In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00115-CV
IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF WREN SHIPLEY
On Appeal from the 367th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25-3631-367
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Walker
OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from a suit to civilly commit Appellant Wren Shipley as a
sexually violent predator under the Texas Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators Act.1 See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.001–.209.
A jury found Shipley to be a sexually violent predator, and the trial court
rendered a final judgment with an order of civil commitment.2 See Tex. Health &
Safety Code §§ 841.003, 841.081. Shipley’s court-appointed counsel has reviewed the
record and opined that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Because we find
nothing in the record that might arguably support Shipley’s appeal, we will affirm.
1
The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act provides for the involuntary commitment of a class of offenders who are “sexually violent predators.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.001. A person qualifies as a “sexually violent predator” if he meets two elements: (1) he “is a repeat sexually violent offender” who (2) “suffers from a behavioral abnormality” that makes him “likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” Id. § 841.003(a). To obtain an adjudication of “sexually violent predator” status and an order of commitment, the State must prove these two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. §§ 841.062(a), 841.081(a); In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 678 (Tex. 2020).
2
Upon entry of a civil-commitment order, the committed person is placed in the custody and control of the Texas Civil Commitment Office, which is responsible for “providing appropriate and necessary treatment and supervision” and for “developing and implementing a sex offender treatment program.” In re Commitment of Bluitt, 605 S.W.3d 199, 201 (Tex. 2020) (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.007, .083).
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2006, when Shipley was sixteen years old, he touched a seven-year-old
female’s genitals.3 He was arrested for indecency with a child by contact. See Tex.
Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). Shipley pleaded guilty to engaging in the delinquent
conduct of assault, and he was placed on juvenile community supervision4 and
required to attend sex-offender treatment.
In 2019, when Shipley was twenty-nine years old, he touched an eight-year-old
male’s and a ten-year-old male’s genitals on multiple occasions.5 He was arrested for
two counts of indecency with a child by contact. See id. He pleaded guilty to both
counts, and he was placed on eight years’ deferred-adjudication community
supervision. His conditions of community supervision required him, among other
things, to avoid contact with minor children, complete sex-offender treatment, and
register as a sex offender. During his period of community supervision, Shipley
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A neighbor was babysitting several children, including the seven-year-old female. While the neighbor was briefly distracted, Shipley isolated the child from the group, led her to the backyard playhouse, placed her on his lap, and reached his hand under her clothing.
4
“Community supervision” and “probation” are synonymous and generally used interchangeably. Hongpathoum[ v. State, 578 S.W.3d 213, 214 n.1 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2019, no pet.); see Euler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 88, 89 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.2007.).
5
The boys are brothers and Shipley’s wife’s nephews. Shipley, “his wife, [and] the boys’ parents all lived in the same home,” and Shipley continued to touch the boys even “after he had been warned by other adults that he was to stay away from them.”
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interacted with minor children, failed to complete sex-offender treatment, and failed
to register as a sex offender. Consequently, the trial court revoked his community
supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to five years’ confinement on
each count.
In April 2025, the State petitioned to civilly commit Shipley as a sexually violent
predator upon his release from confinement. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code § 841.041. The case proceeded to a jury trial.6
The jury heard evidence of Shipley’s delinquent conduct, prior convictions for
sexual offenses, and additional allegations of sexual abuse for which he was never
charged, including his inappropriate touching of an infant, a six-year-old male, and a
twelve-year-old female. A forensic psychologist testified about her professional
review of the case’s records and reports as well as her interview with Shipley. She
explained that Shipley had repeatedly minimized his deviant behavior and that his
minimization “is a potential risk factor for re-offending.”7 She opined that Shipley
suffers from a behavioral abnormality8 that makes him likely to commit a future
6
Shipley was thirty-six years old at the time of trial.
7
For example, when she asked Shipley about his touching of the seven-year-old female’s genitals, Shipley responded, “[W]ell, if you consider that a sexual offense.”
8
A “behavioral abnormality” is “a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.002(2); see also Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 678 (defining that “behavioral abnormality” is a condition
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predatory act of sexual violence.9 The jury unanimously found “beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Shipley] is a sexually violent predator.” Shipley filed this appeal.10
III. DISCUSSION
Shipley’s court-appointed appellate counsel11 has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion in which she “certifies that she has
conscientiously and thoroughly reviewed the entire record in this case and the
pertinent law and has concluded that there is no ‘plausible basis for appeal’ that would
result in reversible error and that this appeal is, therefore, ‘wholly frivolous.’” See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). “The
procedures set forth in Anders are applicable to an appeal from a trial court’s order of
involuntary civil commitment when an appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel
concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues to assert on appeal.” In re Commitment
of Riggs, No. 06-18-00073-CV, 2019 WL 1560688, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
that creates a likelihood that an affected person will engage in future sexually violent behavior).
