[Cite as Salvo-Hill v. Univ. Hosp. Geauga Med. Ctr., 2026-Ohio-3629.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CARMELA SALVO-HILL, EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLA R.
SALVO, DECEASED, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 115735
v. :
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS GEAUGA
MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 17, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-23-975742
Appearances:
Law Offices of Georg Abakumov LLC, and Georg I.
Abakumov; Flowers & Grube, Paul W. Flowers, for
appellant.
Tucker Ellis LLP, Michael J. Ruttinger, Edward E. Taber,
John A. Favret, III, and Kristin Volk, for appellees.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Carmela Salvo-Hill, Executor of the Estate of
Isabella R. Salvo (“Carmela”), appeals the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees University Hospitals Geauga Medical
Center, UH Regional Hospitals, University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, and
University Hospitals Health System, Inc. (collectively “UH”). She raises the
following single assignment of error for review:
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by granting summary judgment
without explanation upon [Carmela’s] wrongful death and survivorship
claims.
Finding that genuine issues of material fact exist, we reverse the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
This appeal arises from the death of Isabella R. Salvo (“Isabella”) and
the injuries she sustained while being transported by wheelchair to her daughter
Carmela’s car during her discharge from University Hospitals Geauga Medical
Center (“UH Geauga”). Carmela, as the Executor of Isabella’s Estate, initiated a
wrongful-death and survivorship action against UH.1 In the amended complaint,
Carmela alleged that Isabella was admitted to UH Geauga on February 10, 2021,
because of back pain. On February 19, 2021, the day of Isabella’s discharge, Carmela
was instructed to park her car at the front entrance of the hospital and wait for a UH
employee, later identified as UH Patient Transporter Suzanne Freeman
(“Freeman”), to bring Isabella by wheelchair. Carmela further alleged that Freeman
1 Carmela filed her initial complaint in February 2023. We note that with her initial
complaint, Carmela contemporaneously filed a motion for extension of time to submit affidavit of merit “out of an abundance of caution.” (Carmela’s Appellate Brief, p. 5.) Carmela then attached the affidavit of merit to her amended complaint in August 2023. stopped the wheelchair near her car, instructed Carmela to not approach or assist in
any way, and instructed another UH Geauga employee, later identified as Patient
Transporter Bruce Morrissey (“Morrissey”), “who was standing in the immediate
area, not to approach or assist.” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 10, 2023.) Freeman
then lifted Isabella from the wheelchair and attempted to place her into Carmela’s
car. Carmela alleged that while doing so, Freeman dropped Isabella “to the
pavement and then, in what would prove to be a series of failed efforts, attempted to
pick up [Isabella] from the ground several times, dropped [Isabella] several more
times, and caused [Isabella] to repeatedly strike the pavement, the wheelchair, and
the automobile sill and door.” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 10, 2023.)
Carmela alleged that UH breached the duty and standard of care that
it owed to Isabella to transport her properly and safely from UH Geauga when
Freeman provided “ancillary services” and attempted to “singlehandedly transfer
[Isabella] to Carmela’s car” and when it required “a Hoyer sling and the assistance
of several staff persons to initially seat [Isabella] into the wheelchair[.]” (Amended
Complaint, Aug. 10, 2023.) And, as a direct and proximate result of “negligent
and/or negligence per se acts” and omissions of UH, Isabella died on February 26,
2021. (Amended Complaint, Aug. 10, 2023.) Isabella’s death certificate listed the
immediate cause of death as the “failure to thrive with recent extremity blunt impact
injuries” and described her injuries as “fell to the ground while being handled.”
(Isabella’s Death Certificate, Mar. 12, 2021.)
Carmela further alleged that, as a direct and proximate result of
Isabella’s wrongful death, her children and next of kin suffered, “inter alia, mental
anguish, loss of services, loss of society including loss of companionship, care,
assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, counsel and other such damages
set forth in [R.C. Ch.] 2125.” (Amended Complaint, Aug. 10, 2023.)
In response, UH filed an answer to Carmela’s amended complaint,
denying liability and asserting several affirmative defenses, including that Carmela’s
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and it has “immunity from
liability for some or all of [Carmela’s] claims, including but not limited to immunity
granted pursuant to [R.C. 2305.2311], House Bill 606, and any further similar
statutory immunity granted by the Ohio General Assembly and/or federal law
including the PREP Act, 42 U.S.C. §247d-6d, et seq., as amended.”2 (UH Answer,
Aug. 24, 2023.) UH further asserted that it was “immune from liability for health
care and emergency services provided during a government-declared disaster or
emergency.” (UH Answer, Aug. 24, 2023.)
The parties proceeded with discovery, which included the depositions
of Carmela, Freeman, Morrissey, Amolak Sandhu, M.D. (“Dr. Sandhu”), and UH
Patient Family Experience Coordinator/Clinical Nurse Advisor Laura Cook
2 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606, which will be explained in more detail below, was enacted
by the General Assembly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to “make temporary changes related to qualified civil immunity for health care and emergency services provided during a government-declared disaster or emergency and for exposure to or transmission or contraction of certain coronaviruses.”
(“Cook”). The following is a summary of the deposition testimony relevant to this
appeal.
Isabella, who was 83 years old at the time, was admitted to UH
Geauga for back pain. Carmela called for an ambulance because Isabella “was
having so much back pain she was having trouble getting out of bed.” (Carmela
Depo., p. 107.) According to Carmela, hospital staff told her that “sepsis arthritis
was causing the back pain.” (Carmela Depo., p. 107.) While in the hospital, Isabella
was diagnosed with “COVID-19 pneumonia” and a “MSSA bacteremia” infection.3
After more than a week of treatment, Isabella’s medical care team
determined that she was medically stable for discharge. Isabella’s doctors wanted
to place Isabella in a skilled nursing facility. Carmela, however, had some concerns,
including the COVID-19 pandemic, so she opted to care for Isabella at home with
the help of a 24-hour-home-health care aide and family members and arranged to
transport Isabella from the hospital. Carmela testified that she was not permitted
to visit Isabella because of the restrictions on hospital visitation during the COVID19 pandemic.
