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Utz v. Utz
LORRAINE A. UTZ v. PETER D. UTZ, SR.
(AC 47777)
Alvord, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had been dissolved in 2007, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying several of her postjudgment motions, including motions for contempt. The defendant failed to pay certain amounts required by the terms of the dissolution judgment, and, in 2017 and 2019, the parties entered into agreements with respect to certain arrearages and amounts owed, which became orders of the court. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied her motion for contempt regarding a home equity line of credit. Held:
The trial court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt for his failure to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close a home equity line of credit, as the court properly determined that the 2017 and 2019 agreements were ambiguous in that respect, which precluded a finding of contempt.
The trial court’s finding that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the children pursuant to their 2017 and 2019 agreements was clearly erroneous, as the reference to “property settlement” in the 2017 and 2019 agreements was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount owed and the agreements therefore did not address the defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, and this court was left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed. The trial court did not improperly deny the plaintiff’s motion for contempt on the basis that the defendant’s incomplete financial affidavit could not have supported any credibility finding in his favor, as the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should have been found not credible was inadequately briefed, and the court had before it the defendant’s testimony with respect to the assets that the plaintiff claimed were omitted from his financial affidavit, and it was for the trial court to accept or reject that testimony. The trial court properly determined that no interest was awarded on the amounts to be repaid by the defendant to the children’s Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts, as the court declined to read into a previous memorandum of decision an order of interest that was not plainly stated.
Argued February 4—officially released September 15, 2026
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London at Norwich, where the defendant
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Utz v. Utz
filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to
the court, Swienton, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief; subsequently, the
court, Diana, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and issued certain financial orders; thereafter, the
court, Connors, J., approved an agreement of the parties
as an order of the court; subsequently, the court, Hadden,
J., approved an agreement of the parties as an order of the court; thereafter, the court, Spallone, J., rendered judgment denying the plaintiff’s motions for contempt; subsequently, the court, Spallone, J., denied the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, and the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Lorraine A. Utz, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Brandon H. Marley, with whom was Drzislav Coric,
for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. In this postdissolution matter, the selfrepresented plaintiff, Lorraine A. Utz, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying several postjudgment motions she filed against the defendant, Peter D.
Utz, Sr. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly (1) denied her motion for contempt alleging
that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms
of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and
close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, (2) found the defendant credible despite his submission of an
incomplete financial affidavit, and (3) determined that
no interest had been awarded on the amounts that the
defendant was ordered to repay to the parties’ children
following his withdrawal of money contained within
their Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts (UGMA
accounts).1 We reverse in part the judgment of the trial
court.2
1
We have consolidated and reordered the plaintiff’s claims. See footnotes 2 and 12 of this opinion.
2
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly denied her motion for reconsideration. Because we reverse the judgment in part with
Utz v. Utz
The following facts and procedural history are relevant. “The parties were married on August 18, 1990. The
court dissolved the parties’ marriage by a memorandum
of decision filed on March 29, 2007. At the time of dissolution, the parties had two minor children. The court
found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably,
and, in addition to a stipulated custody and visitation
order, it entered various financial orders. In relevant
part, it ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
$435 per week in child support, $1 per year in nominal
alimony,3 $1000 per week in periodic alimony4 and a lump
respect to her motion alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home, we need not address the claim with respect to the motion for reconsideration on that issue. Because we reject the remainder of the plaintiff’s challenges, which formed the basis of her motion for reconsideration, we need not review the appropriateness of the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See Hohorst v. Easton, 237 Conn. App. 665, 699, 353 A.3d 263 (2026) (“[b]ecause we conclude that the court properly granted [the] motion for summary judgment, we need not review the propriety of its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration”).
Additionally, we note that the plaintiff’s appeal form identifies only the order denying her motion for reconsideration as the order from which she appeals. However, the plaintiff asserts in her preliminary statement of the issues that one of the issues that she intends to present on appeal is “[w]hether the trial court erred by entering judgment based on a misapprehension of facts.” Moreover, she includes in her principal appellate brief arguments challenging the underlying judgment. Mindful of the plaintiff’s self-represented status, we construe the plaintiff’s appeal to be from both the denial of her motion for reconsideration and the underlying judgment. See Prioleau v. Agosta, 232 Conn. App. 94, 95 n.1, 335 A.3d 93 (2025).
3
“The court ordered nominal alimony of $1 per year ‘until such time as the property settlement [entered by the court was] paid in full and the liens and encumbrances on the [marital home], which the defendant is obligated to indemnify on account of [the property settlement, were] paid in full and, or, released, or he exercises his option to purchase the residence and acreage.’ It further stated that the order of $1 per year alimony would be ‘modifiable to the extent necessary to ensure that the defendant satisfies all of his obligations’ under the property settlement, periodic alimony and lump sum alimony orders.” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.1, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).
4
“The court ordered periodic alimony of $1000 per week ‘until the death of either party, the remarriage of the [plaintiff] or March 31, 2017, whichever shall sooner occur’ with the intent that the order
Utz v. Utz
sum alimony payment of $150,000. The defendant also
was ordered to pay all counsel fees for the minor children
and guardian ad litem, plus make a $50,000 contribution toward the plaintiff’s counsel fees.” Utz v. Utz, 112
Conn. App. 631, 632–33, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied,
291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).
