documents withheld
pursuant to Exemption 3, the Court need not examine their “detailed factual contents.” Morley v.
CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Rather, “the sole issue for decision is the existence
of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the statute’s coverage.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Telematch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 45 F.4th
343, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“To withhold records under Exemption 3, an agency must show that
‘the statute is one of exemption’ and that ‘the withheld material falls within the statute.’”)
(quoting Corley v. Dep’t of Just., 998 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2021))
The relevant statutes that Defendants invoke here for different documents are Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and the National Security Act of 1947. Because Plaintiff does
not challenge the FBI’s withholding pursuant to Rule 6(e), see Pl. Cross MSJ at 4, the Court
considers only the propriety of its withholding pursuant to the NSA. That statute requires the
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Director of National Intelligence and the broader intelligence community to “protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 3024(h)(1); see § 3024(h)(2),
(4). As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the NSA “qualifies as an exemption statute under
exemption 3” because it “refers to particular types of matters to be withheld” — namely,
“intelligence sources and methods.” ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The only remaining question regarding this exemption, then, is whether the FBI has shown that
the documents withheld contain “intelligence sources and methods” within the meaning of the
Act. See Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The agency bears the burden to justify its withholdings under Exemption 3. See
Bigwood v. USAID, 484 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiff accuses the FBI of offering
only a “conclusory assertion that they believe the statutory requirements are met.” Pl. Cross
MSJ at 4; see also id. at 4–5 (complaining that “the Vaughn index describes the withheld records
in impossibly vague terms”).
Cato is mistaken. Defendants offer concrete and specific assertions that justify
withholding. As they explain in their supplemental declaration, the FBI withheld spreadsheets
that document the agency’s “vetting process” — i.e., the process by which agency staff examine
potentially responsive investigative records to determine what can be released to the requester.
See Driver Decl., ¶¶ 10 n.6, 13. Because those responsive spreadsheets contain file numbers that
are assigned to “specific intelligence activities,” the FBI avers that their “disclosure could reveal
intelligence sources and methods, including targets of foreign intelligence or espionage
investigations, human intelligence sources, detailed intelligence activities, and file numbers.”
Id., ¶ 19. It warns that “[r]elease of intelligence file numbers would lead to exposure of the
particular intelligence activity and method at issue and its nexus to a specific FBI intelligence
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program or sub-program,” which in turn would “enable foreign adversaries to anticipate and
avoid detection.” Id., ¶¶ 19, 21.
The Court, after its in camera review, is persuaded that disclosure of the vetting
spreadsheets could compromise intelligence operations. “[I]t is the responsibility of the
[intelligence community], not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle
factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of
compromising the . . . intelligence-gathering process.” CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
Indeed, in the intelligence context, “bits and pieces of data may aid in piecing together bits of
other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.” Id. at
178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Taking into account the “special deference owed to
agency affidavits on national security matters,” Schoenman v. FBI, 841 F. Supp. 2d 69, 84
(D.D.C. 2012); see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927
(D.C. Cir. 2003), the Court concludes that Exemption 3 protects the documents that the FBI has
withheld.
The Court pauses to note that all documents withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(A) are
also covered by Exemption 3. That overlap makes the Court’s task “substantially less
complicated.” See Ullah v. CIA, 435 F. Supp. 3d 177, 183 (D.D.C. 2020). Because the Court
has already determined that the FBI’s withholdings pursuant to Exemption 3 are proper, it need
not address Exemption 7(A). See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 925.