Dr. Sandhu, the UH Geauga Hospitalist in charge of Isabella’s care,
confirmed that her COVID-19 pneumonia and bacteremia infection improved from
the time he first examined her to her discharge. With regard to the bacteremia
3 “MSSA Bacteremia occurs when the MSSA bacteria enters your bloodstream. [It]
is a serious infection that has a high risk of complications and death.” WebMD, What Is MSSA Bacteremia?, https://www.webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/what-ismssa-bacteremia (accessed Aug. 13, 2026) [https://perma.cc/REN9-S6LZ]. infection, Dr. Sandhu stated that “the repeat blood cultures from [Isabella’s]
infection . . . were . . . cleared up.” (Dr. Sandhu Depo., p. 20.) As to Isabella’s
COVID-19 infection, Dr. Sandhu testified that this infection resolved by the time of
discharge, noting that on admission she required oxygen, but “at the time of
discharge, she was on room air, did not require any oxygen.” (Dr. Sandhu Depo.,
p. 20.) According to Dr. Sandhu, Isabella was medically stable for discharge:
[M]edically she was stable for discharge, like, from my standpoint.
From her COVID standpoint, you know, from her infection standpoint,
she was medically stable, you know, for discharge. You know, whether
that be home, yeah, that’s, you know, the family’s right and decision
that they can make. But yeah, she was medically cleared, from my
standpoint, for discharge, 100%.
(Dr. Sandhu Depo., p. 27-28.) Dr. Sandhu recommended six weeks of intravenous
antibiotics upon discharge. He also testified that the details regarding Isabella’s
discharge process were not a part of her medical care. Once he issued the discharge
summary, how the discharge is handled is “out of [his] hands” and is “now in the
hands of either nursing care, case management, or social work,” who would decide
“how many people it would take to transport [the patient], how [the patient] would
get from [their] room to the transport vehicle . . . how [the patient] would get from
the transport vehicle to wherever [they were] headed, whether it was home or to
another medical facility[.]” (Dr. Sandhu Depo., p. 32-33.)
At the time of Isabella’s discharge, Freeman assisted Isabella with the
wheelchair-to-car transport. She brought a wheelchair to Isabella’s room. According to Freeman, a “Hoyer lift” was not used to move Isabella.4 (Freeman
Depo., p. 30.) Rather, Isabella was sitting on the edge of her bed when the nurse
and the nurse’s aide assisted Isabella from her bed into the wheelchair, which was
locked, while Freeman held onto the wheelchair’s handles. From there, Freeman
pushed Isabella to Carmela’s car, which was parked outside the main entrance of the
building. Isabella was still dressed in her hospital gown and had a blanket covering
her. Morrissey waited outside of Isabella’s room and accompanied them with the
transport to Carmela’s car. He walked in front of them, clearing bystanders from
the hallway and opening doors for Freeman during the transport.
Because of the pandemic, UH Geauga had a policy, at that time,
regarding the transport of COVID-19 patients to help control the spread of COVID19. According to UH’s COVID-19 policy, one “clean person” and one “dirty person”
were required during patient transport. Both Freeman and Morrissey testified that
during Isabella’s transport, Freeman was the “dirty person” and Morrissey was the
“clean person.” The “dirty person” wore protective gear or “PPE” (masks, gloves,
and gowns) and was the only person permitted to physically handle or assist the
patient during transport. (Morrissey Depo., p. 31.) Freeman described the role of
the “clean person” as the person “who escort[s her] down the hallway, get[s] the
doors for [her], [and] keep[s] other people away.” (Freeman Depo., p. 25.) The
“clean person” did not wear protective gear, did not touch the patient, and was
4 Freeman described a Hoyer lift as “a sling device that’s hooked onto a pole, and
it’s for assistance lifting a heavy patient.” (Freeman Depo., p. 16.) responsible for maintaining distance to reduce contact and contamination risk.
Therefore, as the “clean person,” Morrissey was not “contaminated” and tried “to
keep everybody away from [Freeman and Isabella].” (Morrissey Depo., p. 31.)
When the three of them arrived at Carmela’s car, Morrissey opened
the car door and then stood at a distance, as the policy required, while Freeman,
alone and as the policy required, began her standard process of moving Isabella from
the wheelchair to the vehicle. This typically involved lining up and locking the
wheelchair and unlocking the legs to swing them out of the way. Freeman positioned
Isabella so that she was facing the car and Freeman was facing Isabella, with
Freeman’s back to the vehicle. Isabella then stood up with Freeman’s assistance.
Freeman placed her arms under Isabella’s armpits to help guide her up. Isabella
started to go down, so Freeman grabbed her tighter in an attempt to keep Isabella
upright. Freeman, however, was unable to keep Isabella upright on her own, and as
a result, Isabella went down to the pavement, while Freeman went down to her
knees. At this point, Isabella was on the ground and Freeman was holding Isabella
up so “she [was] not laying . . . completely on the ground.”5 (Freeman Depo., p. 54.)
Freeman recalled that Isabella only hit the ground once. She did not
recall picking Isabella up and Isabella dropping again or Isabella hitting Carmela’s
car. Morrissey also recalled that Isabella hit the ground once and did not hit
Carmela’s car. According to Morrissey, when Isabella went down, her head did not
5 We note that there is video of the incident that the parties watched in preparation
for their depositions, which was not admitted into evidence and is not included in the record before us.
hit the ground and Isabella “never went from that squat position because [Freeman]
held her there.” (Morrissey Depo., p. 56.) Morrissey further testified that there was
snow on the ground that day and it was cold out.