With respect to the marital home, the court ordered:
“The defendant shall transfer all of his right, title and
interest in and to the home and all the acreage located at
735 Fire Street, Oakdale, Connecticut [(marital home)],
including its contents, which transfer shall relate back
to the plaintiff’s lis pendens dated September 6, 2005.
The plaintiff shall be responsible for the payment of the
balance of the recorded first mortgage on the property to
John and Anna Utz. The defendant shall pay off and close
the line of credit on the [marital home] within [ninety]
days of this memorandum.
“The defendant shall have the option to purchase the
property for [$750,000] and shall notify the plaintiff by
certified mail within [ninety] days of this memorandum
if he intends to exercise the option to buy out. . . . In the event the defendant does not exercise his option to buy
the property, he shall make all necessary arrangements
to remove the Assignment of Right of Usage, recorded
at volume 485, page 755, of the Montville Land Records,
and any recordation of the promissory notes (plaintiff’s
exh[ibit] 2) so that the plaintiff shall have uninterrupted and exclusive use of the home and property. Said arrangements shall include facilitating a possible quiet title
action, [with] which the defendant shall fully cooperate
and pay all legal fees and costs.”
Nine years after the judgment of dissolution, on May
11, 2016, the court, Diana, J., adjudicated a motion for
contempt filed by the plaintiff, which alleged that the
‘shall be nonmodifiable by either party as to term.’ ” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.2, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).
Utz v. Utz
defendant had failed to pay the lump sum alimony owed.
In that decision, the court determined that the “financial
orders of the 2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” The
court set a payment order requiring the defendant to pay
$50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was fully
satisfied. The court further ordered that following the
expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony obligation
on March 31, 2017, the defendant then would pay $350
weekly toward the lump sum alimony order.
In May 2017, the self-represented plaintiff filed a
motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with orders contained in the dissolution judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant owed an arrearage balance of
$17,591.31 with respect to “child support and alimony,”
was “behind on his monthly tax payments in the amount
of $3250” as to the total real estate taxes owed in the
amount of $18,839.77,5 and was “behind on his weekly
lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300”
as to the total lump sum alimony award of $150,000.
The motion for contempt did not include allegations
with respect to the marital home or any related financial
obligations.
On June 8, 2017, the court, Connors, J., approved an
agreement of the parties (June 2017 agreement), making it an order of the court. The June 2017 agreement
provided: “Defendant will pay plaintiff $450 per week
until the total amount of unallocated support arrearage
of $17,531.31, property tax of $17,376.95, and $146,250
of property settlement are fulfilled according to their
divorce decree, totaling $181,158.26. Any changes to
these payments of amounts owed will only be altered as
mutually agreed on by both parties.”
In November 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, in which she referenced the June 2017 agreement
and alleged that the defendant was behind on the payment
obligations set forth in that agreement. In that motion
5
In the 2016 decision, the court, Diana, J., had ordered the defendant to pay real estate taxes on the marital home in the amount of $18,839.77.
Utz v. Utz
for contempt, the plaintiff also noted that the dissolution judgment required the defendant to “pay off a [home
equity line of credit] he took out during the divorce.”
Relatedly, the plaintiff alleged that “[t]he defendant
did not pay off the . . . loan, resulting in a foreclosure
sale [which] is now pending appeal, thus resulting in
homelessness.”6 The November 2017 motion for contempt
was not adjudicated.
On October 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion, which
was coded in the court file as a motion for modification
of child support. She identified as the current unallocated support amount $450 weekly, and the order to be
modified as expressed in the June 2017 agreement. The
plaintiff checked the box asking the court to modify child
support and represented in the motion “[w]e have come
to an agreement on [Docket] Entry [No.] 366 [the June
2017 agreement].” Immediately following this document
in the paper file is a document signed by both parties on
October 3, 2019 (October 2019 document). The October
2019 document states that the parties have “mutually
agreed to a lump sum settlement payment,” which payment “satisfies the [June 2017 agreement]. . . . In the
[June 2017 agreement, the defendant] was to pay [the
plaintiff] $181,158.26 in total. To date, the outstanding
balance that [the defendant] owes totals $126,508.26.”
(Citations omitted.)
The October 2019 document states: “The mutually
agreed upon payment amount is $66,000. Through
executing this agreement, [the defendant] agrees to
pay [the plaintiff] $66,000 in three installments each
equaling $22,000. The installments shall be tendered on
the third of every month for the next three months. The
first installment shall be conveyed on October 3, 2019.
6
The plaintiff alleged: “The defendant has the ability to pay and has offered to pay various lump sums of $60,000 and $30,000 in cash as a settlement of these claims.”
Utz v. Utz
The second on November 3, 2019. The final installment
on December 3, 2019. . . .
“This agreement is executed when [the defendant]
delivers the first installment payment to [the plaintiff]
and both parties sign below. This agreement will be submitted to the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut
for the District of Norwich, from which the Dissolution
Order originated. . . .
“The parties hereby certify that the terms above are
true and accurately represent the will of the parties. The
[p]arties further certify this agreement settles all debt
[the defendant] owes to [the plaintiff], except for any
and all monies owed pertaining to the children.”