2. Exemption 7(E)
For the last tranche, the FBI invoked Exemption 7(E) to withhold 279 pages. Here, too,
there is substantial overlap between documents withheld pursuant to Exemptions 3 and 7(E), but
not all the documents withheld are covered by the former, so the Court must address this
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exemption. Exemption 7(E) authorizes an agency to withhold records that, if released, “would
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would
disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The FBI
invokes only Exemption 7(E)’s “techniques and procedures” prong. To prevail under that prong,
it must demonstrate that its withholdings meet three requirements: first, that the documents were
in fact “compiled for law enforcement purposes” and not for some other reason, see 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7); second, that they contain law-enforcement techniques and procedures that are
“generally unknown to the public,” Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
849 F. Supp. 2d 13, 36 (D.D.C. 2012); and third, that disclosure “could reasonably be expected to
risk circumvention of the law.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)). To facilitate its analysis,
the Court will sort the Exemption 7(E) withholdings into four categories: (1) file numbers; (2)
database names and search results; (3) the FBI’s strategies for vetting investigative records; and
(4) the location and identity of specific FBI units.
As to the file numbers, Cato maintains that Defendants fail to demonstrate that disclosure
would risk circumvention of the law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the FBI cursorily
asserts that all file numbers should be exempt, see Pl. Cross MSJ at 10, Napier’s declaration
provides ample justification. It avers that the combination of FBI file-classification numbers,
office-of-origin codes, and unique investigative-initiative numbers “would allow determined
criminals and foreign adversaries to obtain an exceptional understanding of the body of
investigative intelligence available to the FBI; and where, who, what and how it is investigating
certain detected activities.” Napier Decl., ¶ 64; see also Driver Decl., ¶ 21 (warning that release
of numbers would “provide criminals with a means of judging where the FBI allocates its limited
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investigative resources[ and] how the FBI responds to different investigative circumstances”).
District courts in this Circuit have long accepted this type of explanation. See, e.g., Reps.
Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 548 F. Supp. 3d 185, 200 (D.D.C. 2021), partially
reconsidered on other grounds, 754 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2024); Poitras v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 303 F. Supp. 3d 136, 159 (D.D.C. 2018). Indeed, Circuit precedent “sets a relatively low
bar for the agency to justify withholding” under Exemption 7(E), Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37,
42 (D.C. Cir. 2011), requiring only that it “demonstrate logically how the release of the requested
information might create a risk of circumvention of the law.” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562
F.3d 1190, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Given that low bar, the FBI’s explanation, and the in camera
review, the Court determines that Defendants properly invoked Exemption 7(E) to withhold the
file numbers.
As to the database information, Plaintiff contests whether those records contain
techniques and procedures that are genuinely unknown to the public. Cato first argues that
merely revealing non-public database names would not reveal any non-public facts about FBI
investigative techniques, and that Exemption 7(E) “does not protect techniques and procedures
‘already well known to the public.’” Pl. Cross MSJ at 12 (quoting Founding Church of
Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc. v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 832 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). That
contention misses the point. The FBI’s use of sensitive, non-public databases to conduct
criminal and national-security investigations is itself an investigative technique, see Napier
Decl., ¶¶ 65–66, disclosure of which would make the databases “attractive target[s] for
compromise” and give “criminals who gain access to FBI systems an idea of where they can go
to discover what the FBI knows.” Id., ¶ 68; see also Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 393 F. Supp.
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3d 111, 122 (D.D.C. 2019) (concluding that FBI properly withheld name of database to limit risk
of cyberattack).
Cato further posits that the information located through queries of those databases is not
an investigative technique or procedure. For support, it cites a Third Circuit case holding that
“without more, neither the specifics of a [database] search request — including the identity of the
requesting entity, the date of the request, and the nature of the request — nor the details of the
search result can be fairly understood as a law enforcement technique or procedure.” Viola v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 157 F. 4th 524, 545–46 (3d Cir. 2025). The parties dispute both whether the
FBI has offered something “more” and whether the facts of Viola are distinguishable. See ECF
Nos. 70 (Def. Opp. and Reply) at 14; 72 (Pl. Reply) at 8–9. The Court need not resolve those
questions because it is bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, which has established that “the methods
that the FBI uses to search [a] database and what results it considers meaningful . . . can reveal
law enforcement techniques and procedures.” Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 893 F.3d 796, 800
(D.C. Cir. 2018). The Bureau may “withhold records under Exemption 7(E) on the basis that
releasing them would provide information on how a database is ‘searched, organized and
reported.’” Id. (quoting Blackwell, 646 F.3d at 42). Defendants explained here that releasing
information located through database queries would reveal “how the FBI uses the databases to
support its investigations” and “the scope of FBI collected intelligence on particular subjects,”
enabling criminals to structure their behavior to evade detection or disruption by the FBI. See
Napier Decl., ¶¶ 65–66. Given those explanations and the Court’s in camera review, the
database records fall within Exemption 7(E).
