Slip Op. 26-115
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
FORREST XU,
Plaintiff,
v.
Before: Lisa W. Wang, Judge
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
Court No. 26-03403
HOMELAND SECURITY, and SUSAN S.
THOMAS, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF TRADE,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
[Denying Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.]
Dated: September 16, 2026
Christopher J. Duncan, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff Forrest Xu.
David N. Heitner, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, of New York, NY, for Defendants U.S. Customs and Border Protection, et al. With him on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Justin R. Miller, Attorney-In-Charge, International Trade Field Office, and Aimee Lee, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were Marc Matthews, Alexandra Khrebtukova, Lisa Ross, and Robert Mathai, Office of Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Wang, Judge: Before the court is Plaintiff Forrest Xu’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. Pl.’s Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 13; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of
Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 13-1. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin
Defendants U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”), U.S. Department of Court No. 26-03403 Page 2
Homeland Security, and Susan S. Thomas, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office
of Trade, from deactivating Plaintiff’s entry filer code, which allows him to file entries
with Customs electronically.1 Id. at 1. Plaintiff argues that injunctive relief is warranted
because: (1) Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) Plaintiff faces an immediate
and continuing threat of irreparable harm; (3) the balance of hardships favors Plaintiff;
and (4) the public interest is best served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See
generally id.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Forrest Xu “is a licensed customs broker.” Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 5.
Plaintiff was assigned an entry filer code: “a unique, three character code that Customs
… assigns to a licensed customs broker.” Lizarraga Customs Broker v. Bureau of
Customs & Border Prot., 34 CIT 1309, 1310 (2010). An active entry filer code is
required to file entries electronically with Customs.2 Id. (“In order to file electronically,
the broker must have an active entry filer code and be approved for participation in the
[Automated Broker Interface (‘ABI’)] system.”).
1 Plaintiff refers to the entry filer code at issue as an “electronic entry filer code” at times.
See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 1.
2 As the court has explained, “[f]iling ‘entries’ means the filing of documentation required
to ensure the release of imported merchandise from Customs’ custody or the act of filing that documentation.” Lizarraga, 34 CIT at 1310.
Court No. 26-03403 Page 3
On August 7, 2024, Customs conducted an on-site review at Plaintiff’s office and
found violations of Customs regulations and other customs broker requirements. Letter
from Susan S. Thomas to Forrest Xu (June 1, 2026) (“Suspension Letter”) at 8, ECF
No. 4-1; Letter from Alan Aprea to Forrest Xu (Feb. 5, 2025) at Exhibit A-26–27, ECF
No. 21-2; Broker Visit Interview Questions at Exhibit A-3–16, ECF No.21-2. At that time,
Customs notified Plaintiff that his operation under the name of “Eton Customs Broker
Inc.” (“Eton”) was impermissible and instructed Plaintiff “to cease conducting customs
business” as Eton. Suspension Letter at 8. Two additional written communications were
sent by Customs regarding Plaintiff’s impermissible use of the corporate name Eton, on
February 5, 2025, and on June 6, 2025. Id. at 8–9; Letter from Miyoshi M. Feliciano to
Forrest Xu (June 6, 2025) at Exhibit A-36, ECF No. 21-2. Customs also sent several
“informed compliance letters” to Plaintiff during the period between December 19, 2025,
and March 27, 2026, regarding certain “misuse” of Plaintiff’s entry filer code.
Suspension Letter at 9.
On April 24, 2026, Customs sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that the agency
was “conducting a compliance review of the accuracy of the CBP Form 5106 data that
[he] certified and transmitted to the Automated Commercial Environment” (“ACE”) for
over thirty specific Importer of Record (“IOR”) numbers.3 Letter from Judy Staudt to
3 Per Customs, “CBP Form 5106, also known as the Importer Identity Form, is used to
collect and maintain essential identification information for individuals and businesses involved in importing goods into the United States. This form serves several critical purposes: it establishes or updates an importer's identity within [Custom’s] systems, assigns a unique importer number (often linked to an IRS Employer Identification Court No. 26-03403 Page 4
Forrest Xu (Apr. 24, 2026) (“Apr. 24, 2026 Letter”) at Exhibit A-81–82, ECF No. 21-2.
The letter requested that Plaintiff respond and provide the agency with specific
documentation and answers to a set of questions. Id. at A-82–83. The letter further
specified that “[f]ailure to respond … and/or provide a sufficient explanation and
supporting written or electronic records or documents may result in [Customs] taking
action to disable [Plaintiff’s] ability to transmit CBP Form 5106s electronically in ACE.”
Id. at A-83.
Plaintiff sent a response to Customs on April 29, 2026. Letter From Forrest Xu to
Customs (Apr. 29, 2026), Exhibit C, ECF No. 21-4. In his response, Plaintiff stated that
the importers at issue were “legitimate operating business entities”, but acknowledged
that there was “still room for improvement in our importer verification procedures.” Id.
Plaintiff listed several corrective measures that he proposed to take regarding these
procedures. Id.
In a letter dated May 4, 2026, Customs informed Plaintiff “that [Customs] …
disabled [his] ability to transmit CBP Form 5106s electronically to the Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE) ….” Letter from Judy Staudt to Forrest Xu (May 4,
2026) (“May 4, 2026 Letter”) at Exhibit A-77, ECF No. 21-2. In a subsequent letter,
Customs informed Plaintiff that the agency was “no longer allowing [him] to use [his]
Number, Social Security Number, or a CBP-assigned ID), and is a prerequisite for becoming an Importer of Record.” CBP Form 5106 – Create/Update Importer Identity Form, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, https://www.cbp.gov/document/forms/cbpform-5106-createupdate-importer-identity-form (last visited Sept. 10, 2026). Court No. 26-03403 Page 5
assigned entry filer code” and that the “action extends to both electronic filing in … ACE
… through … ABI and paper filing utilizing [his] assigned entry filer code ….”
Suspension Letter at 8. The letter also informed Plaintiff of an alternate method he could
use to file entries and the steps that Plaintiff would have to take “[f]or [Customs] to
consider reinstating the use of [his] entry filer code after a minimum of 180 calendar
days from the date of [the] letter ….” Id. at 9–10.
On July 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the deactivation of his
entry filer code. See generally Compl. Before filing his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion
for a temporary restraining order “enjoining [Defendants] … from deactivating [P]laintiff’s
customs broker electronic entry filer code ….” Pl.’s Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order at
1, ECF No. 4. Defendants filed their response on August 3, 2026. Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s
Mot. for a Temp. Restraining Order, ECF No. 8 (superseded by ECF No. 21).
The court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order on August 4,
2026. Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, ECF No. 9. On August 6,
2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. Pl.’s Emergency Mot. for
Reconsideration, ECF No. 10. The court denied the motion the same day. Order
Denying Pl.’s Emergency Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. 12.
On August 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed the motion for a preliminary injunction at issue
here. Pl.’s Mot. Defendants filed their response on August 12, 2026. Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s
Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Resp.”), ECF No. 15. Plaintiff sought leave to
file a reply, which was granted. Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File a Reply, ECF Court No. 26-03403 Page 6
No. 23. Plaintiff’s reply was deemed filed on August 21, 2026. Id.; see Pl.’s Reply to
Gov.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 17.
JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction over this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1).4
The court may issue injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction
pursuant to CIT Rule 65. Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as
of right.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); see also Ninestar
Corp. v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1359 (CIT 2023) (“The movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion on a motion for preliminary injunction.”)
(citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
To obtain injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) “it is likely to
succeed on the merits”; (2) “it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary
injunction”; (3) “the balance of … [hardships] favors the [moving party][;] and (4) the
injunction is in the public interest.” Harmoni Int’l Spice, Inc. v. United States, 211 F.
Supp. 3d 1298, 1306 (CIT 2017) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 710 F. 2d 806, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States,
4 Defendants note that Plaintiff’s failure to file “the summons and complaint concurrently
is grounds for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Defs.’ Resp. at 11, n.5. However, such a failure does not necessitate a dismissal. See Chae v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1383 (CIT 2021); Arlanxeo USA LLC v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (CIT 2018). Here, Plaintiff filed his complaint one day after his summons. Summons, ECF No. 1; Compl. Defendants have not alleged prejudice by this one-day delay. See generally Defs.’ Resp. The court declines to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Court No. 26-03403 Page 7
892 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422
F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1280 (CIT 2019). As the court has noted:
In reviewing these factors, “no one factor, taken individually,” is dispositive.
Ugine & ALZ Belg. v. United States, 452 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
… ; FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993). However,
each factor need not be given equal weight. See Ugine & ALZ Belg., 452
F.3d at 1293; Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable harm are generally considered the
most significant factors in evaluating a motion for injunctive relief. See Nken,
556 U.S. at 434; Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Harmoni, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1306.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff is Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits
Plaintiff asserts that “he will succeed on the merits because Customs did not
provide even basic due process ….” Pl.’s Mot. at 9. Plaintiff supports this claim by
alleging that “Defendants’ action is arbitrary and capricious because [Defendants] have
summarily deactivated Mr. Xu’s entry filer code without disclosing the specific reasons
therefore and providing Mr. Xu with the opportunity to counter these reasons through
evidence and argument.” Id. at 6.
Defendants maintain that “the due process afforded to an individual before the
suspension of an entry filer code is governed by Section 558(c) of the APA, which
involves notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the
action, and an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful
requirements. [Customs] afforded Mr. Xu with this due process.” Defs.’ Resp. at 12. Court No. 26-03403 Page 8
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has explained
“that the party seeking the injunction must be able to demonstrate that it has at least a
fair chance of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction to be appropriate.”
Silfab Solar, 892 F.3d at 1345 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a “fair chance” of success on
the merits.5 Specifically, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants failed to identify the reasons
for deactivation, or afford Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to these reasons, ignores
the reality of Plaintiff’s interactions with Customs. Pl.’s Mot. at 6.
Before conducting its April 2026 compliance review, Customs put Plaintiff on
notice of misuse of his entry filer code on several occasions over a one-year period.
Defs.’ Resp. at 18–19 (detailing “[t]he full scope and timeframe of [Custom’s] notice to
5 Plaintiff relies in part on Lizarraga in support of his position. Compl. ¶ 7 (“Under
guidance set forth by this court in Lizarraga[,] … Customs has no right to deactivate a customs broker’s entry filer code without, at a minimum, adherence to proper procedure, such as notice, an opportunity for the broker to respond, and a hearing before an administrative law judge.”); Pl.’s Mot. at 6 (“As this court found in Lizarraga, Mr. Xu is also likely to succeed on the merits.”).
Plaintiff misconstrues the applicability of Lizarraga. Notably, in Lizarraga, which also involved the suspension of an entry filer code, the court specifically noted that “the court is not determining whether the provisions of [5 U.S.C.] § 558 will provide adequate legal due process under circumstances yet unknown.” Lizarraga, 34 CIT at 1318.
Relatedly, in Plaintiff’s reply brief, Plaintiff raises the claim that “[t]he government … is estopped from challenging, [P]laintiff’s showing of likelihood of success [on] the merits, irreparable harm, balance of [hardships], and public interest[,]” given Lizarraga. Pl.’s Reply at 11. Although Plaintiff claims that he “suffered the same injury as the broker in Lizarraga[,]” mere assertions do not constitute evidence. Id. at 7–8. Also insufficient are counsel’s memories of his government service during the Lizarraga litigation. See, e.g., id. at 5. As such, Plaintiff’s estoppel argument fails.
Court No. 26-03403 Page 9
Plaintiff, associated warnings, and time to achieve compliance …”, with citations to
supporting documentation). In these notices, Customs informed Plaintiff of the potential
repercussions of such misuse and how Plaintiff could dispute allegations of misuse. Id.;
see, e.g., Letter from Automative and Aerospace Center to Forrest Xu (Dec. 19, 2025)
at Exhibit A-49–50, ECF No. 21-2.
Further, and prior to deactivating Plaintiff’s entry filer code, Customs informed
Plaintiff that it was conducting a compliance review. Apr. 24, 2026 Letter. In that letter,
Customs put Plaintiff on notice of the issues it was reviewing, specified what information
Plaintiff needed to provide to address the agency’s concerns, and informed him of
potential repercussions. Id. at A-81–83. Specifically, Customs notified Plaintiff that
“[f]ailure to respond to this request and/or provide a sufficient explanation and
supporting written or electronic records or documents may result in [Customs] taking
action to disable [his] ability to transmit CBP Form 5106s electronically in ACE.” Id. at A83.6
Plaintiff failed to respond with the information requested by Customs. For
example, as Customs noted in its May 4, 2026 letter:
[Customs] requested that you provide all communication between yourself
and the above IORs regarding their initial inquiry into filing a CBP Form
5106 or engaging in other customs business. First, you did not provide
evidence showing that you had direct communication with 13 of the above
6 The letter also informed Plaintiff of specific legal requirements he had to follow as a
licensed customs broker and informed Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with these or other applicable legal requirements may result in monetary penalties, revocation or suspension of [his] customs brokers license, or other appropriate actions.” Apr. 24, 2026 Letter at Exhibit A-83.
Court No. 26-03403 Page 10
IORs, nor did you provide any response for seven. Second, you provided
only partial correspondence for 15 of the above IORs. Third, despite your
claim that you reviewed the powers of attorney (POA) for each of the above
IORs for completeness, 15 of the POAs that you provided were not fully
filled out and are therefore incomplete.
Your response claims that you confirm that each IOR is a legitimate
operating business entity and that they are not a fictitious company or
associated with misrepresented parties. However, [Customs] has confirmed
that at least two of the government-issued identifications that you provided
in your response are invalid.
May 4, 2026 Letter at Exhibit A-78.
Given the record evidence, Plaintiff’s due process assertions that Defendants
“summarily” deactivated its entry filer code are unpersuasive.
II. Plaintiff Has Not Established Irreparable Harm
The court next turns to whether Plaintiff has shown “that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief ….” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
Plaintiff argues that he has suffered a “clearly irreparable” injury because “he
cannot continue to operate his brokerage business in a competitive manner” while his
entry filer code is suspended. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. Plaintiff further claims that he “cannot so
easily recover the injury to [his] business from [D]efendants’ action because there is no
way to know whether Customs will ever reinstate his entry filer code, and no guidelines
or hearing process in this regard, [and] no effective remedy will compensate Mr. Xu for
[his] present and continuing injury.” Id.
Defendants rebut Plaintiff’s contention, stating that “Plaintiff’s assertions of the
negative effects on his business fall short of demonstrating the severe or imminent Court No. 26-03403 Page 11
threat of financial extinction required, and he has accordingly failed to establish
irreparable harm.” Defs.’ Resp. at 24.
The court “has long recognized that a movant’s burden to prove irreparable harm
is ‘extremely heavy.’” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 3d 1330,
1340 (CIT 2024); see also Shandong Huarong Gen. Corp. v. United States, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (CIT 2000); Int’l Fresh Trade Corp. v. United States, 26 F. Supp.
3d 1363, 1367 (CIT 2014). As the court has explained,
A finding of irreparable harm requires that a Plaintiff demonstrate “a viable
threat of serious harm which cannot be undone,” justifying the injunctive
relief sought. Zenith, 710 F.2d at 809 …. Generally, an allegation of financial
loss alone, however substantial, which is compensable with monetary
damages, is not irreparable harm if such corrective relief will be available at
a later date. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 (1974). As such,
“[t]he possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will
be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs
heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90.
Nevertheless, irreparable harm may take the form of “[p]rice erosion, loss
of goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities.”
Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Harmoni, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1306–07. The court has also noted that “[w]ithout more,
affidavits from interested parties may be considered weak evidence, unlikely to justify a
preliminary injunction.” Int’l Fresh Trade, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Plaintiff has provided weak evidence for his claim of irreparable injury. Plaintiff
relies on self-attestations regarding: (1) his financial situation; (2) his loss of clients
because of the suspension of his entry filer code; and (3) the challenges of manual Court No. 26-03403 Page 12
filing. Supplemental Declaration of Forrest Xu (“Supplemental Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–11, 13–14,
ECF No. 13-2.
Plaintiff has provided no outside support, such as financial documentation, for his
claim that he will “run out of money” and be forced to close his brokerage in the
absence of a preliminary injunction. Id. ¶ 13; Compare Harmoni, 211 F. Supp. 3d at
1307–08, with ICON EV LLC v. United States, Slip Op. 2026-42 at *14–16 (CIT Apr. 24,
2026). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he “tried to ask [his] clients to stay but they
have no interest in paying [him] to file manually when they can go to another broker and
get electronic service” and that “[m]anual filing is not practical in [this] day and age.”
Supplemental Decl. ¶ 14. However, Plaintiff has not provided evidence of
communications with clients or attempts to file manually to support his claims.
Finally, Plaintiff’s contention that “there is no way to know whether Customs will
ever reinstate his entry filer code, and no guidelines or hearing process in this regard” is
contradicted by record evidence. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. In Customs’ June 1, 2026 suspension
letter to Plaintiff, the agency laid out the specific information and documentation Plaintiff
would need to provide in order “[f]or [Customs] to consider reinstating the use of
[Plaintiff’s] entry filer code after a minimum of 180 calendar days from the date of this
letter ….” Suspension Letter at 9–10. The letter concluded that:
If [Customs] is able to confirm the validity and sufficiency of the information
contained within your response, your entry filer code will be reactivated on
day 181. If [Customs] requires additional information after receiving your
initial response, this will be communicated to you before the end of the 180-day period. Should you fail to provide sufficient information, [Customs] will
continue to disallow the use of your entry filer code beyond the initial 180-day duration.
Court No. 26-03403 Page 13
Id. at 10. In sum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable harm.
III. Plaintiff Has Not Shown that the Balance of Hardships Weighs in His
Favor, Nor That a Preliminary Injunction Would Serve the Public Interest
Plaintiff argues that the balance of hardships weighs in his favor, contending
“[t]he issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent [D]efendants’ continuing action will
have incidental or no adverse impact upon Customs[’] administration of broker licenses
or upon other licensed customs brokers in the region, or anywhere else in the country,
whereas denial of the preliminary injunction will have tremendous impact upon Mr. Xu –
ending his brokerage .… In contrast, Customs is free to continue its other broker
regulation activities during the pendency of the case.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. Relatedly, Plaintiff
argues that “the public interest is best served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction
….” Id. at 7. Plaintiff notes that “[s]hould [D]efendants not be prevented from
implementing their plan, the economic viability of the existing brokers will undoubtedly
be threatened.” Id. at 8.
Defendants counter that the balance of hardships weighs in their favor, stating
that “[a]s a result of Plaintiff’s actions, dozens of importer of record numbers were
issued for which [Customs] does not have accurate and complete information, exposing
the public’s health and safety, and the nation’s security, to the unacceptable risk of
unlawful importation of dangerous goods and lost customs revenue.” Defs.’ Resp. at 25.
Defendants also maintain that the public interest would be disserved by the issuance of
a preliminary injunction, maintaining that “[Customs’] actions ensure that the small
minority of brokers who misuse their entry filer codes do not continue to put at risk the Court No. 26-03403 Page 14
revenue of the United States and the health and safety of all its people, while not
diminishing the availability of compliant customs brokers to the importer community.” Id.
at 26.
When evaluating a preliminary injunction, the court’s considerations of the
balance of hardships and public interest “merge when the [g]overnment is the opposing
party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435; ICON EV, Slip Op. 2026-42 at *16; Ninestar Corp. v.
United States, 687 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1343 (CIT 2024).
Plaintiff has failed to establish that these merged factors weigh in his favor.
Relevantly, the Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]he public interest is served by ensuring
that governmental bodies comply with the law ….” Am. Signature, Inc v. United States,
598 F.3d 816, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants are acting
in contravention of the law. Rather, through its oversight of and communications with
Plaintiff, Customs was ensuring “[a]ccurate and effective enforcement of [the] trade laws
….” Union Steel v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (CIT 2009). Such actions
are in the public interest. See id. Therefore, this factor weighs against granting Plaintiff's
motion.
Further, Defendants’ interests in protecting national security and government
revenue have already been held to be significant public interests by the court. See
Severstal Exp. GMBH v. United States, Slip Op. 2018-37 at *24 (CIT Apr. 5, 2018)
(“Both the rule of law and our nation’s security are foundational to the public good.”);
Harmoni, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 (“Congress made clear that protecting the revenue of
the United States is a significant public interest.”).
Court No. 26-03403 Page 15
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is
DENIED.
/s/ Lisa W. Wang
Lisa W. Wang, Judge
Dated: September 16, 2026
New York, New York