United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-1687
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JASON LEVASSEUR,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Rikelman and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Scott F. Hess, with whom The Law Office of Scott F. Hess,
LLC was on brief, for appellant.
Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Craig M. Wolff, Acting United States Attorney, was on
brief, for appellee.
September 16, 2026
RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Levasseur appeals his
conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that the statute is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him. We
conclude that he has failed to show any error in the district
court's ruling rejecting his as-applied claim and thus affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
"Because this appeal follows [Levasseur's] guilty plea,
we draw the facts . . . from 'the probation office's presentence
investigation report (PSR), the plea agreement, [and] the
transcript of the sentencing hearing.'" United States v. Langston,
110 F.4th 408, 413 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.
Colón-Cordero, 91 F.4th 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2024)). In resolving
Levasseur's Second Amendment claim, we consider only the facts
alleged in his federal indictment, although we rely on a broader
set of facts in describing the background of this case.
On November 16, 2022, a Maine State Police trooper
observed a pickup truck he believed to be operated by Levasseur
enter a gas station in Danforth, Maine. The trooper knew that
Levasseur had an active felony arrest warrant based on a state
probation violation, as well as prior felony convictions. He also
knew that Levasseur was reputed to carry firearms. The trooper
positively identified Levasseur and proceeded to detain him. While
- 2 -restraining Levasseur, the trooper removed a large knife from a
sheath on Levasseur's belt.
The trooper then questioned Levasseur, who confirmed
that he had a firearm. The trooper located a "hunting
rifle . . . wrapped in a blanket on the backseat of the pickup"
with "two rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber."
After additional questioning, Levasseur also acknowledged that "a
baggy of methamphetamines [was] hidden in the center console of
the truck." The "baggy," which contained eight grams of
methamphetamine, was ultimately seized by law enforcement.
According to the PSR, Levasseur later explained that he
had a rifle in his truck that day because he was hungry and had
planned to shoot a deer. He also claimed that he had been hunting
shortly before the trooper arrested him, although he did not have
a hunting license at the time. Finally, Levasseur admitted to
methamphetamine addiction, disclosing that he used between one to
three grams a day.
Before the arrest and federal conviction at issue in
this appeal, Levasseur had previously been convicted of multiple
state offenses under the Maine Criminal Code. His state criminal
history includes three convictions for illegal possession of a
- 3 -firearm1 and one conviction each for operating a motor vehicle
after habitual offender revocation,2 unlawful possession of
methamphetamine,3 and violation of a condition of release on bail.4
Each of these convictions was for a felony offense. Of the firearm
convictions, one concerned possession of a machine gun and another
involved Levasseur trading a firearm with an obliterated serial
number in exchange for methamphetamine.
B. Procedural History
In December 2022, a grand jury indicted Levasseur on one
count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged that
1 "A person may not own, possess or have under that person's
control a firearm, unless that person has obtained a permit under
this section, if that person [h]as been convicted of committing or
found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity of
committing" a crime "punishable by imprisonment for a term of one
year or more." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 393(1)(A-1)(1).
2 "A person commits operating after habitual offender
revocation if that person [o]perates a motor vehicle on a public
way . . . when that person's license to operate a motor vehicle
has been revoked . . . ." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A,
§ 2557-A(1)(A).
3 "[A] person is guilty of unlawful possession of a scheduled
drug if the person intentionally or knowingly possesses what that
person knows or believes to be a scheduled drug, which is in fact
a scheduled drug, and the drug is . . . [m]ethamphetamine and the
amount possessed is more than 200 milligrams." Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1107-A(1)(B)(7).
4 "A defendant who has been granted preconviction or
postconviction bail and who, in fact, violates a condition of
release is guilty of . . . [a] Class C crime if the underlying
crime was punishable by a maximum period of imprisonment of one
year or more . . . ." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1092(1)(B).
- 4 -Levasseur possessed the firearm "knowing that he had previously
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year." It listed his six Maine state convictions as
the predicate offenses supporting the § 922(g)(1) charge.
Levasseur promptly moved to dismiss the indictment,
contending that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him
under the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court denied
Levasseur's motion in October 2023. United States v. Levasseur,
No. 22-cr-155, 2023 WL 6623165, at *9 (D. Me. Oct. 11, 2023). In
reaching its decision, the court concluded that "Levasseur's
alleged prior felony conviction for the possession of
methamphetamine makes him sufficiently dangerous that he may
constitutionally be disarmed." Id. In so holding, the court did
not consider whether any of Levasseur's other predicate offenses,
"individually or collectively," justified disarmament. Id. at *9
n.14.
After the district court denied his motion to dismiss,
Levasseur pleaded guilty to the indictment but preserved his right
to appeal that ruling. He then renewed his motion to dismiss once
the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680
(2024). The district court denied his renewed motion as well.
See United States v. Levasseur, No. 22-cr-155, 2024 WL 3358221, at
- 5 -*3 (D. Me. July 9, 2024). In July 2024, the court sentenced
Levasseur to time served and three years of supervised release.
Levasseur timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
Const. amend. II. Since 2008, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to keep and
bear arms for self-defense. See, e.g., District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
The statute at issue here, § 922(g)(1), makes it
"unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court
of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The question in this case is
whether this statute is constitutional under the Second Amendment
as applied to Levasseur.
Before we analyze Levasseur's Second Amendment claim, we
highlight two concessions by him and explain the nature of his
challenge to the district court's order, which together narrow the
scope of this appeal. First, Levasseur does not dispute that
§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face. In making this
concession, Levasseur acknowledges that the Supreme Court has
- 6 -indicated for nearly 20 years, albeit in dicta, that "longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" are
"presumptively lawful." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26; see
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010)
(plurality opinion) ("We made it clear in Heller that our holding
did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as
'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons[.]' . . . We repeat [that] assurance[] here." (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)). The Supreme Court repeated this
"presumptively lawful" refrain two years ago in Rahimi. 602 U.S.
at 699. Second, Levasseur admits that disarming categories of
dangerous individuals, as § 922(g)(1) does, is consistent with our
Nation's history and tradition.
Levasseur's central claim on appeal is that he does not
fall into any category of individuals who are dangerous enough to
be disarmed. At times, Levasseur appears to contend that only
individuals with predicate convictions for violent felonies
qualify as dangerous. And he would have courts determine whether
a felony is violent by looking to "the elements of the underlying
crime," as opposed to making factual findings based on the
individual's particular criminal history and conduct. In
Levasseur's view, his predicate state conviction for
methamphetamine possession is not a violent felony under that mode
of analysis, and so his disarmament is unconstitutional. At other
- 7 -times, Levasseur appears to argue that individuals with felony
convictions qualify as dangerous only if they have been found to
pose a specific threat of violence to another person, and that he
is not such an individual and thus cannot be disarmed for that
reason either.
In pressing these arguments, however, Levasseur fails to
grapple with the district court's conclusion that our history and
tradition permits disarming individuals who are "too dangerous to
possess a firearm" even if there is no determination that the
individual has a prior history of violence, Levasseur, 2023 WL
6623165, at *7, or poses a specific future threat of violence to
another, Levasseur, 2024 WL 3358221, at *3. Thus, he never refutes
the basis for the court's dangerousness analysis and its holding
that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him. See United
States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623, 633 (1st Cir. 1996) ("In all
events, it is the appellant's responsibility to make some showing
that an error has been committed.").
With the limited scope of Levasseur's arguments in mind,
we proceed to the two-step approach laid out in Bruen and its
progeny for evaluating a Second Amendment claim. Initially, we
must "consider whether the Second Amendment's plain text covers
the regulated conduct." United States v. Vizcaíno-Peguero,
175 F.4th 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2026) (citation modified). If the
answer is yes, then the Constitution "presumptively protects that
- 8 -conduct," and we move to the next step of the analysis. Bruen,
597 U.S. at 17. In the second step, we must determine whether the
government has "demonstrat[ed] that [the challenged] regulation is
consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm
regulation." United States v. Minor, 165 F.4th 616, 621 (1st Cir.