For the third bucket, as a preliminary matter, Defendants’ assertion that the documents
withheld involve “vetting of investigative records” for FOIA requests, see Napier Decl., ¶ 71,
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cannot be squared with the Court’s in camera review, which shows that the bulk of documents
withheld pursuant to this subcategory of Exemption 7(E) are merely compilations of news
articles. The FBI briefly acknowledges its withholding of internal public-affairs news briefings,
asserting that their disclosure would “reveal where the information was collected and what
specific information was deemed relevant to the briefing.” Driver Decl., ¶ 24. It entirely fails to
explain, however, why those news briefings constitute a law-enforcement technique or how their
disclosure would risk circumvention of the law. For those documents, the FBI did not properly
invoke Exemption 7(E).
Plaintiff’s arguments center on the few remaining records in this category, which pertain
to the FBI’s vetting of FOIA responses. Cato believes that those records are neither “compiled
for law enforcement purposes” nor constitute techniques or procedures for “law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions.” Pl. Cross MSJ at 13–14. Defendants, in arguing otherwise,
stumble out of the gate. They emphasize that “there is little meaningful difference between
records compiled for law enforcement purposes and information relating to the search of those
records.” Def. Opp. and Reply at 16 (quoting Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 239 F. Supp. 3d
100, 114 (D.D.C. 2017)). Even where search records were compiled to comply with FOIA rather
than for law-enforcement purposes, “to the extent they replicate information that was compiled
for law enforcement purposes, that distinction is immaterial.” Shapiro, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 113-14
(citing FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 624 (1982)) (stating that it is “reasonably arguable” that
Exemption 7 applies to records that “contain[] or essentially reproduce[] all or part of a record
that was previously compiled for law enforcement reasons”). True enough. Based on the
Court’s in camera review, however, the handful of FOIA-response-related documents that were
withheld under Exemption 7(E) but not under Exemption 3 contain no information compiled for
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law-enforcement purposes. Contrary to the FBI’s assertion that the relevant material is
“derived/compiled from and/or reflect[s] information that would reveal FBI criminal
investigation files” and “investigatory documentation,” Napier Decl., ¶ 70, the Court finds that
the documents still at issue here do not reflect any law-enforcement information. The following
records thus fall outside of Exemption 7(E): Vaughn Index numbers (VIs) 425, 447, 469, 491,
513, 535, 557, 579, 601, 623, 645, 667, 689, and 711.
Finally, as to the location and identity of specific FBI units, Plaintiff contends that
Defendants have not sufficiently explained how disclosure would risk any circumvention of the
law. See Pl. Cross MSJ at 14–15. The Court agrees. The FBI avers that it redacted “the location
and identity of [the] FBI unit involved in the investigation of Cato Institute” because disclosure
would reveal “the targets” and “the physical areas of interest” of the investigation. See Napier
Decl., ¶ 75. “Once identified,” the Napier Declaration warns, “the units’ areas of expertise
would become known and the target of the investigation(s) would be able to discern the
investigative strategies deployed by the FBI.” Id., ¶ 76. In the abstract, that may well be true.
