IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00058-COA
JOHNNY LEE THOMAS A/K/A JOHNNY APPELLANT THOMAS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES W. WRIGHT JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
JOHNNY LEE THOMAS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: KASSIE ANN COLEMAN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/15/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.
EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Johnny Lee Thomas was convicted of the first-degree murder of Garland Murray in
the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Mississippi. He was sentenced to serve life in the
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as a habitual offender pursuant to
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2000). After the trial court denied his
post-trial motion, Thomas perfected this appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On August 7, 2021, outdoor surveillance cameras at the Old Marion Apartments in Meridian, Mississippi, captured the events leading to Murray’s death. The video and audio
recording of the incident was introduced into evidence at trial. Thomas testified that he drove
Tommy Robinson and Matthew Chaney to the apartment complex that day so that Robinson
could meet his wife there. Thomas testified that when the three men pulled into the apartment
complex, he noticed an acquaintance named Marquis, also known as “Black,” in the parking
lot on his right. According to Thomas, he kept driving past Black, took a left, and parked his
car to the side of one of the apartment buildings. At the outset of the surveillance video,
Thomas was standing in the parking lot talking with a group of men. Robinson was across
the street from Thomas, near Thomas’ parked car, sitting at the top of some concrete steps
leading up to an apartment building. Murray was standing at the foot of the steps where
Robinson was sitting. In the video, Murray and Robinson were in the middle of a
conversation that visibly escalated into an argument. Still engaged with Robinson, Murray
proceeded to walk across the street toward the area where Thomas was congregated with
several other men. At one point in the video, Murray walked back into the middle of the
street facing Robinson, who had begun to walk toward Murray. Murray pointed at Robinson
stating, “Man I’ll fight you.” Just a few seconds later, Murray pulled a gun from the
waistband of his pants and fired a shot toward the ground in Robinson’s direction. The bullet
hit the ground several feet in front of Robinson. After Murray fired the gun, Robinson ran
in the opposite direction. Murray then turned away from Robinson and began to walk back
toward Thomas and the other group of men. While Murray never pointed his gun at anyone
else, the gun remained in his hand as he moved among the group. As Murray moved through
2
the group, Thomas was standing behind Murray. While Murray faced away from Thomas,
Thomas fired multiple shots at Murray. After Murray fell to the ground, Thomas fled across
the street and got into his car with Robinson. The pair drove back over to where Murray had
been shot to retrieve one of Thomas’ shoes that had come off as he was running towards his
car. The last seconds of the video show Thomas and Robinson speeding out of the apartment
complex lot while Murray remained lying on the ground. Murray was transported to the
hospital where he died. Murray’s autopsy stated that his cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds. Murray sustained four total gunshot wounds. Two bullets entered Murray’s torso
from the back, and two bullets entered Murray’s torso and right arm from the front.
¶3. After Thomas and Robinson left the apartment complex, Thomas drove to his friend
Troy Reed’s home. Reed testified that Thomas’ wife, Taquaisha, called him and told him that
the car that Thomas drove to his house needed some mechanical work.1 According to Reed,
he assumed that the car was “broke down” and that they needed somewhere to store it until
they got it fixed. In response to Taquaisha’s phone call, Reed told her that the car could
remain parked behind his house until it was repaired. Before a warrant was secured for the
vehicle, investigators received an anonymous tip identifying Thomas as the individual who
shot Murray, and the individual identified the vehicle that he was driving. Investigators were
able to corroborate the anonymous tip through additional eyewitness statements and by
comparing Thomas’ social media pictures with the surveillance video. Detective Richard
1
The initial description of the vehicle that Thomas was driving was a white PT Cruiser. However, after review of the surveillance video, the vehicle was described as a white Kia Soul. Thomas’ wife, Taquaisha owned the Kia Soul, and the vehicle was registered in her name.
3
Robinson testified that multiple investigations were going on at the same time as the shooting
at the Old Marion apartment complex. According to Detective Robinson, one of those
investigations involved a shooting into the home of Willie Ruffin. Detective Robinson
testified that Ruffin was “a known associate of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Robinson.” According
to Detective Robinson, the shooting into Ruffin’s home occurred “like five hours after the
shooting at Old Marion Road in the early morning hours.” During the investigation into the
shooting at Ruffin’s home, detectives found Thomas at the scene. Ruffin testified that on
August 7, 2021, Thomas was living in Ruffin’s home in a studio in the back. According to
Ruffin, on that day, Thomas left Ruffin’s home with Tommy Robinson and Matt Chaney.
Investigators executed a search warrant at Ruffin’s home and found a pair of shorts that
matched those worn by Thomas on the day that Murray was shot. Thomas turned himself in
to law enforcement several days after the shooting, on August 16, 2021.