On October 10, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion coded
in the court file as a motion for modification of alimony
and child support. Therein, she identified as the current
alimony amount $450 weekly and checked the boxes asking the court to modify both alimony and child support
and represented in the motion, “[w]e have an agreement.
Please see attached.” There is no attachment in the court
file following the October 10, 2019 motion to modify.
On November 7, 2019, the court, Hadden, J., following
a brief canvass, approved and made an order of the court
an agreement of the parties, finding it “fair and equitable under the circumstances of this matter.” The November
7, 2019 agreement (November 2019 agreement) provided:
“The parties agree: On June 8, 2017, the parties agreed
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total amount of
$181,158 which included support arrearage, property
tax and property settlement. The parties agree that the
amount owed is to be reduced to $66,000 to be paid in
three installments each equaling $22,000. The defendant
has paid the first two installments and the third installment shall be paid on December 3, 2019. All other orders
will remain in full force and effect.”
In 2022, the plaintiff filed several motions. The
plaintiff filed a motion to modify alimony, in which she
requested, inter alia, that the court modify the alimony
Utz v. Utz
orders to require the defendant to make weekly alimony
payments in the amount of $650 until the defendant’s
obligation with respect to the marital home as ordered
in the dissolution judgment was satisfied. The plaintiff
filed a motion for modification of child support, in which
the plaintiff sought an order requiring the defendant to
continue making $1000 payments to the parties’ daughter until satisfaction of the $6460.98 balance owed her
for postsecondary educational support. The plaintiff
subsequently amended this motion. The plaintiff filed
a motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the
defendant had failed to comply with orders regarding
payment of the children’s postsecondary educational
expenses, including allegations that he owed $26,686.54
to the parties’ son. The plaintiff subsequently amended
this motion. Finally, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to pay
off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home. The plaintiff sought an order requiring the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the
marital home to foreclosure.7
The court, Spallone, J., held a hearing on the motions
filed by the plaintiff in 2022 over three dates in March,
April and November 2023. Between the first and second
hearing dates, the plaintiff retained counsel. Both parties testified, along with the defendant’s brother, and introduced documents into evidence. The parties submitted
posttrial briefing on December 22, 2023.
On April 19, 2024, the court issued its decision on
the plaintiff’s 2022 motions. The court first considered the text of the June 2017 agreement and the May
2017 motion for contempt that preceded the agreement.
The court next considered the filings in 2019, including
the motions for modification and the November 2019
agreement. The court stated that it “listened to the official court recording of the canvass” that occurred on
7
The plaintiff also filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with orders of the court regarding life insurance. The plaintiff does not raise any claims on appeal with respect to the court’s denial of this motion.
Utz v. Utz
November 7, 2019, and noted that neither party asked a
question of the court or expressed any concern regarding
the November 2019 agreement.
The court next turned to the parties’ arguments. The
defendant’s position was that the November 2019 agreement was “dispositive of almost all the issues before the
court.” The plaintiff’s position was that the November
2019 agreement “only addressed certain issues raised in
a motion for contempt and did not include, particularly,
a home equity line of credit . . . on the marital residence that she alleges the defendant failed to pay off.” The
plaintiff argued that she never had agreed that the defendant was no longer obligated to pay off and close the home
equity line of credit. The court recited the plaintiff’s
framing of the principal issue as “whether the November
. . . 2019 agreement precludes the plaintiff from making a claim that the defendant still owes her the value of
the [marital home] which was lost to foreclosure by the
bank for nonpayment of the [home equity line of credit]
in 2019, and, if yes, how much does the defendant owe
the plaintiff and what schedule of payments ought to
be entered.”
In its analysis, the court concluded that the June 2017
agreement, which was referenced in the November 2019
agreement, was “comprehensive, encompassing the then
known financial disputes between the parties.” The court
concluded that, “[b]ased on all the information before the
court, including the content of the motions, the canvass,
the content of the agreement, the relevant circumstances
gleaned from the record and briefs and the reference to
the [October 2019 document], the court concludes that
the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between
them except as pertaining to the children through [the
June 2017 and November 2019] agreements.”
The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claims that
the defendant owed money to the parties’ adult children, which claims the court noted were addressed only
in passing in the plaintiff’s posttrial brief. The court
stated: “The record reflects that on May 11, 2016 . . .
Utz v. Utz
[Judge Diana] found that the defendant owed the parties’ daughter . . . $22,581.78 as of February 23, 2016,
and their son . . . $24,632.82 as of February 23, 2016.
The court went on to order that the obligations be repaid
within three years. The defendant points out in his brief
that there were exhibits presented during the hearing
itemizing payments made to the children since 2011. The
exhibits point to $61,018 being paid to [the daughter]
and $34,424 being paid to [the son] between 2011 and
2022, including $54,542 to [the daughter] and $30,315
to [the son] since the May 2016 order. The defendant
alleges he exceeded his court-ordered obligation to the
children. The exhibit pertaining to [the son] is defendant’s exhibit C, while the exhibit pertaining to [the
daughter] is defendant’s exhibit D. The exhibits consist of spreadsheets supported by contemporaneous documents
including copies of receipts, money orders and the like.
