Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 421
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-401
MICHAEL ENNS Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NINTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60DR-21-3280]
LINDSAY LIPKE
APPELLEE HONORABLE ANDREW GILL, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant Michael Enns appeals the December 26, 2024 order of the Pulaski County
Circuit Court modifying custody of his daughter, Minor Girl (MG),1 from joint custody with
him and appellee Lindsay Lipke to granting appellee primary physical and legal custody of
MG subject to reasonable visitation with appellant.2 He argues that the circuit court erred
in modifying custody because there was no significant evidence to support the modification.
We affirm.
1
D.O.B. January 9, 2009.
2
The circuit court’s order also ruled on other issues, but those issues are not before us in this appeal.
The parties were divorced by decree on August 12, 2022. At that time, they were
awarded joint physical and legal custody of their three minor children. According to the
decree, the parties were to communicate with each other regarding the children’s activities,
schedule, and well-being; and communication was to be reasonable and for the purpose of
fostering a solid relationship between the children and the parents. The parties were also to
have full access to all information related to the children. They were required to confer with
each other regarding important issues, with appellant having final decision-making authority
over education issues and appellee having final decision-making authority over medical
issues. Appellee filed a motion to modify custody on December 9, 2022. She asked to be
the sole custodian of the parties’ children.3 Appellee filed another motion to modify custody
on April 10, 2023. An attorney ad litem was appointed on April 17 to protect the children’s
best interest.
Appellee filed an ex parte emergency motion for custody on August 28. The motion
referenced an incident between appellant and MG and alleged that appellant accidentally
struck MG in the mouth with her cell phone during a struggle. She alleged that the children
were experiencing emotional abuse at appellant’s home and that it had escalated to a physical
altercation and continued police involvement. The circuit court granted appellee’s motion
that same day and entered an emergency order of custody. An emergency hearing took place
3
Between this date and the final hearing in this case, the parties filed more than twenty motions.
2
on September 7. The circuit court entered an order on September 20 setting aside the
emergency order of custody.
Appellant filed a motion to modify custody on October 11. He alleged that appellee
had been withholding visitation4 and attempting to sever his relationship with the children.
He filed a motion for counseling on October 12 alleging that appellee had poisoned the
children’s minds and alleging parental alienation. Appellant asked that the circuit court
appoint Joe Heard as a reunification counselor to help reunify appellant with his children.
An agreed order for counseling with Heard was filed on January 2, 2024. The ad litem filed
a motion to seal and for protective order on May 10. She alleged that the children were
accessing the files online via AOC Court Connect or were provided the items by either the
parties or third parties. She opined that their access to the documents was against their best
interest. She noted that Heard also believed the children’s access was detrimental to their
well-being and to their relationship with their parents. An order to seal and protective order
was entered on May 13.
Appellant field two verified ex parte emergency motions for temporary custody or, in
the alternative, emergency motion for expeditated relief on June 21. The circuit court
entered an order on July 24 on appellant’s motions. The order stated that (1) MG shall enter
intensive mental-health treatment, and both parents must participate in the treatment per
the provider’s instructions; (2) the parties were both granted immediate and equal access to
4
Appellant alleged that he had not had visitation since September 8.
3
the minor children’s cell phones and had the ability to provide the children with appropriate
parental safeguards, they were required to share the logon information and were prohibited
from changing the logon without notifying the other parent immediately, and they were
prohibited from allowing the children to change the logon information; (3) the parties were
prohibited from turning off the children’s cell-phone locations or allowing the children to
do so, and they were required to turn the location back on if they learned that a child had
turned off his or her location; (4) neither party was allowed to let MG operate vehicles,
including golf carts and other motorized vehicles; and (5) neither party could allow MG to
consume alcohol or to attend events in which there was knowledge that alcohol would be
available.
A final hearing took place November 7–8. Allyson Shoptaw testified that she was
the reunification therapist for the family. She stated that she was originally contacted by
appellee to provide therapy between appellant and the two eldest children, MG and MB.5
She testified that appellant subsequently contacted her in August 2024 and that his intake
took place on August 12. She said reunification between appellant and one of the children
was set for August 24, but the child did not show up, so appellant received parent coaching
on that day. She described appellant as “very coachable” and said that he seemed both open
and honest about the family’s current situation. She stated that appellant showed her
messages he had received from MG asking him not to contact her but that he seemed
5
MB was seventeen at the time and has since reached the age of majority.
4
persistent with trying to have a relationship with her. She also said that appellant seemed
accountable for the role he played in his relationship with the children. Shoptaw said that
MG came to therapy on September 19, but she was late. When MG saw appellant, she went
into the restroom and did not come out until she heard the door close when appellant left.
Shoptaw stated that MG did not speak to appellant, although he spoke to her. MG told
Shoptaw that she was not interested in pursuing a relationship with appellant at that time
and that she had some unfinished business with appellant concerning a hardship license.
