FILED
Sep 16 2026, 9:02 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Michael Yonkman,
Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Argonaut Insurance Company,
Appellee-Defendant
September 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CT-422
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45D01-2502-CT-215
Opinion by Judge DeBoer
Judges Mathias and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 1 of 20
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] While investigating a suspected shoplifting, Highland Police Officer Michael
Yonkman was injured when the suspect reversed his vehicle into Yonkman,
pinning him against a parked car. Yonkman filed a complaint against the
suspect and the police department’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM)
provider, Argonaut Insurance Company (Argonaut), seeking damages for his
injuries. Argonaut moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it was filed
outside the statutory limitations period, and, in any event, Yonkman was not
entitled to UIM coverage because he was not occupying his police cruiser when
he was injured. After the trial court converted Argonaut’s motion to one for
summary judgment, Yonkman filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment on the timeliness of his complaint and his occupancy of a covered
vehicle. The trial court ruled in Argonaut’s favor, and Yonkman appeals.
[2] We hold that Yonkman filed his complaint within the two-year limitations
period and that he maintained a sufficient relationship with his police cruiser
during the investigation to be “occupying” it for purposes of UIM coverage.
We thus reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the
court to deny Argonaut’s motion and grant Yonkman’s cross-motion.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 17, 2023, a loss prevention officer suspected Jomo Wilson of
shoplifting from a Kohl’s department store in Highland. Yonkman was
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 2 of 20
dispatched to the store to investigate, and he drove his department-issued police
cruiser to the store’s parking lot. When Yonkman arrived, Wilson had left the
store and was pushing a shopping cart through the lot toward his Ford Escape.
[4] Yonkman parked his cruiser near the Escape. Then he exited the cruiser, left
the engine running, and started walking toward Wilson. Though Yonkman
instructed Wilson to stop, Wilson started running and managed to climb into
the driver’s seat of the Escape before Yonkman caught up to him. Yonkman
opened the driver’s door to arrest Wilson, but Wilson accelerated the vehicle in
reverse. The open driver’s door dragged Yonkman backwards and crushed him
between it and another parked car, injuring him. 1 Only sixty seconds passed
between Yonkman exiting his cruiser and Wilson reversing into him.
[5] On February 18, 2025—two years and one day after the incident—Yonkman
filed his complaint against Wilson and Argonaut, seeking in part to recover
damages for his injuries under the police department’s UIM policy. Argonaut
responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial
Rule 12(B)(6), asserting two arguments. First, it contended that Yonkman filed
the complaint outside the two-year limitations period provided by Indiana law
and the terms of the policy. Second, Argonaut asserted Yonkman was not an
“insured” as defined by the policy because he was not “occupying” his cruiser
at the time of the incident. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 29.
1
The nature and extent of Yonkman’s injuries are not clear from the record before us.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 3 of 20 [6] Argonaut attached several exhibits to its motion, including a copy of the policy,
the charging information filed against Wilson for numerous offenses stemming
from his encounter with Yonkman, the probable cause affidavit filed in
Wilson’s criminal case, and Wilson’s May 16, 2025 plea agreement, in which
he pled guilty to Level 3 felony aggravated battery against Yonkman. Before
Yonkman responded to the motion to dismiss, the trial court converted it to a
motion for summary judgment and enlarged Yonkman’s deadline to respond.2
[7] Yonkman’s response in opposition to Argonaut’s motion was timely, and he
made a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the timeliness of his
complaint and the applicability of UIM coverage. First, he argued his filing of
the complaint was timely because Indiana Code section 1-1-9-1 defined the twoyear anniversary of the incident, February 17, 2025, as a legal holiday
commemorating George Washington’s Birthday. Thus, Trial Rule 6(A)(3)
extended the limitations period through February 18, 2025. Second, Yonkman
claimed that though he was outside his cruiser when Wilson injured him, he
nonetheless occupied it under the four-factor test developed by this Court in
Miller v. Loman, 518 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh’g denied.
2
This was necessary because Argonaut referenced matters outside the pleadings in its motion to dismiss. See
Ind. Trial Rule 12(B) (“If, on a motion [under Rule 12(B)(6)], matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 4 of 20 [8] Among other exhibits, Yonkman designated his own affidavit, in which he
recounted the February 17, 2023 incident. He also explained what he intended
to do had Wilson not fled:
If Wilson had complied with my verbal response to stop, I would
have conducted a theft investigation, which would have required
me to return to my police [cruiser] to run Wilson’s name/identity
through [the] . . . software system located within my police issued
laptop computer inside the police vehicle. Subsequent to the
incident, I became aware that Wilson had an active warrant for
impersonating a federal police officer. Accordingly, [the
software] would have alerted me to the active warrant, and I
would have arrested Wilson for the outstanding warrant.
Further, I would have used the police vehicle to transport Wilson
following the arrest.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 93. Yonkman further alleged that “[h]ad Wilson not
pinned [him] between his Ford Escape and another parked car, [he] would have
returned to [his] police vehicle to initiate a pursuit on Wilson . . . .” Id.
[9] In a combined reply and response to Yonkman’s arguments, Argonaut
designated a memorandum issued by then-Governor Eric Holcomb informing
Indiana state employees “of the 2025 state holidays and the dates on which they
[would be] observed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 11. As shown by that
memorandum, Governor Holcomb had exercised his authority under Indiana
Code section 1-1-9-2 to shift the observance of Washington’s Birthday to
December 26, 2025. Thus, according to Argonaut, February 17, 2025, was not
a legal holiday and Trial Rule 6(A)(3) did not apply.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 5 of 20 [10] On December 1, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for
summary judgment. There, the parties’ arguments largely tracked the
contentions made in their written submissions. However, at the conclusion of
the hearing, Yonkman’s attorney asked the court to take judicial notice of Lake
County Ordinance 1502D (the Ordinance), which declared all county offices
closed on February 17, 2025, in observance of Presidents Day. Because Lake
County offices were closed on the two-year anniversary of the incident,
Yonkman argued Trial Rule 6(A)(4) extended the limitations period by one
day. The court took the motions under advisement, including Yonkman’s
request for judicial notice of the Ordinance.
[11] The day after the hearing, the trial court issued a five-page order granting
Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment, denying Yonkman’s cross-motion,
and certifying the order as a final appealable judgment. The court reasoned that
because Governor Holcomb shifted the observance of “Washington’s Birthday .
. . to December 26, 2025, . . . February 17, 2025 was not a legal holiday in
Indiana and was not to be included in the computation of time . . . to determine
when the statute of limitations expired.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 64. Thus,
“Yonkman’s lawsuit [was] time-barred[,]” rendering moot the issue of whether
“Yonkman was actually occupying the motor vehicle[.]” Id. at 65. The court
did not rule on Yonkman’s request to take judicial notice of the Ordinance or
what effect, if any, the county’s observance of Presidents Day had on the
limitations period.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 6 of 20 [12] Yonkman filed a motion to correct error on December 23, 2025, to which he
attached a copy of the Ordinance. The trial court summarily denied the motion
to correct error on January 22, 2026, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[13] In an appeal following a motion to correct error, our review necessarily involves
both the motion to correct error and the underlying order. Coronado v. Coronado,
243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The denial of a motion to correct
error is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. But when a motion to
correct error involves questions of law, we review those questions de novo,
giving no deference to the trial court’s judgment. Id. Here, the underlying
order was a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment, which implicates
questions of law subject to de novo review. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256
N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025).
[14] Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the party seeking summary judgment has
the initial burden to make “a prima facie showing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). If the moving party
satisfies that burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come
forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Id. Our review is limited “to the materials designated at the trial level.”
Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert.
denied. We construe any doubts as to the facts or reasonable inferences in favor
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 7 of 20
of the non-moving party, and while the trial court’s reasoning “aid[s] our
review, . . . [it does] not bind us.” Sandoval v. Willow Lake Ests. Home Owners
Ass’n, 255 N.E.3d 1181, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).
[15] When, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, we
“consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Because
Yonkman lost on the motions below, he “has the burden of persuading us that
the trial court erred.” Kluger v. J.J.P. Enters., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
1. Statute of Limitations
[16] Though Yonkman purports to raise three issues on appeal, each focuses on a
common question. That is, whether the trial court erred by concluding
Yonkman filed his complaint after the statute of limitations expired.
[17] Our Supreme Court has held that “[s]tatute of limitations defenses are
‘particularly appropriate for summary judgment determination.’” City of Marion
v. London Witte Grp., 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Stickdorn v. Zook,
957 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). The party asserting the defense
must establish three things: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff’s action, so that the
relevant statute of limitations period may be identified; (2) the date the
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was
brought, being beyond the relevant statutory period.” Id. (quoting McMahan v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 8 of 20
Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). If the movant
makes this prima facie showing, “the burden shifts to the opponent ‘to establish
facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense.’” Id. (quoting McMahan,
478 N.E.2d at 120).
[18] Yonkman apparently concedes that Argonaut established items (1) and (2). On
item (1), the parties agree that Yonkman seeks to recover for personal injuries,
so his complaint was subject to the two-year limitations period defined by Ind.
Code section 34-11-2-4. As for item (2), there is no dispute that Yonkman’s
cause of action accrued (and thus the statute of limitations began to run) on
February 17, 2023, the date Yonkman was injured.
[19] Regarding item (3), the parties agree Yonkman filed his complaint two years
and one day after his injury: February 18, 2025. But Yonkman and Argonaut
dispute whether that date was beyond the statutory limitations period. To
determine whether February 18, 2025, was outside the limitations period, we
must apply Trial Rule 6(A), which provides, in part, as follows:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day
of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of
time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included unless it is:
(3) a legal holiday as defined by state statute[.]
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 9 of 20
In any event, the period runs until the end of the next day that is
not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the
office is closed.
[20] According to Yonkman, his complaint was timely filed under Rule 6(A)(3)
because February 17, 2025, was statutorily defined as a legal holiday
commemorating Washington’s Birthday, thus extending the limitations period
through February 18. See Ind. Code § 1-1-9-1(a) (2000). Argonaut disagrees
and argues Governor Holcomb exercised his statutory authority to shift the
observance of Washington’s Birthday to December 26, making February 17 not
a legal holiday. See Ind. Code § 1-1-9-2 (1989).
[21] Interpretation of statutes and trial rules are questions of law reviewed de novo.
Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019). When interpreting a
statute, we ascertain the legislature’s intent by giving an unambiguous statute
“its clear and plain meaning.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016)
(quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh'g denied). We
resort to rules of statutory construction only “if a statute admits of more than
one interpretation.” Id. And we must “examine the statute as a whole,”
reading “sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it
can be harmonized with the remainder of the statue.” Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d
1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g by 15 N.E.3d 72.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 10 of 20 [22] The phrase “legal holiday as defined by state statute” means just that: the
enactments of our legislature govern the dates of legal holidays. The text of
section 1-1-9-1 confirms this interpretation. There, the legislature defined “the
third Monday in February” as a “legal holiday[] within the state of Indiana for
all purposes.” I.C. § 1-1-9-1(a) (emphasis added). The phrase “for all purposes”
leaves no ambiguity that the legislature intended the third Monday in February
to be a “legal holiday as defined by state statute” when calculating filing
deadlines under Trial Rule 6(A)(3). And here, since February 17, 2025 was the
third Monday of that month, Trial Rule 6(A)(3) gave Yonkman until February
18 to file his complaint.
[23] Section 1-1-9-2 does not alter our conclusion. There, the legislature provided:
All legal holidays, except Sundays, shall be paid holidays for
state employees. However, the governor may shift to another
day the observance of a legal holiday, except that Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s birthday shall be observed as a holiday on the third
Monday in January.
I.C. § 1-1-9-2. Argonaut contends the second sentence of section 1-1-9-2
empowers the governor to unilaterally change when legal holidays are observed
for any purpose, including calculating deadlines under Trial Rule 6(A)(3). But
the use of “however” to connect the second sentence to the first indicates the
legislature intended to permit the governor to shift when state employees enjoy
paid holidays, not give the executive carte blanche to redefine the state holiday
schedule for other purposes. Thus, section 1-1-9-2 authorizes the governor to
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 11 of 20
shift only the observance of holidays by state employees, not the dates selected by
the legislature to be actual legal holidays.
[24] We therefore find no genuine issue of fact that Yonkman filed his complaint
within the two-year limitations period on February 18, 2025. 3
2. Occupation of a Covered Vehicle
[25] Because the trial court erroneously found that Yonkman’s complaint was filed
outside the limitations period, it did not reach whether Yonkman was
occupying the vehicle at the time of the incident as required by the UIM policy.
Though Yonkman did not address that issue in his opening brief, Argonaut
raised it in its brief. In reply, Yonkman asserted “[t]he issue of [UIM] coverage
is not properly before this Court because the trial court . . . specifically declined
to rule upon that portion of the motion.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10. Contrary
to Yonkman’s assertion, when we review the grant or denial of summary
judgment, “we stand in the shoes of the trial court” and are not limited by the
issues addressed by the appealed order. 4 Lane v. Menard, Inc., 242 N.E.3d 1060,
3
Because the state holiday schedule is dispositive, we do not comment on whether the trial court could have
taken judicial notice of the Ordinance as evidence that county offices were closed on February 17, 2025. Nor
do we fully address Argonaut’s argument that the UIM policy required Yonkman to file his complaint
“within two years after the date of the ‘accident’” regardless of whether February 17, 2025, was a state or
local holiday. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 11. UIM policies are statutorily required “to afford the same
protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as they would have enjoyed if the offending motorist
had themselves carried liability insurance.” Napier v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 179 N.E.3d 504, 509 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2 (2020) (amended 2026)). Thus, to the extent the Argonaut policy
required Yonkman to file his lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired, that requirement contravenes
public policy and is unenforceable. Id.
4
On August 3, 2026, Yonkman moved to strike Argonaut’s arguments regarding the applicability of the UIM
policy. We denied that motion in an order issued August 19, 2026.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 12 of 20
1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Misner v. Dekalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170
N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), trans. denied.
[26] To resolve whether the present circumstances fall under the terms of the UIM
policy, we start with the general rules of contract interpretation. Progressive Se.
Ins. Co. v. Chastain, 153 N.E.3d 330, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We look to the
language of the insurance agreement “to determine and implement the parties’
intent when they entered the contract.” In re Est. of Webster, 275 N.E.3d 928,
936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 616 (Ind.
2024)). We give undefined terms, if unambiguous, their plain and ordinary
meanings and generally “construe ambiguous terms against the policy drafter
and in favor of the insured.” G&G Oil Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 165
N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind. 2021).
[27] The Argonaut policy provided coverage for “all sums [an] ‘insured’ is legally
entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an
‘uninsured motor vehicle.’” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 8. The term “insured”
was defined to included “[a]nyone ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ . . . .” Id. at 9.
And “occupying” meant “in, upon, getting in, on, out[,] or off.” Id. at 12.
When construing similar policy language, this Court developed the following
four-factor test:
whether a person is “occupying” a vehicle for purposes of [UIM]
coverage requires consideration of: (1) the distance between the
accident and the covered vehicle; (2) the time separating the
accident and the exit from the covered vehicle; (3) the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 13 of 20
individual's opportunity to reach a zone of safety; and (4) the
individual's intentions in relation to the covered vehicle.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 844 N.E.2d 572, 581 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Miller, 518 N.E.2d at 491), summarily aff’d in relevant part by 866
N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. 2007).
[28] This test was first expressed in Miller, where the panel held “a person has not
ceased ‘occupying’ a vehicle until he has severed his connection with it—i.e.,
when he is on his own without any reference to it.” Lake States Ins. Co. v. Tech
Tools, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Miller, 518
N.E.2d at 489). The Miller factors aid in determining whether the injured party
maintained “a relationship between [himself] and the insured automobile” at
the time of his injury. 518 N.E.2d at 491. Each factor carries “greater or lesser
weight depending upon the circumstances of each individual case,” and “[t]here
may be instances in which one of the factors may be determinative.” 5 Id.
5
A judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana opined that “[o]ne might
wonder whether such a four-factor test can be applied as a matter of law. But the Indiana courts in Miller and
the other cited cases decided the question as a matter of law.” Gutierrez, 844 N.E.2d at 581 n.4 (quoting
Spencer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2005), reconsideration denied). The trial
judge here expressed the same concern, reasoning that whether Yonkman occupied his cruiser “could
potentially raise fact issues.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 7 at 65.
We do not comment on whether applying the Miller factors might, under some circumstances, present a
question of fact. Here, the relevant facts are undisputed. The only designated materials discussing the
incident are Yonkman’s affidavit and the probable cause affidavit from Wilson’s criminal case, which do not
conflict. Because the facts of the incident are not disputed, we can resolve whether Yonkman occupied his
cruiser as a matter of law. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.E.3d 1011, 1016 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025) (“When the facts are undisputed, ‘our task is to determine the law applicable to those facts, and
whether the trial court properly applied it.’” (quoting Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., LLC, 782 N.E.2d
470, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 14 of 20 [29] In Gutierrez, Gutierrez was riding in a pickup truck hauling a playhouse to the
driver’s home. 844 N.E.2d at 576. When the playhouse became unsecured and
fell onto the road, Gutierrez and another passenger got out of the vehicle to
load the playhouse back onto the truck. Id. While Gutierrez stood next to the
truck, the driver accelerated in reverse, causing the open passenger door to
knock Gutierrez onto the ground. Id. Gutierrez sought coverage for his
resulting injuries from the truck owner’s insurance carrier, which denied the
claim on the basis that Gutierrez was not occupying the truck when he was
injured. Id. at 577. Thereafter, Gutierrez sued the carrier for breach of contract
and bad faith, and a jury ultimately found in his favor. Id. at 579. At trial, the
carrier moved for judgment on the evidence with respect to Gutierrez’s
occupancy of the truck, which the trial court denied. Id.
[30] On appeal, the carrier argued the trial court erred in denying its motion for
judgment on the evidence because Gutierrez was not occupying the truck under
the Miller test. Id. at 582. The panel rejected that argument, reasoning:
Gutierrez was a passenger in the truck when he and another
passenger got out to retrieve the playhouse that had fallen onto
the roadway. Gutierrez was outside of the truck for less than one
minute and was standing immediately next to the truck when he
was struck by the open passenger-side door. Gutierrez had no
plans to leave the truck and intended to exit only long enough to
re-load the playhouse before he and the others continued on their
journey. He had not had any opportunity nor any reason to
reach a zone of safety. Gutierrez remained vehicle-oriented at all
times.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 15 of 20
Id. at 583.
[31] Here, Yonkman aptly compares the facts of his case to Gutierrez. Like
Gutierrez, Yonkman did not intend to reach a zone of safety after exiting his
cruiser. Instead, the sole purpose of Yonkman’s exit from the vehicle was to
speak with Wilson before returning to the cruiser to look up Wilson in the
police database. And once Wilson entered his Escape, Yonkman wanted to
return to his cruiser to pursue Wilson but was prevented from doing so when
Wilson reversed the Escape into him. Had Yonkman been able to successfully
arrest Wilson, he would have transported Wilson in the cruiser. Moreover,
Yonkman affirmed that he parked his cruiser near Wilson’s Escape and had
been outside it for less than sixty seconds before being struck by Wilson’s
vehicle.
[32] Argonaut tries to distinguish Gutierrez by noting that Gutierrez was struck by
the insured vehicle, while Yonkman’s cruiser was not involved in the collision
at issue here. But this distinction is immaterial, as this Court has found UIM
coverage under Miller when the covered vehicle was not involved in a collision.
For example, in Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, a police officer used her cruiser to
block a lane of traffic to make room for a tow truck. 953 N.E.2d 608, 611-12
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. While she was directing traffic, the officer
was struck and killed by a motorist. Id. at 612. Her estate brought an action
against the police department’s UIM carrier seeking coverage under a provision
of the policy applying to injuries arising out of the use of a covered vehicle. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 16 of 20
The estate and the carrier filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the
trial court ruled in favor of coverage. Id. at 613.
[33] On appeal, the panel affirmed the trial court’s coverage determination,
reasoning:
Argonaut designated no evidence that indicates [the officer’s]
actions with relation to her patrol car were inconsistent with
using the car for controlling traffic around the slide-off site or
were anything other than central to that purpose. Rather,
Argonaut focuses on [the officer’s] distance from the patrol car,
the positioning of the car, the length of time [the officer] spent
directing traffic away from the car, and [the motorist’s]
contentions that she did not see the patrol car’s lights on or see a
reason for a police car to be deployed at all.
Whether [the officer] was 104 feet from her patrol car, as
determined by [one trooper’s] measurements, or some shorter
distance, per [conflicting] testimony, the question is not one of
distance alone, but whether [the officer] was in some active
relationship to the vehicle at the time of the collision. Nor is time
the crucial inquiry. Whether [the officer] spent five minutes or
fifteen minutes directing traffic is not dispositive, so long as she
was still in some active relationship to the car. See Miller, 518
N.E.2d at 491 (rejecting a test focusing only on distance and time
when considering whether an individual was “alighting” from a
vehicle and noting that “other relevant criteria” may be
considered).
Jones, 953 N.E.2d at 619.
[34] Though Jones applied Miller to different policy terms than the “occupying”
language at issue here, courts have held that a physical connection to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 17 of 20
covered vehicle does not control whether the injured party was “occupying” it
for purposes of UIM coverage. See Lakes States Ins., 743 N.E.2d at 320 (the
relationship described by Miller “seems to be something different than simply
physical contact, but instead, seems to be some sort of metaphysical
connection”). In applying Indiana law, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana found that a semi-truck driver was occupying his
vehicle though it was not involved in either of the two collisions at issue.
Spencer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
After the first collision, the semi driver got out of his vehicle to render aid to an
injured motorist, only to be injured himself when the injured motorist’s pickup
truck was struck by another vehicle. Id. at 813-14. The district court found the
driver was occupying the semi under Miller because he left it parked near the
injured motorist, was injured seconds after he’d last exited it, did not have an
opportunity to reach a zone of safety, and intended to continue on his journey
after helping the injured motorist. Id. at 825.
[35] Like the semi-truck driver in Spencer, Yonkman was struck by Wilson’s vehicle
less than a minute after exiting his police cruiser, which was parked near
Wilson’s car. Yonkman intended to use the cruiser during the investigation
and, if necessary, transport Wilson to jail. The undisputed facts thus show that
although the cruiser was not involved in the collision, Yonkman remained
oriented to it under the Miller test.
[36] Despite the factual similarities between Gutierrez, Jones, Spencer, and Yonkman’s
case, Argonaut directs us to Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Herring-Jenkins, 830 F. Supp. 2d
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 18 of 20
566, 577 (N.D. Ind. 2011). There, a construction crew was working to fill
potholes on I-80. Id. at 569. The crew was transported in a dump truck to
stretches of roadway in need of repairs and would exit the truck to complete
their work. Id. After working on a certain stretch of roadway for about an
hour-and-a-half, one worker was struck and killed by a passing motorist. Id.
[37] After the worker’s estate filed a claim with the dump truck’s insurance carrier,
the carrier filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana seeking a declaration that the worker was not “using” or
“occupying” the truck at the time of the accident. Id. at 568. The district court
ultimately ruled in the carrier’s favor, reasoning in part that
[a]lthough [the worker] anticipated becoming a passenger, this
was not to occur until the end of his shift. In the meantime, he
was undertaking tasks that had no relation to being an operator
or passenger of the truck . . . . In fact, [the worker] had been
performing these independent tasks for an hour and one-half
before his death.
Id. at 575.
[38] Herring-Jenkins is readily distinguishable from the present circumstances. As
noted above, Yonkman’s investigation and potential arrest of Wilson were not
independent of his police cruiser, which was a crucial part of Yonkman’s police
work. Nor had Yonkman been performing tasks independent of his cruiser for
a significant time after exiting it, as Wilson’s vehicle struck Yonkman just sixty
seconds after he parked the cruiser. Yonkman’s case is therefore closer to the
facts of Gutierrez, Jones, and Spencer than Herring-Jenkins.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 19 of 20 [39] In sum, Yonkman showed there was no genuine issue of fact that he occupied
his police cruiser under the Miller test, so he is entitled to judgment in his favor
as a matter of law regarding his occupancy of a covered vehicle.
Conclusion
[40] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with
instructions for the court to deny Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment
and grant Yonkman’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the
timeliness of Yonkman’s complaint and Yonkman’s occupancy of his police
cruiser at the time of the incident.
[41] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
David S. Gladish
Mark J. Schocke
Gladish Law Group
Highland, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Dennis F. Cantrell
Zachary J. Reichle
Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-422 September 16, 2026 Page 20 of 20