¶4. Thomas’ three-day trial began on December 9, 2024. During the trial, Thomas
testified in his own defense and did not deny shooting Murray. Instead, Thomas claimed that
he shot Murray in self-defense. Thomas’ version of events that occurred on August 7, 2021,
conflicted with the surveillance video footage that was shown to the jury. After all the
evidence was presented at trial and after closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury
retired to deliberate, and the alternate jurors were dismissed.
¶5. During the jury’s deliberations, the court received a note from one of the jurors
expressing fear and unease in rendering a verdict because witnesses and family members of
the individuals associated with the trial had seen the juror’s vehicles. Ultimately, the jurors
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were brought back into the courtroom, and the judge assured the jurors that law enforcement
would escort them to their vehicles and provide security at their homes if necessary. Later,
during deliberation, the court received a second note, apparently from the same juror, stating
that she was having high anxiety and heart palpitations and did not think she could continue.
Although the court briefly considered replacing the anxious juror with one of the dismissed
alternate jurors who had remained in the courthouse building, the judge did not do so.
Instead, the judge called the jurors back into the courtroom and reiterated that all the jurors
would have security to escort them to their vehicles and that security at their homes would
be provided if needed. After further deliberations, Thomas was found guilty of first-degree
murder. Thomas filed a motion for a new trial on December 20, 2024. His motion was
denied on January 6, 2025. Thomas filed his notice of appeal on January 13, 2025.
ANALYSIS
¶6. Thomas had court-appointed counsel on appeal. Thomas’ counsel filed a timely
appellant’s brief with three issues. Those issues are as follows: (1) The trial court erred by
refusing instruction D-15-1 regarding defense of others; (2) the trial court erred by refusing
instruction D-14 regarding “no duty to retreat;”2 and (3) the trial court violated Batson v.
Kentucky3 by applying unequal scrutiny to the State’s and Thomas’ peremptory strikes.
2
Issue one and Issue two of the appellant’s brief filed by counsel will be consolidated within the analysis portion of this opinion as they both relate to jury instructions.
3
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127(1994), prevent the parties, during the jury selection process, from exercising peremptory challenges to discriminate against potential jurors based upon their race or gender. This issue is typically raised as a “Batson” challenge.
5
Thomas filed a document titled “Pro Se Supplemental Briefing in Support of Direct Appeal.”
While Thomas’ pro se document is identified as a supplemental pleading, it was filed prior
to his court-appointed counsel’s brief. Thomas’ pro se brief addresses an additional eleven
issues. We first address the issues raised by Thomas’ appellate counsel.
I. Did the trial court err in refusing proposed jury instructions D-15-1 and D-14?
¶7. Thomas contends that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction D15-1 on self-defense or the defense of others. Thomas argues that he was denied an
instruction that would have allowed the jury to acquit him if it found he acted in his own
defense or to defend Robinson. Thomas also argues that the trial court erred by refusing his
proposed jury instruction D-14 on “no duty to retreat.” He claims that the jury was never
informed that he did not have a duty to retreat, and the instruction given failed to fairly
announce the law of the case.
¶8. When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, the supreme
court explained in Victory v. State, 83 So. 3d 370, 373 (¶12) (Miss. 2012):
[T]o grant or deny proposed jury instructions is within the sole discretion of
the circuit court. Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). Thus,
this Court reviews the grant or denial of jury instructions for an abuse of
discretion. Id. No one instruction should be singled out. Id. Accordingly, the
Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether an error
has occurred. Id. “A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which
present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the
court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered
fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.”
Id. at 74 (¶20) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶45) (Miss. 2008)).
“[I]f the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no
injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Id. at 73 (¶20) (quoting
Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶224) (Miss. 2006)).
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A. Jury Instruction D-15-1
¶9. Thomas’ proposed jury instruction D-15-1 stated:
The Court instructs the jury that self-defense and defense-of-others is a law of
necessity. Every human being has a right to defend himself and others against
death or serious bodily harm. But in order to justify the use of deadly force in
defense, it must appear that the person attacked was so situated and
endangered that the Defendant honestly believed, and that the Defendant had
reasonable grounds for believing, that he or someone else was in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily harm.
The circumstances under which he acted must have been such as to produce
in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the belief that
the other person was then about to kill him or someone else, or to do him or
someone else serious bodily harm.
The Court instructs you the jury that you are not to judge the actions of Johnny
Thomas in the cool, calm light of after-developed facts but instead you are to
put yourself in his place and judge his actions in the light of the circumstances
confronting Johnny Thomas at the time, as you believe from the evidence that
those circumstances reasonably appeared to him on the occasion; and,
(1) If you believe that under those circumstances it reasonably
appeared to Johnny Thomas, at the instant that he took up a
weapon, that Johnny Thomas then and there had reasonable
ground to apprehend a design on the part of Garland Murray to
kill Johnny Thomas or to do some great personal injury to
Johnny Thomas, and there reasonably appeared to Johnny
Thomas to be [in] imminent danger of such designs being
accomplished; then Johnny Thomas was justified in anticipating
an attack and using reasonable means to defend such attack;
then you must find Johnny Thomas not guilty of the murder of
Garland Murray.
(2) If you believe that under those circumstances it reasonably
appeared to Johnny Thomas, at the instant that he took up a
weapon, that Johnny Thomas then and there had reasonable
ground to apprehend a design on the part of Garland Murray to
kill Tommy Robinson or to do some great personal injury to
Tommy Robinson, and there reasonably appeared to Johnny
Thomas to be [in] imminent danger of such designs being
7
accomplished; then Johnny Thomas was justified in anticipating
an attack and using reasonable means to defend such attack;
then you must find Johnny Thomas not guilty of the murder of
Garland Murray.
The trial court instead gave jury instruction S-3, which ultimately became jury instruction C12. Jury instruction C-12 stated:
The court instructs the jury that to make a killing justifiable on the grounds of
self-defense, the danger to the defendant or another must be either actual,
present and urgent, or the defendant must have reasonable grounds to believe
that the victim intended to kill the defendant or another or to do him or another
some great bodily harm, and in addition to this, he must have reasonable
grounds to believe that there is imminent danger of such act being
accomplished. It is for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the grounds
upon which the defendant acts. If you, the jury, unanimously find that the
defendant acted in self-defense, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict
in favor of the defendant.
During the jury instruction conference when Thomas’ attorney requested the self-defense
instruction, the judge asked, “[T]he self-defense instruction in D-15 is covered?” The State
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” In response the judge stated, “It’s refused. D-15-1 is
covered. It’s refused. D-15-2, it’s refused; covered. Also, the court notes that under the
rules[,] the [c]ourt’s not required to rule on this many multiple instructions that are basically
the same.”
¶10. While the court did not give the instruction requested by Thomas, the court did give
an instruction that covered both self-defense and the defense of others. Thomas’ claim that
the jury was not instructed on his theory of self-defense or defense of another is without
merit.
B. Jury Instruction D-14
8
¶11. Thomas’ proposed jury instruction D-14 stated:
The Court instructs you the jury that if
1) Johnny Lee Thomas was not the initial aggressor, and
2) Johnny Lee Thomas was not engaged in unlawful activity, and
3) Johnny Lee Thomas was in a place where he had a right to be, and
4) Johnny Lee Thomas had reasonable ground to apprehend a design by
Garland Murray to commit a felony or do some great personal injury,
and
5) there was imminent danger of Garland Murray accomplishing such
design,
Then Johnny Lee Thomas had no duty to retreat before using deadly force on
Garland Murray, and you the jury cannot even consider the failure of Johnny
Lee Thomas to retreat as evidence that Johnny Lee Thomas’ use of deadly
force was unnecessary, excessive, or unreasonable.
The trial court refused this instruction, finding that this theory of Thomas’ defense was
covered by other instructions. The trial court had previously approved jury instruction C-16,
along with C-12 noted above. Jury instruction C-16 stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that while a Defendant may stand his ground and
resist force by force, the resistance or force used by the Defendant may not be
disproportionate to the attack or force used by the victim.
¶12. Thomas argued at trial, and on appeal, that instruction C-16 was not sufficient to
properly instruct the jury on his rights in this regard. An almost identical instruction was, in
fact, found to be insufficient in Haynes v. State, 412 So. 3d 1170, 1180 (¶¶33-34) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2025). We find that Thomas’ right to stand his ground and the law regarding no duty
to retreat was not covered by the other instructions, as stated by the trial court.
9
¶13. However, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
instruction D-14 because there was no evidentiary basis to give such an instruction. In
Shaheed v. State, 205 So. 3d 1105, 1112-13 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), this Court
explained:
The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by denying this “stand your
ground” instruction. See Spires v. State, 10 So. 3d 477, 484 (¶ 30) (Miss.
2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court and this Court have held that it is
within the trial judge’s discretion to refuse a “stand your ground” instruction
when the defendant's own testimony is that he had no time or opportunity to
retreat, and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest to a reasonable juror
that the defendant could have retreated but did not do so. See id. at 485 (¶¶ 36-37); Thomas v. State, 145 So. 3d 687, 694-95 (¶¶27-32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
That is the case here. Shaheed’s version was that he and Truss struggled; that
Truss broke free and immediately reached for his pistol, which was in his
waistband; and that he quickly shot Truss only to prevent Truss from shooting
him. The State’s version was that Shaheed shot Truss in the head as Truss
backed away with his hands raised. Neither version or any other evidence in
the record pointed to an opportunity to retreat. Furthermore, other instructions
adequately covered the general rules of law pertaining to self-defense.