Significantly, [Judge Diana’s order] from 2016 does not
mention interest, and . . . it is not reasonable to infer the interest was ordered. Therefore, the motions pertaining
to moneys owed to the children are denied.”
The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, and the defendant filed an objection. On June 14,
2024, the court denied the motion for reconsideration
with the statement that it had “articulated its factual
findings and conclusions of law in its comprehensive
memorandum of decision addressing each of the plaintiff’s motions. Additionally, the plaintiff argues facts
outside of the record in her motion for reconsideration
that the court cannot consider.” This appeal followed.
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court
improperly denied her motion for contempt alleging that
the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the
dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close
the home equity line of credit. The plaintiff contends that the court improperly construed the parties’ agreements,
in that the agreements had “misidentified” as property
settlement the defendant’s lump sum alimony obligation.
Utz v. Utz
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial
court properly found that the parties’ agreements were
ambiguous but erroneously resolved the ambiguity in
favor of the defendant. In light of the agreements’ ambiguity, we conclude that the court properly declined to
hold the defendant in contempt but that the matter
requires a remand for a new hearing and determination
of whether remedial orders should issue.
We begin by setting forth general principles of law and
our standard of review. An agreement of the parties that
has been incorporated into a judgment “must be regarded
as a contract and construed in accordance with the general principles governing contracts. . . . When construing
a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties
from the language used interpreted in the light of the
situation of the parties and the circumstances connected
with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is
to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction
of the written words and . . . the language used must be
accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning
and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject
matter of the contract. . . . When only one interpretation
of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside
the four corners of the contract. . . . Extrinsic evidence
is always admissible, however, to explain an ambiguity
appearing in the instrument. . . . When the language of a
contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties’
intent is a question of fact. . . . When the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the contract must be given
effect according to its terms, and the determination of
the parties’ intent is a question of law. . . .
“A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The court
will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different
interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous. . . .
“In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of
the parties is not clear and certain from the language
Utz v. Utz
of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties. . . .
The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each
provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and
every provision must be given effect if it is possible to
do so. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is
ambiguous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) NationBailey v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182, 191–92, 112 A.3d 144
(2015). The threshold question of whether contractual
language is itself ambiguous is a question of law over
which our review is plenary. Simpson v. Simpson, 352
Conn. 81, 95–96, 335 A.3d 472 (2025).
We first turn to the threshold question of whether the
language of the agreements is ambiguous. Although the
court did not expressly state that it had found the agreements ambiguous, it is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that it looked outside the four corners
of the agreements. Following its examination of “the
plain language of the [November 2019] agreement,”
the court stated that “[s]ome historical context is helpful.” It then examined the motions in the file and the
October 2019 document. The court then stated that it
had determined the parties’ intent “[b]ased on all the
information before the court, including the content of
the motions, the canvass, the content of the agreement,
the relevant circumstances gleaned from the record and
briefs and the reference to the [October 2019 document]
. . . .” Having considered that range of information, the
court concluded “that the parties intended to settle all
monetary debts between them except as pertaining to
the children . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the
home equity line of credit, the court stated that it was
denying the motion “based upon the extensive review
of the testimony, evidence and record set forth above.”8
See Chang v. Chang, 197 Conn. App. 733, 742 n.3, 232
8
Although the court referenced its review of the testimony, we note that the court did not make any factual findings regarding the testimony of the parties as bearing on its determination of intent.
Utz v. Utz
A.3d 1186 (2020) (“[w]itness testimony as to his or her
interpretation of language in an order is extrinsic evidence, which should only be considered when the order
is found not to be clear and unambiguous”). Thus, the
trial court necessarily determined that the agreements
were ambiguous.
We agree with the trial court’s implicit conclusion that
the agreements are ambiguous. As the trial court correctly pointed out, the agreements use a “broad term”—
property settlement—and attached a specific sum to that
term. As the trial court found, the agreements “[do] not
directly reference” the marital home. Thus, we conclude
that the language of the agreements is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, rendering the
agreements ambiguous.
We next turn to the court’s finding that, through the
June 2017 and November 2019 agreements, “the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them
except as pertaining to the children . . . .” “When the
language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination
of the parties’ intent is a question of fact, and the trial court’s interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal
only if it is clearly erroneous. . . .
“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. .
. . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the
evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings,
[w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
Utz v. Utz
marks omitted.) Reiner v. Reiner, 214 Conn. App. 63,
76–77, 279 A.3d 788 (2022).
In the present case, we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed and
that the trial court’s finding that the parties intended
to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the
children is clearly erroneous. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the reference to “property settlement” in the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements
was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount
owed. Therefore, the agreements did not address the
defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution
judgment, to pay off and close the home equity line of
credit on the marital home.
