[Cite as State v. Malinowski, 2026-Ohio-3603.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 4-26-01
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
LOGAN L. MALINOWSKI, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 25 CR 15763
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 15, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Henry Schaefer for Appellant
Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case No. 4-26-01
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Logan Malinowski (“Malinowski”), appeals the judgment of
the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas revoking her community control and imposing a
14-month prison sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On July 16, 2025, Malinowski was indicted by a Defiance County Grand Jury on one
count of assault on a police officer in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a felony of the fourth degree;
one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a combination
of them in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor; and two counts of
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(C)(1), both first-degree misdemeanors.
{¶3} Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed one count of endangering children.
On August 25, 2025, Malinowski pleaded guilty to all remaining charges. On September 16, 2025,
the trial court sentenced her to three years of community control with the following special
conditions:
1. The Defendant shall enter no bars or taverns; the Defendant shall not consume
or possess alcohol;
2. The Defendant shall not use, possess, or consume any cannabis products; and
3. The Defendant shall attend and successfully complete the SEARCH Program
in Bowling Green, Ohio.
The trial court further stated in its judgment entry that “in the event of violation of Community
Control, the Court may impose an eighteen (18) month basic prison term….”
{¶4} In January 2026, Malinowski tested positive for cocaine. A revocation hearing was
held on March 2, 2026 during which Malinowski admitted to the violation but moved to dismiss
on the grounds that the original sentencing entry was deficient pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C). The
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trial court denied the motion, revoked her community control, and imposed a 14-month prison
term.
{¶5} Malinowski timely appealed. She raises a single assignment of error.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by revoking appellant’s
community control and imposing a fourteen-month prison sentence
when the original sentencing entry failed to properly notify appellant of
a specific, definitive reserved prison term.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Malinowski contends the trial court failed to
clearly and definitively notify her of the exact prison term which could be imposed in the
event of a violation of community control sanctions.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence “only if
it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial
court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”
State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will
produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to
be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph
three of syllabus.
Analysis
R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) states in relevant part:
If the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a community
control sanction should be imposed and the court is not prohibited from
imposing a community control sanction, the court shall impose a community
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control sanction. The court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of
the sanction are violated, [or] if the offender commits a violation of any law,
. . .the court may impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose
a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term on the offender and
shall indicate the range from which the prison term may be imposed as a
sanction for the violation, which shall be the range of prison terms for the
offense that is specified pursuant to section 2929.14 of the Revised Code and
as described in section 2929.15 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.) “Thus, ‘[w]hen a trial court imposes community control, it must notify
the offender of the possible results of a violation of those sanctions.’” State v. Van Den
Eynde, 2023-Ohio-1790, ¶ 5 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Lyle, 2014-Ohio-751, ¶ 12 (3d
Dist.).
{¶8} We recently addressed this identical issue in State v. Pruitt, 2024-Ohio-5434
(3d Dist.) and adopt the same rational in this matter. As we explained in Pruitt:
“‘The court must strictly comply with this requirement and
specifically state what the possible prison term may be to the offender orally
at the time of sentencing.’” [Van Den Eynde] at ¶ 6, quoting Lyle at ¶
19. Because compliance with the mandates of R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) “must
come at the sentencing hearing, notification generally is deficient when the
trial court's statements to an offender of a possible term of imprisonment
occurs at a plea hearing and is not repeated at a later sentencing
hearing.” State v. Brooks, 2004-Ohio-4746, ¶ 17. Further, notification given
in a trial court’s entry issued after sentencing does not comport with R.C.
2929.14(B)(4). Id. at ¶ 18.
“‘Compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) is a prerequisite to imposing
a prison term for a community control violation.’” Van Den Eynde at ¶ 7,
quoting State v. Clinton, 2022-Ohio-717, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). “‘When a sentence
fails to include a mandatory provision, such as the notification provision
under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4), it may be appealed because such a sentence is
“contrary to law” and is also not “authorized by law.”’” Id., quoting State v.
Batty, 2014-Ohio-2826, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.). If the trial court failed to properly
notify an offender as required by R.C. 2929.14(B)(4), “the matter must be
remanded to the trial court for a resentencing under that provision with a
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prison term not an option.” Brooks at ¶ 33. “Although a prison term is not
an option at the resentencing, the trial court may choose to impose a longer
time under the same sanction or impose a more restrictive sanction.” State
v. Goldsberry, 2009-Ohio-6026, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.).
“Finally, where an offender is properly notified of a specific prison
term that will be imposed upon a community control violation, the offender
violates the terms of his community control, and the trial judge chooses to
impose a prison term, the ‘term imposed may not exceed the term the
offender was originally notified of under’” R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). Id. at ¶ 13,
quoting Brooks at ¶ 22. See also Van Den Eynde at ¶ 15 (“While changing
the content of the notification from an announcement of a ‘specific prison
term’ to a recitation of the ‘range of prison terms for the offense,’ the
revisions to R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) have not changed the fact that a trial court is
still required to ‘indicate’ the reserved prison term that may be imposed for
a community control violation. R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).”). “However, ‘[b]ecause
the trial judge is not required to choose a prison term under R.C. 2929.15, it
follows that the trial judge could choose to impose a lesser term of
imprisonment than the one the offender was informed of under’” R.C.
2929.19(B)(4). Goldsberry at ¶ 13, quoting Brooks at ¶ 22.
Pruitt at ¶ 8-10.
{¶9} Here, Malinowski contends the judgment entry’s statement that the court “may
impose an eighteen (18) month basic prison term” is “fatally defective,” because
“the language is purely speculative,” and “the trial court failed to fulfill its statutory duty
to properly declare a reserved term at the original sentencing.” (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
We disagree.
{¶10} Apart from the judgment entry, at the September 16, 2025 sentencing hearing,
the trial court stated “if you fail to comply with your rules of community control the Court
can impose any of the originally available prison terms that could be up to an eighteenmonth stated prison term….” (Sept. 16, 2025 Tr. at 9). Thus, orally and in the judgment
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entry of sentence, the trial court plainly and properly informed Malinowski of the
maximum term that could be imposed if she broke the rules of community control. “For
all revocations, the prison term must be within the range of prison terms available for the
offense for which community control had been imposed and the term may not exceed the
prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the original sentencing
hearing.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Monroe, 2020-Ohio-597, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). While the
trial court could have imposed an 18-month maximum prison term, it chose to impose a
lesser 14-month prison term. Accordingly, “because the trial court imposed a lesser term
of imprisonment, [Malinowski’s] sentence is not contrary to law.” Pruitt at ¶ 13. The better
practice remains for the trial court to inform an offender of the range of prison terms that
could be imposed upon a violation of the terms and conditions of a community-control
sanction. See id. (“Even though the better practice would have been for the trial court to
inform Pruitt of the range of the prison term that could be imposed if he violated the terms
and conditions of his community-control sanctions. . . .”) (Emphasis in original.)
However, we find that the trial court did not err by advising Malinowski at sentencing of
the maximum prison term that could be imposed for a violation of community control
sanctions. We further hold that the trial court did not err in subsequently imposing a prison
term less than the maximum term specified in its prior notice. We do not find Malinowski’s
sentence to be contrary to law.
{¶11} Malinowski’s assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶12} For the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.
Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the particulars assigned and
argued, the judgment of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The
cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and
serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings
and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
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