She said that she recommended that appellant not force the children to participate in therapy
at that time. She opined that neither family therapy nor reunification was beneficial and
that it would cause damage. She recommended that everyone be in therapy.
On cross-examination by appellant’s attorney, Shoptaw testified that children’s wishes
are important, and when children are required to invest in a relationship that they are not
ready to invest in, it becomes challenging to the parent to make decisions about what is best
for the children. She stated that she could not say if appellee undermined appellant in a way
that made the children unwilling to participate in therapy with him because appellee was not
her client or a part of this process. She said that it was her understanding that reunification
therapy was needed for appellant and MG because their relationship had “greatly
deteriorated over the last couple of years.” She also said that appellant believed appellee
played an active role in this deterioration. She stated that MG needs more individual therapy
before reunification therapy should take place. She opined that reunification therapy for
the family had failed.
5
While being cross-examined by the attorney ad litem, Shoptaw testified that it was
not in MG’s best interest to be forced into reunification with appellant at this time because
it could further damage their relationship. She said that she gave appellant a list of potential
psychiatrists MG could go to at appellant’s request.
On redirect, Shoptaw testified that relationship therapy is different from cognitive
behavioral therapy because there are different personalities involved, and sometimes the
power dynamic makes it challenging. She said that in this case, it would have been easier if
MG was communicating with appellant. Shoptaw told the circuit court that she spent about
an hour with MG on September 19.
Margaret Lindley testified that she is a licensed clinical social worker and that she
began treating MG in January 2024 after MG transitioned from a prior therapist. She stated
that she diagnosed MG with posttraumatic stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
MG’s symptoms included intense anxiety, mood instability, nightmares, difficulty sleeping,
poor grades, impulse-control issues, and hypervigilance. She stated that the divorce and
ongoing custody battle were difficult to MG. She also identified an incident that took place
between MG and appellant about two years prior when there was a physical struggle over
MG’s phone; MG described it as traumatic and stated that it worsened their relationship.
She described MG’s current relationship with appellant as estranged, unhealthy, and
dysfunctional. She stated that MG experiences intense anxiety when appellant is mentioned
or contacts her, leading MG to become guarded and emotionally dysregulated. She testified
that MG no longer stays at appellant’s house and that she avoids contact with him. She
6
stated that earlier, MG had taken on a parentalized role, acting as appellant’s confidant,
paying for meals, cleaning, and missing school due to appellant’s reliance on her. This role
reversal led to conflict and deterioration of their relationship. According to Lindley, MG
does not feel safe, secure, or understood around appellant. Lindley stated that MG has a
healthy, supportive, and secure relationship with appellee. She said that during family
sessions, communication was open and respectful. She testified that appellee appropriately
addressed MG’s negative behaviors without enabling or condoning them. She said that she
was not currently focusing on trauma therapy with MG because MG lacks the stability and
safety required. She stated that her focus has been on anxiety management, impulse control,
and decision making. She testified that MG showed improvement around late summer
2024, with —Lindley noting her first genuine smile and laugh in session. She stated that she
met with appellant twice, and that he appeared anxious and brought binders containing
notes, texts, and court documents, which Lindley thought was inappropriate. She said that
it suggested that appellant was building a case rather than focusing on therapy. She stated
that appellant was very focused on MG’s negative behaviors and on criticizing appellee rather
than addressing MG’s emotional well-being. She also stated that appellant raised ideas of
residential treatment or boot-camp programs for MG, which Lindley thought were not
appropriate given MG’s condition.
When questioned by appellant’s attorney, Lindley admitted that much of her
testimony was based on information she received from MG, the family therapist, the attorney
ad litem, appellee, and teachers. She stated that she recommended mental-health treatment
7
for appellant on the basis of her personal observations of him and how he presented, not
due to a formal diagnosis. She clarified that recommending therapy did not amount to
diagnosing a disorder. She stated her belief that everyone can benefit from counseling. She
testified that appellant brought massive amounts of printed text messages and binders into
sessions, which seemed intrusive and inappropriate in a therapeutic setting. She said that
MG admitted taking appellee’s car several times and joyriding; disclosed alcohol use, which
she stated began in her early teens; and acknowledged forging paperwork for a hardship
driver’s license because of her anger and resentment toward appellant. She testified that
there was an ongoing power struggle between MG and appellant. She stated that appellant
sometimes called the police to enforce visitation, which was not typical and indicated serious
resistance. She testified that parenting itself is not unhealthy, but the way in which appellant
parents—becoming emotionally dysregulated and labile—contributes to unhealthy
communication and attachment. She said that residential-treatment or boot-camp programs
were not appropriate for MG at this time because she was not gravely disabled or a danger
to herself or others. She testified that MG went to the hospital due to a fall, and MG told
her that appellant focused more on details than MG’s well-being. She described MG as
intelligent, curious, motivated, and a normal teenager seeking independence, though
guarded. She stated that MG’s negative behaviors were not abnormal in the context of a
high-conflict family. She testified that she had concerns with appellant’s inability to take
ownership of problems in the relationship. She noted that appellee had taken responsibility
8
for some issues. She stated that MG does not want to go to appellant’s home and that their
relationship is still strained.