First, we note that, although the court recognized that
“the parties’ briefs do not address the calculation of the
property settlement amount in the [June] 2017 agreement,” a careful review of the record suggests the basis
for the sum identified. The amount identified in the June
2017 agreement as “property settlement” is $146,250,
which figure is slightly less than the $150,000 lump sum
alimony amount ordered by the court in the dissolution
judgment. Despite more than nine years having passed
since the dissolution judgment, as of May 11, 2016, when
adjudicating the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the defendant’s failure to pay the lump sum alimony,
Judge Diana explained that the “financial orders of the
2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” As noted previously,
Judge Diana set a payment order requiring the defendant
to pay $50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was
fully satisfied. Judge Diana further ordered that, following the expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony
obligation on March 31, 2017, the defendant would pay
$350 weekly toward the lump sum alimony order. Were
the defendant to be credited with making all payments
in accordance with the orders issued on May 11, 2016,
a balance of approximately $144,550 would remain on
Utz v. Utz
the obligation.9 In the plaintiff’s May 2017 motion for
contempt, she alleged that the defendant was “behind on
his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount
of $1300,” which would mean that the defendant would
have owed approximately $145,850. We note that there
remains only a $400 difference between the amount
owed as lump sum alimony and the $146,250 amount,
which reasonably could be accounted for as a $350 and
a $50 payment.
Unlike the correspondence between the amount owed
for lump sum alimony and the amount stated in the June
2017 agreement, the dissolution judgment contains no
amounts under the heading of “property settlement” that
can be identified as the source of the $146,250 sum. The
following orders were contained within the “[p]roperty
settlement” section of the dissolution judgment: orders
related to the marital home, the defendant shall retain
his interest in two businesses, orders related to motor
vehicles, each party shall retain their respective bank
accounts, the plaintiff shall retain her lot in Florida, the parties shall share equally in the defendant’s shares of
Pfizer stock and Putnam Fund (worth a combined total
of $25,313), the plaintiff shall retain the proceeds from
the sale of a property in Killington, Vermont (proceeds
of approximately $25,000), and no claims were made
regarding home furnishings and personal property.
As to the specific term “property settlement,” we are
convinced that the term was inaccurately used in the June
2017 and November 2019 agreements. See 11 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. 1999) § 32:6, p. 432 (“The context
and subject matter of a contract may indicate that an
ordinary word or phrase has an unusual meaning in a
given sentence. The context and subject matter may even
show that a word or phrase of otherwise clear meaning
has been inaccurately used by the parties. In either case,
9
This sum is calculated by multiplying forty-six weeks by $50, which totals $2300, and multiplying $350 by nine weeks, which totals $3150. Subtracting both total amounts from the $150,000 total owed equals $144,550.
Utz v. Utz
the parties’ true intention will control notwithstanding
the conventional meaning.”).
Our determination in this regard is buttressed by our
review of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the resolution of which resulted in the June 2017 agreement. In
that motion, she specifies the obligations of the defendant for which she is seeking a finding of contempt. She alleges that he had failed to provide proof of life insurance, had
“not paid the child support and alimony consistently
and thus owes an arrearage balance of $17,591.31,” was
behind on his monthly tax payments, was “behind on his
weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of
$1300,” and had not made efforts to repay amounts due to
the children’s UGMA accounts. Absent from the motion
for contempt is any reference to property division. The
trial court decision underlying the present appeal downplayed the significance of that omission from the motion
by stating that “issues could be settled through an agreement that are not necessarily raised or referenced in a
motion.” Interpreting the June 2017 agreement to refer
to a settlement regarding property division, however,
would mean that the agreement did not encompass the
lump sum alimony obligation. We find it unlikely that the
parties would resolve the plaintiff’s motion for contempt,
with the largest amount alleged owing therein being the
lump sum alimony, by omitting from their agreement
that obligation entirely, and instead setting forth an
agreement regarding property division, which was not
a claim in the motion for contempt.10 We are persuaded
that the more reasonable interpretation of the June 2017
agreement is that it addressed the arrearages identified
in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and that the label
of “property settlement” erroneously was applied to the
lump sum alimony obligation. See R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61,
237, 156 A.3d 539 (2017) (“we should avoid construing
10
We note that the plaintiff filed, in November 2017, another motion for contempt. In this motion, the plaintiff expressly alleged that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit, as ordered in the dissolution judgment. The motion was not adjudicated.
Utz v. Utz
the contract language in a manner that has no rational
explanation, especially when a more reasonable interpretation is readily available”), aff’d, 333 Conn. 343,
216 A.3d 629 (2019).
Although we cannot identify the specific source of
the term “property settlement” as used in the June
2017 agreement, we note that the record reveals prior
instances of the defendant seeking to have the lump sum
alimony award categorized as a property settlement. In
2014, the court, Adelman, J., rejected the defendant’s
contention that the lump sum alimony award constituted a property settlement, which interpretation the
defendant argued in support of his efforts to have the
spousal support obligation discharged under the Bankruptcy Code. Judge Adelman analyzed the judgment and
concluded that the dissolution court clearly intended for
the lump sum obligation to constitute alimony.
The court in this matter placed emphasis on the timing of the November 2019 agreement, explaining that
the plaintiff had stated in her July 2022 motion for
modification that the defendant had taken advantage of
her “dire situation” at the time of the November 2019
agreement when she was being forced to move out of the
marital home due to the foreclosure. The court states
that this acknowledgment in her motion “indicates that
the plaintiff was, indeed, concerned about the loss of the
[marital home] on November 7, 2019, but entered into an
agreement that does not directly reference it. While she
may have regretted that decision three, four, or five years on, that does not provide a basis for the court to revisit it now.” We are not persuaded that the plaintiff’s concern
about losing the marital home leads to a conclusion that
the parties intended that the November 2019 agreement
encompass the defendant’s obligations with respect to
the marital home, particularly because the November
2019 agreement settled the obligations contained within
the June 2017 agreement, which we previously have
Utz v. Utz
interpreted as not addressing the defendant’s obligation
with respect to the marital home.
