Doe v. Smith

majority opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 25-1373

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

SARA SMITH,

Defendant, Appellee, and

MAINE TRUST FOR LOCAL NEWS L3C, d/b/a Portland Press Herald,

d/b/a Maine Sunday Telegram,

Intervenor, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Dunlap,

Circuit Judges.

Louise M. Aponte, with whom Gregory Brown, Lowe Yeager & Brown

PLLC, Stephen B. Segal, and Verill Dana LLP were on brief, for

appellant.

Peter J. Brann, with whom Hannah L. Wurgaft and Brann &

Isaacson were on brief, for appellee Smith.

Eugene Volokh, with whom Sigmund D. Schutz, Alexandra

Harriman, and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP were on

brief, for appellee Maine Trust for Local News.

September 15, 2026

ROE, Circuit Judge.1

Hitting the jackpot isn't always everything it's cracked

up to be. Just ask "John Doe," today's appellant.

Doe won 1.35 billion (yes, billion with a "b") dollars

in the Maine State Lottery. And then he made "Sara Smith," the

mother of his child, sign a non-disclosure agreement ("NDA")

swearing her to secrecy about the win and his identity. But Smith

may have spilled about Doe's lotto win anyway, thus violating the

1 Just kidding -- Judge Thompson authoring here.

But wouldn't it raise eyebrows if the parties and the public

didn't know who was deciding the case? Thankfully, even if the

panel opted to publish a per curium opinion so that the identity

of the authorizing judge was not disclosed, we've still got all

our names on the cover page to let the public know the judicial

arbiters.

As you'll see throughout today's opinion, we believe our

precedent makes paramount the principle of transparency as a

bulwark of the effectiveness of our judicial system and the

public's trust in it. As Chief Justice of the United States Warren

Burger once said, "People in an open society do not demand

infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for

them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." See Adam

Liptak, Secrecy in Lawsuits Has 'Run Amok,' Scholars Say, N.Y.

Times, Aug. 27, 2026. (cleaned up). And increased secrecy in the

courts has not gone unnoticed. In the view of one recent New York

Times article, "[s]ecrecy in lawsuits has 'run amok'" in federal

courts, and studies show that "judges are not doing enough to

protect the public interest in openness." See id. If true, some

would view this as troubling. So putting spotlight on the problem

via a creative little formatting tweak in our opening line is an

easy thing we can do to remind the public of the historical

scaffolding that undergirds our judicial framework of transparency

and public access.

All that's to say: that eye-grabbing opener isn't just for

show but rather, a preview of what we think today's case

highlights, and more importantly, legally demands.

- 3 -NDA, so Doe brought Smith to federal court (whose jurisdiction

arose via the diversity of the parties) seeking an injunction and

damages.

For a while, the district court let the parties litigate

under pseudonyms. (That's why we're calling these two "John Doe"

and "Sara Smith" -- those, of course, aren't their real names.2)

Yet, as trial neared, Doe moved to shutter the courtroom from the

public during the trial and, alternatively, to proceed under

pseudonyms throughout trial. Doe sought such drastic measures, he

said, mainly to preserve his daughter's privacy and protect her,

given the increased risks that came alongside his sudden wealth.

But federal judges take an oath to "do equal right to

the poor and to the rich" (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 453). Faithful

to that oath, the district court denied Doe's requests in a

2 Why do we use "John Doe" as a placeholder name in litigation?

Its use apparently dates back to the Magna Carta (circa 1215).

See William Safire, Who's John Doe?, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1995.

In one account: back then, "two witnesses were needed for legal

action; to protect their identities, substitute names were often

placed on documents," and the classic example was a landlord-tenant eviction action. Id.

And although John's always been a common name, one might still

ask: "Why 'Doe'?" And, while we're at it, "why 'Roe', too?" Well,

"[a] doe is a female deer; roe, a less-familiar term for deer, is

also a name for fish eggs." Id. And, at least in one

lexicographer's account, "'Doe' and 'Roe' were what landowners

called men who poached deer and fish, and who would be just the

kind of men willing to witness legal documents against the

landowners and their landed rights." Id. So now you know about

"Doe" (and "Roe").