But the Court’s in camera review confirms that the FBI has already revealed the location and
identity of the FBI unit involved in the investigation. The unredacted document shows that it is
the Los Angeles Field Office Counterterrorism Division. The FBI, moreover, already revealed
that Cato was the target of the investigation, id., ¶ 75, though it tries to argue otherwise in
briefing. See Def. Opp. and Reply at 19. The only other document withheld under this rationale
offers no additional information. Based on the Court’s in camera review and Defendants’ flimsy
explanations about risk of circumvention, Exemption 7(E) does not apply to the following
records: VIs 251 and 391.
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C. Foreseeable Harm
Even when a record falls within a FOIA exemption, the agency “shall withhold” it only if
“the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by [the]
exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). The foreseeable-harm requirement applies to all
exemptions, except Exemption 3. See Leopold v. Dep’t of Just., 94 F.4th 33, 36–37 (D.C. Cir.
2024). Under that standard, an agency invoking an exemption must “identify specific harms to
the relevant protected interests that it can reasonably foresee would actually ensue from
disclosure of the withheld materials” and “connect [such] harms in a meaningful way to the
information withheld.” Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 436 F.
Supp. 3d 90, 106 (D.D.C. 2019) (cleaned up); see also Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
To invoke Exemption 7(E), an agency must show that disclosure of the withheld
information would be reasonably expected to risk circumvention of the law. Foreseeable harm,
then, is effectively embedded in the test for whether the exemption applies. See Gun Owners of
Am., Inc. v. FBI, 2024 WL 195829, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2024) (“[B]ecause the exemption
already requires a showing of risk of circumvention of the law, no further foreseeable-harm
analysis is necessary.”); see also 100 Reporters v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 602 F. Supp. 3d 41, 83
(D.D.C. 2022) (agreeing that foreseeable-harm requirement is “similar to (and was not intended
to heighten)” Exemption 7(E)’s circumvention-of-law requirement); Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. U.S.
Park Police, 126 F.4th 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (recognizing that “formally distinct”
foreseeable-harm and exemption requirements can “substantively overlap”). The FBI has
established that it reasonably foresees that disclosure of the withheld information will enable
criminals to evade investigation and prosecution. See Napier Decl., ¶¶ 61–69. That is sufficient.
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D. Segregability
The Court ends with segregability. FOIA requires that any “reasonably segregable
portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the
portions which are exempt.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Generally, an agency must provide “a
‘detailed justification’ and not just ‘conclusory statements’ to demonstrate that all reasonably
segregable information has been released.” Valfells v. CIA, 717 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C.
2010). The FBI offered two declarations detailing how it “carefully examined” the responsive
documents, “released all reasonably segregable non-exempt information” from those documents,
and determined after “extensive line-by-line, page-by-page review of the documents at issue”
that no further non-exempt information could be released without revealing exempt information.
See Napier Decl., ¶ 80; see also Driver Decl., ¶ 31. “Those sworn statements sufficiently
establish that ‘no portions of the withheld documents may be segregated and released.’” Porup
v. CIA, 997 F.3d 1224, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Juarez v. Dep’t of Just., 518 F.3d 54, 61
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
In any event, agencies are “entitled to a presumption that they complied with the
obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494
F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “To rebut this presumption, the requester must offer, at least,
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the agency” dropped the ball.
Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 71 F.4th 1051, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff argues that the FBI fully withheld 56 pages pursuant to Exemption
3, see Pl. Cross MSJ at 6, when it instead should have disclosed any non-exempt information that
those pages contained. The Court, however, has reviewed the pages and concludes that the
records almost entirely comprise exempt information, and any non-exempt information is
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inextricably intertwined with it. The non-exempt information, therefore, “cannot be reasonably
segregated without either compromising the purpose of the FOIA exemptions or offering
meaningless words or phrases.” Blixseth v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2020 WL 210732, at
*7 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2020) (citing Mays v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 234 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir.
2000)). The FBI’s segregation is appropriate.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both parties’ Motions
for Summary Judgment. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: September 14, 2026
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