UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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JENNIFER LANNOM, )
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Plaintiff, )
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V. ) Civil Case No. 24-3508 (RJL)
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ZAONA RILEY, et al., )
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Defendants. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
(September l:}, 2026) [Dkt. #9]
Jennifer Lannom ("Lannom" or "plaintiff'), a D.C. resident, was riding her bicycle
when she was struck by a car driven by Zaona Riley ("Riley"), a Maryland resident. The
collision, caused by Riley's illegal U-tum, physically and emotionally injured Lannom.
Lannom sued both Riley and Riley's grandmother, Joanne Chandler ("Chandler"), who
owned the car, for negligence and negligence per se. The defendants failed to respond to
the complaint or otherwise appear in the action, and Lannom moved for default judgment.
Upon consideration of the record and applicable law, I will GRANT plaintiffs motion for
default judgment and award plaintiff$474,047.46 in total damages.
BACKGROUND
As the defendants have not appeared in this action, I must rely on Lannom's
description of the events as drawn from the Complaint ("Compl.") [Dkt. #1], the Plaintiffs
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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Pl. 's Proposed Findings") [Dkt. #15],
and the exhibits presented during the evidentiary hearing. 1
I. The Accident and Emergency Room Visits
On July 31, 2024, Riley struck Lannom with her car while making a sudden illegal
U-tum at the intersection ofl Street and Seventh Street NW in Washington, D.C. See Pl.'s
Proposed Findings at 4. Riley did not use a tum signal and did not check to see if there
was oncoming traffic before turning abruptly into Lannom. Id. The collision was captured
on a nearby security camera and clearly shows Riley's car knocking Lannom off her bike
and into the intersection. Id.; see also Pl.'s Ex. 29 (depicting video footage of the collision).
After Lannom was struck, she began to hyperventilate and experienced "shock" as
cars attempted to move around her in the street. Pl.'s Proposed Findings at 4-5. Police
officers arrived and spoke to Lannom, who was crying. Id. at 5; see also Pl.'s Exs. 35-37
(depicting body worn camera footage of the responding officers interviewing Lannom).
An ambulance brought Lannom to Howard University Hospital, where she reported
"intense, sharp, stabbing pain in her left elbow that continued to worsen." Pl.' s Proposed
Findings at 5. Lannom was diagnosed with a "displaced, comminuted fracture of the left
olecranon, extending into the ulnohumeral joint," in essence a fractured left elbow joint
where the bone was broken into many pieces. Id.; see also Pl.'s Exs. 1-6 (detailing the
discharge summary, x-rays, and medication records from Lannom's care at Howard
University Hospital).
1 Plaintiffs exhibits were entered into evidence during the evidentiary hearing on damages on May 21, 2026. See
Min. Entry, Lannom v. Riley, 1:24-cv-03508-RJL (D.D.C. May 21, 2026).
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Howard University healthcare providers informed Lannom she would need surgery
to repair the broken bones in her elbow and affixed a splint to immobilize the joint until
the surgery could take place. Pl.'s Proposed Findings at 5. Lannom ultimately stayed at
the Howard University Hospital for nearly 17 hours, as the medical staff wanted to observe
Lannom to ensure a bone fragment from her arm would not cut into her vein. Id.
After being discharged, Lannom continued to experience severe pain and, two days
later, visited the Emergency Department of MedStar Washington Health Center because
her left hand had swelled significantly beneath the splint. See PL' s Ex. 39. The hospital
re-splinted her arm and provided her with additional medication to cope with the ongoing
pain. PL' s Proposed Findings at 6-7; see also PI.' s Exs. 7-9 (describing the medical
observations and pain reports taken at MedStar Washington Health Center).
II. Surgery and Physical Therapy
Five days after the accident, on August 5, 2024, Lannom met with orthopedic
surgeon Dr. Kevin O'Malley, M.D. for a pre-operative visit. Pl.'s Proposed Findings at 7.
On August 7, 2024, Dr. O'Malley performed "open reduction [and] internal fixation"
surgery on Lannom. Id.; see also Pl. 's Exs. 15-20 (showcasing the pre- and post-operative
x-ray images and surgical notes from the procedure). During the surgery, Dr. O'Malley
placed a metal plate and several screws around Lannom's left elbow joint, which remain
in place today. See PL 's Ex. 17. Immediately after the surgery, Lannom noted that she felt
"excruciating pain at a 10 out of IO intensity level" when the pain medications wore off.
PL' s Proposed Findings at 7.
Lannom began physical therapy on August 15, 2024, and continued attending
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sessions twice a week for two months. Id. at 8. She also attended several post-operative
appointments with her surgeon. Id. Ultimately, Lannom's emergency care, surgery, postoperative appointments, physical therapy, and medications totaled $74,047.46. Id. at 9;
see also Pl.'s Exs. 48-55 (providing relevant excerpts of Lannom's medical bills); Pl.'s
Ex. 56 (summarizing Lannom's medical costs).
III. Recovery and Medical Examination
In the months following the accident, Lannom's collision-related injuries made even
routine tasks-like dressing, showering, cooking, typing, and caring for her cat-painful
and difficult. Pl.' s Proposed Findings at 9. Her injuries also affected her sleep, mental
health, and social life: she developed anxiety and panic attacks, stopped biking and other
activities she loved, and now lives with a '"lengthy and visible scar on her left elbow that
she perceives as 'gross."' Id. at 10.
Plaintiffs medical expert, Dr. Joel D. Fechter, M.D., personally examined Lannom,
her medical records, and footage of the collision to opine on Lannom' s medical care to date
and future quality oflife. Id. at 11. Dr. Fechter, a licensed and board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, explained that Lannom's ongoing symptoms-including, but not limited to,
intermittent, sharp left-elbow pain every other day, numbness and tingling at the scar, pain
when resting the elbow on a surface, and increased pain with bending, lifting, pushing,
pulling, and twisting-are likely permanent. Id. at 12.
Dr. Fechter added that, as ofnow, the hardware installed during Lannom's surgery
is permanent without surgical intervention. Id. at 11. At some point in the future, Lannom
may choose to remove the hardware from her elbow by a procedure similar in scope and
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complexity to the one she underwent previously. Id. at 13. However, such a procedure
could not be guaranteed to alleviate any of her current symptoms. Id. Lannom testified
that she has considered the hardware-removal surgery, but worries about reliving the "most
painful thing in my life." Id.
IV. Procedural History
On December 17, 2024, Lannom filed suit against Riley and Chandler for
negligence and negligence per se. See Compl. ,r,r 40-63. Lannom claims that Riley
violated several provisions of D.C. traffic laws prohibiting reckless driving and prohibiting
U-tums at any intersection controlled by traffic lights and that defendants' negligence
proximately caused her injuries. Id. ,r,r 42-63.
Lannom served defendants with the complaint on December 26, 2024. See Return
of Service [Dkt. #4, #5]. Neither defendant entered an appearance nor filed an answer to
the complaint. On January 22, 2025, Lannom moved for entry of default, [Dkt. #6], which
the clerk entered against both Riley [Dkt. #7] and Chandler [Dkt. #8]. On March 28, 2025,
Lannom moved for default judgment against Riley and Chandler jointly and severally. See
Motion for Default Judgment ("Mot.") [Dkt. #9]. The Court then held an evidentiary
hearing to determine damages on May 21, 2026. See Min. Entry (May 21, 2026). At the
hearing, Lannom testified in person, and plaintiffs medical expert Dr. Fechter testified de
bene esse.
LEGAL STANDA.RD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, there is a "two-step procedure" in
obtaining a default judgment. Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99,
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102 (D.D.C. 2015). First, after a defendant "has failed to plead or otherwise defend," the
plaintiff may request that the Clerk of the Court enter default against the defendant. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after default is entered, the plaintiff may move for a default
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
An entry of default "establishes the defaulting party's liability for the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint." Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64,
67 (D.D.C. 2011). However, this "does not automatically establish liability in the amount
claimed by the plaintiff." Carazani v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013).
Rather, the Court "is required to make an independent determination of the sum to be
awarded," Int'! Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R. W Amrine Drywall
Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002), and is afforded "considerable latitude" in
making its determination, Boland, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The Court may hold an
evidentiary hearing to help ascertain the appropriate amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
To begin, Lannom has fulfilled the procedural requisites for entry of default
judgment. She effected service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
on each defendant and the Clerk entered default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a). Defendants have neither answered the complaint nor filed any motion to
vacate the orders of default pursuant to Rule 55(c). Because defendants have not responded
to plaintiffs complaint, the defendants admit all allegations in the complaint not relating
to damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C.
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2001 ). In any event, there is little reason to question plaintiffs account of the collision
given that a security camera captured the entire event. See Pl.'s Ex. 29.
I. Liability
Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts that establish all elements of her negligence
and negligence per se claims. To allege a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show, "( 1)
that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the
plaintiff that was proximately caused by the breach." Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d
267, 289 (D.C. 2016). The doctrine of negligence per se applies "where a particular
statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to . . . prevent the type of accident that
occurred[,] ... [an] unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent
as a matter oflaw." Sibert-Dean v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.3d 699,
702 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
Here, Riley breached the duty of care she owed to plaintiff when she illegally made
a sudden U-turn in the middle of an intersection into oncoming traffic. In so doing, Riley
also violated several municipal laws designed to prevent traffic accidents. See 18
D.C.M.R. § 2213.4 ("An operator shall, when operating a vehicle, give full time and
attention to the operation of the vehicle."); 18 D.C.M.R. § 2204.7 ("No vehicle shall make
a U-turn so as to proceed in the opposite direction at any intersection controlled by traffic
lights."); 18 D.C.M.R. § 2204.3 ("No person shall turn any vehicle to enter a private road
or driveway, or otherwise tum a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a
roadway without giving an appropriate signal."); 18 D.C.M.R. § 2204.8 ("The driver of
any vehicle shall not tum a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction unless such
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movement can be made in safety and without interfering with other traffic."); D.C. Code
§ 50-2201.04(b) ("A person commits the offense of reckless driving if the person drives a
motor vehicle on any highway in the District ... [i]n any other manner that displays a
conscious disregard of the risk of causing property damage or bodily injury to any
person."). Finally, Riley's reckless maneuver was clearly the proximate cause ofLannom's
mJunes.