- 4 -comprehensive forty-page opinion. See Doe v. Smith,

No. 2:23-cv-00423-JAW, 2025 WL 1080750 (D. Me. Apr. 10, 2025).3

Now before us, Doe assigns error aplenty to that

decision. We can well appreciate some of Doe's

concerns -- certainly, we respect his worries about his family's

safety lest his identity be unveiled. Yet we discern no abuse of

discretion in the district court's careful judgment preserving the

common-law tradition of public access to -- and oversight

of -- our judicial proceedings. We thus affirm.

HOW WE GOT HERE

We begin with how the case has unfolded so far.

A. The Win and the NDA

Like we said above, Doe hit it big by winning $1.35

billion in the Maine State Lottery in January 2023. Although Maine

law does not keep lottery winners' identities' confidential, Doe

seemed to claim his jackpot through a legal entity to preserve his

privacy.4 And he soon hired what he described as a "highly

respected security firm" that advised him to "strictly adhere to

3 As intimated above, many cases about pseudonyms have at

least one party named "Doe." But for reference, anytime we do a

short-cite to a Doe case, it is the district court's order in this

decision; for any other "Doe"-dubbed party cases, we use the other

party's name to avoid confusion.

4 See 8 M.R.S.A. § 416-A(9) (providing for the release of

information about the winners of Maine's lottery, including

names).

- 5 -a safety program that requires property security, surveillance,

and ongoing threat assessments" to protect his family. But those

were only the beginning of Doe's endeavors to remain anonymous.

The next month, Doe entered into the NDA with Smith

(again, the mother of his minor daughter), so he could maintain

his and his daughter's privacy. The NDA precluded Smith from

disclosing "Protected Subject Matter" -- namely, details of Doe's

lottery win and his finances -- to all but a short list of

"Authorized Recipient[s]" without Doe's permission.

And, as the vast font of human experience has shown time

and time again, this newfound wealth posed new challenges to Doe.

Cf. The Notorious B.I.G., Mo Money Mo Problems, on Life After Death

(CD, Bad Boy & Arista Mar. 25, 1997); Herman Melville, Moby-Dick

or, The Whale at 6 (Penguin Books 1988) (1851) ("The urbane

activity with which a man receives money is really marvelous,

considering that we so earnestly believe money to be the root of

all earthly ills, and that on no account can a monied man enter

heaven. Ah! How cheerfully we consign ourselves to perdition!").

Within a month of the NDA's taking effect, Doe and Smith had become

embroiled in a custody dispute.5

5 Though it isn't especially relevant to the appeal, we'll

just note briefly what happened, at least in Doe's retelling.

Apparently, Smith falsely alleged that Doe kidnapped their

daughter during a long trip in March 2023, and Smith's accusation

was meant to serve as the basis for her securing sole custody over

their daughter.

- 6 -Around September 2023, Doe apparently discovered that

Smith had violated the NDA by wrongfully disclosing details of the

Protected Subject Matter to Doe's father and stepmother. And, as

a result of that disclosure, Doe claims that "other third parties,"

including his sister, were now also in possession of the relevant

information, even though they shouldn't have been in-the-know.

(For her part, Smith denies these allegations, pointing to Doe's

sworn declarations where he admits to telling his father about the

lotto win.)

B. The Case

So, in November 2023, Doe sued Smith in the District of

Maine alleging the above-described violations of the NDA and

seeking injunctive relief and damages. The next day, Doe moved

for leave for both parties to proceed under pseudonyms. And the

magistrate judge granted the motion without issuing an opinion.

Naturally, the local press soon took an interest in Doe's

suit. In February 2024, the Maine Trust for Local News, L3C d/b/a

Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram (whom we'll just call

"the Maine Trust") moved for leave to intervene. Doe opposed;

Smith acceded.6 Importantly, though the Maine Trust also wanted

to unseal several documents, it did not oppose the parties'

pseudonymity, though it reserved the right to do so. And the

6 Still, Smith sought to retain pseudonymity and redaction of

personally identifiable information.

- 7 -district court granted the Maine Trust's motion to intervene, but

expressly did not reach the questions of continued use of

pseudonyms at that point.

C. The Order on Appeal

As trial loomed, Doe moved to close trial to the public

and, alternatively, to use pseudonyms throughout said trial.7 To

start, he underscored the district court's comments (made during

a status conference) that he was essentially faced with a "Catch22" situation.8 As the district court put it:

[E]ven if Plaintiff were to win on his claims,

his identity and confidential information

would be revealed to the public and the media;

7As an alternative to the alternative, Doe sought to have

some trial testimony take place over the phone or on Zoom -- a

request that the district court denied and that Doe does not pursue on appeal.

8 Drawn from the title of Joseph Heller's 1961 novel, a "catch22" is a "problematic situation for which the only solution is

denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule."

Catch-22, Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/catch-22. For those interested in the

term's origins, the folks at Merriam-Webster explain:

The catch-22 in Catch-22 involves a mysterious

Army Air Forces regulation which asserts that

a man is considered mentally unsound if he

willingly continues to fly dangerous combat

missions but that if he makes the necessary

formal request to be relieved of such

missions, the very act of making the request

proves that he is sane and therefore

ineligible to be relieved. Catch-22 soon

entered the language as a label for any

irrational, circular, and impossible

situation.

Id.

- 8 -he would effectively lose the privacy war and

subject himself and his minor daughter to the

irreparable harm he brought suit to avoid.

On the closed trial question, Doe argued that neither the First

Amendment nor the common law established the public's unfettered

right to access civil trials. In support, he explained how "this

whole case is about preserving [his] confidential information,"

and an open trial would defeat the purpose of the litigation; he

argued that an open trial "would deter similarly situated litigants

in the future from seeking to enforce non-disclosure agreements";

and he emphasized that his child's safety, which supposedly

depended on his confidentiality, is "at the heart of [his] claims

in this case." And on the pseudonym question, Doe explained that

he faced an "unusually severe harm . . . were his and his minor

child's identities to be revealed." Indeed, if he succeeded at an

un-pseudonymized trial, he would have "won the battle but

effectively lost the privacy war."

Smith and the Maine Trust opposed both closure and

pseudonymity on various grounds. (We move past the contents of

these filings for now, because they largely track the district

court's analysis.)

In a detailed written opinion, the district court denied

both of Doe's requests. See Doe, 2025 WL 1080750, at *14 (closure

of trial); id. at *15 (pseudonyms). Here are the highlights of

its reasoning (with specifics coming later, as needed).

- 9 -Starting with closure, the district court explained that

it was "a nonstarter," because the "presumptive rule is public

access." Id. at *10. And while there were some examples in which

a limited closure might be appropriate -- for instance, "where the

contents of a pending patent application, which are confidential

by statute, are at issue" -- this was not one such case. Id. at

*11. After all, "courts often deal with information that people

would prefer to keep out of the public eye," such as familial and

financial secrets (both implicated in this case), but "if the

wishes of litigants for privacy trumped the right of public access,

courts would become publicly funded forums for private litigation,

unaccountable to the public itself." Id.

Moving to pseudonymity, the district court held that the

parties could not continue to use pseudonyms should the case go to

trial. Id. at *14. It applied our decision in Doe v. MIT, 46

F.4th 61, 69 (1st Cir. 2022), which itself reiterated that there

is a "strong presumption against the use of pseudonyms in civil

litigation." (We will detail the specifics of Doe v. MIT -- which,

to be clear, involved a different "Doe" than today -- later.) And

Doe's rationale for pseudonymity -- what the district court

described as the "harmful consequences of great, sudden

wealth" -- didn't offer much of a limiting principle. Doe, 2025

WL 1080750, at *15. Instead, such a rule "could be applied to a

relatively large and certainly prominent slice of the American

- 10 -population" far beyond "lottery winners to heirs to large fortunes,

top tier professional athletes, highly successful entrepreneurs,

nationally prominent entertainers," and many others. Id. But

importantly for the district court, "great wealth comes with the

financial capacity to afford enhanced security and privacy,"

lessening the "risks of disclosure." Id.

And, as for the catch-22 -- Doe filing "a lawsuit to

enforce his NDA, which prohibits the disclosure of private

information" but now facing "an upcoming trial at which the private

information could be publicly disclosed" -- the district court

explained it was a "dilemma . . . of [Doe's] own making." Id.

"Parties to sensitive contracts sometimes agree to a confidential

arbitration or a confidential mediation," the district court

explained, "but here the NDA expressly provides that Mr. Doe will

be 'entitled to temporary injunctive relief' upon breach by Ms.

Smith." Id. And because "only a court can issue temporary

injunctive relief, Mr. Doe's NDA contained the seeds of its own

ineffectiveness." Id.

Finally, on Doe's concerns about his daughter, the

district court said that in accordance with the court's normal

protocol for protecting children, "she would be identified only by

initials" during the trial. Id. And, importantly, Doe "provided

no evidence for the Court to conclude that if his name were

revealed, her privacy would be in jeopardy." Id.

- 11 -Unsatisfied, Doe timely appealed.

OUR TWO CENTS

Now before us, Doe says the district court erred in

(1) denying his motion for closure of trial and (2) denying his

request to hold a trial using pseudonyms.9

Everyone agrees that we review each issue under the

"abuse of discretion" standard. See United States v. Kravetz, 706

F.3d 47, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) (public access to judicial records);10

9 We have appellate jurisdiction to consider both issues via

the collateral order doctrine. That doctrine permits "immediate

appellate review of a small class of orders which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted

in the action." Doe v. MIT, 46 F.4th 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up). It applies "when three conditions are satisfied:

the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; it

must resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal

from a final judgment." Id. (cleaned up).

As for the denial of pseudonym use during trial, we've said

specifically that such an order fits the bill. See id. at 66. We

needn't linger there.

As for the denial of the motion to close trial, we think (and

no one contests) it similarly qualifies. The district court's

order "conclusively determine[d]" that the trial wouldn't be

closed; that order was both "important" and "completely separate

from the merits"; and, of course, not reviewing this decision and

thus letting the trial proceed as open would indeed make the

question "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment," because it would unmask Doe and Smith's identities.

Id. at 65-66 (cleaned up).

10Kravetz concerned a journalist's motion to unseal certain

documents in a criminal proceeding, not a plaintiff's motion for

a closed trial. See 706 F.3d at 51. But the district court

thought the case applicable for this reason:

By its nature, the entirety of the information

to be presented at trial is a "judicial

- 12 -MIT, 46 F.4th at 66 (pseudonyms). Such an abuse "occurs when a

material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an

improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper

factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in

weighing them." MIT, 46 F.4th at 66 (cleaned up). And a trial

court never has the discretion "to make a determination that is

premised on an incorrect legal standard." Id. (cleaned up).

A. Trial Closure

Doe assigns four main errors to the trial court's denial

of his motion for a closed trial. Before we get to those errors,

though, we provide some principles that guide our analysis.

Primer

For starters, "historically both civil and criminal

trials have been presumptively open." Richmond Newspapers, Inc.

v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (plurality opinion);

see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979)

record," under the Kravetz definition,

constituting documents and information

"submitted by parties to aid in the

adjudication of" an issue before the court and

that is "meant to impact the court's

disposition of substantive rights."

Doe v. Smith, No. 2:23-cv-00423-JAW, 2025 WL 1080750, at *11 (D.

Me. Apr. 10, 2025) (quoting Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 52). Given the

parties' agreement about Kravetz's applicability, we see no reason

to disturb the district court's application of this framework to

these circumstances. And, along with the framework, we import our

abuse of discretion standard of review. See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at

61.

- 13 -("For many centuries, both civil and criminal trials have

traditionally been open to the public."); Publicker Indus., Inc.

v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that "an

examination of the authority on which the Supreme Court relied in

these cases reveals that the public's right of access to civil

trials and records is as well established as that of criminal

proceedings and records"); Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990

F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 2021) (tracing the public's right of access

back to "Roman law, where trials were res publica -- public

affairs").

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect that

common-law history of transparency. Consider Rule 77(b): "Every

trial on the merits must be conducted in open court and, so far as

convenient, in a regular courtroom." (Emphasis added.) Or

consider Rule 43(a): "At trial, the witnesses' testimony must be

taken in open court," unless another authority requires otherwise.

(Emphasis added.) And while courts applying those rules have

sometimes recognized that such openness requirements might "be

overcome in proper circumstances," everyone agrees that an open

trial is the baseline. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v.

Commodity Exch., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

(describing a "presumption" of open trials).

Doe's attempt to carve out an exception to the common-law

right of access relies primarily on Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 47, a

- 14 -case about a reporter's attempt to access sealed documents in a

criminal proceeding.11 Like the district court, we think Kravetz,

though not a perfect fit on the facts, offers us a helpful

framework for weighing the competing interests in adjudicating a

motion to close a trial to the public where, as here, the parties

agree that its framework applies. See Doe, 2025 WL 1080750, at

*12 (discussing Kravetz). So we'll spell out what, precisely, we

said there.

Kravetz explained that while "the public's right of

access is vibrant, it is not unfettered," and "important

countervailing interests can, in given instances, overwhelm the

usual presumption and defeat access." 706 F.3d at 59 (cleaned

up). Some of those countervailing interests, we said, are "privacy

rights of [participants] and other third parties." Id. at 62.

(cleaned up). In determining whether the protection of those

rights defeated the presumptive right of access, we instructed

courts to consider "the degree to which the subject matter is

traditionally considered private rather than public," as well as

"the nature and degree of injury" to be sustained if the

information was unveiled. Id. (cleaned up). Likewise, "financial

We stop here to note that Smith also argued (both here and

below) that the First Amendment right of access supported denying

Doe's motion to close trial. See Doe, 2025 WL 1080750, at *4.

The district court declined to reach that argument, citing

constitutional avoidance principles. See id. at *8. We do the

same.

- 15 -records of a wholly owned business, family affairs, illnesses,

embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications, and similar

matters will weigh more heavily against access than conduct

affecting a substantial portion of the public." Id. at 62 (cleaned

up). And finally, in quoting from one of our past decisions, we

explained that the trial court "enjoys considerable leeway" in

making the decision to restrict access (or not). Id. at 61

(quoting Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.

1998)).

Discussion

That explained, we turn now to Doe's various arguments.

(Spoiler: none persuade us.12)

First,13 Doe opens his attack on the district court's

decision by saying that it failed to consider Doe's constitutional

"contractual privacy rights" in its analysis. But we can make

quick work of this one. In his opening brief, Doe cites only one

case to support his proposition that such a constitutional contract

right exists, Adkins v. Child. Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525,

545 (1923). But there is a big problem for Doe: the Supreme Court

Giving credit where it's due, our reasoning largely tracks

that of Smith and the Maine Trust.

Just a heads up, we use these bolded ordinal words to set

apart Doe's big (i.e., worth their own heading in his brief)

arguments.

- 16 -overruled that Lochner-era case almost ninety years ago.14 See W.

Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) ("Our

conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's

Hospital . . . should be, and it is, overruled."). And although

Doe rightfully acknowledges that error in his reply brief, he

doesn't provide any other caselaw that explains why his NDA should

constitutionally compel the district court to shutter the

courtroom doors. So that settles that.15

Along similar lines, Doe says the district court

overlooked “relevant case law that . . . recognizes the propriety

of excluding the media and public from a civil trial to protect

competing contractual and privacy interests." But none of Doe's

cases come close to supporting what he wants: full-scale closure

14 The Lochner Era, deriving its name from Lochner v. New

York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), evades easy definition. See Epic Sys.

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 521 (2018) ("'Lochnerizing' has

become so much an epithet that the very use of the label may

obscure attempts at understanding." (quoting Laurence H. Tribe,

American Constitutional Law 435 (1978)). But most commonly, it

refers to the Supreme Court's early-twentieth-century decisions

invalidating legislative efforts to protect workers' rights and

promote labor reform; as Justice Ginsburg explained, the Lochner

court "invalidated [such] legislation based on then-ascendant

notions about employers' and employees' constitutional right to

'liberty of contract.'" Id. at 529 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

So that's why "liberty of contract" is often thought of as a

Lochner-era idea.

15 Doe also invokes his constitutional "right to sue in court,"

but we don't see how that has any bearing on the denial of his

motion to close trial.

- 17 -of a federal civil trial.16 See Standard & Poor’s Corp., 541 F.