Next, we examine the court’s consideration of the
October 2019 document in interpreting the intent of the
parties with respect to the November 2019 agreement.11
“[W]hen the words used in the contract are uncertain
or ambiguous, parol evidence of conversations between
the parties or other circumstances antedating the contract may be used as an aid in the determination of the
intent of the parties which was expressed by the written
words.”12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hirschfeld
v. Machinist, 181 Conn. App. 309, 324, 186 A.3d 771,
cert. denied, 329 Conn. 913, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018). As
the court noted, the October 2019 document states that
the parties certify that “this agreement settles all debt
[the defendant] owes to [the plaintiff], except for any
and all moneys owed pertaining to the children.” We
conclude that the October 2019 document does not support a conclusion that the parties intended to settle all
debts because that language does not appear within the
November 2019 agreement. Instead, the November 2019
agreement states that “[a]ll other orders will remain in
full force and effect.” The court addresses this difference by merely stating that “[t]he document that was
approved by the court does not contain the language
regarding the scope of the agreement, but does again
use the broad term ‘property settlement.’ ” As previously discussed, we are convinced that the use of the
term “property settlement” was intended to refer to the
lump sum alimony. As to the omission in the November
2019 agreement of the language regarding settling all
11
We note that the defendant did not defend the motion for contempt by arguing that the October 2019 document was an enforceable contract but, rather, argued that the November 2019 agreement “was supported by” the October 2019 document.
12
The plaintiff additionally claims on appeal that the court improperly admitted into evidence the October 2019 document. In light of our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly interpreted the parties’ agreements, we need not address her arguments with respect to the October 2019 document.
Utz v. Utz
debts, we find helpful guidance in the related general
rule of construction that, “if a contract includes a level of specificity in one context and then omits that specificity
in a similar context, such an omission is purposeful and
should be given meaning.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. 269.
We also consider the court’s reliance on the canvass of
the parties, performed in connection with the November
2019 agreement. The court stated that it has “listened to
the official court recording of the canvass that occurred
on that date. Both parties . . . stated that the agreement
was fair and equitable under the circumstances, and then
they wanted it to be made [an] order of the court.” The
court additionally found significant that “neither party
raised a question with the court, expressed concern or a
feeling of duress, or otherwise sounded hesitant regarding entry of this agreement on the record.” We are not
persuaded that the canvass supports the interpretation
of the agreement reached by the court.
The entire canvass relied upon by the court comprised
fewer than three pages of transcript in its entirety13 and
directed to the plaintiff only the following questions:
“The Court: So, Ms. Utz, is that, in fact, the term[s]
of your agreement?
“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.
“The Court: Are those the terms of your agreement?
“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.
13
The court stated the agreement on the record as follows: “The written agreement provides that on June 8, 2017, the parties agree that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total amount of $181,158, which included support arrearage, property tax, and property settlement.
“The agreement goes on to state that the parties agree that the amount owed is to be reduced to $66,000 to be paid in three installments, each equaling $22,000. The defendant has paid the first two installments, and the third installment shall be paid on December 3, 2019, and all other orders will remain in full force and effect.”
Utz v. Utz
“The Court: All right. Did you agree to anything other
than that?
“[The Plaintiff]: No.
“The Court: All right. Do you feel you fully understand
these terms?
“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.
***
“The Court: And do you also agree, Ms. Utz, that these
terms are fair and equitable under all the circumstances?
“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.”
The court inquired similarly of the defendant and then
found “that the terms are fair and equitable under the
circumstances of this matter and [the court] will accept
the agreement and enter the terms of the agreement as
orders of the court.”
We conclude that the canvass was not sufficiently
detailed to bear on the question to be resolved, as stated
by the trial court: “[W]hat did the parties mean by the
term ‘property settlement’ with respect to the $146,250
figure?” Significantly, the canvass did not address the
parties’ understanding of the terms of the agreement.
Cf. Halperin v. Halperin, 196 Conn. App. 603, 608–
609, 230 A.3d 757 (2020) (“[f]ollowing the individual
canvasses by counsel, the court sought clarification,
‘given the complexity of th[e] agreement’ ” and asked
about parties’ understanding of “total income” as used in
agreement, ensuring that reference to line 22 on federal
form 1040 was “ ‘deliberate and not accidental’ ”). To the
contrary, the brief canvass conducted in the present case
reveals nothing regarding the parties’ understanding of
the amount identified as “property settlement” in the
agreement.14
Finally, we note that the trial court’s conclusion that
the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except
14
This court was provided with the transcript of only the November 2019 canvass. The trial court stated in its decision that “[b]oth [the June
Utz v. Utz
as pertaining to the children does not account for the
omission of the lump sum alimony award. The agreements
expressly addressed unallocated “support arrearage,”
“property tax,” and “property settlement.” Interpreting
the term “property settlement” to include the defendant’s
obligations in relation to the marital home would mean
that the defendant’s lump sum alimony obligation is
unaddressed by the agreement, and the agreement’s
provision that “[a]ll other orders will remain in full
force and effect” would necessitate a conclusion that
the lump sum alimony remained due and owing. As the
plaintiff represents in her brief to this court, she did
not file a motion for contempt regarding the lump sum
alimony obligation because she believed that obligation
was encompassed within the November 2019 agreement.
Although the trial court’s determination of the parties’
intent was clearly erroneous and, thus, the court improperly interpreted the agreement, the court’s implicit determination that the agreement was ambiguous was proper.
That finding of ambiguity precludes the defendant from
being found in contempt. See Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn.
370, 382, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (“[a] sufficiently clear
and unambiguous [order] is a necessary prerequisite for
a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is
particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely upon
some clear and express direction of the court” (emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Chang v. Chang, supra, 197 Conn. App. 742 n.3 (noting
that extrinsic evidence should only be considered upon
finding that order is ambiguous and, thus, cannot support
finding of contempt). Accordingly, the court properly
declined to hold the defendant in contempt.
2017 agreement and the November 2019 agreement] were accepted by the court and made orders, in open session, with the parties appearing and being canvassed under oath.” The trial court additionally stated that the June 8, 2017 canvass did not “shed light on the [home equity line of credit] issue.” Neither party has challenged on appeal the court’s statement that the June 8, 2017 canvass did not address the home equity line of credit issue. Thus, any absence of the transcript of that canvass does not impact our analysis.
Utz v. Utz
The determination that the agreement was ambiguous,
however, does not preclude the trial court from issuing an
appropriate order of compliance. We note that the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleged that the defendant
was obligated, pursuant to the terms of the dissolution
judgment, to pay off and close the home equity line of
credit on the marital home. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant failed to pay off and close the line of credit,
resulting in foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff alleged that the marital home ultimately was “sold at auction in
June 2019.” In addition to requesting that the defendant
be held in contempt, the plaintiff requested as relief that the defendant be ordered “to compensate for the loss of
the [marital home]” and “such other and further relief
the court may find equitable and appropriate.”
“[I]t is well established that after a judgment has been
rendered, a trial court has inherent authority and continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to
the vindication of [that] . . . judgment . . . . Accordingly, when there is an ambiguity in the language of a judgment, the court may effectuate its prior [judgment] . . .
by interpreting [the] ambiguous judgment and entering
orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted . . .
so long as that interpretation is merely a clarification,
and not an alteration, of the original judgment. . . .
The court’s inherent authority to effectuate its prior
judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance
with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous
judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted, is not dependent upon a predicate
finding that a noncompliant party is in contempt. . . .
Finally, as a general matter, the trial court has wide
discretion and broad equitable power to fashion relief
in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out
of the dissolution of a marriage.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Parisi v. Parisi,
supra, 315 Conn. 381. Thus, the trial court, on remand,
may exercise its discretion to determine whether an order
of compliance should be issued. See id., 386 (concluding
that court improperly found agreement to be clear and,
Utz v. Utz
on remand, after clarifying meaning of agreement, court
should enter accompanying order of compliance); see also
Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 723, 784 A.2d 890
(2001) (“even if the court determines that because of
such an ambiguity contempt would not be warranted, it
may nonetheless enter an appropriate order of payment
based on its interpretation of the judgment”).
II
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the court
erroneously denied her motion for contempt on the basis
that the defendant’s incomplete financial affidavit could
not have supported any credibility finding in his favor.
We are not persuaded.
It is well established that “[i]t is within the province of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh
the evidence presented and determine the credibility and
effect to be given the evidence. . . . Credibility must be
assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but
by observing firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor
and attitude. . . . An appellate court must defer to the
trier of fact’s assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact
finder] is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences from them.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino, 174 Conn.
App. 1, 11, 164 A.3d 787, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 929,
171 A.3d 455 (2017).
We first note that the plaintiff’s general contentions
that the defendant should have been found not credible
are inadequately briefed. The plaintiff points to prior
findings, made by other judges during the prolonged
period of time that this case has been pending, as supporting a finding that the defendant was not credible
during the present hearing. However, the plaintiff does
not identify any specific credibility finding made by the
trial court in the present matter and merely provides that
“his testimony was inconsistent and evasive,” without
Utz v. Utz
identifying the specific pieces of testimony she challenges. See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273
A.3d 271 (2022) (brief containing minimal citations to
record was inadequate).
The plaintiff argues that the defendant omitted trailer
park income and a Fidelity account from his financial
affidavit.15 The defendant was questioned regarding
the trailer park income, and he testified that he is “not
allowed to collect the money. That’s why the fiduciary
does and gets the bills except for a few that I pay that are personal.” The defendant also was questioned at length
regarding the Fidelity account. He testified that he owned
the account, that he did not list it on his financial affidavit, and that he did not list it because it was “a probate
issue, so I have to kind of wait.” The court had before
it the defendant’s testimony with respect to the assets
that the plaintiff claims were omitted from his financial
affidavit, and it was for the trial court to accept or reject that testimony. See L. K. v. K. K., 226 Conn. App. 279,
309–10, 318 A.3d 243 (2024) (“[T]he trial court is free
to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence
presented by any witness, having the opportunity to
observe the witnesses and gauge their credibility. . . .
This court defers to the trial court’s discretion in matters of determining credibility and the weight to be given to
a witness’ testimony. . . . We cannot retry the matter,
nor can we pass on the credibility of a witness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, we reject the
plaintiff’s claim.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
determined that no interest was awarded on the amounts
15
The plaintiff mentions in passing that the defendant omitted from his financial affidavit “other vehicles that he owned.” The only vehicle identified in the plaintiff’s brief, however, is a truck that the defendant testified he no longer owned and had “resold . . . as junk . . . .”
Utz v. Utz
to be repaid to the children’s custodial UGMA accounts.16
We are not persuaded.
The following procedural history is relevant to this
claim. In a July 8, 2011 decision on a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, the court, Boland, J., found
that the defendant “withdrew all balances in the UGMA
accounts in 2008—[the son’s] in July and [the daughter’s]
in September—and deposited all the proceeds into his
personal checking account. He then used this money to
pay his personal obligations.” Judge Boland found the
withdrawals to be a clear violation of the dissolution
judgment and entered a remedial order requiring the
defendant to repay the funds. Specifically, Judge Boland
concluded: “[C]onsidering the circumstances and the
fact that the defendant has had the use of this money
for three years, the court will impose upon him interest
from September 15, 2008, to date of payment at the rate
of 8 percent per annum. The court finds that he withdrew
$14,155.35. Annual interest (not compounded) amounts
to $1132.43 per year, and as of August 1, $3254.57 of
interest will have accrued. Accordingly, his debt to [his
daughter] as of that date is $17,409.92, with a per diem
thereafter of $3.1025.
“As to [the son’s] account, the only distinction is that,
since he is just sixteen, the restoration of the money held therein does not possess the same degree of urgency. The
defendant withdrew $18,009.65 from his son’s account
on July 24, 2008, and on the third anniversary of that
date two weeks from now the interest computed in the
same fashion will amount to $4322.32, or a total due of
$22,331.97, with per diem interest after July 24, 2011,
of $3.9565.”17
16
We note that the plaintiff’s claim on appeal is limited to her contention that the court improperly determined that no interest was awarded. To the extent that she alludes in passing to an argument regarding payments made prior to Judge Diana’s decision, she did not adequately brief any claim that the court improperly determined that the defendant had repaid the principal amounts owed.
17
Judge Boland ordered: “The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, as trustee for [the son], the sum of $22,331.97 on or before July 24, 2012, together with interest thereon from July 24, 2011, through the date of payment in the per diem amount of $3.9565.”
Utz v. Utz
In 2016, Judge Diana, addressing a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff with respect to educational
support, stated: “The defendant has satisfied the terms
of the court order (Boland, J.) (#269.00). The defendant
owes his daughter . . . $22,581.78 as of February 23,
2016. The defendant owes his son . . . $24,632.82 as of
February 23, 2016. No monthly order of repayment is
ordered at this time; however, these obligations shall be
repaid within three years.”
In the present matter, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that the defendant owed interest on the amounts
repaid to the children.18 The court found significant that
Judge Diana’s “order . . . from 2016 does not mention
interest . . . and it is not reasonable to infer the interest was ordered.”
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no interest was owed. She argues
that Judge Boland’s 2011 decision imposed interest and
Judge Diana’s 2016 decision, although not expressly
addressing interest, contained calculations that reflected
an award of interest. We are not persuaded.
“It is well established that the construction of a judgment presents a question of law over which we exercise
plenary review. . . . In construing a trial court’s judgment, [t]he determinative factor is the intention of the
court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . .
Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied
as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment
should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silver v. Silver, 200
Conn. App. 505, 515–16, 238 A.3d 823, cert. denied,
335 Conn. 973, 240 A.3d 1055 (2020).
Although Judge Diana, in his 2016 decision, appeared
to have calculated the amount the defendant owed to
the children by including per diem interest imposed by
18
The court noted that the plaintiff had mentioned her claim that the defendant continued to owe money to the children only in passing in her posttrial brief.
Utz v. Utz
Judge Boland in his 2011 decision, we interpret Judge
Diana’s decision as declining to impose additional interest going forward. First, we note that the court did not
expressly state that interest would continue to accrue.
Nor is it implicit in the court’s ordering of a sum certain. Additionally, Judge Diana declined to impose a payment
schedule but rather ordered only that the amounts be
repaid within three years. Finally, Judge Diana expressly
imposed interest on other payment obligations in his
memorandum of decision. Specifically, he ordered the
defendant to pay the real estate taxes “in the amount of
$18,839.77 plus interest (8 percent per annum) to the
plaintiff to be paid at the rate of $500 per month . . . .” Like the trial court, we decline to read into Judge Diana’s memorandum of decision an order of interest that is not
plainly stated. Accordingly, we conclude that the court
properly construed Judge Diana’s decision. Thus, the
plaintiff’s claim fails.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the denial
of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleging that
the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home
equity line of credit on the marital home and the case is
remanded for a new hearing limited to that issue, after
which the trial court in its discretion may impose reasonable remedial orders as appropriate; the judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.