[Cite as State v. Allen, 2026-Ohio-3631.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115768
v. :
CATRELL ALLEN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 17, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-693653-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, Morgan E. Austin and John D. R-R. Kirkland,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Charles Ruiz-Bueno Co., L.P.A. and J. Charles RuizBueno, for appellant.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
Defendant-appellant Catrell Allen (“Catrell”) appeals the trial court’s
decision denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no
merit to the appeal, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 26, 2024, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a 140-count indictment charging Catrell and Carlton Allen (“Carlton”) with multiple
offenses pertaining to armed robberies of Cleveland pharmacies.1 Both drugs and
cash were stolen during the robberies. The charges included aggravated robbery,
theft of drugs, drug trafficking, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Nearly
all of the counts contained firearm specifications.
Catrell appeared with counsel for arraignment on August 16, 2024. He
entered a plea of not guilty and was released on bond subject to GPS monitoring.
Trial was scheduled for January 13, 2025. Three days before trial,
however, the sole attorney representing both Catrell and Carlton filed a motion to
withdraw for health-related reasons. The trial court granted the motion on the
scheduled trial date, and assigned separate counsel to Catrell and Carlton the same
day.
1 Catrell and his codefendant brother, Carlton, were indicted in the same case and
appeared together before the trial court. Carlton’s case is the subject of a companion appeal, State v. Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115822. The indictment also named a third defendant, Ja’Brian Howard. Unlike the Allen brothers, however, Howard appeared separately before the court.
After further pretrials, trial was reset for June 9, 2025. Trial was
nevertheless continued again because defense counsel and the State were engaged
in another trial. Trial was rescheduled for July 16, 2025.
The parties appeared for trial on July 16, 2025. The trial court noted
that the State had offered a plea deal and asked that the terms be placed on the
record. The State indicated that the offered plea agreement contemplated that
Catrell would plead guilty to 12 counts, some with firearm specifications, and noted
that there was “an agreed recommended range for sentencing on Carlton Allen of 18
to 28 years and agreed recommended range of 15 to 25 years for Catrell.” (Tr. 7.)
After the State placed the plea terms on the record, counsel for Catrell
and Carlton stated that their clients’ family wanted to discharge them and retain new
counsel. Carlton’s attorney spoke first, noting that he and counsel for Catrell had
been appointed approximately seven months before trial and in that time had
“digested a voluminous amount of discovery” that they “attempted to communicate
. . . to [their] clients.” (Tr. 10.) They also performed “extensive legal research” to
determine what the trial court would “be mandated as a floor to give” them if they
lost at trial, ultimately concluding that the answer was a minimum of 38 years and
nine months. (Tr. 10-11.)
Carlton’s attorney stated that while his client had come in that morning
“inclined to resolve his case,” Catrell was not willing to take the package plea deal
and, as a result, neither defendant would be able to plead. Carlton’s attorney stated
that they had tried to involve the family, but family members had ultimately “counseled these young men not to engage in plea negotiations” and had informed
counsel “that they wish for us to be discharged and that they intend on hiring their
own private counsel.” (Tr. 12.) Carlton’s attorney acknowledged that he had told
the family that “this case has been languishing on the docket for some period of
time” but told the court that he believed he was required to make a formal motion
to withdraw. (Tr. 12.)
Catrell’s counsel echoed these remarks, though she explicitly noted that
the request for a change of counsel came “not through [her] client,” but “through the
[family] representative[.]” (Tr. 12.)
The trial court then addressed the defendants directly. For purposes
of this appeal, we focus on its conversation with Catrell:
THE COURT: Have you been provided all discovery in this case and do
you understand the charges against you, Catrell?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: No, I have not really been showed all
the discovery.
THE COURT: What do you think you’ve been — how do you know that?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: I don’t know because I can’t speak.
THE COURT: You don’t know what’s against you, is that what you’re
saying?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yeah, like the evidence.
