IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-545
Filed 16 September 2026
Wilson County, No. 23CR372688-970
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
KENDRAE RAYQUAN PARKER
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 November 2024 by Judge L.
Lamont Wiggins in Wilson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30
October 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel K.
Covas, for the State.
Mary McCullers Reece, for defendant.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him
guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, defendant argues the trial
court erred in denying defendant’s request to represent himself due to the trial court’s
mistaken belief that it lacked discretion to make that decision. Defendant petitioned
for writ of certiorari to appeal the trial court’s civil judgment for attorney’s fees. After
careful review, we deny defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and conclude that
defendant received a fair trial free from error.
STATE V. PARKER
Opinion of the Court
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 30 July 2023, Wilson County 911 emergency communications received a
call, which reported the following: “Two male subjects walked up to his house with a
rifle, left in a gold Infinity headed towards Landfill Road.” The responding officer
(the Corporal) saw a gold Infiniti SUV and initiated a traffic stop. The Corporal ran
the vehicle’s plate numbers and reported that the vehicle was registered to defendant,
though defendant was a back-seat passenger.
A second officer reported to the traffic stop (the Sergeant) and approached the
vehicle. He asked for consent to search the vehicle and asked whether firearms or
other weapons were present inside the vehicle. After the driver admitted that there
was a firearm in the vehicle, the officers removed the occupants and conducted a
search. The vehicle search returned a shotgun found in the “rear cargo area just
behind the back seat of the vehicle” covered by “a blanket or towel.”
On 11 March 2024, defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Defendant’s jury trial commenced on 18 November 2024. At the
conclusion of the State’s direct examination of its third witness, defendant asked the
court to speak on his own behalf. The trial court excused the jury and instructed
defendant to speak with his counsel first. Following a private conversation with
defendant, defendant’s counsel notified the trial court of defendant’s wish for counsel
to withdraw. The trial court stated, “Okay. And I’ll hear you further now, Mr. Parker,
as to the basis for asking your Counsel to withdraw at this time.”
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant responded that his counsel had twice failed to ask the witnesses
certain questions in the manner that defendant wished. Defendant further stated, “I
don’t feel comfortable continuing to trial with him. I’d rather do it myself.” Then the
following colloquy transpired:
THE COURT: All right. And at this stage of the
proceedings, Mr. Parker, you don’t have that option. Once
you begin the trial with a lawyer, you have to continue the
trial with your lawyer.
THE DEFENDANT: I can’t.
THE COURT: You cannot, not at this stage, you don’t get
it both ways. It doesn’t work like that; okay? You do not get
it both ways. Now what I have done is I’ve let you express
yourself and all of this is on the record. If there’s anything
as to in particular that you want to express or put on the
record, I’m going to let you do that, but you don’t get it both
ways. You can’t start with a lawyer and then by virtue of
happenstance or whatever the issue may be decide that you
cannot or do not want to continue with the lawyer; all right.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Now I will . . . give you and [your lawyer]
five minutes outside of the courtroom, if you all want to
talk about some things and the direction of what and where
it should go, I will let you do that. We'll be at ease for five
minutes. You can discuss those questions in that direction
but you don't get it both ways. You will continue with
Counsel.
THE DEFENDANT: But it will be on the record that I feelTHE COURT: This whole discourse is on the record right
now; okay, and your objection is on the record and my
ruling is on the record; okay?
After the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a
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Opinion of the Court
felon. Defendant was sentenced in the presumptive range of 19 to 32 months in
prison. The trial court ordered that defendant be admitted to the Advanced
Supervised Released Program and permitted defendant to be released at the
expiration of the 11-month term pending successful completion of the risk reduction
sentence. The trial court additionally ordered that counsel fees be paid as a civil
judgment.
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal on the record in open court following the
trial court’s order of counsel fees as a civil judgment. Defendant never made a written
notice of appeal regarding the civil judgment for attorney’s fees. On 13 June 2025,
defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment of a
superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-1444(a) (2025).
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over defendant’s self-representation claim.
Further, defendant petitions for a writ of certiorari for review of the trial
court’s civil judgment for attorney’s fees because defendant failed to enter written
notice of appeal, as required by N.C. R. App. P. 3(a) for civil judgments. “A writ of
certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances . . . to permit review of the
judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has
been lost by failure to take timely action.” N.C. R. App. P.21(a)(1). A “writ of
certiorari ‘is not intended as a substitute for a notice of appeal.’ ” Cryan v. Nat’l
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Opinion of the Court
Council of YMCA of the United States, 384 N.C. 569, 573 (2023). Instead, certiorari
should only issue if the petition shows: (1) “merit or that error was probably
committed below,” and (2) “extraordinary circumstances to justify it.” Id. at 572
(cleaned up).
III. Standard of Review
We review “allegations that a trial court has failed to recognize its discretion
to act” de novo. State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522, 535 (2011).
IV. Discussion
A. Self-Representation
First, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to
represent himself because it refused to exercise its discretion under the mistaken
belief it had no discretion to allow defendant to represent himself.
Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; State v. Gerald, 304 N.C. 511, 516 (1981) (citing
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). This right implicitly includes a criminal
defendant’s “right to handle his own case without interference by, or the assistance
of, counsel forced upon him against his wishes.” State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 670−71
(1972); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (“[A] defendant has a
constitutionally protected right to represent himself in a criminal trial.”). However,
“the right to self-representation can be waived by failure timely to assert it, or by
subsequent conduct giving the appearance of uncertainty.” State v. Walters, 182 N.C.
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Opinion of the Court
App. 285, 292 (2007) (quoting United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 (4th Cir.
1985)).
[I]f a defendant proceeds to trial with counsel and asserts
his right to self-representation only after trial has begun,
that right may have been waived, and its exercise may be
denied, limited, or conditioned. Accordingly, after trial has
begun with counsel, the decision whether to allow the
defendant to proceed pro se rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court.
Id. at 292. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion to deny the defendant’s request to
proceed without counsel after the trial has begun. See United States v. Singleton, 107
F.3d 1091, 1097 (4th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, “[w]hen a trial court fails to exercise
its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question
presented, there is error.” State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 591 (1992).
Where a defendant contends the trial court failed to exercise its discretion
under the mistaken belief it did not have discretion, we must ask whether it is clear
from the record, viewed as a whole, “that the trial court was aware of its authority to
exercise its discretion.” State v. Vann, 386 N.C. 244, 252 (2024).
“Review of the entire record is vital, as it would be difficult for an appellate
court to properly determine whether discretion was used on the basis of one word or
sentence in a transcript.” Id. The trial court’s actions, as well as the context behind
the trial court’s words, should be considered. See State v. Long, 196 N.C. App. 22, 28
(2009) (explaining that whether the trial court exercised its discretion in permitting
or denying a jury’s request turns upon the “context of the jury’s request and the
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Opinion of the Court
specific language used by the trial court.”); State v. Lewis, 321 N.C. 42, 51 (1987)
(explaining that a trial court granting the jury’s request to examine photographs and
exhibits, but denying the jury’s request to review a transcript, indicates that the trial
court used its discretion).
We “presume[ ] that a trial court acted correctly until ‘statements of the trial
court show that the trial court did not exercise discretion.’ ” Vann, 386 N.C. at 253
(quoting State v. Starr, 365 N.C. 314, 318 (2011)). “[A]mbiguous statements capable
of multiple interpretations,” are insufficient to overcome the presumption that the
trial court properly exercised its discretion. Id. (quoting State v. Pickens, 385 N.C.
351, 364 (2023)). Instead, the defendant must produce affirmative evidence showing
the trial court failed to exercise its discretion. Id. at 254 (quoting LePage v. People,
2014 CO 13, 320 P.3d 348, 354 (Colo. 2014)).
Such affirmative evidence is shown when a court disclaims its authority or
ability to rule on a particular issue. For example, our appellate courts have held the
following statements suggested the trial court mistakenly believed it did not have
discretion: “[w]e don’t have that capability,” State v. Starr, 365 N.C. 314, 318 (2011),
“we really can’t help you with that particular matter,” State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 28, 30
(1979), “the [c]ourt doesn’t have the ability,” State v. Barrow, 350 N.C. 640, 647
(1999), and “[w]e can’t do that,” State v. Hatfield, 225 N.C. App 765, 771 (2013). In
such statements, the trial court affirmatively disclaimed its authority to act.
Here, defendant contends certain statements made by the trial court indicate
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Opinion of the Court
the trial court believed it lacked discretion to grant defendant’s request to represent
himself mid-trial. Those statements include: (1) “at this stage of the proceedings . . .
you don’t have that option”; (2) “Once you begin the trial with a lawyer, you have to
continue the trial with your lawyer”; (3) “You cannot, not at this stage, you don’t get
it both ways. It doesn’t work like that”; and (4) “You can’t start with a lawyer and
then by virtue of happenstance or whatever the issue may be decide that you cannot
or do not want to continue with the lawyer.” These statements are unlike the trial
court’s statements in Starr, Ford, Barrow, and Hatfield, where the trial court
indicated that the trial court could not do something. Instead, the trial court’s
statements at bar demonstrate defendant could not do something. Stating a
defendant cannot do something is materially different than stating a court cannot do
something, as the latter would question the court’s authority and power.
When looking at the record as a whole and the context behind the trial court’s
statements and actions, no affirmative evidence shows the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that the trial court acted properly. When defendant requested to speak
to the court, the trial court dismissed the jury and told defendant to speak with his
counsel. Defendant’s counsel notified the trial court that defendant wished to
represent himself for the rest of the trial. The trial court allowed defendant to argue
his basis for asking his counsel to withdraw. The trial court allowing defendant to
argue his basis for the request indicates that the trial court was aware of its
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Opinion of the Court
discretion. The trial court would have no need to hear defendant’s argument if the
trial court had the mistaken presumption that it did not have discretion.
The trial court then denied defendant’s request after fully hearing defendant’s
reasons for his request. In denying defendant’s request, the trial court used phrases
that indicated the trial court was using its discretion. For example, the trial court
stated, “You will continue with Counsel,” “my ruling is on the record,” and “I’ve let
you express yourself.” These statements indicate the trial court was aware of its
discretion. At best, defendant has shown an ambiguity which will not overcome the
presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. See Vann, 386 N.C.
at 253. Thus, we must presume the trial court exercised its discretion.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
request to represent himself.
B. Civil Judgment on Attorney’s Fees
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred by entering a civil judgment
against defendant for court-appointed attorney’s fees and expenses where defendant
was not provided adequate prior notice. While the civil judgment for attorney’s fees
is not included in the record on appeal, a civil judgment was docketed per notation
and docket number on the criminal judgment. The record shows defendant was
present when the trial court imposed the fees, discussed the amount with his
attorney, and entered the judgement in open court. Defendant had previously spoken
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Opinion of the Court
to the court during the trial, showing he understood he could address the judge when
needed.
Because defendant failed to enter a written notice of appeal as required by N.C.
R. App. P. 3(a) for civil judgments, defendant petitions for a writ of certiorari for
review of the trial court’s civil judgment for attorney’s fees. Our Supreme Court
recently handed down guidance regarding this Court’s issuance of the writ of
certiorari in State v. Martinez, __ N.C. __, __ S.E.2d __ (No. 101PA25, 14 August
2026). The standard we employ is forth in Cryan v. Nat’l Counsel of YMCAs:
certiorari should only issue if the petition shows: (1) “merit or that error was probably
committed below,” and (2) “extraordinary circumstances to justify it.” 384 N.C. at
572.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate “substantial harm, considerable waste of
judicial resources, or wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake.” Id. In the
exercise of our discretion, we deny the petition for issuance of the writ of certiorari.
V. Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to
represent himself. In the exercise of our discretions, we deny defendant’s petition for
writ of certiorari.
NO ERROR.
Judges TYSON and WOOD concur.
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