J-A15017-26 2026 PA Super 204
RON RHEINGOLD : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AMGUARD INSURANCE COMPANY :
:
Appellant : No. 1123 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
202302763
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY LANE, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 16, 2026
AmGuard Insurance Company (“AmGuard”) appeals from the discovery
order directing it to produce certain documents. We hold that AmGuard has
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating, with sufficient analysis of the
particular documents, that they are protected from disclosure under the
attorney-client privilege attorney work product doctrine. Accordingly, we
affirm.
We glean the following factual allegations from the complaint of the
plaintiff, Ron Rheingold (“Rheingold”). AmGuard is a corporation with its
principal place of business in Luzerne County, and does business in the State
of California as a commercial automobile liability insurer. In January 2018,
AmGuard issued a commercial automobile insurance policy to Reingold in
California. Ten days thereafter, Rheingold was in a three-car collision and
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15017-26
suffered serious bodily injury, including neck, back, and shoulder pain, as well
as loss of earnings. “The driver who rear-ended Rheingold” had liability
insurance coverage of $15,000 per injured person, and ultimately Rheingold
settled his claims against this driver for $15,000. Complaint in Civil Action,
5/18/23, at ¶¶ 12, 25.
In August 2019, Rheingold, represented by counsel, made a policy
demand on AmGuard for the full amount of his uninsured/underinsured
motorist (“UIM”) benefit, $1,000,000. In December 2019, Rheingold
“received notice that the law firm of Kennedy & Souza, APC would be
representing AmGuard regarding the underinsurance matter.” Id. at ¶ 30
(unnecessary capitalization omitted). On the same day, Rheingold requested
arbitration of his insurance claim. Fourteen months later, in March 2021,
AmGuard offered Rheingold $100,000 to settle his UIM claim. In a brief filed
in the arbitration process, AmGuard averred “that Rheingold’s injuries were
‘not causally connected’ to the [automobile] collision and that Rheingold’s
medical expenses and loss of earnings and earning capacity were . . .
exaggerated.” Id. at ¶ 50.
In July 2021, following a hearing, the arbitrator entered a final award to
Rheingold of $985,000, representing his UIM policy limit less $15,000 paid by
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the underinsured driver’s policy.1 The arbitrator also awarded attorneys’ fees
and costs. A California court confirmed the arbitration award and entered
judgment against AmGuard, and AmGuard has satisfied this judgment.
Subsequently, Rheingold filed the instant action in Luzerne County. He
pleaded breach of contract and bad faith, averring that AmGuard: failed to
“objectively and fairly . . . evaluate” his insurance claim; and failed to
“promptly . . . offer payment of the reasonable and fair value of the claim.”
Id. at ¶¶ 63-64. Rheingold also raised, in the alternative, a claim of bad faith
under California law.
In discovery, Rheingold requested various documents to, inter alia,
“seek information regarding . . . the company procedures for evaluating [UIM]
claims, [whether they were] followed, who participated in AmGuard’s decision
to value [his] UIM claim at [$100,000] and to reject the [$1,000,000] policy
limits demand, and why.” Rheingold’s Motion to Compel AmGuard to File
Amended Privilege Logs, 3/3/25, at ¶ 2. AmGuard responded and provided,
inter alia, a four-page privilege log, setting forth a table of withheld
documents. Pertinently, the last page indicated that it withheld 379
documents, which spanned more than 2,000 pages, pursuant to the attorneyclient privilege and attorney work product doctrine. The log grouped these
1 According to Rheingold’s complaint, the arbitrator had also determined “that
the dollar value of the damages recoverable from the uninsured motorist, based upon the evidence submitted,” was $5,240,000. Complaint in Civil Action, 5/18/23, at ¶ 57.
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documents into five rows. By way of example, the first row: encompassed
250 documents; indicated that they spanned 1,538 pages; described them as
“email correspondence;” provided the “date” as “12/12/2019 – 08/01/2022;”
and stated, under the heading, “Subject Matter,” “Communication and related
attachments with outside counsel providing, requesting or reflecting legal
advice regarding underlying action or in connection with the coverage dispute
giving rise to this action.” Privilege Log at 4, Exh. 2 to Rheingold’s Brief in
Support of Motion to Compel Discovery - Production of Documents, 9/9/24
(“Privilege Log”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The remaining four
rows set forth these descriptions under “Subject Matter:” (1) “documents . . .
prepared by outside counsel regarding coverage issues and legal strategy,
including advise [sic] from outside coverage counsel;” (2) “documents
pertaining to the retention, reserves for and/or payment of outside counsel;”
(3) “documents and/or communication pertaining to the selection, rates,
retention and/or payment of experts by outside counsel;” and (4) “internal
documents and/or communication containing information prepared by, at the
direction of, or on behalf of counsel in connection with the coverage dispute
giving rise to this action.” Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Rheingold filed motions to compel AmGuard’s production of documents,
as well as answers to interrogatories. AmGuard filed responses in opposition.
Rheingold also filed a motion to compel AmGuard to file an amended privilege
log, arguing the log: provided “only general descriptions of broad categories
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of documents;” made “no effort to set forth information regarding anything
other than the generic type of communication, i.e. email correspondence[,]
fail[ed] completely to identify the author[,] recipients, or the dates of each
communication;” and failed “to provide anything more than a cursory
description of the subject matter of the general groups of communications.”
Rheingold’s Motion to Compel AmGuard to File Amended Privilege Logs,
3/3/25, at ¶¶ 14-16. AmGuard filed a response, asserting that its privilege
log was sufficiently detailed, and that it had provided more than 600 pages of
non-privileged records.
The trial court appointed a special discovery master (the “discovery
master”) and scheduled a hearing before him.2 Meanwhile, AmGuard filed a
motion for the trial court to conduct in camera review of the withheld
documents, to determine whether the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product doctrine apply. The court agreed to perform in camera review.
On July 2, 2025, the parties appeared before the discovery master on
Rheingold’s motion to compel AmGuard to file an amended privilege log.3
Rheingold argued all of the following. AmGuard’s privilege log was “materially
2 The appointed discovery master was the Honorable Joseph Van Bura (Retired).
3 At this hearing, Rheingold stated that the trial court was separately considering an issue raised by AmGuard — “whether attorney-client privilege . . . is appropriate . . . with a [UIM] arbitration and subsequent bad faith case.” N.T., 7/2/25, at 3.
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deficient” in providing information to the trial court to determine whether the
attorney-client privilege applied to each document. N.T., 7/2/25, at 5. In
contravention of Fisher v. Erie Ins. Exch., 258 A.3d 451 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(en banc), the privilege log did not identify the author, recipient, date, or
length of any document. Thus, it was “impossible” to discern whether any
email went to a third party, which would have resulted in AmGuard waiving
the privilege. Id. Additionally, each document should have “its own separate
entry,” and it was improper to “do a global grouping.” Id. at 7. In sum,
Rheingold asserted the privilege log did not “accurately describe[] what is
being withheld and why it is being withheld:” “There’s just no way to tell.” Id.
at 9, 17. Furthermore, Rheingold challenged the third and fourth rows of the
privilege log: “documents pertaining to the . . . payment of outside counsel”
and “payment of experts by outside counsel.” Id. at 28, 32. Rheingold
disputed that “payment of outside counsel would be [privileged] information.”
Id. at 8.
AmGuard responded that the prior arbitration procedure was a legal
proceeding, which resulted in a California court order, “and any information,
communications, mental impressions” by its counsel “in anticipation of
litigation,” was protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine. N.T., 7/2/25, at 21. AmGuard claimed that Pennsylvania had no
“set rule or form [dictating] the format of a privilege log,” nor any rule
requiring “who the communications were between.” Id. at 33. In any event,
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AmGuard maintained that the log identified “outside counsel as the party
being involved in those documents.” Id. at 37. AmGuard insisted that here,
it provided “the document type, the Bates number, description, the date
range, privilege basis, subject matter, as well as the number of documents
that were withheld,” and “any additional information beyond this could [have]
potentially” waived the privilege. Id. at 33-34. With respect to payment of
its California attorneys’ fees, AmGuard asserted that “legal bills contain
narratives as to what actions . . . were done by these attorneys . . . in the
underlying UIM arbitration.” Id. at 29.
Meanwhile, the trial court conducted in camera review of the withheld
documents. On July 14, 2025, it issued the underlying order, which directed
AmGuard to provide all of the documents to Rheingold within thirty days.
AmGuard filed a timely notice of appeal, averring that the underlying
order was appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313 and the collateral order doctrine.
The trial court has issued a brief Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 4 This Court
initially issued a rule on AmGuard to show cause as to how the order satisfied
the collateral order doctrine. AmGuard filed a written response. This Court
discharged the rule to show cause but advised the parties that this merits
panel may revisit the issue.
4 The trial court did not direct AmGuard to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
of errors complained of on appeal.
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On appeal, AmGuard presents the following issue for our review: “Did
the trial court err in its July 14, 2025 order when it compelled [AmGuard] to
produce documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine?” AmGuard’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
First, we review whether this appeal is properly before us. Generally,
“[a]n appeal may be taken only from a final order unless otherwise permitted
by statute or rule.” Perelman v. Perelman, 259 A.3d 1000, 1005 (Pa.
Super. 2021); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (defining a “final order” as one
that “disposes of all claims and of all parties”). Collateral orders are an
exception to this general rule. See Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). Rule of Appellate
Procedure 313 defines a collateral order as “an order separable from and
collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important
to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is
postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). This Court has “recognized that an appellant’s colorable
claim of attorney-client and attorney work-product privilege can establish the
propriety of immediate appellate review.” Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1006
(some citations omitted). “Whether an order is appealable under the collateral
order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313 is a question of law, subject to a de novo
standard of review, and the scope of review is plenary.” Fisher, 258 A.3d at
459 (citation omitted).
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Here, AmGuard avers that the underlying discovery order directed it to
produce documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney
work product doctrine. This “colorable claim” sufficiently invokes our
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1006;
see also Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Accordingly, we proceed to review the merits of
AmGuard’s claim — that the trial court erred in ordering it to produce the
documents.
We consider the applicable standard of review:
“Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an
appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. To the
extent that the question involves a pure issue of law, our
scope . . . of review [is] plenary.” “The trial court is responsible
for ‘[overseeing] discovery between the parties and therefore it is
within that court’s discretion to determine the appropriate
measure necessary to insure adequate and prompt discovering of
matters allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.’”
Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1007 (citations omitted).
Section 5928 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code5 defines the attorneyclient privilege as follows: “In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or
permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client,
nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case
this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928.
“The work product doctrine is not a privilege, but rather a rule embodied
in Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.3. It is not uncommon however, to see the doctrine also
5 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 101-9914.
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referred to as a privilege.” Fisher, 258 A.3d at 460 n.6 (citations omitted).
Rule 4003.3 provides:
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product privilege
“does not necessarily involve communications with a client.”
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.3 governs attorney
work product as follows:
[Generally,] a party may obtain discovery of any matter
discoverable under Rule 4003.1[, governing the scope of
discovery generally,] even though prepared in
anticipation of litigation or trial by or for another party or
by or for that other party’s representative, including his
or her attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer
or agent. The discovery shall not include disclosure
of the mental impressions of a party’s attorney or
his or her conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes
or summaries, legal research or legal theories.
With respect to the representative of a party other than
the party’s attorney, discovery shall not include
disclosure of his or her mental impressions, conclusions
or opinions respecting the value or merit of a claim or
defense or respecting strategy or tactics.
Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1008 (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.3) (emphasis added).
We have explained:
The party asserting privilege against discovery of requested
materials bears the burden of proof of demonstrating that the
materials are protected from disclosure[, and ]
. . . must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege
has been properly invoked[.] Once the invoking party
has made the appropriate proffer, then the burden shifts
to the party seeking disclosure to set forth facts showing
that disclosure should be compelled either because the
privilege has been waived or because an exception to the
privilege applies.
[I]f the party asserting the privilege does not produce sufficient
facts to show that the privilege was properly invoked, then the
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burden never shifts to the other party, and the communication is
not protected under attorney-client privilege.
Fisher, 258 A.3d at 461 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“The privilege log is the primary source for determining whether
attorney-client privilege or work-product privileges apply.” Id. at 462
(citation omitted).
When responding to written interrogatories or document
production requests, our rules do not per se require the production
of a privilege log when a responding party asserts privilege as a
basis to object to production. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 4006[,] 4009.12[.]
Nonetheless, . . . when privilege is asserted, the responding party
bears the burden of proving the materials are protected from
disclosure. The preparation of a privilege log provides an
acceptable format in which to identify documents, the applicable
privilege, and the reason for the privilege claimed.
Id. at 461 n.8.
Where the log alone does not permit meaningful analysis of the
underlying claim or the scope of the asserted privilege, in camera
review is available. See Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3. As we [have]
acknowledged . . . , “[i]n camera review is a valuable tool for
determining the validity of privilege claims, and in many
instances, it is difficult to make an informed decision regarding
privilege without such an inspection.”
Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
In Fisher, the plaintiffs/insureds filed a breach of contract and bad faith
suit against their insurance company, challenging the latter’s handling of a
UIM claim. Fisher, 258 A.3d at 456. In discovery, the plaintiffs requested
“all documentation reflecting any investigation, evaluation and/or valuation of
[the plaintiffs’] claims for [UIM] coverage authored, prepared by or obtained
by” the insurance company’s attorneys. Id. Ultimately, the insurance
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company produced a privilege log for the trial court’s review. See id. at 460.
The trial court found that it was “unable to resolve the protected claims,” and
thus directed the insurance company “to produce the objected-to materials
for an in camera inspection.” Id. at 461. The insurance company appealed
from this order.6
Relevantly, an en banc panel of this Court determined that the privilege
log was deficient:
[T]he log simply list[ed] numbers of documents, the subject of the
document, and the privilege basis, all in cursory fashion. For
instance, subjects of documents include “Strategy/tactics,”
“Attorney client privilege,” or “Value/merit” and the privilege basis
is simply “MI” (“mental impressions, conclusion or opinions
respecting the value or merit of a claim or defense or respecting
strategy or tactics”) or “AC” (attorney client privilege).
Id. at 461-62.
The Court determined:
This privilege log offered no value to help determine the veracity
of [the insurance company’s] claims of privilege or work-product.
[The privilege] log does not identify which of the seventeen
requests the arbitrarily withheld documents would apply [sic].
[The] log does not identify any author of the documentation[,] the
recipient[, or even] the dates of any of the documents withheld.
Id. at 462. Accordingly, this Court held that the insurance company
6 On appeal, this Court ultimately concluded this order — which directed the
production of documents for in camera review only, and not for disclosure to another party — was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Fisher, 258 A.3d at 467-68. However, in reaching this conclusion, this Court considered the sufficiency of the privilege log, which determined the trial court’s ability to resolve the claims of privilege. See id. at 460.
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failed to meet its burden to assert facts establishing either an
attorney-client or a work product privilege with respect to any of
the documents at issue. In other words, as the party claiming
privilege, [the insurance company] did not produce sufficient facts
to demonstrate that the privilege was properly invoked.
Therefore, the burden of proof never shifted to the [plaintiffs].
Id. (citations omitted).
In the instant appeal, AmGuard avers the following. The prior
arbitration process in California was an adversarial legal proceeding, in which
both AmGuard and Rheingold “retained counsel to present their positions
before a neutral decision-maker whose ruling would bind them.” AmGuard’s
Brief at 13-14. The “attorneys developed strategy, gathered information, and
advised their clients,” and thus the attorney-client privilege and work product
protections applied. Id. at 14. Furthermore, AmGuard and its counsel “were
operating under California law and [anticipated] that its protections would
apply to them.” Id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 954 (stating, inter alia, that “the
client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client
and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by [t]he holder of the privilege”)).
“Pennsylvania law is in harmony.” Id. at 10. AmGuard maintains that it has
not waived the attorney-client privilege because it has not raised, in this
matter, a defense of relying on its prior counsel’s advice.
With respect to specific requests for documents, AmGuard summarizes
that Rheingold’s “Request[s] for Production #16 [and] #17 asked,”
respectively, for “[a]ll communications” between it and its prior counsel
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“regarding all offers to settle the [UIM] action” and “regarding the value of the
[UIM] action.” AmGuard’s Brief at 17 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
AmGuard asserts:
These requests seek documents concerning communications
between [AmGuard] and [its] legal counsel for the underlying UIM
action. As indicated in both [AmGuard’s] Privilege Log and . . .
Supplemental Responses, the documents sought . . . are
privileged and AmGuard properly withheld them from discovery
and as such, the trial court should have protected them from
disclosure.
Id. (citations to reproduced record omitted).
In invoking the attorney work product doctrine, AmGuard alleges that
the contested documents “were . . . created during the California UIM
proceeding” and consist of: AmGuard’s counsel’s “mental impressions,
conclusions, or opinions;” “attorney memoranda, notes, or summaries;”
“counsel’s legal research or analysis;” and AmGuard’s “own evaluations of the
strengths, weaknesses, and strategy related to the arbitration.” Id. at 20-21.
In its opinion, the trial court explained that it considered “extensive
argument and briefing from the parties” and conducted an in camera review
of the disputed discovery documents. Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/25, at
unnumbered 2. The court reasoned, in sum:
[The court] found the documents to be relevant to the proceeding,
discoverable and not privileged. The Court’s expansive review
found the documents were not confidential nor subject to the
attorney-client, work product privileges in this bad faith and
contract action. The discovery sought was not overly broad and
could reasonably be calculated to lead to admissible testimony.
The request was not made in bad faith and did not constitute
unreasonable annoyance as the court considered and balanced the
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interest of all parties. Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations,
Inc. 936 A.2d 1117 (Pa. Super 2007).[7]
Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the
trial court’s order on the grounds that AmGuard has failed to meet its “burden
of proof of demonstrating that the materials are protected from disclosure.”
Fisher, 258 A.3d at 461; see also Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1010 n.4 (“stating
that this Court is not bound by rationale of trial court and may affirm on any
basis”). Preliminarily, we reiterate that where a privilege “log alone does not
permit meaningful analysis of the underlying claim or the scope of the asserted
privilege,” a trial court may conduct in camera review. Fisher, 258 A.3d at
462. Here, the trial court did so and concluded that neither the attorney-client
privilege nor attorney work product doctrine applied. However, the trial court
has not set forth any particular reasoning, with discussion of any document in
detail, in support of this conclusion.
Nevertheless, on appeal, AmGuard has not addressed any particular
document, by reference to its contents, date, author, recipient, or purpose,
nor explained why either the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine
7 The Berkeyheiser decision cited Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011,
which provides in pertinent part: “No discovery or deposition shall be permitted which . . . (a) is sought in bad faith; [or] (b) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or party[.]” Berkeyheiser, 936 A.2d at 1126 (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 4011(a)-(b)).
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applied to it. Instead, AmGuard vaguely argues that: the California arbitration
was an adversarial legal proceeding; AmGuard and its counsel “privately
communicated with the intent of securing or providing legal assistance;” and
thus all of its communications with prior counsel, regarding “all offers to settle
the [UIM] action” and “the value of the [UIM] action,” “are privileged.”
AmGuard’s Brief at 17-18. With respect to the attorney work product doctrine,
AmGuard similarly offers broad strokes — that the withheld records contained
its prior counsel “mental impressions, conclusions, . . . opinions,” “legal
research[,] or analysis,” as well as AmGuard’s “own evaluations of the
strengths, weaknesses, and strategy.” Id. at 20-21. AmGuard offers no more
description or explanation as to any particular document.8. The Fisher Court
found that a defendant’s similar “cursory” language, albeit in a privilege log,
was insufficient to meet its burden “of demonstrating that the materials are
protected from disclosure.” Fisher, 258 A.3d at 461 (citation omitted).
We emphasize that an appellant’s argument must include “such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a). We underscore our role as an error correcting court, and “this Court
will not act as counsel and . . . develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”
Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also In
8 At the hearing before the discovery master, AmGuard argued that “having
to go through . . . over 300 documents and logging each . . . one with . . . additional information” “would be vastly unproportional and burdensome.” N.T., 7/2/25, at 38. They have not raised this argument on appeal.
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re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 986 (Pa. Super. 2009). In light of the lack of argument
particularly addressing any of the more than 2,000 pages of contested
documents, or even a description of any document, we determine that
AmGuard has failed to “produce sufficient facts to show that the privilege was
properly invoked.” Fisher, 258 A.3d at 461. On this basis, we do not disturb
the order directing AmGuard to provide the documents to Rheingold.
Finally, we briefly address AmGuard’s additional arguments. First, it
asserts that the trial court “should also prohibit the production of reserve
information.”9 AmGuard’s Brief at 26. AmGuard contends:
Internal reserve information can play a meaningful role in
counsel’s preparation for a UIM arbitration. While reserves are
set for regulatory and financial purposes, they are informed by the
adjuster’s assessment of the claim, including the potential severity
of the injuries, anticipated medical treatment, wage‑loss
exposure, and the range of possible outcomes based on the
available information. Knowing the reserve can help counsel for
arbitration understand how the carrier viewed the claim during its
evaluation, identify the issues the adjuster believed required
further development, and appreciate the insurer’s anticipated
exposure when the arbitration process began. This allows counsel
to align litigation strategy with the company’s expected risk, focus
discovery on the factors that drove the initial assessment, and
anticipate arguments regarding damages and causation. In that
way, reserve information may assist counsel in ensuring the
defense is thorough, consistent, and responsive to the insurer’s
internal evaluation of potential liability.
Id. at 26-27.
9 This Court has described an insurance reserve as “a pool of funds allocated
to satisfy obligations that may arise under a claim.” PECO Energy Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., n.3, 852 A.2d 1230, 1232 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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On appeal, AmGuard does not invoke the attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine with respect to the reserve information. 10 See id.
Accordingly, this argument is not properly before us under the collateral order
doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
Finally, in its reply brief, AmGuard alleges:
This appeal presents a fundamental legal question with
consequences far beyond the discovery dispute at hand: when an
insurer and insured proceed to mandatory [UIM] arbitration under
state law (California here), are communications between the
insurer and its counsel part of an adversarial adjudicative process
or merely ordinary claims handling? The trial court resolved that
question incorrectly. By treating the UIM arbitration as an
extension of routine claims adjustment rather than a statutorily
mandated proceeding to substitute for litigation, the trial court
compelled wholesale production of attorney-client
communications and attorney analyses that both Pennsylvania
and California law long recognize as privileged.
AmGuard’s Reply Brief at 1.
In light of our above conclusion, that AmGuard has failed to meet its
burden of setting “forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly
invoked,” we do not reach the merits of this issue. Fisher, 258 A.3d at 461
10 AmGuard’s privilege log similarly did not invoke the privilege or work product doctrine for “reserve information,” but instead cited as a “privilege basis,” without further explanation, “confidentiality and relevancy.” Privilege Log at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order directing AmGuard to
produce the contested documents to Rheingold.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/16/2026
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