Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 411
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-26-251
JASON LYNCH Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26JV-24-287]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Jason Lynch appeals the January 16, 2026, Garland County Circuit Court order
terminating his parental rights to his three minor children, MC1 (DOB 09/09/13), MC2
(DOB 07/30/14), and MC3 (06/27/16). On appeal, he argues there was insufficient
evidence to terminate his parental rights under the failure-to-remedy and substantialsentence-in-a-criminal-proceeding grounds. Although we do not affirm on the statutory
grounds relied on by the circuit court, our de novo review permits us to affirm on an
alternative ground pleaded by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and
supported by the record; accordingly, we affirm on the ground of aggravated circumstances.
I. Relevant Background
This dependency-neglect case involves the three minor children of Keri Lynch 1 and
Jason Lynch. DHS removed the children from Jason’s custody in September 2024 due to
concerns of threat of harm and parental substance abuse. The children had previously been
in foster care in an earlier dependency-neglect case. The prior case was closed in April 2024
with Jason receiving custody of all three children, but DHS continued a protective-services
case and provided in-home services. Within weeks, Jason and the children returned to the
home with Keri, whom the children had been removed from.
At the time of the September removal, DHS received three separate referrals alleging
Jason had been driving drunk with the children in the vehicle, smashed the children’s fish
tank, made the children watch the fish die, and poured bleach on the children’s dog while
the children watched. The referrals also alleged Keri had been using drugs and living in the
home with the children despite custody not being returned to Keri during the last case due
to her noncompliance. When DHS and law enforcement investigated, they saw damage to
the home and a dog with chunks of fur missing all over its back and scabs on its skin. Jason
acknowledged he struggled with his behavior and had been unsafe around the children, but
he later denied the allegations, became agitated, and refused a drug screen.
The children independently reported they did not feel safe with Jason because of his
increasingly erratic behavior. They described Jason’s drinking and driving recklessly with
While Keri is not part of this appeal, we include relevant discussion of her
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involvement in this case.
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them in the vehicle, running off the road, punching holes in doors, damaging the home,
physically assaulting Keri, and striking one of the minor children. The children also reported
that Jason claimed to be God and stepped on the dog’s paw until they apologized for
contradicting him. The children indicated Jason’s conduct was ongoing, describing him as
“always upset” and stating that “every day is a bad day.”
Keri acknowledged Jason had been drinking and acting inappropriately and reported
his behavior had previously become so angry and erratic that she sent the children to stay
with her mother. Keri nevertheless minimized several of the children’s allegations and twice
failed to provide a valid drug screen. In light of the children’s reports, Jason’s conduct, the
condition of the home and the dog, and the parents’ behavior during the investigation, DHS
exercised a hold on all three children and removed them from the home.
At the January 7, 2026, termination hearing, DHS caseworker Cecily Truslow
testified she had been assigned to the case throughout most of its pendency. Jason had been
incarcerated since shortly after the case opened. While incarcerated, he completed an angermanagement program and participated in family time, but Truslow was unaware of any other
services he had completed and did not know his anticipated release date. Truslow also
testified that Keri frequently failed to complete requested drug screens. According to
Truslow, Keri would state that she could not provide a urine sample, leave without
completing a requested screen, or otherwise fail to address the request. Truslow further
testified that most of the screens Keri did provide were adulterated and had an insufficient
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temperature reading. DHS offered Keri a hair-follicle test in April 2025, but Keri never
completed it.
Keri was no longer participating in counseling at the time of the hearing. She
continued to reside in the residence from which the children had been removed. Truslow
attempted to inspect the residence on the morning of the termination hearing, but Keri told
her she did not have time for an assessment. Truslow’s previous inspection, which occurred
several months earlier, revealed ongoing repairs. One bedroom was being used for storage
and was inappropriate for a child, while flooring had been removed from other rooms and
was being replaced. Truslow testified the residence was not a home to which DHS could
return the children.
Truslow testified she believed termination was in the children’s best interest because
they deserved an opportunity to be placed together and to begin addressing their trauma in
a stable home. She explained the children could not be returned to Keri because DHS did
not know the current condition of the residence and lacked proof of Keri’s sobriety or
treatment. According to Truslow, Keri had completed a drug-and-alcohol assessment and
was participating in medication management, but those were the only completed services
identified at the hearing.
Jason participated in weekly thirty-minute Zoom visits with the children while
incarcerated. Truslow described those visits as “[n]ot great.” One child did not wish to
participate and frequently attempted to leave or remain off camera. Truslow testified the
child was sometimes coerced or yelled at to return, and the therapist had reported the visits
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were stressful for the child. Keri and Jason also argued during visits and required redirection
by DHS. Although some of the children had previously expressed a desire to return to Keri,
Truslow testified that by the time of the termination hearing, they were less focused on
returning to their mother and more concerned with ultimately being placed together.
DHS adoption specialist Sandra Marfoglio-Hinton testified regarding the children’s
adoptability. When she entered the three children’s information into the adoption-matching
system as a sibling group, the system identified eleven possible adoptive homes. She was
unaware of any condition affecting any of the children that would render them unadoptable.
Keri testified she opposed termination and did not believe it was in her children’s
best interest. She stated she visited the children weekly as much as possible and attempted
to communicate with them and check on their well-being. Keri was not participating in
counseling at the time of the termination hearing. She explained she had been discharged
from counseling because she lacked insurance and disputed DHS’s characterization of her
treatment recommendations. Keri maintained that records she obtained stated that
outpatient treatment could continue, although she acknowledged that other paperwork
reflected a recommendation for inpatient treatment. Keri testified she attempted to obtain
admission to other inpatient programs and acknowledged that inpatient treatment would
help her.
Regarding drug testing, Keri acknowledged there were occasions when she did not
submit to requested screens, although she testified she had complied with screens for several
months during the summer. She admitted she had not completed the requested hair-follicle
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test. Keri further acknowledged that submitting to drug screens was part of her case plan and
conceded she had not complied “100 percent.” When asked when she had last used
methamphetamine, Keri responded it had been “months,” but she could not identify how
many months and referenced a failed drug screen. When later asked what the result would
be if she submitted to a drug screen that day, Keri stated that she did not know.
Jason testified by video from prison. He stated he was incarcerated for a six-month
parole violation and also had pending criminal charges. According to Jason, the parole board
continued to defer consideration of his release while awaiting resolution of those charges.
He testified his pending charges included felony fleeing, felony terroristic acts, and
misdemeanor criminal mischief. His criminal case was scheduled for a March 12 pretrial
hearing and a May jury trial. Jason owned a home and testified he would have a residence
available immediately upon his release. He opposed termination of his parental rights and
hoped Keri would obtain treatment.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court noted the children had been in
DHS custody for approximately 431 days, or more than sixteen months, and emphasized
their need for stability and to remain together. The court also considered the family’s prior
foster-care case.
As to Keri, the circuit court found her compliance with DHS had fallen short of
substantial compliance. The court cited her lack of cooperation with drug testing, her failure
to cooperate with DHS’s efforts to assess her residence, and her incomplete compliance with
the case plan.
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As to Jason, the circuit court expressly stated it was not basing its termination decision
on his pending felony charges. The court did, however, consider that Jason was incarcerated
following a parole violation and that there was no known release date. The court
acknowledged Jason owned a home and had completed an anger-management program and
participated in family time while incarcerated.
The circuit court ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that termination
of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The court found the
children adoptable, terminated Keri’s and Jason’s parental rights, and established adoption
as the permanency goal.
II. Discussion
This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse
the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 64, 684 S.W.3d 219. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Jennings v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 429, 636 S.W.3d 119. In determining whether a finding is
clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the circuit court’s opportunity to
judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
An order terminating parental rights must be based on a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds is satisfied and that termination is in
the children’s best interest. Robinson, supra. Clear and convincing evidence is the degree of
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proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction of the allegation sought to be
established. Rugama v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 62, 684 S.W.3d 256. To
make a best-interest finding, the circuit court must consider two facts: (1) the likelihood of
adoption and (2) the potential harm that would result to the juvenile if he or she were
returned to the parent’s custody. Beanblossom v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App.
605. A best-interest finding as a whole—rather than each factor—must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. Id.
The circuit court terminated Jason’s parental rights on two statutory grounds: (1)
twelve-month failure to remedy and (2) a substantial sentence in a criminal proceeding. Jason
challenges both grounds on appeal but does not challenge the circuit court’s best-interest
findings. Although the evidence supporting the two grounds expressly relied on by the circuit
court is not particularly strong—especially with respect to failure to remedy—the record
nonetheless supports affirmance.
Most significantly, DHS pled aggravated circumstances as an independent ground for
termination in its petition. Although the circuit court did not expressly rule on that ground
in its written order, we affirm termination on aggravated circumstances pursuant to our de
novo review. Under our de novo review, we will affirm a termination-of-parental-rights order
on a statutory ground that was pled in a DHS petition but not relied on—or addressed—by
the circuit court if the ground was proved at the termination hearing. See Millican v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 175, 709 S.W.3d 871. This principle is consistent with
the broader rule that an appellate court may affirm when the circuit court reaches the right
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result, even if for a different reason. See Watkins v. State, 2014 Ark. 283, 437 S.W.3d 685.
Our de novo review opens the entire record for review and does not constrain the appellate
court to the circuit court’s rationale, allowing for review of the record for additional reasons
to affirm. See Kazzee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 78, at 11, 684 S.W.3d 279,
287.
Here, the circuit court’s written order does not reject aggravated circumstances;
rather, it simply does not address that ground despite DHS having pled it. Our task on de
novo review is therefore not limited to determining whether the evidence supporting the two
grounds expressly identified in the order was overwhelming. We may review the entire record
to determine whether termination was nevertheless warranted on the aggravatedcircumstances ground properly placed before the court.
Under the aggravated-circumstances ground, parental rights may be terminated when
there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification. Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i) (Supp. 2025). The inquiry is forwardlooking. The question is not merely whether a parent participated in services or made some
efforts toward compliance but whether additional services are likely to achieve the ultimate
goal of reunification. Id. Even full compliance with a case plan is not determinative because
the relevant consideration is whether the parent has become a stable and safe parent capable
of caring for the children. See, e.g., Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, at 6,
512 S.W.3d 694, 697.
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Viewed as a whole, the record provides considerable evidence in support of
termination under the aggravated-circumstances ground. Jason remained incarcerated at the
time of termination, and his incarceration substantially limited his ability to demonstrate he
could provide the children with the stability and care necessary for reunification. Although
Jason made some efforts while incarcerated—including completing anger-management classes
and participating in family time by Zoom—those efforts did not establish that further services
would realistically permit reunification within a time frame consistent with the children’s
needs.
The record supports the conclusion that there was not a realistic likelihood additional
services would result in successful reunification. We have specifically addressed incarceration
as evidence supporting the aggravated-circumstances ground. In Bevell v. Arkansas Department
of Human Services, 2023 Ark. App. 138, 662 S.W.3d 259, we held the circuit court did not
clearly err in finding aggravated circumstances where the father was incarcerated at the
termination hearing, had been incarcerated ten of the fifteen months of the case, remained
incarcerated under a five-year sentence, admitted he did not participate in the case during
the period he was not incarcerated, and missed three DNA testing appointments. Similarly,
in Murphey v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2016 Ark. App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544,
evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated circumstances where the mother was
incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and stated she had no home to return to
upon release from prison, and the children had been removed from her care on three
separate occasions due to environmental issues.
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While the facts of the present case are not identical, the record demonstrates the
minor children have previously spent time in foster care, Jason allowed Keri back into the
home after the children were removed from her care, Jason admitted having behavioral issues
around the children, and he was incarcerated the majority of the pendency of the case
without a release date in sight.
Accordingly, even if the evidence supporting one or both of the statutory grounds
expressly relied on by the circuit court gives this court some pause, reversal is not required.
DHS pled aggravated circumstances, the issue was before the circuit court, and the evidence
presented at the termination hearing supports that ground by clear and convincing evidence.
Under our de novo review, we may therefore affirm the termination order on the aggravatedcircumstances ground.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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