THE COURT: So you’re saying . . . that your attorneys, who are both
very well known in this building as being reputable attorneys who do
their jobs, you’re saying both of them never discussed with you
discovery in this case?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: They showed me some evidence but
they never really told me what they had against me. What evidence
they have, they showed me the same stuff they showed [Carlton], the
videos and the house about the same thing.
(Tr. 13 and 15.)
Catrell also stated that he “was trying to get [his] case separated” from
his brother’s but did not know whether his attorneys were working with him to
achieve that. (Tr. 16.) The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. And that’s because the State of Ohio made that
decision, not your attorneys. Your attorneys would make that request.
I was there when they made that request. The State of Ohio said no.
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Okay.
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 16.)
With respect to the work put into the case in preparation for trial, as
well as her client’s knowledge of the plea agreement particulars, Catrell’s counsel
stated:
There have been meetings, there have been meetings that were set up
that were — did not end up happening, but they have had ample
opportunity to speak to us and go over discovery. We have gone over
the plea agreements with them, from looking at my file it looks like we
were assigned back in January and I believe [prosecutor] sent us an
initial plea mark probably in like April, so they’ve known about what
these marks have been. My mark has not changed for my client. And
in fact, [Carlton’s] got a little better, so we have told them what the
marks were and we’ve been working towards this trial date.
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 18-19.)
The trial court concluded that it had “heard nothing today that would
lead [it] to believe that these attorneys should be discharged from their duties” and
that both defendants “had ample time and opportunity” before the trial date “to hire private counsel to represent you and have chosen not to do so.” (Tr. 19.) The trial
court announced its intention to proceed with voir dire.
After a recess, the trial court brought in the prospective jury members,
introduced the parties and counsel, briefly explained the jury-selection process, and
again recessed. The trial court informed the jury that they would be brought up at
1:15 p.m. to begin voir dire.
When proceedings resumed that afternoon, however, the State
indicated the plea offer had been amended to lower the recommended sentencing
range for Catrell: “There is one amendment. The substantive counts are still the
same in the plea offer, however, we reached a new agreed recommended range for
Catrell Allen of 13 to 20 years. . . . The only change is the recommended range for
Catrell Allen.” (Tr. 26.)
The trial court then began a plea colloquy, indicating that although it
would question Catrell and Carlton together, it expected them to answer in turn
rather than at the same time. The trial court established the defendants’ ages and
levels of education. It further established that neither was under the influence of
drugs, alcohol, or any other substance that might affect their understanding of the
proceedings.
Asked whether he had been subjected to any threats or whether his
plea was induced by any promises apart from what had been stated on the record,
Catrell initially answered in the affirmative and expressed some confusion:
THE COURT: . . . Has anyone threatened or promised you anything to
enter this plea besides what’s been stated on the record?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
THE COURT: Something different that’s been stated on the record?
Sir, is there anything different — so that agreed recommended sentence
is 13 to 20 years. Are you saying something different was promised to
you?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: It wasn’t a promise. They told me a
plea — I’m sorry, I can plead guilty and give him more time.
(Tr. 29.) The trial court followed up immediately:
THE COURT: . . . I don’t know how they can give him more time, but
do you understand that right now, there is an agreed sentence? I’m
going to abide by those agreements, right?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you think there’s going to be — something else is
going to happen besides that?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: No.
(Tr. 29-30.)
Asked whether he had sufficient time to consult with his attorney prior
to entering his plea, Catrell answered yes. When asked if he was satisfied with
counsel’s representation, he answered yes once again. Catrell also confirmed that
he understood the allegations against him.
The trial court then explicitly asked the defendants if they understood
that entering a plea of guilty constitutes a complete admission of guilt:
THE COURT: Do you understand that a plea of guilt to the plea
agreement is a complete admission of your guilt?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: I’m sorry, can you say that again?
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that a guilty plea is a complete
admission of your guilt?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
(Tr. 30-31.)