2026) (second alteration in original) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at
17). We review de novo the district court's legal rulings
resolving these constitutional questions. See Vizcaíno-Peguero,
175 F.4th at 37 (citing Minor, 165 F.4th at 621).
A. Step One
At step one, we must determine whether the Second
Amendment applies to individuals with felony convictions, like
Levasseur, and whether it applies to his specific conduct in this
case -- possessing a rifle. See id.; Wolford v. Lopez, 609
U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 2032, 2043-44 (2026). The government does
not dispute that possessing a rifle is the type of conduct covered
by the Second Amendment. But it does contend that Levasseur's
felony conviction puts him beyond the reach of the Second
Amendment's protections.
The government maintains that, given his previous felony
convictions, Levasseur cannot qualify as one of "the people"
protected by the Second Amendment. U.S. Const. amend II. Relying
on language from Heller, it argues that the Second Amendment
applies only to "members of the political community," and that
- 9 -individuals with felony convictions like Levasseur have forfeited
their membership in that community. 554 U.S. at 580; see also
Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2043 (stating that "the people" includes
"all members of the political community"). The government also
emphasizes the Supreme Court's repeated references to "law-abiding
citizens" in its Second Amendment decisions. See Heller, 554 U.S.
at 625; Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31-32; Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2045,
2049. In the government's view, because individuals with felony
convictions are not "law-abiding," they cannot be part of "the
people."
Given our ultimate holding that the government prevails
at step two of the Bruen/Rahimi framework, we follow our recent
approach in a similar case and assume without deciding that
Levasseur is one of "the people." As we explained in
Vizcaíno-Peguero, which concerned a challenge to a different
provision of § 922, "the principle of constitutional avoidance
points against our deciding" the scope of "'the people' to whom
the Second Amendment refers . . . if it is not necessary for us to
do so." 175 F.4th at 39. That is especially so because the phrase
"the people" appears in multiple amendments to the Constitution.
See id. at 40 (explaining why it is prudent to avoid this thorny
constitutional question); see, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I
(protecting "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances"); U.S Const.
- 10 -amend. IV (protecting "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures"). Thus, we "bypass the parties' dispute at
Bruen's first step" and proceed to step two. Vizcaíno-Peguero,
175 F.4th at 40.5
B. Step Two
At step two, it is the government's burden to show that
a restriction like § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second
Amendment because it "comports with this country's tradition of
firearm regulation." Vizcaíno-Peguero, 175 F.4th at 40. To meet
its burden, "[t]he government . . . must identify historical
analogues to" the challenged restriction "that suffice to show
that such an encompassing historical tradition exists." Id.
5We note that our sister circuits are split on the question
of whether individuals with felony convictions are among "the
people" protected by the Second Amendment, with most circuits
holding that they are. See Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68, 77 (2d
Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2026 WL 135708 (Jan. 20,
2026) (mem.); Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 124 F.4th 218, 226 (3d
Cir. 2024) (en banc); United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 466
(5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025) (mem.);
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 649 (6th Cir. 2024);
United States v. Watson, 171 F.4th 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2026);
United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 754-55 (9th Cir. 2025) (en
banc), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2026 WL 135692 (Jan. 20, 2026) (mem.); United States v. Harrison, 153 F.4th 998, 1014 (10th Cir.
2025). But see United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 704 (4th
Cir. 2024) (concluding that "the possession of firearms by felons"
is "'activity' . . . that 'fall[s] outside the scope of the
[Second Amendment] right as originally understood'" (last two
alterations in original) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18)), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025) (mem.).
- 11 -The government contends that resolving this case at step
two is straightforward. In its view, we should eschew all
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), because the Nation's history
and tradition of firearm regulation permits class-wide disarmament
of individuals who have been convicted of a crime punishable by
more than one year in prison. The government relies on two
separate aspects of our Nation's history and tradition in making
this argument: disarmament of individuals who "pose a danger of
misusing firearms"6 and disarmament of individuals convicted of a
serious crime. It also urges us to rely on the Supreme Court's
repeated statements that laws disarming individuals with felony
convictions are "presumptively lawful."
We follow a different path and affirm the district
court's ruling based on the limited arguments presented by
Levasseur on appeal. In doing so, we assume in Levasseur's favor
that we can entertain this as-applied challenge to his § 922(g)(1)
conviction,7 and that the Supreme Court's previous statements that
6Before the district court and on appeal, the government has
advanced the theory that it can disarm individuals who pose a
special danger of misusing firearms. For example, it has asserted
that governments historically disarmed "all people belonging to
groups that were, in the judgment of those early legislatures,
potentially violent or dangerous."
7Our sister circuits that have considered the question of
whether to permit as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the wake
of Bruen and Rahimi are deeply divided. Four circuits have
completely foreclosed such challenges. See United States v.
Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1129 (8th Cir. 2024) (concluding that the
- 12 -laws disarming felons are presumptively constitutional are not
dispositive of his Second Amendment claim. Ultimately, we hold
that Levasseur has failed to show any error in the district court's
determination that he falls into the category of individuals who
can be disarmed because they pose a special danger of misusing
firearms and, for that reason, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as
applied to him.
1. The District Court's Analysis
The district court ruled that "Levasseur's alleged prior
felony conviction for the possession of methamphetamine makes him
sufficiently dangerous that he may constitutionally be disarmed."
Levasseur, 2023 WL 6623165, at *9. It reasoned that the Nation
has a history and tradition of disarming individuals who pose a
special danger of misusing firearms, and that, per this history
and tradition, an individual can pose such a danger even without
a determination that the individual has a prior history of violence
Nation has a tradition of disarming "categories of persons . . . who deviated from legal norms or . . . presented an
unacceptable risk of dangerousness"); see also Zherka, 140 F.4th
at 94; Hunt, 123 F.4th at 706; Duarte, 137 F.4th at 761. Three
circuits permit them. See Pitsilides v. Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2025) (explaining that courts must "make an individualized determination" in evaluating as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1)); Diaz, 116 F.4th at 470 (finding § 922(g)(1)
constitutional as applied only to defendants "who would have been
felons at the Founding"); Williams, 113 F.4th at 661 ("The relevant principle from our tradition of firearms regulation is that, when
the legislature disarms on a class-wide basis, individuals must
have a reasonable opportunity to prove that they don't fit the
class-wide generalization.").
- 13 -or poses a specific threat of future violence to another. Id. at
*7-8.
To support its initial ruling rejecting Levasseur's
Second Amendment claim, the district court pointed to laws
disarming Loyalists, Catholics, Native Americans, and African
Americans, emphasizing that none of those groups were disarmed
because they were "violent criminals." Id. at *7. Instead, the
court determined that "[t]he common thread tying the
early-American history of firearm regulation together is that
governments exercised authority to disarm persons seen as too
dangerous to possess a firearm," id., in the sense that they
"plausibly pose[d] a threat to the orderly functioning of society"
if armed, id. at *8 (citation omitted).
In its analysis, the district court also relied on
proposed language for the Second Amendment discussed at state
constitutional conventions held shortly after the Founding. As
the court put it, these proposals demonstrated that "the right to
bear arms was understood to have limits, and the categorical
restrictions were 'not about felons in particular or even criminals
in general;' instead, they were 'about threatened violence and the
risk of public injury.'" Id. (quoting Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d
437, 456 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)). The court
then held that "§ 922(g)(1) is sufficiently analogous to the
historical practices of disarming [categories of] dangerous
- 14 -persons insofar as the statute disarms felons who can reasonably
be viewed as too dangerous to possess a firearm." Id.
After concluding that the Second Amendment does not
prohibit Congress from categorically disarming individuals who are
deemed too dangerous to possess a firearm -- even if they have not
already been deemed violent -- the district court went on to
specifically find that Levasseur was such an individual. See id.
at *8-9. In doing so, the court relied on Levasseur's conviction
for possession of methamphetamine: It explained that "[e]ven one
who simply possesses a controlled substance like methamphetamine
must generally obtain it from someone else, and firearms are often
involved in drug transactions." Id. at *9.8 As the court pointed
out, the "dangerous connection" between illegal drug transactions
and firearms is "well-known." Id.
The district court adhered to its previous conclusion
that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to Levasseur
because his conviction for methamphetamine possession rendered him
"too dangerous to possess a firearm" in rejecting his renewed
motion to dismiss after Rahimi. Levasseur, 2024 WL 3358221, at
*3. It acknowledged that the Supreme Court had found it
significant that Rahimi had posed a specific threat of violence to
For purposes of resolving this appeal, we (1) rely only on
8
Levasseur's predicate conviction for methamphetamine possession
and (2) consider only the elements of that predicate offense and
not the facts underlying his specific criminal conduct.
- 15 -his girlfriend, and that "unlike Rahimi, Levasseur has not been
found by a court to pose a credible threat of danger" to another
person. Id. at *2-3. But the court also noted the Supreme Court's
statement in Rahimi that it was "not suggest[ing] that the Second
Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession
of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to
present a special danger of misuse." Id. at *3 (quoting Rahimi,
602 U.S. at 698). The court linked its understanding of
dangerousness to this specific language in Rahimi.
2. The Historical Analogues Relied on by the District Court
On appeal, Levasseur continues to insist that he cannot
be constitutionally disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment
because his predicate convictions do not involve violence and no
court has found him to pose a specific threat of future violence
to another person. To explain why we are unconvinced by the
limited arguments Levasseur presents, we begin by summarizing the
historical analogues that the government invoked and the district
court relied on to reach its ruling.
Colonial legislatures enacted law after law disarming
groups of individuals who for one reason or another were thought
to pose a danger to public safety. For example, legislatures
disarmed groups opposing the government. In 1775, the Connecticut
legislature enacted a law "disarm[ing]" individuals who "libel[ed]
or defame[d]" the government, prohibiting them from "hav[ing] or
- 16 -keep[ing] any arms." Act of Dec. 1775, reprinted in 15 The Public
Records of the Colony of Connecticut from May, 1775, to June, 1776,
at 193 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Hartford, Case, Lockwood & Brainard
Co. 1890). One year later, the Continental Congress recommended
that the other colonies follow suit and disarm anyone "notoriously
disaffected to the cause of America." 4 Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774-1789, at 205 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1906).
Between 1776 and 1779, several additional colonies
enacted laws to prevent "the great danger to which [they were]
exposed" by disarming Loyalists -- individuals who were loyal to
the British Crown. See Act of 1776, reprinted in 7 Records of the
Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New
England 566-67 (John Russell Bartlett ed., Providence, 1862); Act
of Mar. 14, 1776, ch. 21, 1775-76 Mass. Acts 479; Act of June 13,
1777, ch. 756 §§ 2-4, 1777 Pa. Laws 110, 111-13. These colonies
recognized that it was "very improper and dangerous that persons
disaffected to the liberty and independence of [the country] should
possess or have in their own keeping, or elsewhere, any fire arms,
or other weapons used in war, or any gun powder." Act of Apr. 2,
1779, reprinted in Laws Enacted in the Second Sitting of the Third
General Assembly, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 199 (John
Dunlap ed., Philadelphia, 1779); see also Regulations Respecting
Persons Who Are Disarmed on Account of Their Inimical Principles
- 17 -(May 11, 1776), reprinted in 5 American Archives, ser. 4, at 1504
(Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force
1844) (discussing a New York law disarming "the most dangerous"
"inimical" individuals "not only for the safety of
the . . . Province, but of the United Colonies in general").9 The
repeated references in these laws to "danger" indicate that early
legislatures acted to address "social upheavals," "rebellion,"
"the potential threat coming from armed citizens who remained loyal
to another sovereign," and to protect "public safety" and
"stability." Kanter, 919 F.3d at 457-58 (Barrett, J., dissenting)
(citation modified).10
Proposals for the text of the Second Amendment that were
considered at the time of the Founding also reflected lawmakers'
concerns for protecting public safety. For example, a portion of
the delegation to the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania
proposed that the right to bear arms be protected such that "no
law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless
for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from
These two specific laws were not expressly invoked by the
9
government or cited by the district court, but they are similar to
other Loyalist disarmament laws that the government did invoke and
that the court cited.
Believing that it was "dangerous . . . to permit Papists
10
to be armed," legislatures also prohibited Catholics from
possessing arms. See Act of Mar. 1756, reprinted in 7 The Statutes
at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia ch. 4, 35
(William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, 1820).
- 18 -individuals." 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A
Documentary History 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis added); see Heller,
554 U.S. at 604 (referencing this "highly influential minority
proposal"). Similarly, a motion at the Massachusetts convention
proposed that the Constitution explicitly allow "the people of the
United States, who are peaceable citizens, [to keep] their own
arms." Schwartz, supra, at 681 (emphasis added).
The common theme of these proposals was to disarm those
who "pose[d] a danger to public safety," in the sense that they
threatened to cause public "tumult" or "turbulen[ce]." Kanter,
919 F.3d at 455-56 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (explaining the
definition of "peaceable" at the time). And, although these
proposals were not adopted, they still provide helpful data because
"[t]he Second Amendment codified a 'pre-existing,' 'venerable,'
and 'widely understood' right," so it is "unlikely that 'different
people of the founding period had vastly different conceptions' of
its scope." Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 124 F.4th 218, 264 (3d Cir.
2024) (en banc) (Krause, J., concurring) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S.
at 603-05).
3. Levasseur's Limited Arguments on Appeal
To establish that the district court erred in its legal
analysis, Levasseur would have to show that the historical
analogues the court relied on were not "relevantly similar" to
§ 922(g)(1), either as to why or how that restriction burdens the
- 19 -individual right to keep and bear arms. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692
(quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). Yet Levasseur does not
meaningfully engage with or respond to the nature of the district
court's dangerousness analysis in his opening brief. Instead, he
largely ignores the historical analogues we have just described11
and instead focuses narrowly on other historical laws disarming
individuals who were deemed physically violent.
To be sure, in his opening brief, Levasseur argues that
"[t]he [historical] concept of dangerousness was not nearly as
broad as the [d]istrict [c]ourt suggests." But in making that
argument, he points to surety laws and "going armed" laws,12 which
the district court did not rely on, and contends that they offer
historical support for disarmament only "[w]hen an individual
poses a clear threat of physical violence to another." (Quoting
11 Although the government raised these laws to the district
court and the district court relied on them, Levasseur's opening
brief does not analyze them. See Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate
Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2015) (criticizing "opening
brief [for] present[ing] no argument at all challenging express
grounds upon which the district court prominently relied in
entering judgment"). Instead, Levasseur addresses these analogues
only in his reply brief, risking waiver, as we discuss below. See
id. (finding argument waived because "[o]ne hundred percent of the
argument advanced for why [the court] should reverse [the district
court's] holding [was] in the reply brief").
12 "Surety laws . . . authorized magistrates to require
individuals suspected of future misbehavior . . . to post a bond
which would be forfeit if the individual later broke the peace."
Minor, 165 F.4th at 622 (citation modified). "Going armed
laws . . . prohibited riding or going armed, with dangerous or
unusual weapons, to terrify the good people of the land." Id.
(citation modified).
- 20 -Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698.) He further highlights that "[f]ederal
law only began prohibiting possession of firearms by non-violent
felons in 1961." Then, without ever addressing the historical
analogues the court did rely on, Levasseur maintains that "for 170
years" after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, "a person could
only be disarmed if they had shown themselves to be dangerous" in
the sense that they "pos[ed] a risk of violence."
Relying on his definition of dangerousness, Levasseur
contends that the district court erred in concluding that his
methamphetamine possession rendered him sufficiently dangerous to
be disarmed. Pointing again to the surety and going armed laws,
he insists that "[d]isarmament was only allowed in response to
some type of actual conduct by a person that directly placed
another person at risk of harm." And Levasseur concludes that
because methamphetamine possession does not render him
"dangerous" in that specific way, disarming him is not consistent
with our Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation and
thus the court's analogical reasoning must have been "too broad."
Levasseur's argument that his conviction for
methamphetamine possession was for a non-violent offense, however,
is not enough on its own to explain why that conviction does not
place him into a category of people who pose a special danger of
- 21 -misusing firearms.13 See United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. ___,
146 S. Ct. 1677, 1692 n.6 (2026) (clarifying that the relevant
inquiry centers on whether the individual poses "a special danger
of misuse," not necessarily a danger of physical violence). As we
explained more than a decade ago, there may be "some felonies so
tame and technical" that individuals who commit them will not pose
a special danger of misusing firearms. See United States v.
Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). But Levasseur
fails to explain why the district court erred in concluding that
methamphetamine possession is not one of those "tame and technical"
felonies, especially given the Supreme Court's recognition that
"drugs and guns can sometimes make for a dangerous mix." Hemani,
146 S. Ct. at 1687; cf. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240
(1993) ("When Congress enacted the current version of § 924(c)(1),
it was no doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous
combination.").
Levasseur does tender two arguments that come closer to
addressing the district court's dangerousness analysis. But
neither is enough to demonstrate any error.14
13Levasseur even conceded at oral argument that today,
individuals who pose a special danger of misusing firearms can be
disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
We note that Levasseur did not raise the first argument in
14
his opening brief, so we would normally treat it as waived. See
Clemente Props., Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, 165 F.4th 1, 44-45
(1st Cir. 2026) ("Our circuit disfavors allowing parties to argue,
- 22 -First, Levasseur argues that the district court erred in
its analysis of the "why" behind § 922(g)(1). He contends that
the historical laws relied on by the court are inapt analogues
because those laws disarmed groups of individuals on the basis
that they were viewed as "dissidents or a threat," whereas
§ 922(g)(1) disarms individuals "because they [are] criminals."
But the modern version of § 922(g)(1) does not just serve
the purpose of "crime control," as Levasseur contends. See
Vizcaíno-Peguero, 175 F.4th at 43. In enacting predecessor
statutes to § 922(g)(1), Congress "determined that firearms must
be kept away from persons, such as those convicted of serious
crimes, who might be expected to misuse them." Dickerson v. New
Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983); see also Scarborough
v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) ("Congress sought to
rule broadly to keep guns out of the hands of those who have
demonstrated that 'they may not be trusted to possess a firearm
without becoming a threat to society.'" (quoting 114 Cong. Rec.
14773 (1968))). Indeed, the Supreme Court has described
felon-in-possession bans as reflecting "Congress' judgment that a
convicted felon . . . is among the class of persons who should be
disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of
in a reply filing, issues that should have been included in the
initial filing" and may "deem [such arguments] waived."). But
because we can easily dispense with it on the merits, we proceed
to explain why we find it unpersuasive.
- 23 -potential dangerousness . . . ." Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 67 (1980).
Levasseur offers no other argument challenging the
district court's conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is relevantly similar
on the "why" axis to the historical analogues the court considered,
given the dangerousness principle the court determined was
applicable. To the extent Levasseur means to emphasize that these
analogues are not identical to § 922(g)(1), that would not be
enough for him to prevail on appeal. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the government does not need to identify a historical
precursor that is a "dead ringer" for a modern firearm restriction,
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30, and that courts should not treat the Second
Amendment as "trapped in amber," Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. So, by
overlooking the district court's reasoning for why his conviction
for methamphetamine possession makes him part of a class of
individuals who can be deemed to pose a special danger of misusing
firearms, Levasseur has failed to explain how the court erred in
its analysis of our Nation's history and tradition.
Second, Levasseur suggests that these analogues are not
relevantly similar to § 922(g)(1) on the "how" axis because members
within the disarmed groups could secure the right to keep and bear
arms by taking a loyalty oath. And it is true that, historically,
Loyalists who were willing to swear allegiance to the United States
could regain the right to keep and bear arms. See Range, 124 F.4th
- 24 -at 262 (Krause, J., concurring) (explaining that individuals
"could prospectively regain their rights by proving to a government
official that they no longer posed a danger of misusing firearms").
As Levasseur highlights, the district court described
§ 922(g)(1) as imposing "lifetime disarmament against felons" when
it addressed his arguments attempting to distinguish historical
firearm regulations. Levasseur, 2023 WL 6623165, at *8; see also
Levasseur, 2024 WL 3358221, at *3 (discussing the temporary nature
of the disarmament under the surety and going armed laws analyzed
in Rahimi). But the court rejected the thrust of Levasseur's
arguments on the "how" axis, explaining that he was impermissibly
"demanding a historical twin." Levasseur, 2023 WL 6623165, at *8.
Again, Levasseur has pointed to nothing to undermine the
district court's implicit premise that legislatures can disarm an
individual who is deemed dangerous based on a status for as long
as the individual retains that status. (That is, assuming our
Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation supports
treating that status as a marker of dangerousness.) Indeed, that
was how the laws disarming Loyalists functioned. See 1775-76 Mass.
Acts at 484 (explaining that disarmed Loyalists could "receive
their arms again . . . by the order of [a] committee or the general
court").
In any event, it is not clear that § 922(g)(1) does
impose lifetime disarmament on anyone with a felony conviction.
- 25 -Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), "[a]ny conviction . . . for which a
person . . . has had civil rights restored shall not be considered
a conviction for purposes of this chapter." Levasseur does not
engage with this statutory provision (or the potential restoration
of his civil rights) and the extent to which this provision does
or does not render disarmament under § 922(g)(1) permanent. See
Minor, 165 F.4th at 624-25.15
Ultimately, the district court concluded that
§ 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to Levasseur because of
his predicate conviction for methamphetamine possession, based on
our Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals who
pose a special danger of misusing firearms. On appeal, it became
Levasseur's burden to address the court's reasoning and to explain
why that reasoning, and not some other reasoning, was incorrect.
15 Only "the convicting jurisdiction" can restore civil
rights. Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994).
Because Levasseur was convicted of violating Maine's criminal
statutes, Maine's restoration procedures would govern. See Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 393(2).
In addition to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), Congress also offered
another pathway for the restoration of Second Amendment rights
when it enacted § 922(g)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), an
individual can apply to the Attorney General for relief and regain
their Second Amendment rights if they establish that they are not
"likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety" and
rearmament "would not be contrary to the public interest." If the
Attorney General denies the application, the individual can file
a petition in federal district court for judicial review of the
denial. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). But because the § 925(c) program
was defunct at the time of Levasseur's conviction, we do not
analyze further how it impacts his as-applied claim.
- 26 -See Randazzo, 80 F.3d at 633. Levasseur's decision to argue solely
that he cannot be disarmed because he does not have a history of
violence and has not been found to pose a specific threat of
violence to another person does not address whether he poses a
special danger of misusing firearms. That omission is fatal to
his case.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm Levasseur's conviction.
- 27 -