We find the same to be true in the present case.
¶14. The video of this event was shown to the jury. The video shows that after Murray fired
a shot toward Robinson, Robinson ran in the opposite direction. Murray then turned away
from Robinson and walked toward Thomas and others on the opposite side of the street.
Thomas testified that Murray walked toward him, still holding the firearm in his hand.
Thomas stated that he was afraid Murray would shoot him; however, Murray walked past
Thomas without acknowledging Thomas in any manner. After Murray had walked past
Thomas, Thomas drew his weapon and shot Murray in the back. According to the video,
Thomas fired at Murray less than five seconds after Murray had fired at Robinson. Just as in
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Shaheed, the video and other evidence clearly show that there was no opportunity for
Thomas to retreat. This issue is without merit.
II. Did the trial court err in its Batson analysis?
¶15. Thomas argues that the trial court erred by applying “unequal scrutiny” to the State’s
and Thomas’ peremptory strikes by accepting the State’s reasons for removing black jurors
while rejecting Thomas’ legitimate race-neutral reasons. In the first twelve jurors tendered
by the State, Thomas used eight peremptory challenges to strike jurors 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 20
and 22. The State made a Batson challenge stating that all eight of Thomas’ strikes were for
white potential jurors. After considering Thomas’ race-neutral reasons, the court allowed
four of Thomas’ peremptory challenges to stand, but four jurors were placed back on the
jury. In the second group of jurors tendered to the State, the State used two peremptory
challenges to strike jurors 24 and 28. Thomas made a Batson challenge stating that out of all
the additional jurors who had been submitted, the State used its strikes against the only two
black jurors in that group. The State first argued that Thomas had not made a prima facie
showing that its peremptory challenges were based on race. Without ruling on the State’s
contention, the court asked the State for race-neutral reasons for its challenges. The State
then gave its reasons for each strike. As a result, this issue is moot.4 After hearing the State’s
reasons for its strikes and the responses by Thomas, the trial court allowed the State’s
peremptory challenges to jurors 24 and 28 to stand.
¶16. In Dewberry v. State, 407 So. 3d 269, 275 (¶¶21-22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), this Court
4
See Jones v. State, 252 So. 3d 574, 581 (¶28) (Miss. 2018).
11
stated:
The Batson decision established a three-part mechanism for determining
whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory. “First, the party objecting to
the use of a peremptory strike has the burden to make a prima facie case that
race [or gender] was the criterion for the strike.” Miles v. State, 346 So. 3d
840, 842 (¶4) (Miss. 2022) (quoting H.A.S. Elec. Contractors Inc. v. Hemphill
Constr. Co., 232 So. 3d 117, 123 (¶14) (Miss. 2016)). Under step two, “the
burden shifts to the striking party to state a race-neutral reason for the strike.”
Id. Step three requires that if “the striking party offers a valid race-neutral
reason, [then] the trial judge must allow the strike unless the other party
demonstrates that the valid race-neutral reason was a pretext for
discrimination.” H.A.S., 232 So. 3d at 124 (¶19). However, “[i]f . . . a trial
judge properly finds the party has failed to provide a race-neutral reason [in
step two], [then] the question of pretext never arises, and the juror is returned
to the jury.” Hardison v. State, 94 So. 3d 1092, 1100 (¶28) (Miss. 2012).
“[We] appl[y] a highly deferential standard of review on appeal of a trial
court’s Batson rulings.” Miles, 346 So. 3d at 842 (¶5). “In particular, a Batson
ruling may not be overturned unless the record indicates that the ruling was
clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”
Garlington v. State, 349 So. 3d 782, 803 (¶65) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶17. Thomas first argues on appeal that the trial court accepted the State’s reasons for the
strikes to jurors 24 and 28 without scrutiny. Thomas argued that the State struck the only two
black jurors on the panel. The State argued that juror 24 was the niece of a local judge. More
specifically, the State argued, “That is Judge Harris’s niece, and with her relationship with
Judge Harris, we didn’t know about her – even though she said she could be fair.” Thomas
tries to compare this juror with a juror who was not stricken yet was employed at East
Mississippi State Hospital (a State facility), but a juror with a family connection to the
judicial system is not comparable to a juror employed with an irrelevant state agency.
Thomas also argued that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge against juror
12
28. The State argued, “That was the lady that when questioned about self-defense said that
she would rather kill than be killed. And based off that response, we’re going to strike her.”
Thomas argues that white jurors who expressed strong views on self-defense or gun
ownership were not challenged; however, Thomas does not refer to the record to identify any
white juror to support this argument. In Clark v. State, 343 So. 3d 943, 962 (¶56) (Miss.
2022), the supreme court stated that “[t]here is no established requirement that a trial court
must conduct a comparative juror analysis when one is not requested, and there is no
requirement that a reviewing court must conduct one for the first time on appeal.”
¶18. Thomas next argues that when the State raised a reverse Batson challenge, the trial
court “scrutinized the defense’s strikes with much greater skepticism.” The only specific
example that Thomas discusses in his brief regards juror 6. The race-neutral reason that
Thomas gave in response to juror 6 was “Juror 6 and Juror number 5 appeared to know one
another. I observed them smile at one another when they were seated by one another, and
I’d prefer not to have jurors who have prior friendships, prior relationships.” The supreme
court held in Eubanks v. State, 291 So. 3d 309, 321 (¶40) (Miss. 2020), that the State offered
a valid race-neutral reason for striking a juror who potentially had familiarity with another
juror through their mutual employer. In that case, there was proof in the record that they
shared a common employer. Id. In the case at hand, there is no proof of a relationship
between juror 5 and juror 6 other than they smiled at one another when they were seated.
Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court’s ruling in sustaining the objection as to juror
6 was erroneous.
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III. Does Thomas’ pro se supplemental brief present any reversible
error?
¶19. Large portions of Thomas’ pro se brief fail to comply with Mississippi Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28, so at the outset of our consideration of his pro se brief, we note that
this Court held the following in Hill v. State, 215 So. 3d 518, 523-24 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2017):
The argument section of Hill’s pro se brief is a disorganized series of cursory
and repetitive assertions of error with few citations to the record or relevant
legal authorities. Hill thus fails to comply with the requirement that
assignments of error must be supported by “the reasons for those contentions,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.”
M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). Arguments that do not comply with Rule 28(a)(7) are
“procedurally barred.” Cowart v. State, 178 So. 3d 651, 666 (¶39) (Miss.
2015). “While pro se litigants are afforded some leniency, they must be held
to substantially the same standards of litigation conduct as members of the
bar.” Sumrell v. State, 972 So. 2d 572, 574 (¶6) (Miss. 2008) (quotation marks
omitted); accord Thornton v. State, 141 So. 3d 5, 12 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App.
2014).
We will likewise address only those portions of Thomas’ pro se brief that cite specifics in the
record and make some meaningful argument as to why reversal is required.
A. Pro se Issue 1: The indictment was wholly void and erroneously
amended to include habitual status without due process.
¶20. Thomas claims that the indictment against him was improperly amended to charge him
as a habitual offender because the amendment was done “without notice, a formal hearing,
or a motion to amend in open court—an egregious violation of procedural due process.” The
record shows otherwise. The original indictment filed on January 12, 2023, did not include
a habitual-offender enhancement. The State filed a motion to amend the indictment to charge
Thomas as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-81 on July 3, 2024. Thomas’
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counsel filed a response objecting to the motion on September 1, 2024. The State filed a
reply to the response on September 2, 2024. The parties appeared before the court on
September 5, 2024, for a hearing on the motion. At the request of the State, and without
objection by the defense, the court took judicial notice of the two prior felony convictions
from Lauderdale County, which the State had identified in its motion as the predicate
offenses to be used by the State at any habitual sentencing hearing. Thomas testified at the
hearing. After hearing the evidence and arguments presented by both the State and the
defense, the trial court granted the motion to amend. This issue is without merit.
B. Pro Se Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel violated the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
¶21. Thomas contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective pursuant to
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for three reasons. First, he contends that
his counsel failed to object to the improper amendment of the indictment to charge him as
a habitual offender. For the reasons set forth above, we find Thomas’ claim in this regard is
without merit. See supra ¶20. Second, he contends that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him at his guilty pleas for the prior convictions that those convictions could
later be used to enhance his punishment in subsequent felony prosecutions. We find this
claim to be without merit for two reasons. Counsel at the prior guilty plea proceedings had
no duty to advise him that his convictions in those cases could later be used to charge
Thomas as an habitual offender. See Griffin v. State, 607 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Miss. 1992).
Also, Thomas’ trial counsel in the present case could not collaterally attack the voluntariness
of the prior convictions at the sentencing hearing. Thomas is required to challenge the
15
voluntariness of his pleas in the prior cases by proceedings directly challenging the judgment
in those cases. See Pulliam v. State, 328 So. 3d 93, 99 (¶22) (Miss. 2021). This claim is also
without merit.
¶22. Thomas’ last argument under this issue is that his trial counsel “failed to move for a
mistrial during critical prejudicial events.” Thomas sets out four specific instances where he
contends counsel failed to move for a mistrial and one non-specific set of instances. Thomas
contends that when a juror expressed concern for her safety, trial counsel should have moved
for a mistrial. This contention is without merit because the record reflects trial counsel did
move for a mistrial on this issue. Thomas also contends trial counsel should have moved for
a mistrial when a “compromised” alternate juror was “nearly seated” after jury deliberations
began. Because the alternate juror was not seated, this contention is without merit. Although
trial counsel specifically stated that he had no objection to the court giving the instruction,
Thomas maintains that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial when the court gave
the jury a Sharplin instruction.5 The trial court had the inherent authority and discretion to
give such an instruction to manage jury deliberations. See Oats v. State, 425 So. 3d 540, 548
(¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). This contention is without merit.
¶23. Thomas next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial
when the trial court refused to give a jury instruction to define “premeditated” after the jury
had begun deliberations and requested a definition. The appellate record does not show that
the jury made any such request, and this claim is without merit.
5
Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976).
16
¶24. Finally, under this issue, Thomas maintains that his trial counsel should have moved
for a mistrial due to an “overwhelming pattern of judicial bias and evidentiary rulings.” He
does not, however, identify any evidence of judicial bias and points to no evidentiary ruling
that would support his claim. Because Thomas fails to point to any example in the record to
support his claim and makes no meaningful argument on this point, pursuant to Hill, this
issue is barred from consideration on appeal.
C. Pro se Issue 3: Judicial and prosecutorial conflict violated due
process.
¶25. Thomas contends that his convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for
a new trial because the same judge and same prosecutor who “handled Defendant’s prior
conviction were assigned to this trial, raising serious concerns of impartiality and judicial
bias.” Because Thomas did not file a motion for the trial judge to recuse prior to trial, we find
that he has waived any objection to the judge presiding over his case. See Sanford v. State,
424 So. 3d 410, 413-14 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). Thomas cites no case, and we find none,
that prohibits the same prosecutor from prosecuting a defendant for multiple different crimes.
This issue is without merit.
D. Pro se Issue 4: Trial court committed reversible error in the
Batson analysis.
¶26. This issue was raised by Thomas’ appellate counsel and has been addressed above.
See supra ¶¶15-18. Thomas cannot raise the same issue in his supplemental brief. M.R.A.P.
28(b).
E. Pro se Issue 5: The trial court erred in giving and refusing jury
instructions, and the jury instructions failed to include elements
17
of first-degree murder, all violating defendant’s right to a fair
trial.
¶27. We first address Thomas’ claim that the jury instruction failed to include all the
elements of first-degree murder that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thomas, however, fails to point out which element was missing from the instruction.
Pursuant to Hill, this argument is also barred on appeal. See supra ¶19. In any event, to
convict Thomas of first-degree murder, the State was required to prove that (1) Thomas
killed Garland Murray; (2) without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense; (3)
with deliberate design to cause his death by shooting him. See Willis v. State, 352 So. 3d 602,
617 (¶41) (Miss. 2022). The record shows that instruction C-10 included all these essential
elements of the crime. This contention is without merit.
¶28. Thomas alleges that the trial court refused all his proposed instructions and gave all
the State’s instructions. He contends that the defense’s requests for instructions as to “selfdefense, defense of another, and lesser-included offenses (such as manslaughter or justifiable
homicide)” were denied. However, the record shows that the court gave a self-defense
instruction (which included a justifiable killing and defense of another) and two
manslaughter instructions (heat of passion and imperfect self-defense). Thomas fails to
identify a defense instruction that was wrongfully refused or a State’s instruction that was
wrongfully given. He makes no specific arguments concerning any specific instruction. This
issue, too, is procedurally barred pursuant to Hill. See supra ¶19. In any event, when reading
the instructions in this case as a whole, we find that “the instructions fairly announce the law
of the case and create no injustice.” See Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14, 20 (¶26) (Miss.
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2003).
F. Pro se Issue 6: Jury taint, coerced verdict, and courtroom
misconduct violated defendant’s constitutional right to a fair
and impartial trial.
¶29. Thomas argues that the trial court erred in forcing a juror to remain on the jury after
she requested her own removal due to anxiety and heart palpitations. According to the
record, the jury retired to deliberate at 11:13 a.m., and box lunches were waiting for them in
the jury room. After the court sent the jury out of the courtroom, the record reflects that the
judge spoke with the alternate jurors and dismissed them. The court advised the alternates
that the circuit court clerk had a box lunch for them and that they were free to go or stay to
await the verdict. The trial judge then announced that the court would be in recess to await
the jury’s verdict. The record reflects that a short break was taken, and then the court was
advised that the jury had sent out a note at 1:38 p.m. The attorneys and the defendant were
advised that the note read:
I feel uncomfortable making a decision due to not having much safety. We did
not have a destination to park. Witnesses and family of the people in the trial
seen my vehicle. Can we bring in an alternate juror.
This note was discussed on the record by the court and attorneys for the State and Thomas.
The court indicated that it would call the jury back into open court and advise the jurors that
deputies would be present to escort them safely to their cars and would assist the jurors in
getting home if that was needed. After being given an opportunity to respond to the court’s
intended course of action relative to the note, neither party voiced an objection to the process.
¶30. At 1:41 p.m. the jury was brought back into the courtroom. Apparently, before the
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court addressed the jury regarding the first note, a second note was given to the court. The
trial court advised the jurors of the arrangements it had made concerning the jury’s exit from
the courthouse. The trial court then addressed the second note, which had been signed by the
juror stating that she was having a problem making a decision. Upon questioning by the
court, the juror admitted that she had not answered the appropriate questions during voir dire,
but she indicated that she did not know at that time what would be involved. The jury was
then taken back into the jury room at 1:47 p.m.
¶31. During a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the court advised the parties that
it was not convinced that the juror’s malaise was a sufficient reason to be excused by the
court. The court then raised a question concerning whether either of the alternate jurors was
still in the courthouse and whether one could be placed back on the jury. After bringing in
one of the alternate jurors into the courtroom for questioning, the court determined that it
would not be appropriate for him to serve. The decision was then made to have the juror
continue her duties. The court advised that when the jury was brought back into the
courtroom, the court intended to give the jury the Sharplin instruction. Counsel for Thomas
indicated that he had no objection to the instruction. The jury was brought into the courtroom
at 2:06 p.m., and the court gave the jury the Sharplin instruction. The jury again retired to
continue their deliberations at 2:08 p.m. Immediately, outside the presence of the jury,
counsel for Thomas moved for a mistrial because of the circumstances with the juror who
asked to leave. The court overruled the motion. The record shows that the jury returned its
verdict in open court at 3:35 p.m. As noted above, the trial court had the inherent authority
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to give the instruction to the jury in order to manage jury deliberations, especially in light of
the interruptions caused by the notes. This issue is without merit.
G. Pro se Issue 7: Erroneous evidentiary rulings and jury
instruction denial occurred.
¶32. Under this issue, Thomas fails to identify any evidentiary ruling by the court and fails
to identify any specific jury instruction. This issue is barred from consideration on appeal
pursuant to Hill. See supra ¶19.
H. Pro se Issue 8: Denial of access to trial transcripts and records
violated due process.
¶33. Thomas claims that he was denied timely access to the complete record and trial
transcripts. The record shows that Thomas’ trial counsel was allowed to withdraw, and the
trial court appointed the State Public Defender’s Office of Indigent Appeals to represent
Thomas on appeal. The notice of appeal and designation of the record was filed by appellate
counsel on January 13, 2025. The Supreme Court Clerk filed the “Transcript Due Date
Notification” on January 17, 2025, notifying the court reporter that the transcript was due on
March 14, 2025. An order granting the reporter an extension of time to file the transcript set
a new due date of thirty days after March 15, 2025. The reporter filed the transcript with the
circuit court clerk on March 2, 2025. The circuit clerk was granted an extension of time to
prepare the appellate record, with the due date set for thirty days after April 12, 2025. The
appellate record was filed on May 12, 2025. The record does not show that any request was
made by Thomas for records from the circuit clerk’s office. The Supreme Court Clerk sent
notice of the availability of the appellate record to counsel of record on June 17, 2025. The
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due date for the Appellant’s brief was forty days after June 17, 2025. Thomas’ pro se
“supplemental” brief was filed on August 5, 2025. The Appellant’s brief was timely filed by
Thomas’ appellate counsel on September 26, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 28(b), Thomas was
authorized to file a pro se supplemental brief; however, Thomas filed his pro se brief before
his counsel filed his brief. We find no evidence of a denial of transcripts or records, and this
issue is without merit.
I. Pro se Issue 9: The verdict of first-degree murder was contrary
to law and evidence, in violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.
¶34. In this issue, Thomas contends that the trial court erred by not granting a directed
verdict. He further argues that because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence, the court erred by failing to grant his post-trial motion for a new trial. His
arguments are based upon the video evidence that shows that Murray was the initial
aggressor and fired the first shot at Robinson before Thomas allegedly responded in defense
of his friend Robinson. Thomas argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he did not act in self-defense or in defense of Robinson.
¶35. In Brisco v. State, 295 So. 3d 498, 510 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), this Court stated:
Motions for a directed verdict challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Moss v. State, 190 So. 3d 9, 13 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). All evidence
introduced by the State, together with any reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom, is accepted as true. Davis v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 703
(Miss. 1988). . . . The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the offense and did not act in self-defense.
Franklin v. State, 72 So. 3d 1129, 1136 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
McIntosh v. State, 749 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). “All
credible evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt will be accepted as true.”
Brown v. State, 176 So. 3d 1, 12 (¶33) (Miss. 2015).
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¶36. The video evidence itself is sufficient to affirm the trial court’s refusal to acquit
Thomas. The video clearly shows that Robinson and Murray were involved in a conversation
away from the other group of men. Murray walked away from Robinson and joined the men
across the street. The argument continued between Robinson and Murray, and when
Robinson started walking toward Murray, Murray fired a shot into the ground between him
and Robinson. At that point, Robinson turned and ran in the other direction. The video shows
that Murray turned away from Robinson and walked through the group of men. When
Thomas was in a position behind Murray, Thomas then pulled his weapon and shot Murray
in the back. We find that fair-minded jurors could find from viewing the video that Thomas
was not in immediate threat of harm from Murray. It does not appear from the video that
Murray had even acknowledged Thomas’ presence.
¶37. Concerning our review of challenges to the weight of the evidence, this court stated
in Flynt v. State, 183 So. 3d 1, 10 (¶30) (Miss. 2015):
The Court has summarized the standard of review for the denial of a motion
for new trial as follows:
In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this
Court will overturn a verdict only “when it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand
would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So. 2d
at 844. See also Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942,
947 (Miss. 2000) (holding that a motion for a new trial is
addressed to the discretion of the court and should be granted
only “in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict.”). As with challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views all evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Factual disputes are
properly resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new trial.
Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379, 382 (Miss. 1986).
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Beasley [v. State], 136 So. 3d [3963,] 403 (¶35) [(Miss. 2014)].
(Emphasis added). It was a question for the jury to decide whether Thomas acted in necessary
self-defense. In Tutwiler v. State, 197 So. 3d 418, 424 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), we stated:
“A successful self-defense argument requires that the jury believe that it was
objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe he was in danger of
imminent death or serious bodily harm.” Wilder v. State, 118 So. 3d 628, 631
(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Livingston v. State, 943 So. 2d 66, 71
(¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). “The question of whether the defendant acted in
self-defense is a question for the jury to resolve.” Id. (citing Dubose v. State,
919 So. 2d 5, 7 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)).
The jury resolved this issue by finding that Thomas did not act in necessary self-defense or
defense of another. This issue is without merit.
J. Pro se Issue 10: The trial court erred in allowing the State to
argue that defendant’s post-incident flight created
premeditation, misstating the law and misleading the jury.
¶38. Thomas claims the State argued that “the crime evolved into first-degree murder ‘after
the fact’ based solely on the Defendant’s decision to flee the scene.” He argues that this
argument by the State confused the jury because deliberate design must be present at the time
of the killing. The State responds by arguing that there was no contemporaneous objection
to the State’s argument at trial; therefore, this issue is barred from consideration on appeal.
See Harris v. State, 384 So. 3d 493, 497 (¶11) (Miss. 2024). The State further contends that
the claim is without merit because while the State did urge the jury to consider Thomas’
flight after the crime, the State did not ask the jury to consider flight to prove deliberate
design. The State argued that Thomas’ flight was circumstantial evidence of consciousness
of guilt, which is permissible pursuant to States v. State, 88 So. 3d 749, 757-58 (¶36) (Miss.
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2012). Our review of the State’s closing argument shows that the comment was that Thomas
got rid of the weapon and went to his friend’s house and was hiding. The State argued that
this shows a consciousness of guilt. This issue is without merit.
K. Pro se Issue 11: The trial court violated the defendant’s right to
an impartial jury and due process when it nearly reseated an
alternate juror who had been improperly contacted by the
circuit clerk about the merits of the case.
¶39. As stated above, the trial court did not place the alternate juror back on the jury after
deliberations had begun.6 The questioning of the alternate juror took place outside the
presence of the jury and in no way impacted the jury deliberations or the defendant’s right
to a fair trial. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶40. Having found no reversible error, we affirm Thomas’ conviction and sentence.
¶41. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.
6
Pursuant to MRCrP 47(d), an alternate juror can only replace a juror prior to the time the jury begins its deliberations.
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