The trial court then walked through the charges and possible
penalties, making it clear at the outset that it intended to abide by the agreed
minimum sentencing range. It further explained the Reagan Tokes Law (R.C.
2929.144), postrelease control, and additional plea conditions. Asked whether he
understood all the penalties the trial court described, Catrell answered, “Yes.”
(Tr. 36.)
The trial court continued its colloquy by explaining the constitutional
rights Catrell and Carlton would be waiving by entering guilty pleas rather than
going to trial. Both confirmed that they understood. The trial court then stated:
THE COURT: Let the record reflect the defendants are making
knowing, intelligent and voluntary decisions to withdraw their not
guilty pleas and enter pleas of guilt.
(Tr. 47.) Catrell and Carlton then entered their guilty pleas, and the trial court
scheduled sentencing for August 27, 2025.
On August 12, 2025, Catrell filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. He attached an affidavit in which he claimed that counsel refused to seek
severance of his case from Carlton’s, failed to prepare for trial, and badgered him into agreeing to a plea for his brother’s sake. He also claimed to be “completely
innocent.”
Catrell did not appear for sentencing, and a capias was issued. He was
taken into custody on September 13, 2025. The State subsequently filed an
opposition brief to Catrell’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Catrell appeared before the trial court on September 23. His attorney
moved to withdraw, arguing that her hands were “completely bound” because of the
accusations Catrell levied against her in his affidavit. (Tr. 61.) The trial court
appointed new counsel for Catrell for purposes of the plea-withdrawal hearing,
which it scheduled for October 8, 2025.
Catrell’s new counsel filed a supplemental motion to withdraw the
guilty plea on October 6, 2025. The plea-withdrawal hearing went forward as
scheduled, with Catrell represented by his new attorney. The trial court heard
arguments. Catrell’s contentions echoed those in his affidavit. He also added that
he believed the State would not be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea.
The State argued that the case had been pending for a substantial
amount of time, with multiple trial continuances at the request of the defense. It
contended that “as time goes on, memories fade, witnesses move,” and “[i]t
absolutely would prejudice the State to delay these proceedings any further.” (Tr.
69-70.) It further argued that there were no false promises made and that the plea
colloquy itself demonstrated a lack of coercion. The State also indicated that family members were present on the day of the plea and that Catrell had extensive
discussions with them before deciding to enter a guilty plea.
With respect to Catrell’s claim of innocence, the State remarked:
He asserts his innocence, however, many of these charges were
captured on video of the suspects committing these offenses. The
defendant was found in the home where many of these narcotics were
recovered. His DNA was found on multiple firearms that the State
intended to argue were used during these robberies to commit these
robberies. So there is evidence of his guilt, and again, this is just a mere
change of heart.
(Tr. 71.)
The trial court denied Catrell’s motion on the record and scheduled
sentencing for October 16, 2025. Sentencing proceeded on that date, and the trial
court sentenced Catrell to a minimum term of 13 years in prison, with the maximum
to be determined by the applicable Reagan Tokes tail.
This timely appeal followed.2
II. Assignment of Error
Catrell presents a single assignment of error for our review:
The trial court committed prejudicial error in denying Defendant
Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We overrule Catrell’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
2 Catrell filed the timely notice of appeal pro se and attempted to represent himself,
including filing a brief that failed to conform to the appellate rules. Appellate counsel was subsequently appointed, however, and briefing began anew.
III. Analysis
A. Introduction
Catrell divides his assignment of error into two issues. First, he argues
that Crim.R. 32.1 and precedent state that presentence motions to withdraw guilty
pleas should be freely and liberally granted, and therefore the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion. Second, he contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because, at the plea hearing, it had
not adequately explained the effects of his guilty plea.
Notably, Catrell did not argue below, in either his two written motions
or during the plea-withdrawal hearing, that the trial court should have permitted
him to withdraw his plea because the colloquy failed to comply with Crim.R. 11. In
addition, he has not separately assigned error with respect to his claim that the trial
court failed to fully comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) or independently argue that his
plea should be vacated as not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See,
e.g., State v. Fontanez, 2024-Ohio-4579 (8th Dist.), aff’d, 2026-Ohio-3281.
“Generally, an appellate court need not address an appellant’s argument if it is not
set forth as an assignment of error in conformity with App.R. 12(A) and 16(A).”
(Citations omitted.) Fig as Custodian for Fig Ohio18, L.L.C. v. Lynch, 2024-Ohio3196, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.). An appellate court may nevertheless “reach the merits of an
argument if the assignments of error were ‘readily discernable’ from the
propositions of law, and where the opposing party responded as if the propositions were assignments of error.” Lynch at ¶ 39, quoting Eberhard Architects at ¶ 16,
citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Allton, 2014-Ohio-3742, ¶ 6-7 (10th Dist.).
In this case, Catrell argues in his second issue presented for review
that the trial court failed to fully comply with Crim.R. 11. That argument is readily
discernible from his propositions of law, and the State has responded as if it were a
separate assignment of error, even characterizing Catrell’s argument as a contention
that his plea “must be vacated” on that independent basis. (Appellee’s brief at p. 11.)
We will therefore address the merits of Catrell’s Crim.R. 11 argument.
B. Compliance With Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)
Because we treat the issue of compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) as
a separate assignment of error, and because the resolution of that issue is relevant
to at least one factor for evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the plea-withdrawal motion (namely, whether Catrell was afforded a proper
Crim.R. 11 plea hearing), we address this issue first.
Crim.R. 11(B)(1) provides that a “plea of guilty is a complete admission
of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires that during the plea colloquy,
the trial court do the following:
Inform[] the defendant of and determine[e] that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentence.
During the plea colloquy, the trial court explicitly informed Catrell
that a plea of guilty constitutes a complete admission of guilt. While we have already
quoted this portion of the trial court’s colloquy in recounting the procedural history, we excerpt it again to emphasize that the trial court provided the required
advisement essentially verbatim:
THE COURT: Do you understand that a plea of guilt to the plea
agreement is a complete admission of your guilt?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: I’m sorry, can you say that again?
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that a guilty plea is a complete
admission of your guilt?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
(Tr. 30-31.)
Under applicable precedent, including the Ohio Supreme Court’s
affirmance in State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, of this court’s en banc opinion in
that case, the trial court’s explicit advisement (and Catrell’s response) terminates
the inquiry.
Catrell nevertheless argues that the trial court was required to place
the factual basis for the plea on the record to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). This
argument misinterprets governing law. Fontanez involved the issue created when a
trial court does not expressly advise a defendant that a guilty plea constitutes a
complete admission of guilt. The Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion makes it clear that
further inquiry is required only where the trial court “fails to explicitly state that a
guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt[.]” Fontanez at ¶ 47. There is
no freestanding requirement that the trial court place the factual basis for the plea
on the record. State v. Heisa, 2015-Ohio-2269, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
In the present case, there was no failure to explicitly inform and
therefore no need to further examine the plea colloquy. The trial court explicitly
asked Catrell whether he understood that a guilty plea constituted a complete
admission of guilt. Catrell asked the trial court to repeat the question. The trial
court repeated the specific advisement, and Catrell indicated he understood. No
further inquiry into compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) is necessary, and we find
no merit to Catrell’s arguments concerning the trial court’s compliance with
Crim.R. 11.
C. Crim.R. 32.1 Motion to Withdraw Plea
Crim.R. 32.1 governs withdrawals of guilty pleas and states that “[a]
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence
is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside
the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
Generally, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentencing should be
freely and liberally granted. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). We review
the trial court’s denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion:
“[T]he general rule is that motions to withdraw guilty pleas before
sentencing are to be freely allowed and treated with liberality . . . still
the decision thereon is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
. . . Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court acted unjustly or
unfairly, there is no abuse of discretion. . . . One who enters a guilty plea
has no right to withdraw it. It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to determine what circumstances justify granting such a motion.”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213-214 (8th Dist.
