In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00057-CV
JA’LIYAH CELESTINE, Appellant
V.
LINDA YVONNE HOLLAND, Appellee
On Appeal from the 60th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25DCCV1415
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ja’Liyah Celestine appeals1 from the trial court’s granting of a plea to the jurisdiction in
favor of Linda Yvonne Holland. Celestine argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting
Holland’s plea to the jurisdiction because Celestine validly alleged that Holland acted outside the
scope of her employment with Beaumont Independent School District (BISD) and because the
claim could not have been brought against BISD. In the alternative, Celestine argues that the
trial court should have allowed her to amend her pleadings in response to Holland’s plea to the
jurisdiction or should have permitted jurisdictional discovery before considering jurisdictional
issues. We hold that the trial court did not err in granting the plea to the jurisdiction, and thus,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
The underlying suit involves an alleged assault and battery brought by a former student,
Celestine, against a school resource officer (SRO), Holland. Celestine, in her second amended
petition, alleged that Holland acted ultra vires and used excessive force against her while
breaking up a fight between Celestine and another student. Holland filed a plea to the
jurisdiction arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because (1) Celestine
lacked standing to seek prospective relief due to the fact that she had already graduated from
BISD; (2) Celestine’s allegations did not state a valid ultra vires claim against Holland; and
(3) any tort claims against Holland must be dismissed under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s
1
Originally appealed to the Ninth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Ninth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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(TTCA) election of remedies provision. The trial court set the plea for an oral hearing.
Celestine replied to Holland’s plea, arguing that her pleadings clearly established that Holland’s
behavior went beyond the scope of her employment. Holland filed a reply brief in support of her
plea.
The trial court held a hearing on Holland’s plea and granted the plea to the jurisdiction
that same day, dismissing Celestine’s claims with prejudice. Celestine filed a request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as a motion for new trial. Holland replied to
Celestine’s motion for new trial, and Celestine filed a brief to support her motion in response.
The trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law but did not rule on Celestine’s
motion for new trial. Celestine’s motion for new trial was “overruled by operation of law.” TEX.
R. CIV. P. 329b(c).
II. Standard of Review
“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law” that is properly
asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 224, 226 (Tex. 2004). We review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction
de novo. Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2019).
A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of
jurisdictional facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Where, as here, “‘a plea to the
jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence
submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,’ even where
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those facts may implicate the merits of the cause of action.” City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298
S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227).
Parties may submit evidence supporting or opposing the plea, which we review under the
same standard applicable to a traditional motion for summary judgment. Chambers-Liberty, 575
S.W.3d at 345 (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016)).
“[W]e take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference
and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 384. “[I]f the
relevant evidence . . . fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules
on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. But “[i]f the
evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court [must deny]
the plea to the jurisdiction” and allow the fact-finder to resolve the issue. Id. at 227–28.
III. Election of Remedies Provision of the TTCA2
Holland argues that the trial court correctly granted her plea to the jurisdiction because
Celestine’s pleadings established that her claims against Holland fell within the TTCA’s election
of remedies provision. Section 101.106(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code states,
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct
within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been
brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to
be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the
employee’s motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the
plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the
governmental unit as defendant on or before the [thirtieth] day after the date the
motion is filed.
2
Celestine does not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of her ultra vires claim against Holland. Instead, she proceeds solely on her assault and battery claim against Holland in her individual capacity.
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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f). Celestine, however, argues that she “validly
alleged that Holland acted outside the scope of her employment” and that the claim “could not
have been brought against BISD.”
A. Outside the Scope of Employment
The TTCA defines “[s]cope of employment” as “the performance for a governmental unit
of the duties of an employee’s office or employment and includes being in or about the
performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by competent authority.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(5). The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the TTCA
“calls for an objective assessment of whether the employee was doing her job when she
committed an alleged tort, not her state of mind when she was doing it.” Laverie v. Wetherbe,
517 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. 2017) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(5)).
The scope-of-employment analysis, therefore, remains fundamentally objective:
Is there a connection between the employee’s job duties and the alleged tortious
conduct? The answer may be yes even if the employee performs negligently or is
motivated by ulterior motives or personal animus so long as the conduct itself was
pursuant to her job responsibilities.
Id.
There is no dispute that Holland was employed by BISD as the SRO at the time of the
events that give rise to the underlying suit for assault and battery. The issue between the parties
is whether Holland acted outside the scope of her employment when she, as alleged by Celestine
in her second amended petition, subjected Celestine “to an extreme and excessive use of force”
to break up a fight between Celestine and another student. Celestine asserts in her pleadings that
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Holland stepped outside the scope of her authority as an SRO when she engaged in conduct
constituting “routine student discipline.”
Pursuant to the Texas Education Code,
[a] school district peace officer, a school resource officer, and security personnel
shall perform law enforcement duties for the school district that must include
protecting:
(1) the safety and welfare of any person in the jurisdiction of the peace
officer, resource officer, or security personnel; and
(2) the property of the school district.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.081(d-1). Section 37.081 of the Texas Education Code goes on to
state that a school district may not assign or require as duties of an SRO “(1) routine student
discipline or school administrative tasks; or (2) contact with students unrelated to the law
enforcement duties of the” SRO. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.081(d-2).
Celestine argues that the trial court “[i]mproperly [r]esolved [d]isputed [f]acts and
[f]ailed to [c]onstrue the [p]leadings in Celestine’s [f]avor.” However, Celestine asserts in her
own pleadings that Holland was an employee of BISD and was acting within her duties when she
broke up the fight. While Celestine asserts in her pleadings that Holland’s actions were
excessive and in violation of BISD policies, thus placing her behavior outside the scope of her
role as SRO, there is no dispute that Celestine acknowledges in her own pleadings that Holland
was acting as an SRO when she intervened to break up the fight between Celestine and another
student.
In considering the question of whether Holland was acting within the scope of her
employment, we must consider the connection between Holland’s job duties and the alleged
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tortious conduct—here, Holland’s job duties required her to protect the safety and welfare of the
students and faculty. It is clear from the pleadings that there was an altercation happening
between Celestine and another student, Holland was called to assist in breaking up the
altercation, and, in the course of doing so, allegedly committed the tortious behavior Celestine
complains of in her suit. See Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 753 (citing Melton v. Farrow, No. 03-13-00542-CV, 2015 WL 681491, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 10, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(“Texas appellate courts have consistently held that acts may still be within the scope of the
employee’s duties even if the specific conduct that forms the basis of the suit was wrongly or
negligently performed or driven by personal animus.”); Anderson v. Bessman, 365 S.W.3d 119,
125–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“So long as it falls within the duties
assigned, an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, even if done in part to serve
the purposes of the employee or a third person.”)).
Celestine further argues that Holland stepped outside the scope of her employment by
engaging in “routine student discipline”—however, by her own pleadings she asserts that SROs
“shall perform ‘law enforcement duties’ focused on the safety and welfare of individuals and
property at school.” Celestine argues that the situation had de-escalated by the time Holland
arrived. However, in her pleadings, she points out that Holland was involved in breaking up the
altercation between Celestine and another student. Celestine’s argument that the altercation was
de-escalating does not change Holland’s role in ensuring the safety and welfare of the students
and faculty.
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Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that Holland was acting within her
scope of employment when she broke up the altercation occurring on school property between
two students.
B. Celestine’s Suit Could Have Been Brought Against BISD
Alternatively, Celestine argues that even if Holland was acting within the scope of her
employment, the election of remedies provision of the TTCA would not apply because Celestine
could not have brought an assault and battery claim against BISD. Specifically, she argues that
the TTCA does not apply to intentional torts against a school district, and therefore, BISD would
be immune from suit.
In Franka v. Velasquez, the Texas Supreme Court “considered whether a suit for which
the [TTCA] has not waived immunity is nevertheless ‘under’ the [TTCA] for purposes of
[S]ection 101.106.” Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. 2011). Noting that
“[r]equiring a government employee to prove that his employer’s immunity from suit has been
waived in order to obtain dismissal forces the parties to take unexpected positions with collateral
risks,” the Texas Supreme Court in Franka concluded “that for [S]ection 101.106(f), suit ‘could
have been brought’ under the [TTCA] against the government regardless of whether the [TTCA]
waives immunity from suit.” Id. at 380, 385. Celestine argues that “Franka did provide that
suits against governmental employees can be considered ‘brought under’ the TTCA even when
the TTCA does not waive immunity,” but she contends that Franka “does not mean that under
all circumstances an intentional tort claim ‘could have been brought’ against a governmental
unit.” We decline to apply Franka in a piecemeal fashion, and, as such, Celestine’s argument
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that it could not have brought suit against BISD because BISD’s immunity is not waived for the
intentional tort of assault and battery as presented in this case, is unpersuasive. See id. at 385.
We overrule Celestine’s first issue.
IV. Amending Pleadings
Celestine contends that even if the trial court properly granted Holland’s plea to the
jurisdiction, Celestine should have been afforded the opportunity to amend her pleadings “or
allowed the case to proceed to discovery” to consider the issues based on discovery. However,
“[i]f the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the
jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff[] an opportunity to amend.” Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 227. Celestine asserts that additional discovery would have allowed the trial court
to find that Holland was not within the scope of her employment when the alleged assault
occurred. The parties, however, have already briefed the issue below and have addressed it on
appeal. Celestine has twice amended her petition already and responded to the allegations in
Holland’s plea to the jurisdiction, focusing heavily on the role of Holland and her scope of
employment. See Cnty. of El Paso v. Baker, 579 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no
pet.). As such, we find that no additional pleadings can cure the jurisdictional defect.
We overrule Celestine’s second issue.
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V. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: August 25, 2026
Date Decided: September 14, 2026
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