Further, Chandler is vicariously liable for Lannom's injuries. Under D.C. law, Riley
was acting as Chandler's agent since she was operating Chandler's vehicle, allegedly with
Chandler's consent. See Athridge v. Rivas, 312 FJd 474, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Chandler
verbally communicated that the car was hers. Compl. ,r 34. Lannom also submitted
certified copies of documents obtained from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles,
confirming Chandler's ownership of the vehicle. See Pl.' s Ex. 60. Chandler has provided
no evidence to overcome the presumption that Riley acted as her agent when she operated
the vehicle. Therefore, plaintiff has adequately alleged her claims against both defendants.
II. Damages
With liability established, what remains is the question of damages. The plaintiff
must prove to the Court her requested damages "to a reasonable certainty." Elite Terrazzo
Flooring, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 68. The plaintiff may offer "detailed affidavits or
documentary evidence" on which the Court may rely, and is "entitled to all reasonable
inferences from the evidence [she] offer[s]." Amrine Drywall, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
a. Medical Costs
"Under settled District of Columbia law, a 'plaintiffs damages [for past medical
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expenses] should include the value of all reasonably necessary medical and hospital
services furnished' to the plaintiff." Green v. US. Postal Serv., 589 F. Supp. 2d 58, 68
(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Albano v. Yee, 219 A.2d 567,568 (D.C. 1966)).
Here, Lannom's medical costs total $74,047.46; this includes costs stemming from
the ambulance ride, the initial emergency visit at Howard University Hospital, the
subsequent emergency visit at MedStar, the surgery, post-operative appointments, and
physical therapy. See PI.'s Ex. 56 (summarizing Lannom's medical bills). When asked
whether the "medical treatment [Lannom] received, was reasonably necessary treatment
causally connected to the injury she suffered in this collision," Dr. Fechter, plaintiffs
medical expert, confirmed, "[y]es, I think that it was." See Pl.'s Ex. 63, 36:13-17
(transcript of Dr. Fechter's deposition testimony). I have no reason to doubt his conclusion.
b. Pain and Suffering
"Trying to quantify pain and suffering and to put a dollar figure on the amount of
damages to be awarded is extremely difficult." Green, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 70. In D.C.,
judges often consult the D.C. Standardized Civil Jury Instructions when considering an
appropriate damages award. See, e.g., Rhodes v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 2d 246, 324-25 (D.D.C. 2013). Under D.C. Standardized Civil Jury Instruction§ 13-1, the Court may
consider, among other factors:
1. The extent and duration of any physical injuries;
2. The effects that any physical injuries have on the overall physical and emotional
well-being of the plaintiff;
3. Any physical pain and emotional distress that the plaintiff has suffered in the
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past or may suffer in the future;
4. Any disfigurement or deformity suffered by the plaintiff, as well as any
humiliation or embarrassment associated with the disfigurement or deformity;
5. Any inconvenience the plaintiff has experienced in the past or may experience
in the future.
Here, the injury to Lannom' s elbow was significant and the symptoms from her
injury-including intermittent pain, numbness, and diminished lifting capacity-are likely
permanent. Pl. 's Proposed Findings at 12. In her own words, Lannom suffered "emotional
distress" in the aftermath of the accident. Id. at 20. The injury inconvenienced Lannom at
home and at work, and has altered her ability to enjoy certain activities, like bike riding,
that featured prominently in her previous routines. Id.
Upon consideration of the evidence and testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing, the Court deems it fair to award Lannom $400,000 in past and future noneconomic
damages for her pain, suffering, mental distress, inconvenience, and loss of capacity for
the enjoyment of life resulting from the accident. This amount is commensurate with
damages awarded in cases where plaintiff suffered injuries under a similar set of facts. See,
e.g., Eason v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (finding plaintiff was
entitled to $300,000 for past and future noneconomic damages after he was struck by a
vehicle while riding his bike and suffered injuries to his left shoulder, brain, and spine).
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for
Default Judgment [Dkt. #9] is GRANTED. An accompanying Order will issue
contemporaneously with this opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
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