Morrissey then offered Freeman assistance, but Freeman refused
because he was the “clean person.” According to Freeman, Morrissey moved the
wheelchair when Isabella fell to the ground. Carmela then ran into the emergency
department for help. Freeman stayed with Isabella, lifting her so that she was not
completely on the ground, until additional hospital personnel arrived on the scene
to assist. Morrissey stated that there were “four, maybe even five people” who lifted
Isabella off the ground and into the wheelchair. (Morrissey Depo., p. 60.)
Freeman testified that Carmela told her, “I don’t blame you.”
(Freeman Depo., p. 63.) Freeman further testified that she “did not tell Carmela at
that point, ‘it took three people to get her into a chair in the room, I don’t know how
they expect me to do this myself,”’ stating that there were “only two [people] in the
room.” (Freeman Depo., p. 64.) Freeman also did not recall telling Carmela that
‘“they didn’t tell me [Isabella] wasn’t ambulatory[.]’” (Freeman Depo., p. 64.)
Carmela testified as to how Freeman attempted to move Isabella into
the car. Carmela did not understand why Freeman was struggling with getting
Isabella into the car because Isabella would usually get “up out of the chair and [get]
right in the car” and “nobody told [Carmela that her] mom could not stand up on
her own and get in the car.” (Carmela Depo., p. 142-143.) Carmela asked Freeman
if Morrissey could help and Freeman replied, “[N]o, he’s not allowed to help me. He’s my clean guy.” (Carmela Depo., p. 142.) According to Carmela, she put a pillow
on the ground between her car and Isabella because she was worried about the
wheelchair causing a wound to Isabella’s leg and Freeman was “worried about the
ground.” (Carmela Depo., p. 150.) At that point, the wheelchair was out of the way.
Carmela could not remember if she moved it or if Morrissey did.
Carmela described the incident as “it wasn’t a fall. . . . [Freeman] has
her, and she can’t hang on to her anymore, so she sets her on the ground. So that’s
when she told me to get help because she can’t do this . . . and by that time [Isabella]
is laying on the ground.” (Carmela Depo., p. 153.) Freeman tried to help Isabella
stand up but was unable to do so.6 Freeman then asked Carmela to get help.
Carmela testified that Freeman stated to her, “I don’t know why they thought I could
do this. It took three of us to get her in a wheelchair.” (Carmela Depo., p. 144.)
Carmela ran into the emergency department and said, “[P]lease, we need help, we
need help, can somebody bring a gurney, can somebody please help[.]” (Carmela
Depo., p. 143.) When she returned, she tried to assist Isabella, but a UH Geauga
police officer had her stand back. Carmela testified that it took five people to get
Isabella back into the wheelchair. They then wheeled her into the emergency
department.
6 In Carmela’s appellate brief, she states, “Freeman failed, several times, to pick
Isabella up from the ground causing her to ‘repeatedly strike the pavement, the wheelchair, and the automobile sill and door.’” (Carmela’s Brief, p. 4, quoting paragraph 18 of her amended complaint and citing page 143 of her deposition transcript.) Our de novo review of the record, however, including page 143 of Carmela’s deposition testimony did not reveal any reference to Freeman “failing several times to pick up Isabella and causing her to repeatedly strike the pavement, the wheelchair, or the automobile sill and door.”
Carmela spoke with Cook while in the emergency department.
Carmela explained to Cook what happened and told her that she “was very upset”
and if Isabella “wasn’t able to get in [her] car, [then] why didn’t somebody tell [her].”
(Carmela Depo., p. 146.) Carmela remembered saying to Cook, “[i]f somebody had
half a brain, they should have said she’s unable to get into a car, we could use
transport to get her home.” (Carmela Depo., p. 146.) Carmela also asked why Cook
did not recommend transport again if Isabella was not able to move and they offered
it the previous day. Following their conversation, Carmela was allowed to see
Isabella in the emergency department. She described her mother as having “bruises
and wounds” all over “her arms, her legs, her chest, [and] her neck” and “blood all
over the blanket[.]” (Carmela Depo., p. 147.) Isabella passed away a week later, with
the medical examiner specifying “blunt impact injuries” as the cause of her death.
Carmela could not state whether Isabella still had trouble walking at
the time of discharge or whether Isabella was physically able to get in and out of a
car on the day she was discharged because she was not able to see her. Carmela,
however, did tell Isabella’s nurse that she was concerned about Isabella going home
if she was still in pain and if that problem was not resolved.
Cook testified that as a Patient Family Experience Coordinator, she is
available as a resource for patients if they have questions, concerns, or complaints
and if they need help. She first got involved with Isabella’s hospital stay when
Carmela left a message for her on February 18, 2021, regarding assistance with home
health care and discharge planning. Cook had a conference call with Carmela, a transitional care coordinator, and the assistant head nurse. The concern that day
was with Isabella’s discharge because physical therapy recommended 24-hour care
and Carmela needed more time to set up for the home care. Carmela testified that
Cook mentioned during their call that they could send Isabella “home in an
ambulance” on February 18 because Carmela was at work. (Carmela Depo., p. 123.)
Because Carmela did not have the 24-hour home health care set up yet, they agreed
to discharge Isabella the next day. Cook testified that she did not recall “offering a
transport vehicle when [she] first learned that there was some . . . issue with getting
[Isabella] out of the hospital on the 18th[.]” (Cook Depo., p. 29.)
Cook received a call from the emergency department after the
incident to speak with Carmela. From what Cook could recall, she remembered
Carmela stating something along the lines that they dropped Isabella in the parking
lot. Carmela made a comment to her that Isabella “was too weak to be sent home in
a wheelchair and in a car, that it had taken three people to get her in the wheelchair
and only had one transporter. That it wasn’t [Freeman’s] fault . . . they should have
never put her in that position.” (Cook Depo., p. 34.) According to Cook, Carmela’s
“biggest concern” was “who said it was okay to send her home in a wheelchair in the
car? And why didn’t they offer [her] transport to home? That’s negligence, and the
situation wasn’t taken seriously.” (Cook Depo., p. 35.)
Following discovery, UH moved for summary judgment, asserting
immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 (“H.B. 606”) because the health care services
it rendered concerning Isabella’s discharge and transport are linked to her medical care and treatment as a COVID-19 patient.7 UH further asserted that Carmela failed
to produce an expert report as required to establish a wrongful-death medicalnegligence claim. Lastly, UH contended that Carmela’s survivorship cause of action
qualified as a “medical claim” and was barred by the one-year statute of limitations
set forth in R.C. 2305.113.
Carmela opposed the motion, arguing that H.B. 606 has no relevance
to her claims because her case is one of ordinary negligence and even if her claims
could be considered medical, UH is not afforded protection under H.B. 606 because
Isabella’s injuries occurred following her medical treatment and were not incident
to her COVID-19 diagnoses. Carmela further argued that her wrongful-death claim
can exist outside of a medical-malpractice claim. Lastly, with regard to the lack of
an expert report, Carmela argued that expert testimony is not required when a
common knowledge exception applies.
In September 2025, the trial court granted UH’s motion. In its
journal entry granting the motion, the court stated: “The court, having considered
all of the evidence and having construed the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving parties, determines that there remain no genuine issues of material fact
and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Journal Entry,
Sept. 25, 2025.)
7 The record reflects that in March 2025, UH moved for a judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), which Carmela opposed. The trial court denied UH’s motion in April 2025.
It is from this order that Carmela appeals, raising one assignment of
error for review challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in UH’s
favor.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment
de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). In a de novo
review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and
independently reviews the record to determine whether the denial of summary
judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any
material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving
party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made. Id., citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217 (1994).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
demonstrating that no material issues of fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio
St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary
judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving
party must then point to evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 293. Trial courts should
award summary judgment only after resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving
party and finding that “‘reasonable minds can reach only an adverse conclusion’”
against the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359 (1992), quoting Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2 (1982).
Additionally, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is not
permitted to weigh the evidence or choose among reasonable inferences. Dupler v.
Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121 (1980). Rather, the court must
evaluate the evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of
credibility in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
B. Explanation in the Order Granting Summary Judgment
Carmela first argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide an
explanation when it granted summary judgment in UH’s favor. UH contends that
detailed opinion by the trial court identifying its reasons for granting summary
judgment is not required because this court exercises de novo review over summary
judgment.
In support of her argument, Carmela relies on caselaw from the Ninth
District Court of Appeals and contends that the trial court’s judgment should be
reversed and the matter remanded so the trial court can create an entry sufficient to
permit appellate review. See Pitts v. Sibert, 2015-Ohio-3020 (9th Dist.); MSRK,
L.L.C. v. Twinsburg, 2012-Ohio-2608 (9th Dist.); Mourton v. Finn, 2012-Ohio3341 (9th Dist.); Zemla v. Zemla, 2012-Ohio-2829 (9th Dist.); Covender v. State, 2019-Ohio-3715 (9th Dist.); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Tillman, 2018-Ohio-629 (9th
Dist.); Hunt v. Alderman, 2015-Ohio-4667 (9th Dist.). Carmela asks this court to
adopt the Ninth District’s reasoning. We decline to do so.
We have previously addressed this exact argument and have declined
to accept it. In Ferguson v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., 2022-Ohio-3133 (8th Dist.),
we recognized the caselaw from the Ninth District and held: “With due respect to,
and after consideration of, these nonbinding conclusions, there is no reason to
remand in this case.” Id. at ¶ 65. We reasoned:
Because our review of the trial court’s order is de novo . . . [w]e review
the evidence “as if for the first time.” Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d
349, 353, 2016-Ohio-8374, 75 N.E.3d 161. We afford no deference to
the trial court’s decision and independently review the record to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. It is as if the
motion and evidence therein is first reviewed at the appellate level.
[Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105]; Argabrite at ¶ 14. There is no
requirement under Civ.R. 56 that a trial court provide reasons for its
decision. Sterling Contr. LLC v. Main Event Ent., LP, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 110965, 2022-Ohio-2138, ¶ 12 (citing Medina ex rel.
Jocke v. Medina, 9th Dist. Medina No. 20CA0044-M, 2021-Ohio-4353,
¶ 22). And, because a motion for summary judgment does not involve
factfinding, there is no requirement for findings of fact under Civ.R. 52.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at ¶ 60-61.
The trial court’s choice to not set forth detailed reasons for granting
summary judgment is not a basis for reversal in this case. Id. at ¶ 71. While
ultimately we reverse the trial court’s judgment, the court’s failure to set forth
detailed reasons for granting summary judgment is not the basis for reversal.
Having found that the trial court was not required to provide reasons
for its decision granting UH’s motion for summary judgment, we next address the
merits of Carmela’s appeal.
C. H.B. 606
We begin our analysis with the discussion of H.B. 606, which was
enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and “applies to acts, omissions,
conduct, decisions, or compliance from the date of the Governor’s Executive Order
2020-01D, issued March 9, 2020, declaring a state of emergency due to COVID-19
through September 30, 2021.” Id. at Section 4. H.B. 606, Section (B)(1), gives
immunity to
a health care provider that provides health care services, emergency
medical services, first-aid treatment, or other emergency professional
care, including the provision of any medication or other medical
equipment or product, as a result of or in response to a disaster or
emergency is not subject to professional disciplinary action and is not
liable in damages to any person or government agency in a tort action
for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from
any of the following:
(a) An act or omission of the health care provider in the health care
provider’s provision, withholding, or withdrawal of those services;
(b) Any decision related to the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of
those services;
(c) Compliance with an executive order or director’s order issued
during and in response to the disaster or emergency.
(Emphasis added.)
H.B. 606’s immunity does not apply if “the health care provider’s
action, omission, decision, or compliance constitutes a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of the patient or intentional
misconduct or willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person against whom
the action is brought.” H.B. 606, Section 1(B)(2).
Carmela argues that her wrongful-death and survivorship claims are
based upon principles of ordinary negligence and do not qualify as a “medical claim”
within the meaning of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). Carmela notes that her amended
complaint does not challenge any medical care or any COVID-19 medical diagnosis
or treatment. According to Carmela, the definition of a medical claim “does not
extend to non-medical hospital staff members who carelessly drop discharged
former patients in parking lots.” (Carmela’s Brief, p. 10.) She further contends that
the immunity provided under H.B. 606 does not apply to UH because Isabella’s
injuries occurred following her medical treatment, were unrelated to any medical
procedure, and were not incident to her COVID-19 diagnoses.8 Additionally, she
argues that the plain language of H.B. 606 limits immunity to providers within the
scope of their field in response to medical decisions related to the COVID-19
emergency during the time period set forth in the order.
UH contends that it is entitled to immunity under H.B. 606 because
Isabella received health care services by a health provider, which were as the result
of or in response to the COVID-19 emergency. According to UH, H.B. 606 does not
hinge on whether a claim is a “medical claim” under R.C. 2305.113. Rather, H.B. 606
8 Alternatively, Carmela contends that even if her claim for ordinary negligence
could be considered a medical claim, H.B. 606’s immunity does not afford UH protection because a defendant’s recklessness is an exception to immunity.
speaks in terms of broadly defined “health care services” and covers all decisions
and acts integral to delivering those services during the emergency. UH contends
that Carmela’s attempt to characterize her claim as “ordinary negligence” and
separate “discharge and transport decisions from medical treatment” does not alter
H.B. 606’s applicability. (UH’s Brief, p. 13.) While Carmela argues that her claim is
not a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113 because the injuries occurred following
Isabella’s medical treatment and were unrelated to any medical procedure, she also
argues that H.B. 606 does not afford UH any immunity because Isabella’s fall was
unrelated to any medical procedure or any COVID-19 medical diagnosis or
treatment. In other words, UH’s transport of Isabella by wheelchair to Carmela’s
car following her discharge does not constitute “healthcare services” as set forth in
H.B. 606.
Our analysis of the issue of immunity under H.B. 606 has uncovered
little development in that area of the law, but our review has revealed an appellate
case from the Tenth District, which has analyzed the issue — Samadder v. Ohio
State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 2024-Ohio-6104 (10th Dist.).9
In Samadder, the plaintiff was admitted as a patient for treatment of
COVID-19, which required placement on a ventilator and catheter. Plaintiff alleged
that the placement of the catheter caused “a perforation to her right ventricle which
9 Other than Samadder, trial courts have interpreted the extent to which immunity
may be afforded through H.B. 606, focusing on the “treatment directly related to or impacted by COVID-19, not treatment that merely took place during the time period the state of emergency was in effect.” Knoblauch v. Mercy Health, Lucas C.P. No. CI0202203410, 2025 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 2001, at *9 (May 28, 2025).
required an emergency sternotomy and repair. She further alleged that she
experienced swelling and a loss of pulse in her left arm following that procedure.”
Id. at ¶ 2. The hospital filed for summary judgment pursuant to H.B. 606, arguing
that it is entitled to immunity under H.B. 606. The court of claims granted summary
judgment in favor of the hospital, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the
Samadder Court found that the plain language of H.B. 606 “conditions its
application on whether the healthcare services at issue were provided ‘as a result of’
the COVID-19 pandemic, not whether the standard of care was altered by the
pandemic.” Id. at ¶ 18. Ultimately, the defendant was afforded immunity because
the court found that the treatment at issue was “inextricably linked to her treatment
as a COVID-19 patient.” Id.
UH argues that Samadder applies to this case because the “healthcare
services” at issue were provided “as a result of” the COVID-19 pandemic. More
specifically, the discharge decision, method of transport, and division of roles
between “clean” and “dirty” transport personnel were adopted “as a result of” the
pandemic and implemented during the emergency period in direct response to
infection-control concerns. Whereas, Carmela argues that while UH accurately
observed that H.B. 606(1)(B)(1) provides immunity “‘as a result of’ the COVID-19
pandemic, not whether the standard of care was altered by the pandemic,’ it fails to
reveal that “the treatment at issue” in Samadder was “inextricably linked to her
treatment as a COVID-19 patient.” Id. at ¶ 18. We agree with Carmela that
Samadder is distinguishable.
In Samadder, 2024-Ohio-6104 (10th Dist.), it was not possible to
“divorce [the plaintiff’s] treatment at [the hospital] from the pandemic.” Id. That is
not the situation in the matter before us. Rather, our focus is on whether the
wheelchair transport in this case constitutes “health care services” under H.B. 606,
which is defined as:
services rendered by a health care provider for the diagnosis,
prevention, treatment, cure, or relief of a health condition, illness,
injury, or disease, including the provisions of any medication, medical
equipment, or other medical product. “Health care services” includes
personal care services and experiential treatment.
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606, Section 1(A)(21).
Therefore, in order to determine if summary judgment was proper,
we must determine if Freeman’s wheelchair transport of Isabella to Carmela’s car,
following Isabella’s discharge from UH, constituted service for the “diagnosis,
prevention, treatment, cure, or relief of a health condition, illness, injury, or
disease[.]” (Emphasis added.) Id. Because Ohio law is sparse regarding H.B. 606,
we turn to the definition of a medical claim as set forth in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) for
guidance.
D. Healthcare Services and Medical Claim
“Medical claim” is defined in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) as “any claim that
is asserted in any civil action against a physician [or] . . . hospital . . . against any
employee or agent of a physician [or] hospital . . . and that arises out of the medical
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.” (Emphasis added.) In Estate of Stevic
v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 2009-Ohio-1525, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the “term ‘medical claim’ as defined in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) has two
components that the statute states in the conjunctive: (1) the claim is asserted
against one or more of the specifically enumerated medical providers and (2) the
claim arises out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment.” Id. at ¶ 18.
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the “terms ‘medical
diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’ are terms of art having a specific and particular meaning
relating to the identification and alleviation of a physical or mental illness, disease,
or defect.” Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 557 (1993), citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990). Whereas, “the word ‘care’ is a general word without a
specific legal meaning until placed in a particular context.” Id. “‘[C]are’ as used in
R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) (where the word is preceded by terms such as ‘physician,’
‘hospital,’ ‘nurse,’ and ‘medical diagnosis’) means the prevention or alleviation of a
physical or mental defect or illness.”10 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court has
instructed that the term “care” as used in “R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) should not be broadly
interpreted when the context in which it is used is properly understood.” Id.
Here, Carmela contends that her wrongful-death and survivorship
claims do not qualify as a “medical claim” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.113. She
concedes that UH is among the specifically enumerated hospital “employees”
against which a medical claim may be brought. Rather, Carmela argues the claims
do not arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of UH. Carmela
10 The Ohio Supreme Court in Browning defined “medical claim” as used in a prior
but analogous version of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3).
contends that the above-definition of “medical claim” “does not extend to nonmedical hospital staff members who carelessly drop discharged former patients in
parking lots.” (Carmela’s Appellate Brief, p. 10.) In support of her argument,
Carmela cites to several cases, including O’Dell v. Vrable III, 2022-Ohio-4156 (4th
Dist.); Rome v. Flower Mem. Hosp., 70 Ohio St.3d 14 (1994); Christian v. Kettering
Med. Ctr., 2017-Ohio-7928 (2d Dist.); and Hill v. Wadsworth-Rittman Area Hosp.,
2009-Ohio-5421 (9th Dist.), for the proposition that her claim is not a “medical
claim.” We review each case in turn.
In O’Dell, an elderly patient fell and broke her hip while in her room
at a nursing home. She died shortly after the fall, and her son as her personal
representative filed a complaint against the nursing home and other corporate and
individual defendants. No one observed the patient fall, and the complaint alleged
both medical-malpractice and ordinary negligence claims. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that all of the claims were “medical claims”
under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) and that all ordinary negligence claims should be
dismissed. The trial court agreed and dismissed all but the medical claims. Id. at
¶ 17.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court erred when it
determined that all his claims were a single medical claim and dismissed all his
remaining claims, except the medical claim as alleged in Counts 6 and 7. Plaintiff
argued that the trial court incorrectly applied the definition of “medical claim” in R.C. 2305.113(E) to include acts of ordinary negligence, contending that a “fall” is
not a medical claim. Id. at ¶ 26.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff’s
claims were not limited to medical claims, noting that falls can be general negligence
claims, depending upon the factual circumstances. Id., 2022-Ohio-4156, at ¶ 40
(4th Dist.). “When a person falls because of the negligent use of medical equipment
during a medical procedure, it is a medical claim,” but when “the fall does not arise
out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, the fall gives rise to a general negligence
claim, not a medical claim.” Id. at ¶ 40, 42. Furthermore, the O’Dell Court listed
four factors to consider when deciding whether the claim was a medical claim:
“(1) whether the equipment ‘was used for “the prevention or alleviation
of a physical or mental defect or illness;’” (2) ‘whether the equipment
was “an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure;’” (3) whether
‘use of the equipment “arose out of” a physician ordered treatment;’
and (4) whether ‘use of the equipment required a “certain amount” of
professional expertise or professional skill.’”
Id. at ¶ 43, quoting McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., 2013-Ohio-1618, ¶ 21, quoting
Conkin v. CHS-Ohio Valley, 2012-Ohio-2816, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), quoting Browning, 66
Ohio St.3d at 557, and Rome, 70 Ohio St.3d at 16-17.
In finding that plaintiff’s claim was an ordinary negligence claim, the
O’Dell Court explained:
[The patient] was found on the floor of her room at 1:30 a.m. No one
witnessed her fall. She was not being transported to or from a medical
procedure. There was not any evidence that she was being assisted with
any medical equipment for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis,
care, or treatment, nor was she using medical equipment that was
ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of a medical procedure. If
we infer that she was attempting to use the bathroom, her use of the
bathroom did not involve the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect or illness. Her injury did not arise out of medical
diagnosis, care, or treatment and, therefore, did not give rise to a
medical claim. Her claim states a common law general negligence
claim, not a medical claim.
Id. at ¶ 49.
In Rome, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the circumstances
under which the allegedly negligent use of medical equipment is considered a
“medical claim.” The Rome Court held that the “term ‘medical claim’ as defined in
R.C. 2305.11 includes a claim for a hospital employee’s negligent use of hospital
equipment while caring for a patient which allegedly results in an injury to the
patient.”11 Id. at syllabus.
Rome was a consolidated case involving two separate plaintiffs. One
of the plaintiffs was a hospital patient who fell from a wheelchair during transport
to physician-ordered physical therapy. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the
transport of the patient by hospital staff to physician-prescribed physical therapy
was “ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of his physical therapy treatment”
and, therefore, his claim was a medical claim because it resulted from the patient’s
care or treatment. Id., 70 Ohio St.3d at 16.
As to the other plaintiff, the Rome Court also held that her fall was a
“medical claim” when a radiological intern failed to fasten the footboard to the base
11 We note that just as in Browning, in Rome, the Ohio Supreme Court defined
“medical claim” as used in a prior but analogous version of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). of radiology table causing the patient to fall when the table was tilted for the X-ray
procedure. The Court stated:
[W]e find that the process of securing Barbara Rome to a radiology
table is ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of the
administration of the X-ray procedure which was ordered to identify
and alleviate her medical complaints. Furthermore, at the time of her
injury, Mrs. Rome was a patient at Flower and was being assisted by an
employee of Flower, which employee was required to exercise a certain
amount of professional expertise in preparing the patient for X-ray.
Accordingly, we conclude that Rome’s claim arises out of “medical
diagnosis, care, or treatment” relating to the identification and
alleviation of a physical or mental illness, disease, or defect.
Id.
In Christian, the plaintiff arrived in her friend’s car to the emergency
department. Id., 2017-Ohio-7928, at ¶ 3 (2d Dist.). A registered nurse, who was
working in the emergency room, brought a wheelchair to the car and attempted to
transfer the plaintiff from the car to the wheelchair. “The attempt was unsuccessful,
for reasons that are in dispute, and [the plaintiff] ended up on the ground. [The
nurse] called for assistance, and [the plaintiff] was lifted onto a gurney and
transported into the emergency department.” Id.
The Second District Court of Appeals determined that the transfer
from the car to the wheelchair was not an inherent part of a medical procedure or
physician-ordered treatment and did not give rise to a “medical claim.” The
Christian Court stated, “[The nurse’s] act of transferring [the plaintiff] from the
[friend’s] vehicle to the wheelchair was simply for the purpose of allowing [the plaintiff] to enter the hospital, where she could then seek medical attention.” Id. at
¶ 31.
The Christian Court included a summary of cases from other
appellate districts that found that injuries alleged from falls gave rise to general
negligence claims, not medical claims:
[C]ourts have held that the plaintiff did not assert a “medical claim”
when the injury allegedly arose from (1) falling out of a wheelchair
while on the way to lunch at an assisted living facility, Eichenberger v.
Woodlands Assisted Living Residence, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-5354, 25
N.E.3d 355 (10th Dist.); (2) falling while attempting to stand from a
wheelchair outside the hospital upon discharge, Hill v. WadsworthRittman Area Hosp., 185 Ohio App.3d 788, 2009-Ohio-5421, 925
N.E.2d 1012 (9th Dist.); (3) falling while going from a hospital bed to
the bathroom, Balascoe v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., 110 Ohio
App.3d 83, 673 N.E.2d 651 (7th Dist.1996); and (4) falling backwards
while washing hands in a bathroom while receiving rehabilitative care
following surgery, McDill v. Sunbridge Care Enters. Inc., 4th Dist.
Pickaway No. 12CA8, 2013-Ohio-1618. In each of these cases, the
injury did not arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment.
Id. at ¶ 21, quoting Christian v. Kettering Med. Ctr., 2016-Ohio-1260, ¶ 35 (2d
Dist.); see also Conkin, 2012-Ohio-2816, at ¶ 9 (1st Dist.) (holding that a nursing
home employee did not provide “medical care” when transferring the plaintiff’s
ward, a resident, from her wheelchair into a Hoyer lift so that the ward could
shower).
In Hill, the plaintiff was discharged from an outpatient procedure and
the nurse escorted her out of the hospital in a wheelchair. Id., 2024-Ohio-5421 (9th
Dist.). The nurse left the plaintiff alone while attending to someone who appeared
to be having a heart attack. The plaintiff became impatient to go home, and while attempting to stand up, she tripped over the wheelchair footrests and fractured her
patella. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital and
nurse.
On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s fall while attempting to stand from a
wheelchair outside the hospital upon discharge was not ancillary to, or an inherently
necessary part of, her treatment, such that the claims were not “medical claims”
under R.C. 2305.113. Id. at ¶ 17. The Hill Court explained:
At the time of her injury, [the plaintiff] was either discharged or in the
final stage of discharge from the hospital. There were no diagnostic
tests or treatment activities to be completed before she left the hospital.
Accordingly, [the plaintiff] was not injured in the course of the
prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.
Browning, 66 Ohio St.3d at 557. Nor was the transport ancillary to,
and an inherently necessary part of, any treatment. Rome, 70 Ohio
St.3d at 16. Under the definition of “medical claim” in R.C. 2305.113
and as interpreted by Browning and Rome, this case does not involve
a medical claim.
Id.
With the foregoing definition in mind, we now address whether
Freeman’s actions constituted “healthcare services.” We agree with Carmela that
they do not, and the facts of this case are similar to O’Dell, McDill, Conkin, Hill, and
Christian where a patient suffered an injury because of a force separate from the
patient’s medical care, diagnosis, or treatment. As the O’Dell Court stated:
Falls can either be medical claims or general negligence claims,
depending upon the factual circumstances. When a person falls
because of the negligent use of medical equipment during a medical
procedure, it is a medical claim. . . . However, where the fall does not
arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, the fall gives rise to a
general negligence claim, not a medical claim.
Id., 2022-Ohio-4156, at ¶ 40, 42 (4th Dist.).
Here, the record is clear that Isabella was a discharged patient from
UH before her fall occurred and Freeman’s attempt to move Isabella from the
wheelchair to Carmela’s vehicle was not being used as an inherently necessary part
of a medical procedure. Dr. Sandhu testified that “[Isabella] was medically cleared,
from [his] standpoint, for discharge, 100%.” (Dr. Sandhu Depo., p. 27-28.) Nor did
the wheelchair transport arise out of the course of receiving medical diagnosis, care,
or treatment. Dr. Sandhu explained that the details regarding the process of
Isabella’s discharge were not part of her medical care. He stated that the decision of
how many people it would take to transport Isabella was out of his hands and “in the
hands of either nursing care, case management, or social work[.]” (Dr. Sandhu
Depo., p. 33.) Additionally, the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner determined
that Isabella’s cause of death was a “failure to thrive with recent extremity blunt
impact injuries,” which occurred when she “fell to the ground while being handled.”
(Isabella’s Death Certificate, Mar. 12, 2021.) Lastly, the act of transporting a patient
by wheelchair did not require any professional expertise or skill. Freeman testified
that her training consisted of occasionally observing how to move patients between
wheelchairs and beds; the only equipment she was instructed to use was a Hoyer
lift; and the total amount of time that Freeman trained for her transport position
was three weeks. Therefore, we conclude that Freeman’s act of transferring Isabella from the wheelchair to Carmela’s car was too attenuated from the receipt of medical
treatment, care, and diagnosis to constitute “health care services.”
Because the record in this case demonstrates that the wheelchair
transport does not constitute “healthcare services,” we find, as matter of law, that
H.B. 606 does not afford UH immunity. The overwhelming bulk of facts in this case
relate not to Isabella’s COVID-19 treatment while in the hospital, but rather to the
wheelchair transport to her daughter’s car following her discharge. We cannot say
based upon the record before us that UH’s policy for transporting COVID-19
patients is sufficient to establish that it provided health care services as defined in
H.B. 606. In the absence of any “healthcare services” provided by UH, this case is
an ordinary negligence suit brought by Carmela. Thus, we conclude that UH is not
entitled, as a matter of law, to immunity under H.B. 606.
We note Carmela also argues that this court should not be persuaded
by UH’s reliance on Norris v. Basden, 2024-Ohio-1019 (10th Dist.), for the
proposition that transporting a discharged patient by wheelchair to a private vehicle
was ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of medical care, making a claim
based on that transport a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). We agree with
Carmela that Norris is distinguishable.
In Norris, the plaintiff’s summary judgment response was untimely
and stricken from the record, which was a significant factor in the Norris Court’s
rejection of plaintiff’s appeal. Id. at ¶ 39 (“Foremost, in the cases cited by [plaintiff]
that involve summary judgment, the court concluded various claims based on patient or resident falls were not ‘medical claims’ only after the plaintiff properly
opposed summary judgment and presented the trial court with specific facts
showing that a genuine issue exists for trial.”) The Norris Court further stated that
“none of the cases cited by appellant involve uncontested averments by a medical
professional that all of their interactions with the plaintiff on the date of injury,
including transporting the plaintiff from a wheelchair to a vehicle, were conducted
within their role as a medical professional and based on their medical training.” Id.
at ¶ 42.
E. Ordinary Negligence
Having found that UH’s actions did not constitute “healthcare
services” under H.B. 606, we next address whether summary judgment was proper
on Carmela’s ordinary negligence claims.12 In reaching the determination, we
consider the following question: “Does the evidence present ‘a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury’ or is it ‘so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law[?]’” Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993),
quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986).
After carefully reviewing the record and the evidence submitted by
the parties in this case, we find that the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury. In other words, a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Here, there is inconsistent testimony as to whether Isabella’s transfer from
12 The elements of a negligence claim are (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and
(3) damages proximately caused by that breach. (Citations omitted.) Texler v. D.O. Summer Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 680 (1998). her hospital bed into the wheelchair required two UH employees as opposed to three
UH employees. Freeman testified there were “only two [people] in the room.”
(Freeman Depo., p. 64.) According to Freeman, she “did not tell Carmela [that] ‘it
took three people to get her into a chair in the room, I don’t know how they expect
me to do this myself[.]”’ (Freeman Depo., p. 64.) Whereas, Carmela testified that
Freeman stated to her, “I don’t know why they thought I could do this. It took three
of us to get her in a wheelchair.” (Carmela Depo., p. 144.)
There is also inconsistent testimony as to whether UH recommended
an ambulance transport upon Isabella’s discharge. Carmela testified that Cook
mentioned during their call on February 18 that they could send Isabella “home in
an ambulance” since Carmela was at work. (Carmela Depo., p. 123.) After the
incident, Carmela asked Cook why they did not recommend transport for
February 19 if Isabella was not able to move and they offered it the previous day.
Whereas, Cook testified that she did not recall “offering a transport vehicle when
[she] first learned that there was some . . . issue with getting [Isabella] out of the
hospital on the 18th[.]” (Cook Depo., p. 29.) However, when Cook spoke with
Carmela in the emergency department after Isabella’s fall, she recalled Carmela
asking her “[W]ho said it was okay to send [Isabella] home in a wheelchair in the
car? And why didn’t they offer [her] transport to home? That’s negligence, and the
situation wasn’t taken seriously.” (Cook Depo., p. 35.)
In light of the foregoing and when construing the evidence most
strongly in Carmela’s favor, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist. In reaching our decision, we are mindful that when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or choose among
reasonable inferences. Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121
(1980). Rather, the court must evaluate the evidence, taking all permissible
inferences and resolving questions of credibility in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in UH’s favor was improper.
F. Common Knowledge Exception
Lastly, Carmela argues that even if her claim is considered a medical
claim, the common knowledge exception applies and expert testimony, as
contended by UH, is not necessary.
Carmela maintains that an injury occurring while a patient is
transported in a wheelchair is not beyond the experience possessed by a lay person
and requires no expert testimony. UH, relying on Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d
127 (1976), contends that expert testimony is essential for medical-negligence claims
under Ohio law. However, having found that Carmela’s claim is an ordinary
negligence claim and not a medical claim, the expert testimony required for a
medical-malpractice claim involving professional skill and judgment is not
implicated by the facts of this case.
Therefore, we conclude that UH failed to meet its burden on summary
judgment, and because genuine issues of material fact remain as to Carmela’s
negligence claims, UH’s motion for summary judgment was improperly granted.
Therefore, the sole assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR