IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC SCT-Civ-2025-0008
Appellant/Defendant, Re: ST-2024-RV-00019
v.
KLB REALTY LLC
Appellee/Plaintiff.
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT/ORDER
TO: Justices of the Supreme Court
Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court
Judith L. Bourne, Esq.
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq.
Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court
Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court
Supreme Court Law Clerks
Supreme Court Secretaries
Order Book
Westlaw
Lexis/Michie
Please take notice that on September 17, 2026, a(n) Order dated September 17, 2026,
was entered by the Clerk in the above-entitled matter.
Dated: September 17, 2026
DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ.
Clerk of the Court
By:
Deputy Clerk II
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0008
)
v )
)
KLB REALTY, LLC )
Appellee/Plaintiff. )
)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Thomas and St. John
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Sigrid M. Tejo
Considered: October 16, 2025
Filed: September 17, 2026
Cite as: 2026 VI 20
BEFORE MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN
Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
Judith L. Bourne, Esq
The Bourne Law Office, PLLC
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorneys for Appellant
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq
Hodge & Hodge
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorney for Appellee
JUDGMENT
CABRET, Associate Justice
AND NOW, consistent with the Opinion of even date, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Superior Court’s January 21, 2025 judgment is AFFIRMED; it
is further
ORDERED that copies be directed to the appropriate parties
SO ORDERED this 17th day of September 2026
The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
SCT-CIV-2025-0008
Judgment
Page 2 of 2
BY THE COURT:
-/
Mr ee 44 a le
RIA M(CAB Ber
Assoc
Speen
ATTEST:
DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ.
Clerk of the Court
Jim
By
Deputy Clerk
Dated YX \ X NS WO
Copies (with accompanying Opinion of the Court) to
Justices of the Supreme Court
Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court
Judith L. Bourne, Esq
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq
Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court
Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court
Supreme Court Law Clerks
Supreme Court Secretaries
Order Book
Westlaw
Lexis/Michie
For Publication
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
THE BOURNE LAW OFFICE, PLLC ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0008
)
v )
)
KLB REALTY, LLC )
Appellee/Plaintiff. )
a)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Thomas and St. John
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Sigrid M. Tejo
Considered: October 16, 2025
Filed: September 17, 2026
Cite as: 2026 VI 20
BEFORE MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN,
Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
Judith L. Bourne, Esq
The Bourne Law Office, PLLC
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorneys for Appellant
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq
Hodge & Hodge
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
CABRET, Associate Justice
ql The Bourne Law Office, PLLC (“Bourne”) appeals from the Superior Court’s January 21,
2025 order granting attorney’s fees to appellee KLB Realty (“KLB”), which KLB incurred in
connection with Bourne’s seeking Superior Court review of the Magistrate Division’s August 23, The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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Opinion
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2024 order in a forcible entry and detainer action granting restitution of certain premises to KLB
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s order
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"2 This appeal stems from a protracted and heavily-litigated dispute between Bourne and its
landlord, KLB, concerning the premises occupied by Bourne as a law office. The underlying case
originated in the Magistrate Division as a Forcible Entry and Detainer (“FED”) action initiated by
KLB. KLB prevailed in that case and in an order dated August 23, 2024, the Superior Court granted
immediate restitution of the premises to KLB, subject to a seven-day stay of execution. Bourne
filed a notice of appeal seeking Superior Court review! of the magistrate judge’s decision on
August 28, 2024, and filed a motion in the Magistrate Division for an emergency stay of execution
pending appeal on August 29, 2024. Bourne argued that the stay was necessary to avoid the
mooting of its appeal pursuant to this Court’s holding in Keating-Smith v. Mustafa, 78 V.1. 866
(V.I. 2024).? The magistrate judge denied this motion on September 3, 2024. The same day
Bourne filed an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration” of its August 29 emergency motion for stay
of execution. The magistrate judge denied that motion on September 6, 2024
£3 On September 6, 2024, Bourne filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court, which this Court denied on September 13, 2024 on the grounds that Bourne failed to first
request a stay of execution from the Superior Court judge assigned to the review. Jn re: The Bourne
' Judges of the Magistrate Division may hear forcible entry and detainer actions pursuant to the original jurisdiction granted by 4 V.LC. section 123(a)(6). When a magistrate judge enters a final judgment in a case over which it has original jurisdiction pursuant to 4 V.I.C. section 123(a), that judgment is “immediately appealable to the judges of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.” SUPER CT. R. 322(a)
? In Keating-Smith, this Court held that restoration of the subject premises to the landlord moots an FED appeal because the Superior Court cannot divest a landlord of possession once possession is restored, even if the judgment was entered in error. Keating-Smith, 78 V.I. at 880-81, In other words, an FED judgment effectively becomes unreviewable once the premises have been restored to the landlord
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Law Office, PLLC, 2024 V1 31. On September 16, 2024 Bourne filed an “Urgent Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal,” which the Superior Court granted in an order dated September 18, 2024, subject
to Bourne’s posting of a supersedeas bond of $25,950. On September 23, 2024, Bourne moved for
reconsideration of that order, on grounds that the Superior Court relied on 28 V.I.C. § 788, which
had been declared unconstitutional.? Three days later, Bourne filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requesting that the Court require the Superior Court judge
assigned to the review of the magistrate judge’s decision to issue a stay of the magistrate’s
judgment. In an order dated September 30, 2024, this Court stayed enforcement of the magistrate
judge’s decision granting restitution until resolution of the mandamus proceedings
44 While the mandamus proceedings were pending, the Superior Court judge scheduled a
hearing on Bourne’s motion for reconsideration, and on October 22, 2024, issued a revised order
that set the terms of the supersedeas bond at $10,800. Later, in an opinion dated November 12,
2024, this Court granted Bourne’s mandamus petition in part, ordering the Superior Court judge
to apply the correct legal standard in fixing the terms of the supersedeas bond and vacating the
October 22, 2024 order fixing the bond at $10,800. Jn re: The Bourne Law Office, PLLC, 2024 VI
31. The next day, November 13, 2024, Bourne filed a dismissal of review pursuant to Superior
Court Rule 322.5(a) and the Superior Court held a hearing on November 14, 2024. At that hearing,
the Superior Court clarified that the rule under which Bourne had attempted to dismiss its case had
been repealed, and Bourne then moved the court to dismiss the review “under whatever rule is
relevant” (S.A. 100-01). KLB did not oppose Bourne’s motion to dismiss the review, and the
3 28 V.I.C.§ 788 formerly provided that no appeal from an FED judgment may be taken unless the defendant posted a bond, guaranteed by two sureties, to the plaintiff in the amount of twice the rental value of the premises for the period from when the initial judgment is rendered to the time a final judgment is rendered. In Keating-Smith, this Court found section 788 to be unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Keating-Smith, 78 V1. at 876-77
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Superior Court dismissed the review in an order dated November 15, 2024. At the hearing on
Bourne’s dismissal, KLB informed the Superior Court that it intended to seek attorney’s fees and
the Superior Court granted KLB fourteen days to file the motion
q5 On November 27, 2024, KLB moved pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 541(b) for attorney’s fees of
at least $4,875, which it claimed were solely incurred in defending the review of the magistrate
judge’s decision in the Superior Court, including work on the mandamus action in this Court
Alternatively, KLB requested attorney’s fees for the entirety of the proceedings in the amount of
$12,862.50. Bourne opposed KLB’s motion for fees on December 13, 2024. In an order entered
on January 21, 2025, the Superior Court granted KLB’s motion and awarded the attorney’s fees
incurred in defending Bourne’s review of the magistrate judge’s August 23, 2024 decision, as well
as defending against Bourne’s petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court. The Superior Court
ultimately awarded $4,875 in fees and $156.76 in costs. Bourne timely filed a notice of appeal
from the order granting fees and costs on February 18, 2025
II DISCUSSION
A Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
46 This Court may not consider the merits of an appeal unless we first determine that we have
jurisdiction. Richards v. People, 74 V.1. 539, 544 (V.I. 2021) (citing V.. Gov't Hosps. & Health
Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.I., 50 V.I. 276, 279 (V.I. 2008)). This Court has jurisdiction over
“all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court.” 4
V.LC. § 32(a). Generally, “a trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees is a final judgment
provided that the lower court has quantified the award if it has awarded fees.” V.1. Gov't Hosps. &
Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov'tof the V.I., 50 V.I. 276, 279 (V.I. 2008)
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47 Here, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order quantified both the fees and costs to be
awarded to KLB. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order constitutes a final
order and this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. See Rojas v. Two/Morrow Ideas
Enters., Inc., 53 V.L. 684, 691 (V.I. 2010) (orders fully adjudicating attorney’s fees and costs are
final and appealable)
48 “This Court reviews the Superior Court's ruling on a motion for attorney's fees and costs
for abuse of discretion.” Jn re Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.1. 446, 449 (V.I. 2013) (citing Simpson
v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 277 (V.I. 2012)). “To the extent the review implicates an interpretation of
law, however, we review that interpretation de novo.” Id.
B The Prevailing Party
49 Bourne argues that the Superior Court erred in granting attorney’s fees to KLB, contending
that KLB was not a prevailing party with regard to the review because Bourne moved to dismiss
the review before the Superior Court rendered a decision on the merits. Bourne further reasons that
because the “only matter that was actively litigated” was the legality of the supersedeas bonds
imposed by the Superior Court, KLB could not be a prevailing party because this Court determined
that both the September 18, 2024 bond of $25,950 and the October 22, 2024 bond of $10,800 were
unlawfully calculated. We disagree on both issues
£10 In the Virgin Islands, the prevailing party in a civil action other than a non-frivolous
personal injury suit may recover “such sums as the court in its discretion may fix by way of
indemnity for [its] attorney's fees in maintaining the action or defenses thereto.” 5 V.I.C. § 541(b)
The Legislature enacted section 541(b) to abolish the “American Rule,” which prohibits awarding
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action. Hansen v. Bryan, 68 V.1. 603, 613 (V.I. 2018)
By abolishing the American Rule, the Legislature intended to allow the prevailing party in an The Bourne Law Office, PLLC y. KLB Realty, LLC
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Opinion
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action to recover their attorney’s fees. The Legislature made this decision for reasons of public
policy, “believing that a party should not have to bear the legal expenses of demonstrating either
that it is not at fault or that it is the victim of another's fault.” DaCosta v. DaCosta, 74 V.I. 640,
646 (V.I. 2021); Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc., No. ST-97-CV-925, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 51, at
*]—2 (Super. Ct. Sep. 28, 2012) (unpublished) (“The purpose of the statute is “to indemnify the
prevailing party” for legal expenses incurred in connection with the prevailing party's efforts to
establish that it was ‘not at fault or [was] the victim of another's fault.’”); Znt'l Leasing & Rental
Corp. v. Gann, Civ. No. 08-40, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172, at *3 (D.V.I. Mar. 23
2010) (unpublished) (same)
§11 Accordingly, although the term “prevailing party” is not defined by statute, “we adopt [a]
more liberal construction of ‘prevailing party,’” in order to give effect to the legislative intent
behind the enactment of section 541(b).” DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 645. But even before this Court held
that “prevailing party” should be liberally and broadly construed, courts in the Virgin Islands held
that a prevailing party is one “who has achieved at least some of the benefits which were sought
in the litigation, even if judgment is not obtained.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v.
Garcia, 72 V.1. 344, 347 (Super. Ct. 2020) (citing Isaac v. Crichlow, Case No. SX-12-CV-065
2016 V.I. LEXIS 145, at *3 (Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2016) (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Gov't
of the V.I., No. ST-09-CV-118, 2009 V.I. LEXIS 53, at *3 (Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (holding
that “[a] prevailing party in a civil action exists if ‘a party has achieved at least some of the benefits
which were sought in the litigation, even if a judgment is not finally obtained’”) and Jo-Ann’s
Launder Ctr. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 31 V.1. 226, 233 (D.V.I. 1995) (“[A] prevailing party is
one who has received ‘at least some of the benefits which were sought in the litigation, even if a
judgment is not finally obtained.’”). In our decision in DaCosta, where this Court held that The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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“prevailing party” should be liberally construed, we reaffirmed these constructions of the phrase
and endorsed the notion that total success on the merits is not a prerequisite for an award of
attorney’s fees, so long as a party has achieved at least some of the benefits it sought in the
litigation. DaCosta, 74 V.1. at 646 (“In this case, the Superior Court ruled in [plaintiffs] favor on
every disputed issue, and the monies awarded to [plaintiff] on those issues greatly exceed the sum
that she consented to pay to [defendant]. To hold, under these circumstances, that [plaintiff] is not
a prevailing party for purposes of section 541 would effectively elevate form over substance, and
improperly construe section 541 in the same manner as federal statutes providing limited
exceptions to the ‘American Rule *”): This interpretation of “prevailing party” is further
indicative of the flexibility applied by Virgin Islands courts in order to give effect to section 541(b)
412 However, Bourne cites to Rohn v. Daily News Publ'g Co., Inc., 72 V.1. 301 (Super. Ct
2019) for the proposition that because Bourne moved to dismiss its review and the Superior Court
granted its motion, KLB cannot be a prevailing party as no judgment on the merits was entered. In
Rohn, the plaintiff brought a defamation action which she failed to prosecute. /d. at 303-04. After
the court ordered sanctions prohibiting the plaintiff from offering any trial testimony which could
have been elicited at a deposition, the plaintiff moved to dismiss her own lawsuit with prejudice
Id. Thereafter, the defendant moved for attorney’s fees incurred in preparing for the suit. /d. In
analyzing whether the defendant was a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees, the Superior
Court noted that “[nJeither a judgment nor judicial decision has been rendered in Daily News
favor,” and that “where a judgment or judicial decision has not been rendered a defendant may not
recover fees when a plaintiff dismisses an action with prejudice absent exceptional circumstances.”
Rohn, 72 V.1. at 309, 310 (internal citations omitted). The Superior Court therefore denied the
defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees
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413 There are, however, several distinctions which render Rohn inapposite. Here, unlike in
Rohn, a decision has been rendered in KLB’s favor. KLB prevailed in the underlying FED action
when the Superior Court granted restitution of the premises, and the subsequent lengthy motion
practice in the Superior Court and the prohibition and mandamus actions in this Court solely
concerned the underlying FED judgment. Further, the cases supporting the Superior Court’s
decision in Rohn are primarily federal, and accordingly interpret and apply the American Rule on
attorney’s fees—which the Virgin Islands has explicitly abrogated. See Hansen, 68 V.I. at 613
Chief among these distinctions, however, is the fact that in the intervening period since Rohn was
decided this Court has held that the term “prevailing party” should be liberally and broadly
construed. This directive is in line with the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the American Rule and
to afford relief to the party who achieved at least some of the benefits they sought in the litigation
See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 644, 646. In light of these distinctions, Rohn is not persuasive authority
on the question of whether KLB is a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under the
circumstances presented
414 Applying a liberal and broad construction of the term “prevailing party” under DaCosta,
we find that KLB is the prevailing party. KLB prevailed on the merits in the underlying FED action
when the Superior Court granted restitution of the premises. Accordingly, when Bourne initiated
a review of that determination in the Superior Court, Bourne sought the benefit of having the
judgment reversed and retaining the subject premises. In defending the review, KLB sought the
benefit of preserving the magistrate judge’s decision and regaining possession of the subject
premises. When Bourne dismissed the review, KLB achieved “at least some of the benefits” it
sought in the litigation—indeed, KLB achieved the only benefit it sought in initiating the FED
action. See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 646. In effect, KLB occupies the position it would have if the The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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Superior Court entered judgment in its favor. Although Bourne unilaterally moved to dismiss the
review before the Superior Court could render judgment, this does not mean that neither party
prevailed in the litigation. The FED judgment in favor of KLB stands, and that is the primary
benefit sought by KLB in defending against Bourne’s review. Despite the fact that the Superior
Court did not render a judgment on the merits of the restitution issue, no one can question that
KLB achieved arguably the only benefit it sought from the litigation. Accordingly, we hold that
KLB is a prevailing party in the review
415 This construction of “prevailing party” follows our precedent and squares with
formulations that have already been applied in the Superior Court. See Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 72 V.1. at 347. This construction also comports with the legislative intent in
enacting section 541(b), which was to abolish the American Rule and allow for a prevailing party
to recover its attorney’s fees—an endeavor which requires a broad and liberal construction of the
statute. See DaCosta, 74 V.I. at 646-47
C Fees in The Underlying FED Matter
4.16 Bourne also argues that the Superior Court did not have authority to award attorney’s fees
incurred in the defense of the underlying FED matter, as a motion for costs and fees was never
before the Superior Court and attorney’s fees are not recoverable in FED cases
417 In the Virgin Islands, longstanding law prohibits the recovery of attorney’s fees in FED
actions. See 28 V.I.C. § 794 (providing that the total court fees and costs for the summary
proceedings provided for by this chapter shall be $2.00); C.AZL., Inc. v. Dunagan, 904 F.2d 189
191 (3d Cir. 1990) (Section 794 “specifically addressed to costs in FED proceedings prevails over
the general costs statute and . . . attorney's fees are not recoverable in FED proceedings.”); Jn re
The Bourne Law Office, 2024 VI 31, n.2 (“While the construction adopted by the Third Circuit The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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in C_M_L. is not binding on this Court, it is binding on the Superior Court until and unless this
Court adopts a different rule in an appropriate future case.”). Accordingly, any fees granted by the
Superior Court for work KLB performed in litigating the FED matter before the magistrate division
would be prohibited
€18 However, the Superior Court’s January 18, 2025 order granted attorney’s fees and costs
which KLB certified that it incurred in defending the review, and did not grant any fees or costs it
incurred in litigating the underlying FED matter. When the Superior Court entered its order, it
specifically noted that the grant of fees and costs “exclude[d] any time spent defending the matter
in the magistrate division.” Accordingly, the Superior Court’s grant of fees did not encompass
work Bourne performed in litigating the underlying FED action, and was thus proper. Therefore,
we decline to disturb the Superior Court’s award of fees on this ground
D Fees for the Mandamus Petition in the Supreme Court
419 Finally, Bourne argues that the Superior Court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to KLB
for work it performed while defending Bourne’s mandamus petition — which this Court granted
in part in Jn re: The Bourne Law Office, PLLC, 2024 V1 31—because that petition was “a separate
civil matter in a different court, over which the Superior Court has no jurisdiction.” Accordingly,
Bourne argues, the Superior Court lacked authority to award fees for work KLB performed outside
of the Superior Court review of the magistrate judge’s decision
420 In making this argument, Bourne provides no citation to statutory or case law. Bourne’s
argument on this point consists of three sentences, and is thus undeveloped. See Gourmet Gallery
Crown Bay, Inc. v. Crown Bay Marina, L.P., 68 V.1. 584, 600 (2018) (finding a three-sentence
argument to be perfunctory and waived under Rule 22(m)(3)). Accordingly, this argument is
waived because this issue is ““adverted to in a perfunctory manner” and “unsupported by argument The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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and citation to legal authority.” V.I.R. App. P. 22(m)(3). “This form of conclusory argument
deprives this Court of any meaningful opportunity to review an allegation of error.” FirstBank P.R
v. Harthman Leasing III, LLLP, 2025 VI 18, £48. Accordingly, we uphold the Superior Court’s
award of fees.*
Ill CONCLUSION
921 KLBisa prevailing party in the Superior Court review, because the term “prevailing party”
is to be interpreted liberally and broadly, and KLB achieved the benefit it sought in the review
The Superior Court’s grant of costs and fees was proper because it excluded work Bourne
performed in the underlying FED action, and Bourne’s argument that the Superior Court could not
award fees related to the mandamus petition is waived because it is unsupported by citation to the
record or statutory or case law. Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court’s grant of fees and costs
Dated this 17th day of September 2026
BY THE COURT:
am Ae
ees MARIA M../CAB
ssociate
4 We note that Rule 30(a) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure is the sole vehicle for parties to seek costs related to actions in this Court. Rule 30(a) provides, in pertinent part, “if a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, or a petition granted in part and denied in part, reasonable costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the Supreme Court.” V.1. R. App. P. 30(a) (emphasis added). Rule 30(a)’s mandatory language is demonstrative of the intent that this procedural provision control over section 541(b)’s general rule that attorney’s fees may be recovered in civil actions. This rule controls because “[t]he authority of this Court to create procedural rules and substantive law is concurrent with the Legislature,” World Fresh Mkts., LLC v. Palermo, 74 V.1. 455, 461 (V.I. 2021), and where this Court has enacted a procedural rule, that rule controls over a procedural statute enacted by the Legislature. See id. See also Haynes v. Ottley, 61 V.1. 547, 561 (V.1. 2014) (quoting V./. Pub. Servs. Comm'n v. V.L Water & Power Auth., 49 V.I. 478, 485 (V.1. 2008)) (“[T]he more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one, unless it appears the Legislature intended for the more general to control, or for both statutes to apply concurrently.”); Hansen v. Bryan 68 V.I. 603, 613 n.6 (V.I. 2018) (“[T]he Legislature intends for section 541 to operate as a general rule in all civil cases, to be deviated from only in cases where the Legislature enacts a statute imposing a different standard.”). Parties seeking costs related to actions in this case should thus follow the procedure set out by Rule 30 The Bourne Law Office, PLLC v. KLB Realty, LLC
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ATTEST:
DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ
Clerk of the Court
By Z 74
hy
Deputy Clerk
Dated rik Wo