In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00107-CV
WILLIAMSON MUSIC 1ST, LLC, AND RAYMOND GORE, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellants
V.
EQYINVEST OWNER II, LTD, LLP, Appellee
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 342-346924-23
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a bench trial on the amount of damages due to a landlord of a
commercial-leased premises after the tenant stopped paying rent and was subsequently locked
out. Appellants, Williamson Music 1st, L.L.C. as tenant and Raymond Gore as tenant’s
guarantor (collectively, Williamson), appeal the trial court’s judgment. Appellants contend in
two issues that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to support the (1) damages awarded
for breach of the lease, specifically due to the landlord’s failure to mitigate damages; and
(2) award of attorney’s fees.1 We find legally sufficient evidence to support damages for breach
of the lease. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in
part.
I. Background
Williamson Music signed a shopping center lease agreement (Lease) with Appellee,
EQYInvest Owner II, Ltd., LLP, as landlord. Gore signed the Lease as a guarantor. The Lease
term began in April 2022, was to continue for approximately three years, and would have
expired on July 31, 2025. Rent was $5,857.33 per month, which on an annual basis is
$70,288.00 per year.
Williamson ceased paying rent in August 2023, and EQY locked Williamson out of the
premises on August 18, 2023.
1
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
EQY later sued Williamson for breach of the Lease and the guaranty. After a bench trial,
the trial court entered judgment for EQY and awarded it breach of contract damages, including
past-due rent in the amount of $170,484.37, attorney’s fees in the amount of $86,725.00,
additional fees on appeal, court costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest on those amounts.
II. Legal-Sufficiency Standard of Review
In both its issues, Williamson challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s judgment. “When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
‘whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the
verdict under review.’” 425 Soledad, Ltd. v. CRVI Riverwalk Hosp., LLC, 709 S.W.3d 551, 561
(Tex. 2024) (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). “We credit
favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not.” Id. (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827); see Upshaw v.
Lacado, LLC, 650 S.W.3d 61, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied).
[W]hen reviewing a legal-sufficiency challenge . . . , we view all evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and we overturn such a judgment only if there
is a complete absence of evidence proving a vital fact, the rules of law or evidence
bar the court from weighing the only evidence proving a vital fact, the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or the evidence
conclusively disproves the existence of a vital fact.
Westwood Motorcars, LLC v. Virtuolotry, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 879, 885–86 (Tex. 2024) (citing
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 810); see Upshaw, 650 S.W.3d at 73–74. “But no matter what
evidence is or is not considered, our ultimate test is ‘whether the evidence at trial would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.’” Upshaw, 650 S.W.3d at
74 (quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827).
3
Since this was a bench trial, we add: “A trial court’s findings of fact issued after a bench
trial have the same weight, and are judged by the same appellate standards, as a jury verdict.”
Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. 2019) (citing Anderson v. City
of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)). “When neither party requests findings of
fact and conclusions of law following a nonjury trial, all fact findings necessary to support the
trial court’s judgment are implied.” Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex.
2017).
III. Damages for Breach of the Lease and Mitigation
In its first issue, Williamson claims the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
trial court’s damages award for breach of the Lease. Williamson asserts that it presented
evidence that EQY failed to mitigate damages, and that EQY failed to rebut this evidence.
A. Applicable Law
The Texas Supreme Court stated,
A landlord should not be allowed to collect rent from an abandoning tenant when
the landlord can, by reasonable efforts, relet the premises and avoid incurring
some damages. We therefore recognize that a landlord has a duty to make
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages when the tenant breaches the lease and
abandons the property, unless the commercial landlord and tenant contract
otherwise.
Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. 1997). The
Texas Supreme Court announced this duty under the common law. Id. at 295 (“Because there is
no statute addressing this issue, we look to the common law.”). “We hold that the landlord’s
duty to mitigate requires the landlord to use objectively reasonable efforts to fill the premises
when the tenant vacates in breach of the lease.” Id. at 299. “We stress that this is not an absolute
4
duty. The landlord is not required to simply fill the premises with any willing tenant; the
replacement tenant must be suitable under the circumstances.” Id.
The landlord’s duty to mitigate is also a matter of statute. Section 91.006 of the Texas
Property Code states, “A landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if a tenant abandons the leased
premises in violation of the lease.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(a). What is “a duty,”
though? In 2007, the Dallas Court of Appeals described the statutory duty in terms consistent
with the Palisades Plaza common law duty by stating, “A landlord has a duty to make
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages when the tenant breaches the lease and abandons the
property.” Landry’s Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430, 436 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006; Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d
at 299). Thereafter, the Dallas Court of Appeals went a step further, holding, “The rule in
Palisades Plaza has since been codified[.]” White v. Harrison, 390 S.W.3d 666, 675 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(a)).
While not going so far as to say that the statutory duty is an express codification of
Palisades Plaza, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has applied Section 91.006 and Palisades
Plaza hand-in-hand. Hoppenstein Props., Inc. v. Schober, 329 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006; Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d
at 299).2 Also, though not expressly adopting the “codification” language of White, the
2
The timing here is of interest. The sequence was an opinion by the Texas Supreme Court in January 1997, then the statute, then an opinion on rehearing in July 1997, which did not cite the brand-new statute. See Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 294 (“We withdraw our opinion of January 10, 1997, and substitute the following in its place.”). For present purposes, it is enough that the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has applied Palisades Plaza and the statute hand-in-hand. Hoppenstein Props., Inc., 329 S.W.3d at 849. Therefore, we need not resolve whether Section 91.006 formally codified the Palisades Plaza common law duty.
5
Fort Worth Court of Appeals cited White in a landlord-tenant dispute. See Customer Ctr. of
DFW Inc. v. RPAI N. Richland Hills Davis Ltd. P’ship, No. 02-20-00189-CV, 2021 WL
2149623, at *4 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing White,
390 S.W.3d at 675).
There is, however, a difference between Palisades Plaza and Section 91.006. It concerns
the ability of parties to contract around the landlord’s duty. “In Palisades Plaza, the [Texas]
Supreme Court said the rule applied ‘unless the commercial landlord and tenant contract
otherwise.’” White, 390 S.W.3d at 675 n.5 (quoting Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 299). “The
Legislature eliminated the possibility of contracting around the duty to mitigate, stating: ‘A
provision of a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty
under this section is void.’” Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b)).
Having set forth the common law and statutory law regarding mitigation, we turn to the
nuts and bolts of how parties contest mitigation or a lack thereof during litigation.
Regarding a tenant’s pleadings, there is some nuance.
When the tenant contends that the landlord has actually mitigated damages, the
breaching tenant need not plead the landlord’s actual mitigation as an affirmative
defense. Rather, the tenant’s evidence of the landlord’s mitigation tends to rebut
the measure of damages under the landlord’s claim of breach[3] and may be
admitted under a general denial.
Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 300. “The tenant’s contention that the landlord failed to mitigate
damages, in contrast, is similar to an avoidance defense; evidence of failure to mitigate is
admissible only if the tenant pleads the failure to mitigate as an affirmative defense.” Id.
3
Such as a landlord collecting rent from a new tenant while seeking to recover from the former tenant unpaid rent on the same property for the same time period. See Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 300.
6
Either way, at trial, the tenant bears the burden: “[T]he tenant properly bears the burden
of proof to demonstrate that the landlord has mitigated or failed to mitigate damages and the
amount by which the landlord reduced or could have reduced its damages.” Id. at 299 (emphasis
added).
B. Standard of Review in this Procedural Context
As discussed above, the tenant bears the burden on mitigation contentions. Id. Having
established this, we discuss the standard of review in greater detail.
“When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it
bears the burden of proof, the judgment must be sustained unless the record conclusively
establishes all vital facts in support of the issue.” Catholic Diocese of El Paso v. Porter, 622
S.W.3d 824, 834 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Shields P’ship, 526 S.W.3d at 480). “In reviewing such a
challenge, we examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all
evidence to the contrary. If no evidence supports the finding, then we examine the entire record
to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law.” Upshaw, 650 S.W.3d at
74 (citation omitted) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001)
(per curiam)). “To conclusively establish [a] fact, the evidence must leave ‘no room for ordinary
minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from it.’” Porter, 622 S.W.3d at 824 (alteration
in original) (quoting Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Lufkin Indus., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 224, 235 (Tex.
2019)); see Upshaw, 650 S.W.3d at 74. In sum, if you are the party who has the burden, and you
were denied relief in the trial court, on appeal you must show that the evidence conclusively
7
established your right to the relief you seek. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d
769, 774 (Tex. 2020) (citing Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241).4
C. Applicable Facts
After Williamson failed to pay rent in August 2023, EQY locked it out later that month.
EQY relet the premises to a new tenant, Jaydev Cards, Inc. d/b/a Trudy’s Hallmark (Hallmark),
effective July 22, 2024. EQY’s lease with Hallmark provided Hallmark with 150 days’ free rent,
so Hallmark did not begin paying rent until approximately January 1, 2025.
When EQY sued Williamson for breach of the Lease and guaranty, it sought, among
other amounts, damages of $170,484.37 representing past-due rent owed under the Lease from
August 1, 2023, through December 21, 2024, the overlap of the remainder of Williamson’s lease
and Hallmark’s lease term. Williamson sought an offset for the rent and interest EQY claimed
for months that overlapped with Hallmark’s lease term, calculated at $62,096.52. Williamson
also claimed EQY failed to credit it with $20,000.00 worth of furniture and equipment that EQY
locked in the leased premises and did not return to Williamson.
Among other amounts, the trial court awarded EQY damages of $170,484.37
representing past-due rent owed under the Lease. The trial court did not credit Williamson for
the $20,000.00 it requested for reimbursement of personal property that remained on the
premises after being locked out.
4
Lockheed was seeking a refund of franchise-tax payments. Lockheed, 601 S.W.3d at 773–74. The court held, “[T]o warrant appellate reversal of a trial court’s judgment in favor of the Comptroller, the evidence must conclusively establish the material facts entitling the claimant to the refund it seeks.” Id. at 774.
8
D. Analysis
Williamson contends that EQY failed to reasonably mitigate. Williamson’s argument
could also be described as an assertion that EQY mitigated, and received non-rent benefit(s)
from that mitigation, but failed to pass along that benefit to Williamson. Either way, Williamson
bore the burden. See Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 299.
Williamson contests the period spanning from July 2024 through December 2024.
During that time, the lease of the replacement tenant had begun, but the replacement tenant,
Hallmark, was not paying rent. Williamson does not contest EQY’s mitigation from January
2025through July 2025, when Williamson’s Lease would have ended.
Williamson cites to the testimony of Stephanie Rippe, EQY’s Senior Property Manager,
who testified that EQY received an enhancement to the value of the shopping center in exchange
for giving Hallmark free rent. Williamson argues that EQY “failed to credit [it] with the . . .
months of [free] rent that it gave to Hallmark for valuable construction improvements and
enhancement to the property value.” Williamson complains that it was entitled to credit for all
the “free rent” months during which Hallmark’s lease overlapped with its own.
Williamson’s Lease provides that Williamson would remain liable if EQY gave “free rent
or concessions” to a replacement tenant. The Lease provides as follows:
[EQY] . . . may . . . relet the Leased Premises . . . at such rental or rentals and
upon such other terms and conditions as [EQY] in its sole discretion may deem
advisable, . . . and [Williamson] shall pay all costs of such reletting including, but
not limited to, the reasonable cost of any such alterations and repairs made to the
Leased Premises, reasonable attorneys’ fees and brokerage commissions related to
obtaining possession and making a new lease with another tenant, free rent or
concessions, lease assumptions and any other costs reasonably associated with
reletting the Leased Premises.
9
(Emphasis added). Williamson cites Section 91.006(b), which provides that any lease provision
“that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty” under the
statutory requirement to mitigate damages “is void.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b).
Williamson, however, does not assert that this provision (or any provision) of the Lease is void.
Taken as a whole, Williamson’s argument is that EQY benefited in non-rent ways from
Hallmark’s build-out, and that this should have been credited to Williamson as rent.5
Williamson’s argument presumes that EQY could have obtained a lease from Hallmark without
offering “free rent” to Hallmark; in other words, that EQY could have started leasing to
Hallmark at full value at the inception of Hallmark’s lease. There was evidence, however, that
giving a free-rent period to new tenants was the usual practice at EQY’s shopping center. David
Schulenburg, a leasing agent for EQY, testified that he normally gave free rent to tenants when
they signed a lease. Schulenburg likewise gave Hallmark 150 days’ free rent. The purpose in
giving the free rent, he said, was “[t]o allow them to have some time to build out their space and
commence business.” Williamson itself was given ninety days’ free rent when it moved into the
property.
Williamson cites no evidence that EQY could have leased the premises to Hallmark (or to
any other tenant) for any amount immediately after Williamson stopped paying rent, or for any
5
Williamson urges that “there is insufficient evidence of mitigation and offset because the [EQY] failed to rebut [Williamson’s] evidence of mitigation.” To the extent this phrasing constitutes an attempt to flip the burden, we reject it. Williamson bore the burden. See Palisades Plaza, 948 S.W.2d at 299. Further, there is internal tension in the argument that there is “insufficient evidence of mitigation” because “evidence of mitigation” was unrebutted. We look, then, to the substance of Williamson’s assertion that “the [EQY] failed to credit [Williamson] with the six months of [free] rent that it gave to Hallmark [in exchange] for valuable construction improvements and enhancement to the property value.”
10
amount at any time prior to the time Hallmark started paying rent. Williamson cites no evidence
establishing that EQY’s free-rent practice was an unreasonable mitigation effort on EQY’s
behalf or that EQY could have attracted a suitable tenant without such a concession. Further,
Williamson points to no evidence establishing the dollar value of Hallmark’s build-out.
We conclude that the record does not conclusively establish that Williamson carried its
burden regarding rental mitigation (or lack thereof). There was evidence from which the trial
court could have reasonably reached the result it did regarding EQY’s concessions to Hallmark.
This does not entirely dispose of Williamson’s first issue.
Embedded within its mitigation argument, Williamson also complains that EQY’s
damages should have been reduced by $20,000.00 to account for the value of Williamson’s
personal property remaining on the premises when EQY locked Williamson out for non-payment
of rent. Williamson urges that EQY’s failure to “tak[e] commercially reasonable efforts to either
sell or return the property” constituted additional failure to mitigate. Williamson does not
contend that it asked to retrieve the property but was rebuffed. Williamson urges that EQY
never asked Williamson to retrieve the property. Williamson, however, does not point to any
provision of the Lease which requires EQY to ask Williamson to retrieve the property. The
Lease provides that in the event of default, EQY was entitled to enter the leased premises and
remove all or part of Williamson’s property and sell that property for EQY’s benefit, or to store
the property at Williamson’s cost and for Williamson’s account. The Lease further provides that
if Williamson failed to remove trade fixtures or other property at the termination of the tenancy,
these items would be deemed abandoned, and at EQY’s option, would become EQY’s property
11
or could be removed or stored at Williamson’s expense, or sold, with the proceeds belonging to
EQY.
Rippe testified that, under the Lease, she had the right to dispose of the personal property
left on the premises. Rippe said that she waited approximately six months to dispose of the
personal property because Gore had told her he was “trying to collect money in order to get back
into the space.” Rippe testified that Gore never asked for access to remove the personal
property. In any event, the value of the personal property was disputed.6
We likewise conclude that the evidence does not conclusively establish that EQY failed
to mitigate its damages regarding the personal property left on the premises. There was evidence
from which the trial court could have reasonably reached the result it did regarding mitigation
and the personal property.
We overrule Williamson’s first issue.
IV. Attorney’s Fees
In its second issue, Williamson claims that there was legally insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. Williamson does not challenge the
applicability of fee shifting—it challenges only evidence supporting the reasonableness and
necessity of the fees awarded.
6
Josh Thorn, Gore’s business partner, testified that the property left on the premises was worth approximately $20,000.00. Rippe testified that the value of the personal property was not enough to warrant an auction, but if she had conducted an auction, she would have credited any excess proceeds to Williamson’s rent. Rippe stated that she donated some of the property to a church and the rest was hauled off by EQY’s maintenance company. Rippe testified that EQY did not get any money for the property but instead had to pay to have it removed.
12
A. Applicable Law
An “award of attorney’s fees generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2012) (citing Ragsdale v. Progressive
Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)). Any attorney’s fees awarded,
however, must be supported by legally sufficient evidence. Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.,
620 S.W.3d 335, 356 (Tex. 2020) (“We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on the issue of
attorneys’ fees because there is legally sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s award . . . .”).
The Texas Supreme Court has “elaborated on the showing an attorney must make to
support an award of fees in ‘any situation in which an objective calculation of reasonable hours
worked times a reasonable rate can be employed.’” Id. at 354 (quoting Rohrmoos Venture v.
UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019)). “In these situations, ‘the fact
finder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is determining the reasonable hours
worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the fee claimant bears the burden of
providing sufficient evidence on both counts.’” Id. (quoting Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at
498). “Such evidence ‘includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed,
(2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the
reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate
for each person performing such services.’” Id. (quoting Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at
498).
13
Rohrmoos Venture did not overrule El Apple. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 501
(citing El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 760) (“To summarize, the lodestar method as we presented it in
El Apple applies for determining the reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees in a feeshifting situation . . . .”).
Rohrmoos Venture, however, provided guidance on the application of El Apple. Id.
Rohrmoos Venture gave three examples of the court having previously required evidence
sufficient for the trial court to meaningfully review a request for attorney’s fees, making
Rohrmoos Ventures, at a minimum, the fourth expression of the meaningful review requirement.7
To that end, “billing records are strongly encouraged to prove the reasonableness and necessity
of requested fees when those elements are contested.” Id. at 502. The guidance further provided
that “[c]harges for duplicative, excessive, or inadequately documented work should be
excluded.” Id. at 498–99 (quoting El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 762).
There was much other guidance in Rohrmoos Ventures. See Champion Food Serv., Inc.
v. ProAlamo Foods, L.L.C., 738 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. 2026) (Blacklock, C.J., joined by
Sullivan, J., concurring) (citing Rohrmoos Ventures, 578 S.W.3d at 483–506) (describing the law
regarding recovery of attorney’s fees as “murky water” and observing “perhaps we will soon
have another chance to confront . . . the curious state of the law governing attorney’s fee
awards”).
7
Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 494 (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818– 19 (Tex. 1997)) (“no meaningful way to determine if the fees sought are in fact reasonable and necessary”); id. at 495 (quoting El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 763) (“Without at least some indication of the time spent on various parts of the case, a court has little basis upon which to conduct a meaningful review of the fee award.”); id. at 496 (quoting Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam)) (“insufficient information to meaningfully review the fee request”).
14
B. Analysis
In the portion of the trial where attorney’s fees were discussed, the trial court informed
the parties that it was familiar with Rohrmoos Ventures and, as the presiding judge, well aware of
the events in this case. The record before the trial court, however, included billing records from
EQY’s counsel with vague and duplicative time entries. Phrases such as “[r]eview underlying
documents,” “[r]eview pleadings,” and “[r]eceive and review email from Court,” appear
repeatedly, often in succession. Counsel for EQY attributed this to his awareness that billing
records would become exhibits, so he avoided detail that would, in his estimation, reveal
attorney-client privilege. On cross-examination, EQY’s counsel admitted that there was only a
single petition, a single answer, and Williamson had not filed a motion for summary judgment.
By mentioning this, we do not mean to question the trial court’s familiarity with the case, nor do
we mean to question the trial court’s sense of what sort of time, all things known to the trial court
considered, an attorney could have reasonably spent on this case. Instead, this goes to show that
the evidence in the record provided to this Court could reasonably be argued to fall short of what
Rohrmoos Ventures requires.
The trial court looked to the right legal guidance, Rohrmoos Ventures. Williamson’s
appellate challenge to the attorney’s fees awarded to EQY led with Rohrmoos Ventures and
discussed Rohrmoos Ventures extensively.
EQY, however, made no argument that the evidence it presented to the trial court passes
muster under the 2019 decision in Rohrmoos Ventures. Instead, EQY urges that a 2015 decision
of an intermediate court of appeals regarding the standard of review following a bench trial. See
15
Karns v. Jalapeno Tree Holdings, L.L.C., 459 S.W.3d 683, 690–91 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015,
pet. denied). We do not go so far as to find briefing waiver by EQY, but we do not undertake to
navigate Rohrmoos Ventures for EQY.
Accordingly, we find for Williamson on the issue of attorney’s fees.
We sustain Williamson’s second issue. As a result, we remand for a new determination
of attorney’s fees. See Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 506.
V. Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to EQY and
remand for a new determination of attorney’s fees. In all other respects, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: May 21, 2026
Date Decided: September 15, 2026
16