UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ADRIANA MARIA QUIROZ ZAPATA )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Case No. 26-1560 (RJL)
V. )
)
MARK.WAYNE MULLIN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
__________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September ( i ~ 2026 [Dkt. #36, 46, 54]
Plaintiff Adriana Maria Quiroz Zapata was granted protection from removal to
Colombia, her native country, so the Government sent her to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo instead. Plaintiff has challenged the Government's decision to remove her to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo because she alleges that the country refused to
accept her before her removal. The Government has now disproved that theory. The
Immigration and Nationality Act strips jurisdiction from federal courts over "any cause or
claim ... arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to .. . execute removal
orders[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Because plaintiff's claims "aris[e] from the decision or
action" to "execute [her] removal order[]," I will DISMISS the case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and DENY the pending motions.
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BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2026, the Government removed plaintiff Adriana Maria Quiroz Zapata
("plaintiff'), a native and citizen of Colombia, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Compl. ,I,I 13, 47. Plaintiff principally alleges that her removal was unlawful because the
Democratic Republic of the Congo refused to accept her before she was removed. Id. ,I 47.
In reliance on plaintiff's representations, I granted plaintiff's request for a temporary
restraining order to facilitate plaintiff's return to the United States. See Mem. Order [Dkt.
# 14]. The Government subsequently introduced evidence that the Government had not
received notification of any refusal prior to plaintiff's removal. See Mot. to Dissolve TRO
[Dkt. #24]. I therefore granted the Government's request to dissolve the temporary
restraining order and ordered plaintiff to show cause as to why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mem. Order [Dkt. #35].
On June 15, 2026, plaintiff responded to the order to show cause. See Resp. to Order
to Show Cause [Dkt. #37]. Plaintiff has also moved for reconsideration of my decision to
dissolve the temporary restraining order and has moved for leave to file a supplemental
complaint. See Mot. for Reconsideration [Dkt. #36]; Mot for Leave to File Supplemental
Complaint [Dkt. #46]. After her removal to the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
plaintiff voluntarily traveled to Spain for an "interim medical evacuation," where she
remains currently. See Notice [Dkt. #43]. On August 18, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion to
expedite consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the motion for leave to file.
Mot. to Expedite [Dkt. #52]. On September 2, 2026, plaintiff filed a supplemental motion
for an order directing USCIS to adjudicate plaintiff's Form I-131 humanitarian parole
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application. Pl. 's Suppl. Mot. [Dkt. #54]. All motions except the Form 1-131 humanitarian
parole motion are now ripe.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court has "an independent obligation to assure itself that it ha[s] subject-matter
jurisdiction." Jibril v. Mayorkas, 101 F.4th 857, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that "(i]f the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added); see also Hurt v. US. Ct. ofAppeals for
D.C. Cir. Banc, 264 F. App'x 1, I (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("It was proper for the
district court to analyze its own jurisdiction sua sponte and dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction."). Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claims at issue. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir.2015)
(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
ANALYSIS
"'Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,' possessing 'only that power
authorized by the Constitution and statute."' Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). The
Immigration and Nationality Act provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added).
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Section 1252(g) does not "sweep in any claim that can technically be said to 'arise
from' the three listed actions of the Attorney General." Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 294 (2018). "Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions
themselves." Id. While the "statute does not sweep broadly," its "narrow sweep is firm."
E.FL. v. Prim, 986 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 2021). Courts "cannot entertain challenges to
the enumerated executive branch decisions or actions." Id.
I initially considered the merits of plaintiff's claims because of the parallels between
this case and Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025). See Mem. Order [Dkt. #14]
at 3. In Abrego Garcia, the district court held that it hadjurisdiction over Abrego Garcia's
claims of mistaken removal to El Salvador. See Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 777 F. Supp. 3d
501, 515 (D. Md. 2025). The Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court declined to stay the
preliminary injunction ordering Abrego Garcia's return. See Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 2025
WL 1021113, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (Thacker, J., concurring)("§ 1252(g) does not
strip us of jurisdiction here"); Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. at 1018. Indeed, numerous courts
of appeals have affirmed the exercise of jurisdiction over claims alleging that the
Government lacked authority to execute a removal order or otherwise violated a separate
statute or court order. See Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 1000 (9th Cir.