Supp. at 1274 (permitting 40-50 minutes' worth of closure to

protect trade secrets); Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975

F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1992) (permitting a brief closure while antiterrorist measures on airlines discussed); Publicker Indus., 733

F.2d at 1074 (holding that the district court abused its discretion

by closing a preliminary injunction hearing). And the only example

of full trial closure that Doe produces on appeal is a juvenile

case -- which is apples-and-oranges different from his suit (as

that case itself explains). See In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 448

(Ohio 1990) ("Juvenile courts differ significantly from courts of

general jurisdiction. . . . Consequently, juvenile courts have

adopted unique methods of conducting their proceedings."). No

error here.

Second, Doe says the district court misunderstood the

balancing test established in Kravetz. Again, Kravetz made clear

that the court must weigh "the nature and degree" of injury that

public disclosure would cause, considering "the sensitivity of the

information and the subject" and "how the person seeking access

intends to use the information." 706 F.3d at 62. Doe says that

16 Wenote here, also, that there are some mild waiver problems

with Doe's argument that the district court "failed to consider"

some of his "relevant case law," such as Ospina and In re T.R.,

neither of which he seems to have cited below. (The waiver issue,

of course, is that a party can't fault a district court for not

considering a case that they didn't cite below.)

- 18 -the district court whiffed on that weighing; had it done its job

properly, it (in Doe's words) "would have found that the sensitive

nature" of the NDA "defeats public access," as evidenced by (1) all

the press that lottery winners get generally and (2) all the press

that this specific case has gotten.

But we think the district court's decision evinced

careful consideration of Kravetz, as well as these factors and

facts. See, e.g., Doe, 2025 WL 1080750, at *11-13. It

acknowledged that Doe has argued this is a sensitive case focusing

"on the parties' individual finances, family affairs including

those involving their minor daughter, and may include information

the parties deem to be embarrassing and that they would prefer to

keep private." Id. at *11. And while the district court explained

that it took such "considerations seriously," it remained true

that (1) "courts often deal with information that people would

prefer to keep out of the public eye," and (2) "if the wishes of

litigants for privacy trumped the right of public access, courts

would become publicly funded forums for private litigation,

unaccountable to the public itself." Id. Further, the district

court cited several cases in Maine highlighting how "courts

routinely describe in published divorce cases the intimate

financial circumstances of the divorcing couple, sometimes in

detail," and "where children are involved, even in custody

disputes, courts routinely issue publicly available orders." Id.

- 19 -at *12 (cleaned up, collecting cases). Such discussion surely

goes to the "nature and degree" of the injury, as well as the

"sensitivity of the information and the subject," so we can't agree

with Doe that the district court neglected evaluating the relevant

factors under Kravetz. See 706 F.3d at 62; id. at 61 (explaining

that "once the trial court has struck the balance, an appellate

court will review its determination only for mistake of law or

abuse of discretion").

Nor, on the question of how the people "seeking access

intend[] to use [Doe's] information," do we think the district

court erred in rejecting the notion that public access to this

trial will "simply . . . cater to a morbid craving for that which

is sensational and impure," despite Doe's contention otherwise.

Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 62 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). That

statement from Kravetz (itself cribbed from past cases) largely

concerns the unnecessary release of "peripheral" information,

which is why the "simply" is there in that quote. Id. (cleaned

up). But we agree with the district court that, like it or not,

Doe's identity is at "the heart of this dispute" that he's sued

over. See Doe, 2025 WL 1080750, at *12.

Third, Doe claims the district court misconstrued the

NDA by implicitly asserting Doe was "weaponizing" it against Smith

to "gain leverage over her in their custody dispute." Doe says

that the district court's discussion of how NDAs are a matter "of

- 20 -public interest" actually reveals (1) an incorrect factual

assumption by the district court, (2) an improper suggestion that

Doe's NDA was unenforceable, and (3) an injudicious appearance of

"misplaced sympathy for Smith as the silenced victim of a

weaponized NDA." See id. at *13.

But after our own careful review of the record, we again

see no reversible error. As to the first point, the district court

simply said that this case takes place in "the broader context of

contested custody litigation in state court." Id. at *12. That's

undoubtedly true. This lawsuit was filed six months into the

custody dispute which, as we understand it, was still ongoing when

the district court considered the closure motion. As to the second

point, the district court's discussion of caselaw about NDAs

(including their unenforceability) was just an explanation of why

a family dispute and an NDA would constitute a matter of public

interest. See id. at *13. And as to the third point, we see no

evidence that the district court based its decision on "misplaced

sympathy" for Smith, given its careful explanation of the parties'

positions and its extensive discussion of the law.

Fourth and finally, Doe asserts that "the District Court

seemingly denied Doe’s Motion for closure of trial because he is

rich" (emphasis Doe's). We can't agree. True, the district court

noted that a "party's wealth alone is not a legitimate reason to

restrict the right of public access" and that federal judges swore

- 21 -an oath to "do equal right to the poor and to the rich." See Doe,

2025 WL 1080750, at *13-14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453). But in doing

so, the district court was simply responding to a throughline of

Doe's briefing -- that his newfound wealth, and the dangers that

come with it, require closure of trial. See, e.g., id.

(identifying Doe's filings stating that "[t]here are unique risks

inherent to being an ultra-high-net-worth individual, especially

where, as here, the individual's increase in wealth is swift and

dramatic"). And, again, we think the district court's detailed

discussion of the parties' positions and the law belies any

suggestion that the motion was denied simply because Doe was rich.

See generally id.

Having walked through Doe's arguments, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of his motion

to close trial based on the vibrant and presumptive common-law

right of public access.

B. Pseudonyms

Next, we turn to Doe's lamentations about the district

court's rejection of his proposal to use pseudonyms throughout

trial. We again begin with a framework of analysis before turning

to Doe's many gripes.

- 22 -Primer

For starters, there is a "strong presumption against the

use of pseudonyms in civil litigation."17 MIT, 46 F.4th at 67.

(Note that we're about to crib, rather heavily, from this case,

which artfully explains the law in this area.)

There are plenty of good reasons for this presumption.

For one, our country has a long-running tradition "of doing justice

out in the open, neither in a corner nor in any covert manner."

Id. at 68 (cleaned up). For another, "anonymizing the parties

lowers the odds that journalists, activists, or other interested

members of the public would catch wind of [judicial] mischief,"

such mischief being something we strive to avoid. Id. at 68-69

(cleaned up). And for a third, "litigating behind a curtain

creates a shroud of mystery, giving the impression that something

secret is going on," another thing we strive to avoid, given that

a "judicial system replete with Does and Roes invites cynicism and

undermines public confidence in the courts' work." Id. at 69

(cleaned up).

17 For those interested in the presumption's doctrinal

origins, we advise the curious reader to review Judge Selya's

helpful description in MIT. See 46 F.4th at 67-68. But the

SparkNotes is that "federal courts enforce the presumption against

party pseudonyms in civil litigation under their inherent power to

formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the

Constitution or the Congress." Id. at 68 (cleaned up).

- 23 -All those reasons explain why "litigation by pseudonym

should occur only in exceptional cases." Id. at 70 (cleaned up).

Although we've explained that the ultimate inquiry into finding an

"exceptional" case is a "totality of the circumstances" test, we've

recognized that "general guidelines" would be helpful for courts

navigating this area. Id. Thankfully, we've identified a

"workable methodology for sorting out the (relatively few)

'exceptional cases' in which pseudonymity should be allowed." Id.

These narrow cases mainly fall into four paradigms:

1. A "would-be Doe who reasonably fears that coming out

of the shadows will cause him unusually severe harm

(either physical or psychological)." Id. at 71.

2. A case where "identifying the would-be Doe would

harm innocent non-parties." Id. (cleaned up).

3. A case where "anonymity is necessary to forestall a

chilling effect on future litigants who may be

similarly situated." Id.

4. A case that is "bound up with a prior proceeding

made confidential by law." Id.

But "[t]hese paradigms are rough cuts," so three more wrinkles

guide our inquiry. Id. First, "it is possible that a party whose

case for pseudonymity appears weak when each paradigm is analyzed

separately may nonetheless make a persuasive showing when multiple

paradigms are implicated." Id. Second, there may be "rare cases"

- 24 -where, although the case fits within one or more paradigm, "either

the need for openness or the prospect of serious prejudice to other

parties from a grant of pseudonymity overwhelms the movant's

privacy concerns." Id. And third, it's well possible that "these

four paradigms" don't "capture the entire universe of cases in

which pseudonymity may be appropriate," so at bottom, what courts

should do is look at the "totality of the circumstances." Id.;

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain