Li v. Du

majority opinion

[Cite as Li v. Du, 2026-Ohio-3619.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

DAVID LI, et al. C.A. No. 31500

Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

MIKE GANG DU, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

Appellees/Cross-Appellants CASE No. CV-2018-03-1469

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 16, 2026

SUTTON, Judge.

{¶1} Appellants/Cross-Appellees David Li and Cindy Li (“the Lis”) appeal the April 7,

2025 final judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Mike Gang Du and Julie Zheng Zhou (“the Du-Zhous”) cross-appeal the July 25, 2018, October

25, 2023, October 18, 2024, and April 7, 2025 judgments of the Summit County Court of Common

Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

Relevant Background Information

{¶2} This case and appeal arise from an incident that took place on February 25, 2016,

at Revere Middle School when T.L., a minor, threatened 1 to conduct a school shooting. W.B.,

another student at the middle school, heard T.L.’s remarks and told his father about the threat.

W.B.’s father went to the Bath Township Police Department with his son and made a police report

The Lis deny in this case that their son made a threat.

concerning the statements made by T.L. The police interviewed T.L. the next day at the school,

and, according to the police report, T.L admitted he often thought of death and had thought about

bringing a gun to school to shoot other students who have been mean to him over the years, and

he would target the cafeteria or gym where there would be a lot of students who are easy targets.

The report also stated T.L. admitted he vented his frustrations to his friends during lunch. That

same day, the Superintendent of the Revere Local School District sent an email to parents notifying

them of a report that a student threatened to bring a weapon to school. In response, Mr. Du sent

three emails to staff at Revere Local Schools using three different email addresses he had

previously created prior to 2015, all of which were pseudonyms. The email addresses were

[email protected], [email protected], and [email protected]. In the emails, Mr.

Du expressed concern about the safety of the students and recommended the school remove the

student who made the threat. Mr. Du also alleged that previous welfare and safety concerns had

been expressed about the student. Mr. Du did not sign the emails using his real name because he

was concerned about retaliation.

{¶3} As a result of the statements made by T.L., he was expelled from school by the

Revere Local School District Board of Education. The Lis are the parents of T.L. The Lis appealed

the decision to expel T.L. to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the

decision of the school board in the case Li v. Revere Local Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Ed., Summit County

Common Pleas case number CV-2016-05-2184 (“the expulsion case”). The Lis appealed that

decision to this Court, which dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Du-Zhous were not parties to

nor witnesses in the expulsion case.

{¶4} On March 30, 2018, the Lis, on their own behalf and as guardians of T.L., a minor,

filed a complaint against the Du-Zhous alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. The Lis alleged in their complaint that the emails sent by Mr. Du were defamatory and

the cause of T.L.’s expulsion from Revere.

{¶5} The Du-Zhous responded to the Lis’ complaint with a counterclaim against the Lis

alleging abuse of process and frivolous conduct. The counterclaim specifically alleged that the

Lis’ filing of the complaint against them was frivolous and an abuse of process. This distinction

is important because as the case proceeded in the trial court, the Du-Zhous filed numerous motions

alleging additional instances of misconduct by the Lis and their attorneys and sought sanctions

against the Lis and their attorneys pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11.

{¶6} The Du-Zhous filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the Lis’ complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and requested the Lis be sanctioned

pursuant to R.C. 2323.51. On July 25, 2018, the trial court granted the Du-Zhous’ motion to

dismiss and denied their motion for sanctions. The trial court stated in its order granting the motion

to dismiss that the matter had arisen out of an incident that took place in February 2016, “wherein

a police report was filed with the Bath Police Department regarding a threat made by Plaintiffs’

child, T.L. As a result of the threat, T.L. was expelled from Revere Middle School.”

{¶7} On October 6, 2018, while the trial court case was pending on the Du-Zhous’

counterclaim, Mr. Li sent an email using Mrs. Li’s email address with numerous attachments to

multiple individuals including several parents of Revere students. The email and attachments

accused the Du-Zhous of framing T.L. in order to have T.L. expelled from school because he was

an academic rival of their son.2 Specifically, the email stated the Du-Zhous “planned the scheme

and fabricated all those [‘Tom Smith,’ ‘Rob Dole,’ and ‘Swisscheese’ emails,]” referring to the

emails sent by Mr. Du to Revere staff soon after the reported threats were made by T.L.

Mr. Li used Mrs. Li’s email address to send the email with her knowledge and permission.

{¶8} The Du-Zhous subsequently amended their counterclaim to include claims for

defamation per se and malicious prosecution based on Mr. Li’s email. The Du-Zhous’ amended

counterclaim continued to allege the frivolous conduct claim was based on the Lis’ institution of

the underlying litigation.

{¶9} The Du-Zhous moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on their

counterclaims for frivolous conduct, abuse of process, defamation, and malicious prosecution. The

Lis moved for summary judgment on the Du-Zhous’ counterclaims. On October 25, 2023, the

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Du-Zhous and against the Lis on the DuZhous’ counterclaim of frivolous conduct, finding on the issue of liability only that the Lis engaged

in frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv). The trial court, however,

granted summary judgment in favor of the Lis on the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous

conduct that was based on R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii). The trial court did not determine

damages at that time. The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Lis on the

Du-Zhous’ counterclaims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation.

{¶10} Throughout the trial court proceedings, the Du-Zhous have sought sanctions against

the Lis and the Lis’ attorneys J. Reid Yoder and Kyle Johnson and their law firms pursuant to

Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 for the filing of the Lis’ complaint and for conduct that occurred during

the pendency of the trial court matter. The trial court denied all of the Du-Zhous’ motions for

sanctions.

{¶11} On November 18, 2024, the trial court held a hearing to determine the amount of

damages on the Du-Zhous’ successful counterclaim for frivolous conduct against the Lis. On April

7, 2025, the trial court awarded damages to the Du-Zhous in the amount $37,208.50, which

consisted of $34,642.00 in attorney fees and $2,567.50 in expert fees incurred by the Du-Zhous as

a result of the Lis’ frivolous conduct.

{¶12} The Lis have appealed and have set forth four assignments of error for our review

in their “Statement of Assignments of Error” portion of their brief. The Du-Zhous have crossappealed raising six cross-assignments of error for our review. To facilitate our analysis, we will

consider the assignments of error out of order and have grouped some assignments of error.

II.

The Du-Zhous’ Counterclaim for Frivolous Conduct

THE LIS’ ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON [THE DU-ZHOUS’] COUNTERCLAIM FOR SANCTIONS UNDER

R.C. 2323.51 BY RELYING ON FACTUAL FINDINGS IN CASE NO. CV2016-05-2184 THAT DID NOT HAVE A PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN THE

PRESENT LITIGATION.

THE DU-ZHOUS’ CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

WHEN IT DECLINED TO CONSIDER ANY CLAIMS FOR FRIVOLOUS

CONDUCT BASED ON [R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) AND (ii)] BECAUSE IT

HAD REJECTED THEM FIVE YEARS EARLIER.

{¶13} The Lis argue in their second assignment of error that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of the Du-Zhous on the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous

conduct in violation of R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv.). The Du-Zhous argue in their second

cross-assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the

Lis on Du-Zhous’ counterclaim against the Lis for frivolous conduct in violation of R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii). In other words, the Lis argue they should not be liable on the frivolous

conduct counterclaim at all, and the Du-Zhous argue the Lis should be liable for frivolous conduct

pursuant to all four subparts of R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a).

{¶14} R.C. 2323.51(A) provides in relevant part:

(2) "Frivolous conduct" means either of the following:

(a) Conduct of . . . [a] party to a civil action . . . or . . . [a] party's counsel of record

that satisfies any of the following:

(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the

civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, including, but not limited

to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith

argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be

supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.

(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no

evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary

support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by

the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of

information or belief.

{¶15} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56

when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R.

56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must

resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356,

358-359 (1992). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing

the trial court of the basis for the motion and pointing to parts of the record that show the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996).

Specifically, the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record

of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. Once a moving party satisfies its burden of supporting its

motion for summary judgment with acceptable evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), Civ.R. 56(E)

provides that the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving

party’s pleadings. Id. at 293. Rather, the non-moving party has a reciprocal burden of responding

by setting forth specific facts, demonstrating that a “genuine triable issue” exists to be litigated at

trial. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996).

{¶16} In their second assignment of error, the Lis argue the trial court erred by relying on

findings of fact from the expulsion case when it granted summary judgment in favor of the DuZhous on their counterclaim for frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv).

We agree. The Du-Zhous were not parties to the expulsion case and therefore, the findings of fact

in that case cannot be used as res judicata in this case. “Res judicata” includes the concept of issue

preclusion. Robinholt v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-248, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), quoting Huber v. Inpatient Med.

Servs., Inc. 2018-Ohio-4686, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). The doctrine of issue preclusion holds that a fact that

was actually and directly at issue in a previous action and was passed upon and determined by a

court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between

the same parties or their privies. (Emphasis added.) Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,

2006-Ohio-6553, ¶ 44, quoting Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd.,

81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395 (1998).

{¶17} Because the trial court quoted extensively from the decision in the expulsion case

in granting summary judgment in favor of the Du-Zhous, it is clear that the trial court believed the

findings of fact from that case had a preclusive effect in this case. But because the Du-Zhous were

not a party to the expulsion case, the findings of fact in the expulsion decision could not be used

in this case, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis.

{¶18} In addition, in conducting our de novo review, we have reviewed the evidence

submitted in support of the Du-Zhous’ motion for summary judgment. It was incumbent on the

Du-Zhous to point to evidence admissible pursuant to Civ.R. 56 to establish that there was no

genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Lis’ conduct in filing the complaint was

frivolous.

{¶19} Civ.R. 56(C) provides in relevant part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence,

and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except

as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears

from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to

the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being

entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s

favor.

{¶20} Upon review, we determine that the Du-Zhous did not meet their burden to establish

that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Lis’ conduct was frivolous.

Here, we are not determining that the Lis’ conduct in filing the complaint was not frivolous, only

that the Du-Zhous did not establish with evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that there is no genuine

issue of fact concerning whether the Lis’ conduct was frivolous and that the trial court erred by

treating findings of fact in a separate case to which the Du-Zhous were not parties as res judicata.

{¶21} The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Lis on a portion of

the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct, specifically that the conduct violated R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii). The trial court’s explanation for doing so was “the argument set forth

in the [Du-Zhous’] Motion for Summary Judgment relies upon the same facts and law (insofar as

it relates to R.C. []2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii)) which was previously rejected by the [c]ourt.

Therefore, this [c]ourt declines to address any arguments raised pursuant to R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii).”

{¶22} It appears that the trial court did not engage in a review and analysis of the parties’

evidence submitted in connection with their respective motions for summary judgment when

granting summary judgment in favor of the Lis and against the Du-Zhous on the Du-Zhous’

counterclaim for frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii) but instead relied

on its previous pre-summary judgment orders. Because the trial court did not refer to any Civ.R.

56(C) evidence when granting summary judgment in favor of the Lis and against the Du-Zhous

on the portion of the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii), but instead referred only to its prior decisions on the Du-Zhous’

motions for sanctions, we determine the trial court erred.

{¶23} Therefore, there remain genuine issues of material fact concerning the entirety of

the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim against the Lis for frivolous conduct. The Lis’ second assignment of

error and the Du-Zhous’ second cross-assignment of error are sustained.

The Du-Zhous’ Counterclaim for Defamation

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER IN

FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE LIS WERE

NOT DEFAMATORY PER SE.

{¶24} In their first cross-assignment of error, the Du-Zhous argue the trial court erred

granting summary judgment in favor of the Lis on the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for defamation.

The Du-Zhous alleged in their amended counterclaim that the Lis defamed them when Mrs. Li

sent an email falsely accusing the Du-Zhous of setting up T.L in order to “frame” him and

“plan[ning] the scheme and fabricat[ing]” Mr. Du’s emails to school officials that had expressed

concern over T.L.’s threat to conduct a school shooting. In his deposition, Mr. Li took

responsibility for sending the email using his wife’s email address. The Du-Zhous’ counterclaim

alleged these statements constituted defamation per se. The Lis argued in their motion for

summary judgment that the statements in the email were not false, were made with qualified

privilege, and were not defamatory per se.

{¶25} Defamation is a false statement that injures a person’s reputation. Gosden v. Louis,

116 Ohio App.3d 195, 206 (9th Dist. 1996). In addition, the statement must be made without

privilege to a third party. Northeast Ohio Elite Gymnastics Training Ctr., Inc. v. Osborne, 2009-Ohio-2612, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). A statement is actionable as defamation per se if it: (1) alleges an

indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) imputes a loathsome or contagious

disease that would exclude a person from society; (3) tends to injure a person in his trade or

occupation; or (4) tends to subject a person to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt. Dunnigan v.

City of Lorain, 2002-Ohio-5548, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.); Gosden at 207. When not ambiguous, whether

a statement is defamation per se is a question of law for the trial court to determine. Gosden at

207.

{¶26} Qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation. Hill v. Ohio

Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 2021-Ohio-561, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). Where found, it does not absolutely

immunize statements from liability but instead subjects the party claiming defamation to a

heightened proof requirement. Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 243, 248 (1975). To overcome

the defense of qualified privilege, a party must show that the subject communication was made

with actual malice, meaning that the speaker knew it was false or recklessly disregarded the truth.

Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111, 118 (1991).

{¶27} There is no dispute that the statements in Mr. Li’s email and attachments were

published. Thus, the issues for this assignment of error are whether there are genuine issues of

material fact that the statements in the email and attachments were false and made without

privilege, and whether or not the statements, as a matter of law, constituted defamation per se.

{¶28} In his email to Revere parents, Mr. Li stated:

Dear fellow Revere parents,

I’d like to thank you for your support for [T.L.] and let you know that we will never

forget. Since the incident occurred we’ve never given up pursuing the truth. Now

it is clear that many people’s belief is right.

We have unearthed evidence that [Mr. Du’s emails were] a set up devised by [the

Du-Zhou] family to frame [T.L.]. It took us over one and a half years of

investigation to unearth the fact that the [Du-Zhou] family planned the scheme and

fabricated all those “Tom Smith”, “Rob Dole”, and “Swisscheese” emails.

The attached document was distributed to Revere [School] District members at a

recent IEP team meeting. It is a summary of the related facts and evidence.

{¶29} Attached to Mr. Li’s email was a memorandum to T.L.’s “IEP Team” titled, “Some

Related Information,” which stated that Mr. Du admitted to lying in his emails and accused the

Du-Zhous of preparing the emails before “the incident.” The memorandum referred to further

attachments, also sent with Mr. Li’s email, which included part of the police report by the Bath

Township Police Department, the email sent by the Revere superintendent notifying parents that a

“student had threatened to bring a weapon to school,” and the emails sent by Mr. Du under

pseudonyms to school officials expressing concern about school safety and asking the school to

remove the individual who made the threat.

{¶30} The Du-Zhous argue the following specific statements made by Mr. Li in the email

and attachments are defamatory per se:

• We have unearthed evidence that it was a set up devised by [T.D.]’s family to

frame [T.L].

• It took us over one and a half years of investigation to unearth the fact that

[T.D.]’s family planned the scheme and fabricated all those “Tom Smith,” Rob

Dole,” and “Swisscheese” emails.

• [W.B. and his father] asked to have their “identities hidden.” Tom Smith et al

were using a more devious way that would shock ordinary people’s conscience.

• [W.B.’s family] and the [Du-Zhou] families are the only two parties in the

whole world that alleged [T.L.] made threats in the past, contradicting all

records and evidence, including those of Revere.

• [Mr. Du] came “up with the fake names and email addresses, set up the email

accounts with the fake names.”

• Those who have knowledge of them unanimously believe that the emails were

prepared before the incident by [T.D.] and his parents.

• [T]here was zero parent concerned and the only explanation would be a set up

scheme.

{¶31} The trial court found Mr. Li’s email did not accuse the Du-Zhous of any particular

crime and there is “no such crime known as a ‘setup scheme’ within the plain meaning of those

words.” We agree with the trial court in this regard.

{¶32} The trial court went on to find the email does not state what the Lis accuse the DuZhous of scheming to set up. The email only refers to “the incident” and purports to describe

“some of ‘the forces that brought the situation to [T.L].’” The trial court further found that “the

act of creating an email address or planning a course of action to accuse another person of an action

does not subject anyone to public hatred, ridicule or contempt on its face; therefore the Lis’ email

is not defamatory per se.” However, a review of the attachments to that email makes clear what

the scheme was the Du-Zhous were accused of setting up. The Lis accused the Du-Zhous of preplanning and taking steps to carry out a scheme to set up or frame the Lis’ teenage son in order to

have him, an academic rival of the Du-Zhous’ son, expelled from school.

{¶33} Such accusations would tend to subject the Du-Zhous to public hatred, ridicule,

contempt, or damage to reputation, and are actionable if Mr. Li’s statements are false and made

without privilege. The Sixth District Court of Appeals determined that a complaint that alleged

that a plaintiff intentionally overpaid an employee and “subjected [the plaintiff] to damage to his

reputation, public contempt, ridicule, shame, and disgrace” sets forth all the elements for a

defamation per se action. Johnson v. Port Clinton, 2025-Ohio-3100, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.). Statements

in a flyer that a business has a long history of racial profiling and discrimination have been found

by a trial court to be defamatory per se and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court

denying the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Gibson Bros., Inc. v.

Oberlin College, 2022-Ohio-1079, ¶ 32, 89, 133 (9th Dist.).

{¶34} As Chief Justice O’Connor observed in her dissent in Wayt v. DHSC, L.C.C.,

2018-Ohio-4822, ¶ 40:

a person’s reputation is separate from her or his body, and the person has little

control over it - reputation exists entirely in the hearts and minds of others. The lack

of control over one’s own reputation is one reason that the tort of defamation is so

menacing. A person can be of upstanding character, yet when someone defames

her or him, there is no well-defined solution for piecing reputation back together or

even for determining the damage. A reputation damaged by defamation is not fixed

by mending it; one can only attempt to repair reputation by convincing each and

every person who observed the defamatory statement that it is not true. It is often

nearly impossible to determine whether reputation is restored or to quantify the

damage. In part, that is why a victim of defamation per se, that is, defamation that

is clear on its face, does not have to prove damages. Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio

St. 549, 553, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956).

{¶35} Mr. Li’s accusations tend to subject the Du-Zhous to public hatred, ridicule, or

contempt and are actionable if Mr. Li’s statements are false and made without privilege. The trial

court, however, did not reach the issues of the truth or falsity of the statements or qualified

privilege. Therefore, we only determine that the statements in Mr. Li’s email and attachments, if

false and made without privilege, could constitute defamation per se. It is up to the trier of fact to

determine whether in the first instance the statements were false, and if so, whether the statements

were made without privilege.

{¶36} The Lis argue that because Mr. Li sent the emails using his wife’s email account,

and there is no evidence that Mrs. Li and T.L participated in writing and sending the email,

summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Li and T.L. was appropriate as there is no genuine issue of

material fact that Mrs. Li and T.L. did not publish the defamatory statements. The Du-Zhous have

conceded that they are not making any claims against T.L. The Du-Zhous argue that Mrs. Li

testified in her deposition that she agreed with her husband sending the email using her email

address and under her signature. Mrs. Li denied writing or even reading the email and many of

the attachments before they were sent. The Du-Zhous argue that nevertheless, Mrs. Li is liable for

the statements in the email, citing Murray v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 2004-Ohio-821, ¶ 104 (7th Dist.)

(“[a]ny act by which a defamatory statement is communicated to a third party is a publication[,]”

and a person who requests, procures, or abets in the publication of defamatory material is liable.)

This Court is not convinced that Murray can be applied here. In Murray, the issue was whether a

newspaper publisher was liable for an alleged defamatory article written by a reporter for the

newspaper. In this case, the issue is whether a wife can be liable for specific alleged defamatory

statements sent by her husband on an email account they share. Liability for the publication of

defamation must be predicated on a positive act. Scott v. Hull, 22 Ohio App.2d 141, 144 (3d Dist.

1970). We therefore conclude that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact concerning

whether Mrs. Li published, or requested, procured, or abetted the publication.

{¶37} Accordingly, the Du-Zhous’ first cross-assignment of error is sustained.

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SANCTIONS WITH ITS

DISMISSAL ON JULY 25, 2018, AND IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER [R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) AND (ii)] AT ANY POINT IN THIS LITIGATION.

The Motion to Dismiss Complaint

{¶38} On May 21, 2018, the Du-Zhous filed a motion to dismiss the Lis’ complaint

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In their

motion, the Du-Zhous also moved for sanctions against the Lis for frivolous conduct pursuant to

R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a). The Du-Zhous argued because the Lis had received “a [c]ourt’s final ruling

on the cause and propriety of T.L.’s expulsion five months before [the] Complaint was filed, the

filing constitutes an abuse of process and frivolous conduct and should be sanctioned.” In denying

the Du-Zhous’ motion for sanctions against the Lis, the trial court simply stated, “[the Du-Zhous’]

Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.” (Emphasis in original).

{¶39} The Du-Zhous however, asserted a counterclaim against the Lis for the exact same

frivolous conduct they alleged in their motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion for

sanctions at the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) stage of the proceedings, when the evidence had not yet been

developed in the way it was when motions for summary judgment were filed. Thus, we determine

the trial court did not err by not awarding sanctions to the Du-Zhous in connection with its decision

granting their motion to dismiss the Lis’ complaint. 3

{¶40} While the Du-Zhous argue in this cross-assignment of error that the trial court erred

in refusing to consider R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii) sanctions at any point in this litigation,

they have not pointed to the refusals to which they are referring in this cross-assignment of error.

This cross-assignment of error discusses only the complaint, and briefly, the actions of Attorney

Yoder before filing the complaint. The Du-Zhous have alleged other instances of frivolous

conduct elsewhere in their brief, and those arguments will be addressed in our analysis of those

cross-assignments of error.

{¶41} Accordingly, the Du-Zhous’ fourth cross-assignment of error is overruled.

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SANCTIONS IN ITS

OCTOBER 18, 2024 [] DECISION.

The Lis have not assigned as error the dismissal of their complaint.

{¶42} On February 11, 2024, the Du-Zhous again moved for sanctions against the Lis

pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)-(iv), and also against two of the Lis’ attorneys and their law

firms, Attorney J. Reid Yoder and Attorney Kyle Johnson, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R.

11. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied the motion for sanctions in an October

18, 2024 order.

{¶43} On appeal, as it relates to their February 11, 2024 motion, the Du-Zhous focus on

the following conduct that they deem to be sanctionable:

1. Pleadings reiterating false storylines, which included the filing of the complaint,

the motion for reconsideration, the motion to amend their complaint, the motion

to strike the Du-Zhous’ amended counterclaim;

2. Answers to interrogatories in which the Lis deny that T.L. threatened to conduct

a school shooting;

3. Subpoena issued to the Du-Zhous’ minor children;

4. Depositions to aid the Lis in their federal case against Revere;

5. Interfering with the subpoena for the Lis’ forensic audit of Mrs. Li’s phone; and

6. The Lis’ motion to disqualify the Du-Zhous’ counsel and efforts to disbar

counsel.

{¶44} In its order denying the February 11, 2024 motion for sanctions, the trial court

stated in a footnote that because it had already found frivolous conduct by the Lis in its order

granting the Du-Zhous’ motion for summary judgment, it would not readdress the issue as it relates

to the Lis. To the extent that the February 11, 2024 motion targets the Lis’ filing of the complaint

against the Du-Zhous, that is the same conduct alleged to be frivolous conduct in the counterclaim.

Because we are reversing the grant of summary judgment on the frivolous conduct counterclaim,

this particular issue is premature. However, the motion also targets conduct on the part of the Lis’

in addition to what was alleged in the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim. The February 11, 2024 motion

also concerned conduct by the Lis during the course of the litigation. Therefore, we sustain the

Du-Zhous’ fifth assignment of error as it pertains to the Lis’ alleged frivolous conduct for filing

the motion for reconsideration, the motion to amend the complaint, the motion to strike the DuZhous’ amended counterclaim, several answers to interrogatories, subpoenas issued to the DuZhous’ minor children; conducting depositions to allegedly aid the Lis in their federal case against

Revere, allegedly interfering with the subpoena for the Lis’ forensic audit of Mrs. Li’s phone, and

attempting to disqualify the Du-Zhous’ attorney. We stress here that we are not deciding that these

actions constitute frivolous conduct, only that the trial court must decide in the first instance if

these actions on the part of the Lis constitute frivolous conduct.

{¶45} We will now turn our attention to the conduct of the attorneys, as that was addressed

by the trial court in its October 18, 2024 order.

{¶46} “R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11 both address the filing of frivolous claims.” Dietrich

v. Core, 2023-Ohio-1463, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting In re Guardianship of Bakhtiar, 2018-Ohio

1764, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). “The statute and rule differ in that the statute employs an objective test for

frivolous conduct while the rule employs a subjective one.” Dietrich at ¶ 10, citing Kozar v. Bio

Medical Applications of Ohio, Inc., 2004-Ohio-4963, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). “R.C. 2323.51 also has a

broader reach than Civ.R. 11, as it permits a court to impose sanctions ‘against a party, the party’s

counsel of record, or both.’” P.N. Gilcrest Ltd. Partnership v. Doylestown Family Practice, Inc.,

2011-Ohio-2990, ¶ 32 (9th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2323.51(B)(4); compare Civ.R. 11 (allowing courts

to impose sanctions only against the filing attorney or pro se party).

Civ.R. 11

{¶47} Civ.R. 11 “requires an attorney to sign all pleadings and further provides that the

signature constitutes a warrant that there is good ground for the action.” Clark v. Corwin, 2015-18

Ohio-4469, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting Heron Point Condominium Unit Owner's Assn. v. E.R. Miller,

Ltd., 2012-Ohio-2171, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.). If an attorney willfully violates the rule, the court may

issue sanctions. Civ.R. 11. Before a court imposes sanctions under Civ.R. 11, “it must consider

whether the attorney who signed the document (1) read it; (2) harbored good grounds to support it

to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief; and (3) did not file it for the purpose

of delay.” Lable & Co. v. Flowers, 104 Ohio App.3d 227, 235 (9th Dist. 1995). Civ.R. 11 employs

a subjective test for frivolous conduct. Dietrich at ¶ 10. The relevant inquiry is whether the

attorney had a good faith belief to support the pleading. Woods v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 1993

WL 49796, *7 (6th Dist. Feb. 26, 1993).

{¶48} A decision regarding sanctions under Rule 11 is generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion, but questions that are purely legal – such as whether there are good grounds to support

a filing – are reviewed de novo. Callahan v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 2009-Ohio-5148, ¶ 25 (9th

Dist.). An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

R.C. 2323.51

{¶49} Ohio’s frivolous conduct statute is codified in R.C. 2323.51. This measure was

enacted by the General Assembly in 1987, rectifying many of the shortcomings of Civ.R. 11.

“Conduct” includes “the filing of a civil action, the assertion of a claim, defense, or other position

in connection with a civil action, the filing of a pleading, motion, or other paper in a civil action,

including, but not limited to, a motion or paper filed for discovery purposes, or the taking of any

other action in connection with a civil action[.]” R.C. 2323.51(A)(1)(a). Thus, the duties imposed

reach beyond the mere filing of a pleading. And again, the definition of frivolous conduct includes

conduct that obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil

action or is for another improper purpose, including causing unnecessary delay or a needless

increase in the cost of litigation; is not warranted under existing law, consists of allegations or

other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support; or consists of denials or factual

contentions that are not warranted by the evidence. R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a).

{¶50} “R.C. 2323.51 does not purport to punish an attorney for failing on a claim.” Oehler

v. McAdams, 2019-Ohio-1976, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). “Rather, it addresses conduct that serves to harass

or maliciously injure the opposing party in a civil action or is unwarranted under existing law and

for which no good-faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law may be

maintained.” Oehler at ¶ 12, quoting Harold Pollock Co., L.P.A. v. Bishop, 2014-Ohio-1132, ¶ 19

(9th Dist.), quoting Indep. Taxicab Assn. of Columbus, Inc. v. Abate, 2008-Ohio-4070, ¶ 22 (10th

Dist.). In other words, the statute is designed to deter egregious conduct. See Oehler at ¶ 12.

{¶51} “This Court’s standard of review is subject to which part of the analysis is at issue

on appeal.” In re Guardianship of Bakhtiar, 2018-Ohio-1764, at ¶ 19. A trial court’s factual

findings will not be overturned if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. S & S

Computer Sys., Inc. v. Peng, 2002-Ohio-2905, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). We review questions of law, such

as whether a claim is warranted under existing law, de novo. Jefferson v. Creveling, 2009-Ohio1214, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); City of Lorain v. Elbert, 1998 WL 195724, *2-3 (9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1998).

Finally, we review a decision whether to impose sanctions for improper conduct under an abuse

of discretion standard. P.N. Gilcrest Ltd. Partnership v. Doylestown Family Practice, Inc., 2011-Ohio-2990, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.). In doing so, we observe that “[t]he trial judge, of course, will have

had the benefit of observing the entire course of proceedings and will be most familiar with the

parties and attorneys involved. Consequently, a finding as to the commission of frivolous conduct

is entitled to substantial deference upon review.” Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286,

292 (9th Dist. 1992). And, “[w]hen determining whether conduct is frivolous pursuant to R.C.

2323.51, courts must be careful not to deter legitimate claims. . . The test to determine whether a

claim is frivolous is whether no reasonable lawyer would have brought the action in light of

existing law.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State ex rel. Chrisman v. Clearcreek

Twp., 2014-Ohio-252, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).

{¶52} Now that we have set forth the applicable standards of review, we turn to the

specific allegations against the attorneys.

Attorney Yoder

{¶53} The Du-Zhous alleged that Attorney Yoder engaged in frivolous conduct by: filing

the initial complaint, the motion to reconsider the dismissal of the complaint, the motion to amend

the complaint, the motion to strike the Du-Zhous’ amended counterclaim; certain answers to the

Du-Zhous’ interrogatories; subpoenaing the Du-Zhous’ minor children and filing a brief in

opposition to the Du-Zhous’ motion to quash the subpoena; attempting to disqualify and disbar the

Du-Zhous’ attorney; and interfering with a subpoena issued by the Du-Zhous to the Lis’ forensic

expert.

{¶54} In declining to impose sanctions against Attorney Yoder, the trial court observed

that the appeal of the expulsion case was not dismissed until June 6, 2018, over two months after

the Lis’ March 30, 2018 complaint was filed in this case. The trial court further found that the DuZhous failed to present sufficient evidence that Attorney Yoder’s filing of the complaint and

motion for reconsideration of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of the complaint constituted frivolous

conduct pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv), and that he was acting as a reasonable

lawyer in filing the motion for reconsideration and motion to amend the complaint. The trial court

further found that Attorney Yoder’s actions in filing the Lis’ complaint and the motion for

reconsideration of the dismissal of the Lis’ complaint and motion to amend the complaint did not

violate Civ.R. 11 given the time frame of these filings. There was an appeal pending in the

expulsion case when the complaint was filed, and by the time Attorney Yoder filed the motion for

reconsideration and motion to amend the complaint, the Du-Zhous had filed a counterclaim against

the Lis. The trial court found no evidence that Attorney Yoder did not read the pleadings or did

not have grounds to support the filing of the pleadings, nor was there evidence that the filings were

intended to delay the proceedings. The trial court found that Attorney Yoder’s actions were not

frivolous in nature related to the interrogatory answers, he had reasonable bases for the pleadings

he filed and further found no bad faith on the part of Attorney Yoder. The trial court was

“unpersuaded that Attorney Yoder’s conduct was willful rather than negligent to meet the standard

under Civ.R. 11.” The trial court found the Du-Zhous failed to present any objective evidence to

support a finding that the subpoena of T.D., the Du-Zhous’ minor son, was frivolous as defined by

R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv). Regarding the Du-Zhous’ claim that Attorney Yoder

frivolously interfered with their subpoena to the Lis’ expert, the trial court found that while “the

circumstances surrounding Mrs. Li’s cell phone were extremely contentious to all parties[,]” the

Du-Zhous failed to establish objective evidence of frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C.

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv). The trial court specifically noted that Attorney Yoder raised

defenses to the subpoena, including privilege, and while Attorney Yoder was eventually

unsuccessful in having the subpoena quashed, R.C. 2323.51 does not purport to punish, rather it

addresses egregious conduct.

Attorney Johnson

{¶55} As for Attorney Johnson, the Du-Zhous alleged that Attorney Johnson violated R.C.

2323.51 and Civ.R. 11: by making certain statements regarding the forensic analysis of Mrs. Li’s

cell phone, by filing the Lis’ amended answer; and by deposing several witnesses. It is important

to note that Attorney Johnson began representing the Lis in 2021, after the Lis’ complaint had been

dismissed and after the Du-Zhous’ amended counterclaim was filed. Therefore, Attorney

Johnson’s role was defending the Lis against the amended counterclaim, not prosecuting a

complaint against the Du-Zhous.

{¶56} The trial court stated that the Du-Zhous’ argument concerning the forensic analysis

of Mrs. Li’s phone was “part and parcel of the grievance and disbarment proceedings,” and

declined to revisit the issue as it was moot.

{¶57} As for Attorney Johnson’s filing of the Lis’ answer to the Du-Zhous’ amended

counterclaim, the Du-Zhous take issue with Attorney Johnson for asserting truth as a defense to

the Du-Zhous’ counterclaims and denying what they deem well-established facts. The trial court

found there was insufficient evidence to support that Attorney Johnson denied facts already in

evidence, but rather, in an effort to defend his clients against the Du-Zhous’ counterclaims, he

provided answers related to the Du-Zhous’ allegations. The trial court further stated, “[h]ere, the

question is whether Attorney Johnson had a reasonable basis for answers provided in the Lis’

Amended Answer[,] and observing, “[i]t is not frivolous conduct for an attorney to reasonably rely

on the representation of his or her client[.]” and the evidence supports a reasonable basis for the

answers. Turning to Civ.R. 11, the trial court found no evidence to indicate Attorney Johnson did

not read the pleadings or have grounds to support filing the answers, or that the filings were

intended to delay the proceedings. The trial court stated, “[i]n fact, it is the [Du-Zhous’]

counterclaim and amended counterclaim which continue to be litigated in this matter, not the

answers to those filings.”

{¶58} The Du-Zhous also argue that Attorney Johnson’s depositions of two Bath police

officers, the Bath chief of police, W.B., the student who overhead T.L.’s statements at the lunch

table, and W.B.’s father were frivolous conduct. Attorney Johnson argued that the depositions

were necessary to the Lis’ defense against the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for defamation. The trial

court agreed and found no frivolous conduct related to the depositions and no violation of Civ.R.

11. The trial court observed that the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim and amended counterclaim required

the Lis to defend against the Du-Zhous’ assertions and resulted in “the exhaustive rehashing of

events in this case.”

Analysis

{¶59} As the trial court repeatedly noted, the Lis’ complaint against the Du-Zhous was

dismissed on July 25, 2018. The parties have engaged in approximately eight years of litigation

since that time. Specific to this assignment of error, Attorneys Yoder and Johnson have been

defending their clients against the Du-Zhous’ counterclaims. It is apparent there is fierce

disagreement among the parties. The Lis assert that Mr. Du’s emails sent under pseudonyms

resulted in their son’s expulsion from school. The Du-Zhous assert the Lis initiated this litigation

to harass them. In the midst of this contentious litigation, the attorneys are doing their jobs,

zealously representing their respective clients.

{¶60} This Court has reviewed the extensive record in this extremely contentious case.

Upon review, using the applicable standards of review, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in

denying the Du-Zhous’ motion for sanctions against Attorneys Yoder and Johnson.

{¶61} We are sustaining this assignment of error regarding the allegations of frivolous

conduct on the part of the Lis, as set forth above, and overruling the assignment of error as it

pertains to the Lis’ attorneys. Again, this is not because we decide the Lis’ conduct as alleged in

the Du-Zhous’ February 11, 2024 motion for sanctions was frivolous. We only decide that the

trial court must in the first instance address those allegations as the allegations concern different

conduct than was alleged in the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct, and the analysis

will necessarily take into account the motivations and knowledge of the Lis during the course of

the litigation.

{¶62} Accordingly, the Du-Zhous’ fifth cross-assignment of error is sustained in part and

overruled in part.

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

WHEN IT LIMITED ITS FINDING OF FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (a) TO

THE LIS; (b) TO THE FIRST TIME THE FALSE ALLEGATIONS WERE

MADE; AND (c) TO THE THIRD TIME THE FALSE DENIALS WERE

MADE, PURSUANT TO [R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(iii) AND (iv)].

{¶63} The trial court limited its decision in its grant of summary judgment on the DuZhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct, because the counterclaim was filed against the Lis

based on the Lis’ complaint, not on conduct that occurred subsequent to the complaint or conduct

by other persons. The Du-Zhous chose to bring frivolous conduct as a counterclaim against the

Lis based on alleged false claims in the Lis’ complaint and chose to separately file numerous

motions for sanctions for frivolous conduct against the Lis and their attorneys for various alleged

instances of misconduct and abuses. While our disposition of the Lis’ second assignment of error

might render this assignment of error moot, we think it is important to underscore the difference

between the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct and their motions for sanctions for

frivolous conduct, as those filings target both the initial filing of the complaint by the Lis and their

attorneys as well as additional acts at different points during the litigation. The counterclaim for

frivolous conduct concerns what the Lis knew when they filed the complaint. Therefore, while we

are sustaining the Lis’ second assignment of error as to the granting of summary judgment on the

Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct, the trial court did not err in limiting its analysis of

the Du-Zhous’ counterclaim for frivolous conduct to the Lis and to the allegedly false claims in

the Lis’ complaint. That was the basis for the counterclaim for frivolous conduct.

{¶64} Accordingly, the Du-Zhous’ third cross-assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF [THE DU-ZHOUS] FOR SANCTIONS

UNDER R.C. 2323.51 BY RELYING UPON FACTUAL ASSERTIONS

THAT WERE NOT RAISED IN [THE DU-ZHOUS’] MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LIS ENGAGED IN

FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT DESPITE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD

SUPPORTING THE LIS’ FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST [THE DUZHOUS].

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING [THE

DU-ZHOUS] ATTORNEY’S FEES, EXPERT FEES, AND COSTS

BECAUSE [THE DU-ZHOUS] FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE

THAT COULD DEMONSTRATE HOW THE TIME EXPENDED BY

THEIR ATTORNEY OR TEIR EXPERT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE LIS’

PURPORTED FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT.

THE DU-ZHOUS’ CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING SANCTIONS IN ITS APRIL

7, 2025[] DECISION.

{¶65} Our resolution of the Lis’ second assignment of error and the Du-Zhous’ first and

second cross-assignments of error renders the Lis’ first, third, and fourth assignments of error and

the Du-Zhous’ sixth cross-assignment of error moot pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

III.

{¶66} For the forgoing reasons, the Lis’ second assignment of error is sustained, and their

first, third, and fourth assignments of error are moot. The Du-Zhous’ first and second crossassignments of error are sustained, their third and fourth cross-assignments of error are overruled,

their fifth cross-assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part, and their sixth crossassignment of error is moot. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Judgment affirmed in part,

reversed in part.

and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to both parties.

BETTY SUTTON

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

KYLE A. JOHNSON, ZACHARY S. MOTTICE, and HAYLEY E. KICK, Attorneys at Law, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

KAREN C. LEFTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

ADAM D. FULLER, Attorney at Law, for Cross-Appellee.

THOMAS M. DICAUDO, Attorney at Law, for Cross-Appellees.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain