In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00068-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.L., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 354th District Court
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court No. 94909
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights to their child, Chloe.1 The trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights after finding that she (1) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,”
and (2) that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2) (Supp.). The trial court terminated Father’s rights
after finding that he had (1) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,”
(2) “constructively abandoned the child,” and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N) (Supp.), (b)(2).
Mother and Father each appeal. In Mother’s appeal, she challenges the trial court’s
findings supporting the termination of her parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the
Texas Family Code and argues that the Department “failed to make reasonable efforts and did
not tailor services to Mother’s special needs.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings supporting the termination of his
parental rights. Rather, in his sole point of error on appeal, Father argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his request for an extension of the one-year statutory limitation.
Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s determination as to
termination under ground E for Mother and to support the trial court’s finding that the
1
We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minor child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
2
Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, we affirm the judgment as to Mother.
Furthermore, we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to proceed to trial
and affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Father.
I. Evidence at Trial
Mackenzie Cook, a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse at Hunt Regional Medical
Center (HRMC), testified that on April 24, 2025, Chloe was brought into the HRMC labor and
delivery department via ambulance in respiratory distress. She testified that Chloe was “cyanotic
in color, blue” upon her arrival, and small for her assumed age of only a few hours old. Mother
believed, but was not certain, that Chloe had reached full gestational age prior to her home birth.
Chloe was brought to the NICU after her initial assessment in labor and delivery. Cook stated
that Mother appeared to be “disassociate[ed] from the situation.” Father was not present until
later that day, when he appeared disheveled and loud. Cook was assigned to Chloe’s care on her
next shift on April 30, when Chloe was approximately six or seven days old. Mother had been
discharged from the hospital by that date, but neither Mother nor Father were present at the
NICU with Chloe. Before a baby is released from the NICU, HRMC has a “rooming-in process”
during which the parents and the infant are in a boarding room caring for the baby with standard
check-in times by the nursing staff. Mother and Father did not consistently visit or care for
Chloe in the hospital, so they were unable to do a “room-in” procedure with Chloe. Though
HRMC requested that Mother and Father do the “board and stay” so Chloe could be discharged,
they failed to do so. The hospital procedure of “rooming-in” allows the hospital to observe the
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parents’ abilities to change diapers, understand the baby’s cues, safely feed and care for the
infant, and to meet the basic needs of the child.
Cook explained that Father stated he could not stay when he was not on his medication
because of his “symptoms.” Cook said that Mother stated that she would stay one of the days,
but then “she fell asleep the night before and then she left.” Cook also stated that she observed
Mother “talking to herself” and not interacting with Chloe, but rather Mother “was sitting at the
bedside looking around the NICU and just kind of appeared to be out of it and talking to herself.”
Father seemed to have difficulty changing Chloe’s diapers and feeding her, at one point
attempting to feed Chloe a bottle while she was lying flat on her back, which could cause
aspiration. On May 1, Cook recalled that there was a time when Chloe was crying and both
Mother and Father were present but not tending to Chloe. When Cook explained that they could
tend to Chloe and care for her to alleviate her crying by holding her or offering her a pacifier,
checking her diaper, or feeding her, neither Mother nor Father attempted to care for her. Instead,
Cook offered Chloe a pacifier, which then calmed her. Later that same day, Father again
attempted to feed Chloe while she was lying flat, even after the previous incident when HRMC
staff warned him of what could happen if Chloe were fed on her back.
Cook never witnessed Mother attempting to care for Chloe while in the NICU. Cook
explained that Mother had many opportunities and was even asked to provide care to Chloe, but
she would just look to Father. Even though Mother and Father had access to a boarding room,
which would have allowed them the opportunity to stay consistently close to Chloe to help meet
4
her needs, they never used it. Cook stated that neither Mother nor Father displayed an ability to
safely care for Chloe.
Jenna Hebert, the neonatal program manager at HRMC, testified that she was part of
Chloe’s care team starting on May 1, 2025. Hebert also testified to witnessing Father attempting
to feed Chloe while she was lying flat on her back, a separate incident from what Cook
witnessed. Hebert testified that after she gave instructions on how to feed Chloe and it appeared
as though Father understood, she went to check on another patient. Upon her return, Father said
that Chloe was not hungry and he had put her back in bed. Hebert explained the importance of
scheduled feedings for a NICU baby, and Father attempted to feed Chloe again, but he once
again began the feeding with Chloe lying on her back, having to be reminded that it was not a
proper position. Father continued to state that Chloe was not hungry; however, Hebert was then
able to give Chloe her bottle, and she took a full feeding. Hebert was concerned about both
Mother and Father because it had appeared that they were not eating, sleeping, or showering.
Hebert stated that at no point during her care of Chloe did she feel that either Mother or Father
was capable of caring for Chloe.
Josh Arbuckle, an investigator for the Department, was assigned to Chloe’s case when
she was brought into HRMC with respiratory issues and Mother refused to allow the hospital to
administer medication. Arbuckle testified that Mother informed him that she discovered she was
pregnant around the seven-month mark of her pregnancy and she did not seek prenatal care.
Father informed Arbuckle that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
psychosis. While Father did not report any use of illegal drugs, he admitted to drinking alcohol
5
even though he was advised not to while on his medication. Father’s responses worried
Arbuckle because Father could not stay on topic and Father told Arbuckle that he believed the
newborn baby was already trying to say “dada.”
When Arbuckle visited Mother and Father’s residence, he noted that the electricity to
their unit was coming from an extension cord running from a neighbor’s unit, into which Mother
and Father had plugged “several surge protectors” to power their residence. Arbuckle stated,
There was no appliances at all. No stove, no refrigerator, no sink, no microwave.
That was in the kitchen. The only item that was there for [Chloe] was a
brand‐new crib and a brand‐new car seat. The restroom did not have any running
water. The toilet had fecal matter and waste material stacked up on several days
of use.
The shower did not look like the hardware was attached and could
be utilized for any type of bathing. The room that the parents stated that [Chloe]
would be going into had some security issues or minor cracks with weathering,
bugs getting into there, so ‐‐ in other words, the window could fall out at that
point.
He stated that the living conditions were not suitable for a child. The Department attempted to
contact family members as possible placements for Chloe during the pendency of the case, but it
was unsuccessful in finding such placement. Chloe was removed on May 1, 2025, and placed
with a nonrelative.
Mother testified that she had no history of illegal drug use, contrary to her medical
records, which reflected that she used methamphetamine from ages seventeen to twenty-two.
She also disputed that she was still involved with Father, though she admitted that she was with
him the night prior to her testimony when Father was arrested. Mother had a prior criminal
history involving assault both as a juvenile and as an adult. At the time of trial, Mother lived in a
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unit in her own mother’s building and admitted that she has never paid her own bills and
received electricity through an extension cord.
Mother was also asked about her personal hygiene, and though she testified that she
typically showers every other day, she also agreed that her medical records stated that she had
“gone closer to six months between taking showers” in the past and admitted that she brushes her
teeth “twice a month” because she feels daily brushing is “kind of a lot, every day.”
Mother stated that she was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, and that she had been
admitted to Glen Oaks Hospital, a mental-health hospital, several times. She denied having
homicidal thoughts during her time at Glen Oaks, though the medical records state that she had.
Mother disputed many of the notes in her medical records related to her behaviors and reasons
for admission. Though she had been prescribed medication for her schizophrenia, she had not
taken the medication since 2024 and stated that she was “fine” without the medications.
Around her third or fourth month of pregnancy, Mother had a pregnancy test done at the
hospital, as she was trying to get “Medicaid to help [her] pay for when [she] gave birth.”
Though it was recommended, she did not obtain prenatal care, stating that she did not have a ride
to visit the doctor’s office. And while she obtained Medicaid in her seventh month of pregnancy,
she still did not obtain prenatal care.
On the day Mother went into labor, she explained that she did not realize what it felt like
to go into labor, and it was not until several hours later when her sister called for an ambulance.
Chloe was born in the ambulance on the way to HRMC. Mother admitted that she refused
medications for Chloe at the hospital. Chloe was in the hospital for eight days, during which
7
time Mother stated that they did not use the boarding room because it was not offered until a few
days prior to Chloe’s discharge and that she and Father were just sleeping by Chloe’s bedside
and slept one time in their truck.
Mother admitted to not being forthcoming in her psychological evaluation and with
different medical providers. She also admitted that she had not been able to maintain stable
employment or pay her own bills, though she stated that her mother has offered to help her until
she finds employment. Mother explained that she also did some parenting and substance abuse
classes, submitted to an intellectual and developmental disabilities test, an IQ test, and
psychological tests, as well as all drug testing requested of her. She visited Chloe on a weekly
basis.
While Mother admitted she knew the Department did not want her to be around Father,
the night prior to the final hearing, Father was arrested while with Mother. Mother explained
that she would not allow Father to be around Chloe unsupervised unless he could prove that he
would “act[] right.” Mother stated that she loved Chloe and that they have been able to bond
“[a] little bit.”
The Department elicited testimony from Mother that she was not entirely truthful in her
evaluations, that she did not complete her parenting courses, did not maintain stable, safe, and
appropriate housing, nor a stable income, she continued to operate a motor vehicle without a
license, and did not take the required life-skills classes.
Michelle Collins, the conservatorship caseworker for the family, testified that Chloe was
placed in foster care at the time of the final hearing and had been with the foster family for seven
8
months. Collins testified that Chloe was bonded with the family, both the caregivers and the
other children in the home, and the family was “adoption-motivated” and a good placement for
Chloe.
Collins also discussed Mother’s service plan that was implemented by the Department for
Mother to be reunited with Chloe.2 Collins stated that though Mother participated in
psychological evaluations, her answers in the evaluation and her responses in the notes from the
mental-health facility directly contradict each other. Mother had also not been compliant with
her medication management. Mother failed to complete her parenting courses and was unable to
provide a stable home with “a working refrigerator, microwave, toilet, sink, and bathtub,” as
ordered. Mother also never provided Collins with proof of a valid driver’s license or liability
insurance. Mother had not provided any evidence of stable employment.
Mother visited Chloe weekly during the pendency of the case, and Collins described
Mother as struggling and would get frustrated during the visits Collins observed. Collins also
noted that she observed hygiene issues with Mother, including foul odors more than once—even
after hygiene discussions.
Diana Wirt, a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer, testified that Chloe
was doing well and reaching her milestones, including crawling, in her current placement. Wirt
had difficulty maintaining contact with Mother, though she noted that she was able to see Mother
at least a few times. Mother and Father did not present any plan about what their future plans are
for Chloe or how they would or could care for Chloe, and Wirt testified that she did not believe
2
The testimony also discussed Father’s incompletion of his service plan; however, because Father does not challenge the termination findings against him, we do not discuss the evidence put forth.
9
either Mother or Father could safely care for Chloe, recommending termination of Mother and
Father’s parental rights to Chloe.
The trial court, after hearing the evidence, found that the Department had met its burden.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that she “engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the
physical or emotional well-being of the child,” and that termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2). The trial
court also terminated Father’s rights after finding that he had (1) “engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the
physical or emotional well-being of the child,” and (2) “constructively abandoned the child,” and
(3) termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (b)(2).
II. Mother
In her appeal, Mother challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of termination under subsection (E), and (2) whether the Department presented
sufficient evidence regarding the reasonable efforts it made to return Chloe to Mother as required
by Section 161.001(f) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E),
(f) (Supp.).
A. Standard of Review
“Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights, ‘“the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is
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paramount.”’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.)
(quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003)). “A child’s emotional and physical
interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459
S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.)).
“[T]he appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is
such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the
State’s allegations.” In re A.C., No. 06-25-00084-CV, 2026 WL 878798, at*2 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2026, pets. denied) (mem. op.) (alteration in original) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25 (Tex. 2022)). “Both legal and factual sufficiency review deal with whether ‘a reasonable
factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction,’ but there is a difference between legal and
factual sufficiency.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018)).
For legal sufficiency, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that” termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the child.
In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)
(per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We
assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a
reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have
reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
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By comparison, when reviewing “factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to
evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence
the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘“whether
the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about
the truth of the . . . allegations.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d
at 108 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d. at 25)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then
the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.
2022)). To make “this determination,” we undertake “an exacting review of the entire record
with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437
S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports Termination Under Subsection (E)
Mother first complains of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings that termination was appropriate under subsection (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). Subsection (E) provides for termination of parental rights if the parent has
“engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Within the context of subsection (E), endangerment
encompasses “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-thanideal family environment.” In re I.T., No. 01-18-01013-CV, 2019 WL 1996515, at *8 (Tex.
12
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.
v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). “To ‘endanger’ means to expose a child to loss or
injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health.” Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at
533).
The Department need not “establish that a parent intended to endanger a child to support
termination under subsection (E).” Id. “Nor is it necessary to establish the parent’s conduct was
directed at the child or caused actual harm; rather, it is sufficient if the parent’s conduct
endangers the child’s well-being.” Id.; In re A.B., No. 05-23-00667-CV, 2023 WL 8863490, at
*8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re I.T., 2019 WL
1996515, at *8).
“Endangering conduct does not have to occur in the child’s presence.” In re A.B., 2023
WL 8863490, at *8 (citing In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied)). “A parent’s past endangering conduct may create an inference that past
conduct may recur and further jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional
well-being.” Id. (citing In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d at 171; In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of
uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” Id.
(quoting In re I.T., 2019 WL 1996515, at *8 (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied))).
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Mother asserts in her brief that the Department relied on her mental-health issues to form
the basis of its subsection (E) arguments, rather than presenting an actual course of endangering
conduct. We disagree with this interpretation of the evidence.
The Department presented evidence regarding Mother’s inability to care for Chloe, both
while she was pregnant by failing to obtain any prenatal care and after Chloe’s birth, including
during Chloe’s NICU stay and during Mother’s visitations after Chloe’s discharge. Mother
struggled with basic care and understanding of Chloe and did not seek to improve her abilities in
any way. Though she attended some parenting classes, Mother did not complete the courses
required of her. Mother admittedly could not find stable employment and the testimony shows
that Mother’s living arrangements were unfit for a child—including no electricity, no running
water, fecal matter filling the toilet, and no diapers, formula, or food for a child. Mother’s living
conditions remained much the same throughout the course of the case. See In re A.T., 406
S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pets. denied) (“Unsanitary conditions can qualify as
surroundings that endanger a child.”). Mother also struggled with her own personal hygiene,
even when others attempted to intervene and offer help. Mother did not shower regularly and
admitted that she did not see a need to regularly brush her own teeth.
Furthermore, as it relates to Mother’s mental health, Mother had been hospitalized
several times and admitted to assaulting her family members. While Mother admitted to having
been diagnosed with schizophrenia, she had done nothing to take care of herself and refused to
take her medications. Though she denied it in her testimony, Mother’s medical records reflected
that she had “homicidal thoughts” toward her father and sister. “While mental incompetence or
14
mental illness alone are not grounds for termination of the parent-child relationship, ‘[w]hen a
parent’s mental state allows the parent to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child, that conduct has bearing on the advisability of terminating the
parent’s rights.’” In re E.G., 643 S.W.3d 236, 253 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.)
(alteration in original) (quoting In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2019, no pet.)).
Given the undisputed evidence, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief
or conviction that Mother’s conduct and the condition of the environment she intended to bring
Chloe into would subject Chloe to a life of uncertainty and instability and thus endanger her
physical and emotional well-being. The evidence is thus legally and factually sufficient to
support the statutory predicate finding of termination under subsection (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re I.T., 2019 WL 1996515, at *8. We overrule Mother’s first issue.
C. The Department’s Reasonable Efforts to Return Chloe
By her second issue, Mother argues that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts
to return Chloe because there was no evidence that Mother’s service plan “was written in a
manner that was clear and understandable” to her.
Our sister court in Austin recently discussed Section 161.001(f), noting its recent addition
to the Texas Family Code, and stated,
Though subsection 161.001(f) is new to the [Texas] Family Code, the phrase
“reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” is not new to [S]ection
161.001, as it appears in subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N), known as the “constructive
abandonment” predicate ground. See [TEX. FAM. CODE ANN].
§ 161.001(b)(1)(N); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2025, pet[s]. denied). We presume that the legislature enacted this amendment
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“with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it.”
JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 597 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. 2019) (quoting
In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)).
So, when considering whether the Department proved by clear and convincing
evidence that it made reasonable efforts to return the child[] to Mother, we look to
relevant jurisprudence construing the Department’s reunification efforts under
subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N). See In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 328–29 (citing
In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 92 (Tex. 2021)[ (orig. proceeding)]). Our
sister courts of appeals that have examined subsection 161.001(f) have reached
this same conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 328; In re K.N.S., No. 12-25-00171-CV,
2025 WL 3724545, at *9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 23, 2025, [pet. denied]) (mem.
op.); In re M.B., No. 14-25-00418-CV, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL
3275376, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25, 2025), [withdrawn &
superseded by No. 14-25-00418-CV, 2026 WL 2265725 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] August 6, 2026, (no pet. h.)]. “Generally, implementation of a family
service plan by [the Department] is considered a reasonable effort to return the
child to the parent.” A.D. v. Tex[.] Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673
S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (quoting In re A.L.H., 468
S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)).
D. F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 731 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026,
no pet.) (ninth alteration in original).
Here, the Department developed a service plan for Mother, and the trial court ordered that
Mother complete those services as part of the reunification process. Mother argues, however,
that it was “unreasonable” for the Department to create a service plan and “believe[d] that any of
the services would reasonably be achievable for [Mother] without additional assistance” given
Mother’s “mental and intellectual deficiencies.” Mother argues that the plan was not written in
such a way that she could reasonably understand it, though Mother never raised this issue to the
Department or before the trial court. Mother blamed her inability to complete her service plan
on transportation and timing, stating that there were office closures and she needed to use the
time to search for a job. Mother never indicated an inability to understand her service plan. The
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Department created a service plan, attempted to assist Mother in working through her services,
made efforts to work with family members to find a non-foster placement for Chloe, and
continued contact with Mother throughout the course of the proceedings. “This constitutes
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable
efforts to return the child[] to Mother.” In re D. F., 731 S.W.3d at 742–43 (citing A.D. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.)
(“determining [the] Department made reasonable efforts to return [the] child to [the] parent by
developing [a] service plan, attempting to communicate with parent, and attempting family
placement”); C.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00852-CV, 2019 WL
3367524, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“concluding [the]
Department made reasonable efforts to return [the] child to [the] parent by developing [a] service
plan, attempting to communicate with [the] parent, assisting parent with scheduling visits, and
determining whether parent secured drug-free housing”)).
We overrule Mother’s second issue.
III. Father’s Denial of His Motion for Continuance
Father does not challenge the trial court’s termination findings, but rather, Father argues
on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to retain the case on the docket.
A. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the trial
court’s discretion.” In re A.R., No. 06-22-00065-CV, 2023 WL 1769269, at *14 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Feb. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.D., No. 06-18-00105-CV, 2019 WL
17
1302932, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see Joe v. Two
Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). “We are not to substitute our
judgment for the trial court’s [judgment] . . . .” In re A.R., 2023 WL 1769269, at *14 (quoting
In re J.D., 2019 WL 1302932, at *6). For this reason, “[w]e will sustain the trial court’s ruling
absent a finding that ‘the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles,
such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.’” In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (quoting In re R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (quoting Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007)).
B. Motion for Continuance
Here, as the trial court called the case for trial, Father’s trial counsel announced that he
had filed a motion to retain “moments” before the case was called. The basis for the motion to
retain was that Father had been unable to complete his services due to numerous arrests during
the course of the proceedings, including being arrested the night prior to the final hearing. He
sought a continuance of 180 days. The trial court allowed Father’s trial counsel to call witnesses
in support of his motion to retain, who confirmed that Father had been arrested four times in the
year prior to the final hearing, and was arrested the evening prior to the hearing. In arguing the
motion, Father’s trial counsel argued that extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant a
continuance, namely that Father was admitted to a mental-health facility based on an emergency
detention order. The trial court denied Father’s motion, discussing the repeated arrests of Father
as the cause for his unavailability.
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C. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying the Motion for Continuance
Father argues that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of his
motion for continuance. “A state’s attempt to terminate the parent-child relationship is governed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011,
no pet.) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)). “Moreover, the Texas
Supreme Court has recognized that the involuntary termination of parental rights implicates
fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)).
“In light of this weighty precedent, there can be no doubt that [Father’s] right to retain custody of
[Chloe] is a constitutionally protected liberty interest and must be afforded procedural due
process.” Id. (citing Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 116 S.W.3d 266 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied); In re G.C., 66 S.W.3d 517, 525 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, no pet.)).
Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits, the court may not
retain the suit on the court’s docket after the time described by Subsection (a)
unless the court finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child
remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that
continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator
is in the best interest[s] of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (Supp.). “The absence of a party to a proceeding is not an
adequate ground for a continuance unless the party shows that it had a reasonable excuse for not
being present and that its absence resulted in prejudice.” In re T.M., No. 02-09-00145-CV, 2009
WL 5184018, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing
Erback v. Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1943, writ ref’d w.o.m.);
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); Com. Standard Ins. Co. v. Merit Clothing Co., 377 S.W.2d 179, 181
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(Tex. 1964) (“holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling a motion for
continuance because, in part, the record did not reflect any harm”); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688,
693 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.); Richards v. Schion, 969 S.W.2d 131,
132 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)). “When the movant seeks a continuance
because of an absent witness, it must show the materiality of the absent witness’s testimony.” Id.
(citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 252; Fountain v. Knebel, 45 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001,
no pet.); Humphrey v. Ahlschlager, 778 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ)).
Father does not discuss any extraordinary circumstances in his brief that would support a
continuance in a termination case. Father’s motion for continuance, argument at trial, and
argument in his appellate brief concern the reason why he was absent from trial. Father did not
show by affidavit (or otherwise) at trial and has not shown on appeal that he would have testified
to facts that are contrary to or that are mitigating from the testimony offered by the Department.
He has also not explained how his presence at trial would have potentially changed the trial
court’s parental termination decision. Thus, under the standards described above, because Father
has not demonstrated that his absence and the denial of his continuance motion resulted in
prejudice, we overrule his sole issue. See In re T.M., 2009 WL 5184018, at *6.
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IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: August 21, 2026
Date Decided: September 10, 2026
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