The forensic psychologist diagnosed Shipley with pedophilic disorder and
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unspecified personality disorder with antisocial features. She explained that pedophilic disorder involves “sexual urges, thoughts, fantasies, or behaviors involving a prepubescent child” and that antisocial personality disorder involves “a pervasive pattern of a disregard for and the violation of the rights of others.”
10
Shipley filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law.
Shipley is represented on appeal by court-appointed counsel from the Texas
11
Independent Office of Inmate Counsel. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.051(e) (providing for the appointment of counsel for indigent inmates).
5
Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (citing In re Commitment of Warren, No. 09-11-00010-CV,
2012 WL 4845662, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 11, 2012, pet. denied))12; cf. In re
P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27. n.10 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing Anders procedures apply in
parental-termination cases, even though Anders concerned a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel).
Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by providing a professional
evaluation of the record and stating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal on
appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Counsel has provided Shipley
with a copy of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and
a copy of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel also advised Shipley of his
right to review the record, file a response to counsel’s brief, and pursue discretionary
review.
We notified Shipley of counsel’s motion and Anders brief and provided him
with an opportunity to respond. He filed no response. The State declined to file a
See In re Commitment of Barnes, No. 11-24-00038-CV, 2026 WL 193421, at *1
12
(Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 22, 2026, no pet.) (applying Anders procedures to civilcommitment cases under Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code); In re Commitment of M.A.C., No. 04-18-00865-CV, 2019 WL 3208819, at *1 (Tex. App.— San Antonio July 17, 2019, no pet.) (same); In re Commitment of Clark, No. 09-05-526 CV, 2006 WL 3530552, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2006, no pet.) (same); cf., In re E.M., No. 03-96-00703-CV, 1997 WL 217186, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 1, 1997, no writ) (op., not designated for publication) (concluding that Anders procedures are appropriate when court-appointed counsel concludes an appeal of an involuntary-commitment order is frivolous).
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responsive brief but agreed with counsel’s “averment that there is no reversible error
present.”
After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the
ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills Anders’s requirements, we must
independently examine the record for any arguable ground that may be raised on his
behalf. In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no
pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M.,
No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5,
2018, pet. denied); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding
nothing in the appellate record that arguably might support the appeal, we agree with
counsel that there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. Accordingly, we
conclude that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Barnes, 2026 WL 193421,
at *1.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having concluded that Shipley’s appeal is frivolous, we grant counsel’s motion
to withdraw13 and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. R. 43.2(a);
Barnes, 2026 WL 193421, at *1 (granting counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirming
trial court’s final judgment and order committing appellant for treatment and
supervision).
13
Counsel urges this court not to “extend the requirement for indigent representation to discretionary review” for civil-commitment appeals. See 2026 WL 193421, at *1. In Barnes, our sister court declined to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in P.M. to civil-commitment appeals and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. See id. at *1 n.2; (discussing P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 26–27). In P.M., the Supreme Court considered an appointed counsel’s representation of an indigent mother in an involuntary parental-rights termination proceeding and held that “the right to [appointed] counsel under [Texas Family Code] Section 107.013(a)(1) through the exhaustion of appeals under Section 107.016(2)(B) includes all proceedings in this Court, including the filing of a petition for review.” 520 S.W.3d at 27.
In Barnes, the Eastland court distinguished an appointed counsel’s representation under the Texas Family Code from representation under the Texas Health and Safety Code. See 2026 WL 193421, at *1 n.2. Family Code Section 107.016(2)(B) affords indigent parents in involuntary-termination proceedings the right to counsel until “all appeals . . . are exhausted or waived.” Tex. Fam. Code § 107.016(2)(B). In contrast, Health and Safety Code Section 841.144 entitles “a person subject to a civil[-]commitment proceeding . . . to the assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceeding,” which includes “a trial or hearing,” but contains no language extending representation to discretionary review. Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.002(3-a), 841.061 (trial), 841.103 (hearing), 841.144(a). The Eastland court reasoned that Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code contains no statutory language “comparable to Section 107.016 of the Family Code that would indicate a legislative intent to extend counsel’s representation to the filing of a petition for review in this context.” Barnes, 2026 WL 193421, at *1 n.2. We find Barnes persuasive and decline to extend P.M. to civil-commitment appeals. See id.
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/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Delivered: September 10, 2026
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