2025) (section 1252(g) does not strip jurisdiction over claims about "ICE's separate
decision about where to send" plaintiff); Jama v. INS., 329 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2003)
(exercising jurisdiction over challenge to country of removal), ajf'd sub nom. Jama v.
lmmigr. & Customs Enf't, 543 U.S. 335 (2005); Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) Uurisdiction over Federal Tort Claims Act claim alleging
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removal in violation of a stay of removal). But see Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938,
940 (8th Cir. 2017) (no jurisdiction over Federal Tort Claims Act challenge to mistaken
removal).
That said, the factual predicate for plaintiff's legal claim of wrongful removal to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has collapsed. 1 As I have already found, "[d]efendants
have now ... proffered new evidence, including sworn declarations, that the DRC accepted
Plaintiff through the established manifest process before her removal." Mem. Order [Dkt.
#35] at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[B]oth the State Department and the United
States Embassy in Kinshasa have additionally confirmed that they did not receive and were
not aware of the purported April 14 letter [refusing plaintiff] from the DRC before
plaintiff's removal." Id. 2
With the core element of plaintiff's unlawful removal claim now disproven,
plaintiff's claims, including her due process challenge to the procedures for removal,
amount to a bare challenge to the execution of her removal order. See Compl. ,i,i 53-82.
Her case therefore falls squarely within § 1252(g)'s jurisdiction-stripping language. See,
e.g., E.FL., 986 F.3d at 965 (court lacked jurisdiction over challenge to execution of
removal order while Violence Against Women Act petition was pending); Rauda v.
1
In assessing subject-matter jurisdiction, "a court may consider documents outside the pleadings." Charles v. United States, 2022 WL 951242, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2022) (citing Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
2
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration attempts to relitigate my factual findings and is meritless. See Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-4. The documents raised by plaintiff were part of the record when I dissolved the temporary restraining order, and they do not contradict the Government's . understanding that the Government was unaware of any refusal before plaintiff's removal.
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Jennings, 55 F.4th 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2022) (no jurisdiction over attempt to "enjoin the
government from removing" plaintiff). And in any case, plaintiff does not dispute that she
has a pending appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Resp. to Order to
Show Cause at 4-5. 3
To further underscore the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, exerc1smg
jurisdiction would likely entangle the Court in sensitive foreign affairs matters. Plaintiff
has now voluntarily relocated to Spain. See Notice [0kt. #43]. Plaintiff vigorously
contests defendants' understanding of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's acceptance
of plaintiff. See, e.g., Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-7. Ordering any relief under these
circumstances risks encroaching on the Executive Branch's communications with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. But "[ c]ourts are not a forum for reconsidering the
wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the political branches in the realm of foreign
policy." D.A. v. Noem, 800 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting El-Shifa Pharm.
Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 4
3
To the extent that plaintiff's claims do not "aris[e] from the decision or action" to "execute [her] removal order[]," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), they belong in plaintiff's ongoing proceeding before the Board oflmmigration Appeals, see id. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9). Plaintiff's Form I-131 motion appears to be barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See A.MS. v. Edlow, 826 F. Supp. 3d 153, 171 (D.D.C. 2026) ("[T]he text of Sections 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 1182(d)(5)(A), when considered in conjunction, offer 'clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the [Secretary's] discretionary decisions about the [humanitarian parole] process[.]'" (quoting Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 776 (8th Cir. 2024))). 4
Separately, plaintiff's counsel's conduct in this litigation raises serious questions as to her compliance with the Local Rules and candor with the Court. Local Civil Rule 7(m) requires counsel to "discuss the anticipated motion with opposing counsel in a good-faith effort to determine whether there is any opposition to the relief sought and, if there is, to narrow the areas of disagreement." Plaintiff's counsel emailed her motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint at 4:23 am and filed the motion about an hour later. See Defs.' Opp'n to Pl. 's Mot. for Leave to File First Suppl. Comp!. [Dkt. #49] at 2. Plaintiff's most recently filed motion to expedite certifies compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(m) but suggests that plaintiff did not
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby DISMISS the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and DENY the remaining motions. An accompanying order will issue
contemporaneously with this opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
even attempt to contact defendants to obtain their position on the motion. See Mot. to Expedite [Dkt. #52] at 4 ("Given Defendants' filed Oppositions to the underlying motions ... and their prior positions in this litigation opposing every extension of relief, undersigned counsel has a reasonable and good-faith basis to conclude that Defendants oppose expedited consideration."). If this litigation were to continue, such conduct raises the possibility of further consequences including sanctions.
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