Lindley told the ad litem that MG reported to her that she felt responsible for her
younger sister while at appellant’s house, including making sure that she had food and clean
clothes. MG stated that this responsibility negatively affected MG, leading to missed school,
declining grades, and reduced participation in gymnastics and social activities. MG also
worked as a coach at her gym and valued her job. Lindley stated that MG had poor grades,
but they had improved significantly in the current semester, and MG had fewer absences.
She testified that MG’s behaviors were dangerous, but they were not out of control or
abnormal compared to other teens in high-conflict families. She said that MG reported to
her that appellant drank beer to excess, especially following the divorce. Lindley testified
that MG did not need an additional psychological evaluation since her symptoms did not
warrant it. She described MG’s maturity as slightly above average given her circumstances.
MG described her relationship with appellee as good, close, and healthy, with no problems.
However, MG said appellant’s unpredictability and mood swings cause her the most
frustration, which increases her anxiety. MG told Lindley that appellant would berate her
and tell her she was bad in response to her behaviors; however, she said that appellee would
respond by grounding her, making her repay money for shopping, and having calm
conversations about the risks and dangers of her actions. Lindley testified that she did not
go through the binders and texts appellant brought with him because she did not think it
was relevant to MG’s individual therapy.
9
Lindley testified on redirect that during her meeting with appellant, she noticed that
he was paranoid, anxious, and extremely focused on appellee and that he often had to be
redirected back to MG’s needs. She stated that his bringing binders containing text messages
and notes suggested he was insecure and wished to build a case rather than engage in therapy.
She said that appellee imposed consequences for MG’s negative behavior, but that she was
unaware of any disciplinary actions appellant had taken besides refusing to sign for MG’s
hardship license. She stated that MG told her appellant berated her instead of providing
constructive discipline. She described appellant’s parenting style as ineffective. She said that
appellant recorded MG’s phone conversation about drinking without MG’s knowledge,
which she believed was intrusive and increased MG’s distrust. She also said that MG told
her about an incident in which appellant showed up angry at a homecoming party MG was
attending and that he raised his voice at her and embarrassed her. MG also said that
appellant had shown up unannounced at other events, which made MG anxious and
hypervigilant, fearing that he might show up again. Lindley stated that MG’s resistance to
appellant was deeper than a simple preference for one parent’s home. She said that MG’s
response was more physical and primal, indicating a lack of safety and healthy attachment.
Lindley testified that MG had not reported any positive feedback from appellant in the past
year. She said that MG had been able to maintain a job, have close friendships, improve her
grades, and genuinely engage in school.
Lindley testified during recross by appellant’s attorney that her focus is on the
patient’s emotional well-being and perception, even if events are disputed. She clarified that
10
while objective truth can be important, therapy often centers on how the child experiences
and interprets events. She stated that it was not the fact that appellant brought the
documents to therapy that made him seem paranoid, it was that he seemed intent on proving
himself right rather than focusing on MG’s therapeutic needs. Lindley admitted that MG
sometimes lied to appellant and turned off her phone location but emphasized that trust is
fundamental in a parent-child relationship. She agreed that MG had snuck out of appellant’s
house, but she did not recall how many times this happened. Lindley reiterated that MG’s
resistance to visitation reflected deeper emotional and relational issues, not just teenage
defiance. She stated that her understanding concerning the phone incident was that there
was a physical struggle over the phone during which MG felt physically intimidated. She
stressed that even if appellant did not intentionally hit MG, MG’s perception of intimidation
mattered therapeutically. She testified that according to her notes, MG described appellant’s
moods as labile, erratic, and anxiety provoking, which affected her sleep, behavior, and
relationships. She said she was shown a video of MG crying while appellant yelled at her
with police present and stated this was unhealthy. She said both appellant and appellee
could benefit from counseling during this conflict. She also testified that MG thought
appellant’s filing multiple motions was bullying and felt excessive, which fueled her
resentment toward appellant.
During recross by the ad litem, Lindley testified that MG’s suicidal thoughts were
vague and more about not wanting to wake up and face ongoing stress rather than an active
plan to kill herself. She said that it seemed to be a desperate attempt for help, not a concrete
11
plan. She said that she was not aware that MG had any self-harming behaviors. She clarified
that MG was not afraid of getting in trouble with her father, she was afraid of her father’s
demeanor and reactions. She denied that MG showed her any concerning text messages
between MG and appellant that MG had provided to her.
On further redirect, Lindley stated that her therapy sessions did not focus on which
parent’s version of events was factually accurate; her focus was on helping MG cope with her
experiences, regulate her emotions, and develop healthy decision-making skills. She stated
that the phone-struggle incident was significant because it marked a turning point in MG’s
relationship with appellant.
Lindley told the ad litem during further cross-examination that appellant’s actions
made it more difficult for her to help MG progress toward stability and improved mental
health. She testified further that appellant made her work more difficult because he was
focused on being right and proving entitlement rather than prioritizing what was best for
MG. As it related to MG visiting appellant and appellee’s role in MG’s decision, Lindley
stated that a parent cannot physically force a child to attend visitation, and forcing a child
to live in a home where the child feels unsafe is not healthy. She said MG should be entitled
to some agency over where she lives and with whom she feels safe. She testified that MG’s
core problem was her lack of emotional safety and trust with appellant, which could lead to
long-term attachment issues if not addressed.
Jenny Childress testified that she provides coparenting counseling for high-conflict
divorce couples and that she saw appellant and appellee in that capacity as required by their
12
divorce decree. She stated that she met with each party individually twice before having a
joint session in October or November 2022. She stated that the primary issue both parties
brought to her was communication, which she described as poor. She held only one joint
session because, by the end of it, she determined that continuing joint work was not
therapeutically appropriate. She stated that she asked both parties to bring a list of issues
they wished to address; however, only appellee brought a list. Her issues were discussed, but
they were not resolved. She stated that the session was dominated by appellant’s focus on
appellee’s leaving him and his belief that he did not have the same earning potential. She
said that appellee brought a calendar to work through possible adjustments, but that
appellant’s only response was that he would have to get it to his attorney. She testified that
no progress was made on scheduling or any other topic. She stated that she felt like a
“referee” because appellant was extremely angry—his focus was on the divorce and financial
issues, particularly his belief that he lacked the earning power of appellee. The session ended
abruptly when appellant became enraged. He gathered his things, stood up, and screamed
in appellee’s face. Childress stated that appellant got close enough to appellee that she feared
for appellee’s safety. She described the interaction as hostile and stated that she stood up in
case she needed to intervene. She testified that such safety concerns are rare in her twelve
years of practice. This was when she determined that it was not appropriate to continue joint
sessions. She stated she already had concerns about the parties’ ability to coparent in light
of her individual meetings with them; in the joint meeting, they were unable to really discuss
any coparenting issues. She described appellant as distraught, angry, and obsessively anxious
13
about the divorce and finances in the individual sessions; however, she did not have similar
mental-health concerns about appellee. Childress testified that appellant believes appellee
does what she wants to do and that the children listen to her, but he did not identify any
concerns about his own parenting ability. She opined that coparenting was not appropriate
for the parties and that parallel parenting—using structured communication apps like
OurFamilyWizard—would be more suitable. She stated that she would have to think
carefully before agreeing to work with them again.
On cross-examination, Childress testified that she could not remember whether there
were two joint sessions with the parties. She stated that during the joint session she
remembers, appellant mentioned appellee owed him a large sum of money, while appellee
alleged that appellant owed her money for expenses like gymnastics, braces, or medical bills.
She said that while the parties discussed their financial disputes, they did not reach parenting
issues. She denied that she recorded the joint session and said that she would be surprised
if a video of appellant’s behavior during the joint session surfaced.
Appellee testified that she and appellant were divorced by decree on August 12, 2022.
She said they agreed to joint custody of their three children. She stated that the decree
ordered appellant to cover the children’s health insurance, but she pays for it herself. She
said that the decree also required equal division of medical, dental, orthodontic, counseling,
and extracurricular expenses; however, she said that appellant had not paid any of his share
of the costs even though she documented them in OurFamilyWizard. She also said that the
decree ordered appellant to satisfy certain obligations, and he had failed to comply. She
14
asked the circuit court to order appellant to pay his share of the children’s expenses and to
hold him in contempt for failing to comply with his other obligations. On cross-examination
by appellant’s attorney, appellee stated that she had made her payments as ordered in the
divorce decree.
Kennth Joe Heard was called by appellant and testified that he was appointed by court
order to provide solution-focused family counseling for the parties. He began counseling in
December 2023, and it included individual sessions, joint sessions, and sessions with the
children. He stated that there were thirty-six sessions over a five-month period. His goal was
to improve coparenting, support reunification between appellant and MG, and provide
guidance on appropriate parenting practices. One significant issue was whether MG could
obtain a hardship driver’s license. Appellee supported it, but appellant opposed it after MG
took appellee’s car without permission and went on a joyride. MG later falsified paperwork
to obtain the license by signing appellant’s name, which escalated tensions between appellant
and MG. Appellant also complained that appellee withheld information about the
children’s activities and appointment. Appellee complained about appellant’s anger and
yelling. Heard stated that by May 2024, things fell apart between appellant and MG because
MG became increasingly resistant to seeing appellant. MG sent text messages threatening to
harm herself if she were forced to visit him, which undermined therapy. MG also accused
Heard of taking money from appellant to be on his side. Heard said that appellee requested
a neutral therapist, indicating that she did not believe he was neutral. He stated that he
withdrew because he felt as though trust had been broken, making continuation unethical.
15
He testified that both parents disapproved of MG’s behavior (alcohol use, joyriding, and
unauthorized credit-card use).
On cross-examination by appellee’s attorney, Heard testified that he discharged the
family a day after MG sent him the text message. He admitted that while he was providing
services to the family, he recommended that MG not stay with appellant on a weekly basis
because she complained of sleep problems while at appellant’s. He acknowledged that MG’s
grades were suffering when he started seeing the family. He stated that between January and
May 2024, MG was seeing appellant only on the weekends. He said that the problems
between MG and appellant started with the hardship-license dispute. He stated that by the
time of his May 9 report, all three children were estranged from appellant due to his anger
and communication issues. He agreed that MG and appellant have a very estranged
relationship. He agreed that his attempts to reunify the family were unsuccessful. He said
that MG continued to experience significant distress around appellant throughout
treatment, which became worse over time. He stated that both parents participated
appropriately during the sessions and that both shared concerns about MG’s behavior. He
said that appellee did not condone or encourage MG’s behavior.
On cross-examination by the ad litem, Heard stated that appellant and appellee have
different parenting styles: appellee has a gentle, loving approach while appellant is a little
stricter than appellee. He said that MG felt like appellant got angry easily and would yell at
her. He described the family as a high-conflict family. He stated that he did not feel that
16
coparenting should stop, but he felt that it had become ineffective. He testified that the
parents should stop arguing and start problem solving.
On redirect, Heard stated that MG is smart enough to manipulate this situation the
way she wants it to go. He said that appellant had an issue with MG’s sneaking out when
she was at his house and his not knowing where she was.
On recross by appellee’s attorney, Heard said that no one expressed any concern to
him that appellee was trying to take appellant’s parenting time away. He agreed that MG’s
relationship with her father was further affected after she read online filings about her and
appellee.
Appellee testified that appellant last had visitation with MG in July 2024. She denied
failing to coparent or deliberately preventing visitations, stating she has encouraged MG to
spend time with appellant, but MG refused. She explained that MG checks with her before
making decisions and that she provides MG with money and a phone but does not restrict
them. She stated that MG admitted she drank alcohol during appellant’s custodial time in
April and that he recorded her admission but did not discipline MG. She said that she later
grounded MG, had stern conversations with her, and worked with MG’s therapist on truth
telling. She admitted that she initially believed MG’s denial before learning the truth. She
acknowledged that MG had taken her vehicle about three times but said that it had not
happened in over a year. She also admitted that MG had sneaked out of appellant’s house
to attend parties. She stated that appellant often demanded visitation without regard for
MG’s schedule and that she told him to coordinate visits directly with MG because of MG’s
17
job and activities. She said that she always knows where MG is because she communicates
with MG, but she admitted that appellant complained about not knowing MG’s location.
She denied pitting MG against appellant and said that MG trusts her because she does not
use fear-based parenting. She testified that at a Catholic High School event, appellant
approached her aggressively, spilled wine on her, and grabbed her arm. A shoving match
ensued between appellant and appellee’s now husband, Byron Wilkes, and appellant fell
backward onto a table. She was shown a video of the event and stated that appellant was the
aggressor. She said that she discussed the incident with the children to reassure them but
denied disparaging appellant. Appellee was presented with text messages between her and
the parties’ son, MB, wherein she told him to delete the messages. She said that she told
him to delete the messages because she wanted to avoid further litigation. The message
concerned a golf camp MB wanted to attend, which appellant refused to allow. In the
message, she told MB to stand up for himself.
When questioned by her attorney on cross-examination, appellee stated that, lately,
appellant has not picked MG up from school for visitation as required by the divorce decree.
She said that she has never kept MG away from appellant and that she has encouraged MG
to visit appellant. She acknowledged that in January 2024, Heard recommended changing
MG’s schedule to every other weekend with appellant. She said that later, the attorney ad
litem recommended that MG stay with appellee due to tension with appellant and the
burden on her gymnastics coach. She stated that she followed this recommendation and
informed appellant. Appellee testified that she tried extensively to arrange family therapy
18
for appellant and MG after the sessions with Heard ended in May, but she was unsuccessful.
She said that she finally reached out to Shoptaw and then asked appellant to follow up, but
he did not do so until August. She stated that appellant and MG’s relationship deteriorated
further between June and August. She admitted that she does not punish MG for refusing
visitation with appellant because she believes that would be fear-based parenting. She said
that MG was following professional recommendations, so punishing her for that would be
inappropriate. However, she said that she does discipline MG for other behaviors. She
stated that her communication with appellant is very nonproductive. She introduced text
messages wherein appellant was cursing her. She said that this type of communication has
been frequent and has hindered their ability to coparent. She testified that she moved to
reopen the case because appellant did not pay his court-ordered obligations and refused to
discuss his financial obligations during coparenting sessions; she was concerned about his
physical aggression toward her (shoving, spraying her with a hose, and throwing her out of
the garage); she also had concerns about his anger, yelling, blaming, and shaming behaviors
toward the children. She asked the circuit court to end the litigation, focus on the children’s
emotional well-being, and allow therapeutic efforts to rebuild relationship.
When questioned by the ad litem, appellee testified that she has called the police at
least once on appellant, but most of the time, appellant calls the police when the children
refuse visitation. She stated that appellant records the children without their knowledge,
which she believes is unhealthy, is an invasion of privacy, and creates mistrust.
19
On redirect, appellee stated that MG was prescribed psychiatric medication while
previously under the care of Dr. Aldea. She admitted that she told MG to stop taking the
medication temporarily because MG said it was making her sick. She said that even though
she disagreed that MG should take the medication, she did not disagree with the diagnosis.
She testified that MG had expressed suicidal thoughts in November 2023 in an attempt to
avoid going to appellant’s house. She was presented with a May 4, 2024 message wherein
MG stated, “Call the mental health hospital and come get me. I want to go there. I’m at my
breaking point.” She acknowledged the message. When asked about a message she sent
appellant telling him that she was “not obligated to have [the children] ready for [him] at a
certain time and location,” she explained that she sent it because appellant gave her only
fifteen minutes’ notice before arriving and without checking to ensure that the children were
home. She stated that the decree provides that appellant is to pick the children up from
school or activities, not from her house.
Appellant testified that he last exercised visitation with MG on July 8. He said that
since then, he has seen her only at two or three medical appointments. He stated that
appellee makes it difficult for him to exercise his visitation by not answering his texts, not
telling him where MG is, not telling him where to pick up MG, and helping MG avoid
visitation. He said that they were court ordered to use their best efforts to ensure that MG
is sharing her location via her cell phone; however, he stated that MG’s location is usually
turned off. He said that on one occasion, MG’s location showed that she was home, but she
was at a football game. He testified that MG lies, sneaks out, uses alcohol, spends time alone
20
with boys, and participates in other risky behavior. He said that he is especially concerned
about MG’s mental health and medical care, including medication management. He had a
problem with appellee modifying MG’s psychiatric medication without proper medical
authority. He admitted that he showed up at a homecoming party during his custodial
period late one night but denied that he did anything inappropriate—he just wanted to
enforce MG’s curfew. He said the delay in appellee’s paying him as ordered by the divorce
decree affected his ability to pay expenses for the children. He admitted that he suffers from
depression and ADHD for which he takes Lexapro. He stated that he has been under
mental-health care for about twenty years. He denied that his mental-health issues impair
his parenting ability. He asked that he be granted final say in parenting decision, especially
medical decisions. He acknowledged the incident with him and MG concerning her phone.
He said he grabbed her phone, which caused it to hit MG’s mouth. He stated that he did
not physically harm MG and that MG hit herself in the mouth. He testified that this was
the triggering event that escalated litigation. He asked the circuit court to order reunification
therapy that does not allow MG to control participation. He expressed concerns that her
therapist’s approach undermines progress.
On cross-examination by appellee’s attorney, appellant stated that in addition to the
listed diagnosis, he also has anxiety and sleep apnea and is prescribed Lexapro, Adderall,
Ambien, lorazepam (taken as needed), and blood-pressure medications. He last saw his
psychiatrist on September 18. He admitted that he was not in therapy at the time of his
deposition in August because he had had his last therapy session in April 2023. However,
21
he stated that he began therapy in August 2024. He said that his past therapy sessions dealt
with anger, obsessive thoughts, and disproportionate reactions to triggering events. He
admitted that he had not paid his court-ordered expenses and that he owes about $20,000.
He also acknowledged other court orders he had not followed. He admitted that he sprayed
appellee with a hose during an altercation. He testified that Heard recommended a
graduated visitation schedule for MG in early 2024, starting with weekends and gradually
increasing. He also agreed that the ad litem recommended that MG not be forced to stay at
his house due to stress and self-harm concerns. He said that MG asked him to agree to the
recommendation. He stated that appellee attempted at least once to facilitate visitation by
dropping MG off but that MG immediately left. He testified that his relationship with all
three children is strained. He admitted that he has yelled at appellee in front of the children,
they have seen him physically push appellee, and he has spoken negatively to them about
appellee and Wilkes. He was asked about texts from MG in which she indicated she did not
want to have anything to do with him and was stressed and anxious about coming to his
house, among other things. He testified that all his children have expressed concerns about
his behavior. He admitted that it was hard for him to discipline the children and that he
had asked appellee to discipline MG. When asked why he had not disciplined MG when
she took appellee’s car, he responded that he did not have access to her and did not see MG
for ninety-nine days.
During cross-examination by the ad litem, appellant acknowledged that during his
deposition, he stated that he sometimes had one or two glasses of wine or beer in the evening.
22
He confirmed diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder, ADHD, and major depressive
disorder (recurrent severe). He was advised at his September 18 visit to refrain from alcohol
and illicit nonprescription drug use and to take his medication as directed. He stated that
the doctor told him alcohol was not contraindicated with his medications. He said that he
had had about two or three glasses of wine before the incident at Catholic High. He stated
that he rarely yells at his children but has a loud voice that may be perceived as yelling. He
said that he had discussed finances with his children twice since the divorce. He admitted
saying negative things about appellee and Wilkes to the children but claimed that it was selfdefense. He denied shoving appellee during a garage incident; rather, he was just trying to
block her entry and close the garage door because she had kicked him while trying to push
her way past him. He said that he has tried to fix his relationship with MG by seeing
therapists, lowering his voice, and working with Heard. He admitted that his individual
counseling since the divorce has been spotty, although he has made efforts to find providers.
He denied pushing or bumping Wilkes at the Catholic High event.
Casey Moore testified that she is acquainted with MG and that MG has left
appellant’s home during visitation and stayed the night at her home. Moore told the
attorney ad litem that she was attending an event at Catholic High and witnessed appellant
harassing appellee.
MG testified that she was currently in the tenth grade. She stated that she did not
believe she and appellant have “the best of a relationship.” She said that she thought
appellant has a lot of built-up anger that he would take out on her, which made it difficult
23
for her to be around him because she became anxious and afraid. However, she stated that
she loves appellant. She said that a lot of appellant’s anger was because of appellee. She
testified that appellant told her that he thought appellee was a horrible, selfish, and selfabsorbed person and that he did not want MG to end up like her. She said that she thought
appellant hates appellee because of how angry he becomes when he speaks about her. She
stated that appellant would tell her he was “broke” and would sometimes send her screen
shots of his bank account. She testified that appellant blamed appellee for his financial
situation because he had to move to Michigan for a while. She said that appellee generally
punished her by grounding her for at least a month when she does things she is not supposed
to do. She stated that grounding includes not being allowed to go out and having very
limited and monitored screen time on her phone. She said that she did not get any real
punishment at appellant’s house. She testified that her grades are better this semester
because she has not really been stressed out, anxious, or sad. She described her mood as
“lighter” and said that she feels more motivated. She credited her change this semester with
removing appellant from her life. She said that when she was visiting appellant, he would
scream or yell at her at least once a day. She stated that she did not want to go to counseling
with appellant right now; however, she said there is a chance she will want to go in the future.
She testified that she had spent the last three years afraid, sad, and anxious and that she just
needed a break. She stated that she wanted to live with appellee and that she was not open
to visitation with appellant right now because she did not think he was getting any better,
and she is uncomfortable around him.
24
On cross-examination by appellant’s attorney, MG admitted stealing appellee’s car
three times and picking up four other kids on one occasion. She also admitted that she
forged appellant’s signature on a hardship application because she “really need[ed] it.” MG
agreed that she took appellant’s credit card and charged $1,200 at Lululemon. She said that
she turns off her location because she is afraid that appellant will show up where she is. She
stated she left her phone at home when she went to a homecoming party, she did not turn
off her location. She also acknowledged that she was at a party late one night, and appellant
showed up, which upset her. MG admitted drinking alcohol. She also admitted leaving
appellant’s house without his knowledge and going to stay at Moore’s house. She testified
that she had a get together with ten to fifteen people at appellee’s house when appellee was
out of town. She denied that appellee allows her to stay home without adult supervision
when appellee is out of town. MG admitted that she has threatened to hurt herself and had
to go to the emergency room in relation to that. However, she stated that it has been a year
since she threatened to harm herself. She stated that she was overwhelmed and preferred
the emergency room over going to appellant’s home. She testified that the last time appellee
took her phone away from her was a year ago.
On redirect, MG stated that appellant has allowed her to make purchases on his credit
card. She said that she did not turn her location off because she thought she was going to
get in trouble with appellant but that she turned it off because she did not want him to show
up and ruin her fun by yelling at her in front of her friends as he has done in the past. She
25
said there was an incident at home where appellant showed up and called the police while
her friends were over and that it got around school that her “dad is . . . crazy.”
The circuit court entered an order on December 26 granting appellee primary
physical and legal custody of MG. The order stated in pertinent part:
5. The Court finds there is a material change in circumstances warranting a
custody modification due to the parties’ complete inability to co-parent with one
another and the deterioration of [appellant’s] relationship with [MG]. Further
[appellant] did not enforce the remedies made available at his request. The Court
cannot allow [MG} to dictate the parties’ custodial arrangement and custody. The
Court also agrees that requiring law enforcement, intensive treatment, or physical
intervention to enforce custodial arrangement will likely do more harm than good
and would not be in [MG’s] best interest.
6. Due to the breakdown in the relationship between [MG and appellant],
[appellee] will have primary physical and legal custody of [MG] subject to [appellant’s]
reasonable visitation. . . . This arrangement shall begin at the recommendation of the
reunification therapist.
The order also found the parties in contempt. Appellee was found in contempt for failing
to discuss medical treatment with appellant, failing to make sufficient efforts to abide by the
custodial schedule with the children, and not making sufficient efforts to ensure that
appellant had access to the children’s location. However, the circuit court recognized that
appellee might not be comfortable or even unable to physically force a teenaged child to
comply with a custodial arrangement. The circuit court noted that there were no
consequences for MG’s outright refusal to comply with the custodial arrangement or
direction from appellant. It found that appellee had been indifferent to finding a solution
to ensure appellant had his custodial time. It did not, however, find that appellee was in
contempt for her alleged disparagement of appellant to the children. The circuit court found
26
that appellant was in contempt for instigating hostility in front of the children; for discussing
the matter and pending litigation with the children; and for not making a good-faith effort
to coparent in that he unilaterally terminated counseling between him and appellee and
harassed appellee during her custodial time.
Appellant timely appealed. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in modifying
custody because appellee failed to prove a material change in circumstances. In reviewing
child-custody cases, we consider the evidence de novo but will not reverse a circuit court’s
findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence.6 We give due deference to the superior position of the circuit court to view and
judge the credibility of the witnesses.7 This deference is even greater in cases involving child
custody since a heavier burden is placed on the circuit court to fully utilize its powers of
perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. 8
In order to modify a custody decree, the circuit court must apply a two-step process:
first, the court must determine whether a material change in circumstances has occurred
since the divorce decree was entered; second, if the court finds that there has been a material
change in circumstances, the court must determine whether a change of custody is in the
child’s best interest.9 Generally, courts impose more stringent standards for custody
6
Hewett v. Hewett, 2018 Ark. App. 235, 547 S.W.3d 138.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Shell v. Twitty, 2020 Ark. App. 459, 608 S.W.3d 926.
27
modifications than they do for initial custody determinations.10 The party seeking
modification has the burden of showing a material change in circumstances. 11 However, we
have held that the combined, cumulative effect of particular facts may together constitute a
material change.12
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in modifying custody because there was
no significant evidence to support the modification. He cites Vereen v. Vereen,13 to support
his argument that if there was a material change in circumstances, it was appellee’s actions,
not his, that led to it. In Vereen, this court held that the mother’s refusal to appear for
visitation amounted to a material change in circumstances. The court also credited the
therapist’s testimony that she had no concerns with the children spending time with their
father. However, the facts in this case are distinguishable. Although the circuit court found
appellee in contempt for her indifference to appellant’s being able to have visitation with the
children, it did not say she had refused appellant visitation with MG. In fact, there was no
allegation that appellee, like the mother in Vereen, refused to open the door when appellant
showed up for visitation or that she refused to appear for the exchange. Per the divorce
order, appellant was to pick up the children for his visitation, and there is nothing to suggest
10
Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005).
11
Id.
12
Shannon v. McJunkins, 2010 Ark. App. 440, 376 S.W.3d 489.
13
2023 Ark. App. 317, 669 S.W.3d 903.
28
that appellee prevented him from doing so. Additionally, appellee dropped MG off at
appellant’s home at least once, and MG ran to Moore’s house. The children in Vereen
suffered from anxiety, just as MG did. However, there was no evidence that they threatened
self-harm if forced to visit their father, which is what MG did. In Vereen, the therapist stated
that she did not have any concerns with the father parenting and spending time with the
children. Here, the evidence shows that Heard suggested in January 2024 that MG’s time
with appellant be reduced to every other weekend, and appellant agreed to that change. Also,
the ad litem suggested that MG not be forced to stay at appellant’s house, and MG asked
appellant to agree to that change. Although he did not say he agreed, he did nothing to
show his disagreement. Additionally, the evidence shows that there was a complete
breakdown in appellant’s and MG’s relationship following the phone incident. There was
no evidence in Vereen that such a breakdown existed. In Vereen, the mother was the problem;
in this case, the breakdown of appellant and MG’s relationship is the main problem.
The circuit court did not err in finding that a material change in circumstances had
occurred such that modification was necessary. The parents were unable to coparent when
it came to MG. MG refused to be around appellant and even threatened to harm herself if
she was made to do so. After she started spending less time with appellant, MG’s grades
improved, her anxiety lessened, and she seemed happier. In light of the evidence, we affirm
the modification and hold that it was in MG’s best interest.
Appellant also seems to argue that he should have been granted custody of MG. We
disagree. There is nothing to suggest that being in appellant’s primary custody would be in
29
MG’s best interest. As the evidence shows, things improved in her life when she spent less
time with appellant.
To the extent that appellant asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor, we will not
do so. It is well settled that we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal.14
Affirmed.
HARRISON and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Ingle Law Firm, by: Matthew R. Ingle, for appellant.
Mann & Kemp, PLLC, by: Angela Mann, for appellee.
14
Cline v. Simpson, 2024 Ark. App. 611, 703 S.W.3d 497.
30