In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00369-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF MARGARITA RAMIREZ, DECEASED
On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2014-PR01566-1
Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In June 2026, Appellant Gabriel Paul Salas, pro se, filed a notice of appeal
asking this court to “open up the Cause No. #2014-PR-01566-1 out of Probate Court
No. 1 in Tarrant County, Texas.” He asserted in the document that he had inherited
properties from his deceased grandmother and that the properties had been sold
without his consent and were occupied by “burglars.” He also filed a copy of a
2014 “Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title” and an April
2026 motion that he had filed in the trial court seeking to reopen the probate
proceeding. But see Tex. Est. Code § 257.151 (providing that after a will is admitted to
probate as muniment of title, a court may subsequently open an administration for the
testator’s estate but that application must generally be filed within four years of the
testator’s death); see also id. §§ 55.251 (providing two-year deadline to file bill of review
proceeding to revise and correct an order or judgment in a probate proceeding),
256.204 (providing that generally, “an interested person may commence a suit to
contest the validity thereof not later than the second anniversary of the date the will
was admitted to probate”).
Appellant did not indicate that the trial court had ruled on his motion to
reopen probate proceedings, and the trial court’s online register of actions does not
reflect that any such order has been signed. We thus notified Appellant of our
concern that this court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court had
not signed an appealable order. Because it was unclear whether Appellant was
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attempting to appeal from the 2014 order, we also notified him of our concern that
we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because his notice of appeal had not been
timely filed. We cautioned him that we could dismiss this appeal unless he or another
party filed a response showing grounds for its continuance.
Appellant filed a response asserting that an order in a probate proceeding is
appealable if it disposes of all parties or issues in a particular phase. 1 He further
asserted that he “barely found out that [his grandmother] was deceased” and had not
been informed about the 2014 order.2 Thus, he argued, this court has jurisdiction over
the appeal.
With respect to the 2014 order, the Rules of Appellate Procedure address
circumstances in which a party receives late notice of a judgment or order. “If a party
affected by a judgment or other appealable order has not—within 20 days after the
judgment or order was signed—either received the notice . . . or acquired actual
knowledge of the signing,” then for any period under the appellate rules that begins to
run when an order or judgment is signed, the period “will begin for that party on the
earlier of the date when the party receives notice or acquires actual knowledge of the
1
Appellant’s response also includes a general assertion that appellate courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. Appellant has not filed a petition for mandamus relief and has not shown his entitlement to such relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.3, 52.8.
2
The trial court’s register of actions reflects that since at least 2015, Appellant (or someone with the same name) has been sending correspondence to the trial court regarding the probate proceeding.
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signing.” Tex. R. App. P. 4.2. However, “in no event may the period begin more than
90 days after the judgment or order was signed.” Id. (emphasis added). Even if that
rule applied, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed far too late. Likewise, if Appellant
is attempting to file a restricted appeal, then his notice of appeal was untimely. See
Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c) (providing that for restricted appeal, notice of appeal must be
filed within six months of judgment’s signing). Thus, this court has no jurisdiction
over an appeal from the 2014 order. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1.
If Appellant’s notice of appeal relates to his motion to reopen probate
proceedings, and assuming that a ruling on the motion would be an appealable order,
nothing before this court shows that the trial court has ruled on it. Thus, Appellant’s
notice of appeal is premature and does not vest this court with jurisdiction over his
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (providing timeline to file notice of appeal after a
judgment is signed), 27.1 (addressing premature filing of notice of appeal); Miller v. Sw.
Exposition & Live Stock, No. 2-07-261-CV, 2007 WL 2693870, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 13, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Womack v. Sanders,
No. 02-24-00457-CV, 2024 WL 5162853, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19,
2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that Rule 27.1 “‘does not contemplate an appellate
place holder until there is a final appealable judgment’” and that this court is not
required to hold an appeal open until the trial court signs an appealable order at some
future date (quoting Ganeson v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007,
pet. denied))).
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Because Appellant’s notice of appeal is untimely as to the 2014 order and
because the trial court has not signed an appealable order with respect to Appellant’s
motion to reopen probate proceedings, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Per Curiam
Delivered: September 10, 2026
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