1980), quoting Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 1978). “[A] defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.
. . . [T]he trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a
reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.” Xie at 527.
“For us to find an abuse of discretion in this case, we must find more
than an error of judgment. We must find that the trial court’s ruling was
‘unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Xie at 527, quoting State v. Adams,
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). Moreover, “‘the good faith, credibility and weight of
the movant’s assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that
court.’” Xie at 525, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977). This is
because “[t]he trial court was in a better position to evaluate the motivations behind
the guilty plea than is an appellate court which is only reviewing a record of the
hearing.” Xie at 525.
This court has held that a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion
to withdraw is not an abuse of discretion when the record reflects (1) the defendant
is represented by highly competent counsel; (2) the accused was afforded a full
hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he or she entered the plea; (3) after the
motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing
on the motion; and (4) the court gives full and fair consideration to the pleawithdrawal request. Peterseim at 866. The scope of the hearing “is dependent upon
the facial validity of the motion itself,” and a motion consisting of “bold assertions
without evidentiary support” does “not merit the type of scrutiny that substantiated allegations would merit.” (Cleaned up.) State v. Musleh, 2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 40 (8th
Dist.).
Ohio courts have also recognized additional, nonexhaustive factors
that trial courts should consider when deciding a presentence motion to withdraw a
plea. State v. Walcot, 2013-Ohio-4041, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). These factors include
“(5) whether the state will be prejudiced by the withdrawal; (6) whether the timing
of the motion was reasonable; (7) the reasons for the motion; (8) whether the
defendant understood the nature of the charges and [possible penalties]; and
(9) whether the [defendant] was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense[.]”
Id. See also State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 (1st Dist. 1995); State v. Moore,
2012-Ohio-5734, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). No one factor is absolutely conclusive. Fish
at 240; Walcot at ¶ 22. See also State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 16-17.
Applying the Peterseim factors to this case, we first note that there was
no dispute that Catrell was represented by highly competent counsel. This is, in fact,
conceded on appeal. Catrell’s appellate counsel expressly states that his trial
attorney is “known to the undersigned to be highly competent counsel under the
Peterseim . . . standard.” (Appellant’s brief at p. 8.)
Our independent review confirms that Catrell’s complaints regarding
counsel, including those made in his affidavit, do not withstand scrutiny. While
Catrell alleged that counsel had failed to adequately prepare for trial, this conflicts
with Catrell’s own acknowledgment, prior to taking the plea, that counsel had shown
him video footage and other evidence. It also conflicts with counsel’s statements concerning meetings and discovery review, such as counsel’s statement on the
record that both Catrell and his brother “have had ample opportunity to speak to
[counsel] and go over discovery” and that the defendants and their attorneys had
“been working towards this trial date” for months. (Tr. 18-19.) Indeed, as the State
notes in its brief, Catrell remained free on bond and was therefore not subject to the
logistical constraints facing defendants who remain in jail prior to trial.
Furthermore, on the day of the plea, when trial was about to
commence and Catrell made an effort to discharge his attorney, the trial court
pressed him on whether he had an opportunity to review evidence with counsel.
(Tr. 12-13.) Catrell’s responses consisted solely of evasion coupled with generic
contentions — unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and therefore ultimately hollow — that his
attorney had not shown him all of the State’s evidence against him.
Catrell’s appellate counsel further concedes that while Catrell had
argued that his trial counsel should have requested that his case be severed from his
brother’s, this characterization of the procedural history, if accurate, was a “trial
strategy and in the purview of trial counsel.” (Appellant’s brief at p. 8.) We question
the accuracy only because, while no formal motion to sever was filed, the trial court
specifically stated that it was present when Catrell’s attorney made precisely such a
request.
Finally, not only was counsel ready when jury selection commenced,
but in further negotiations, counsel also secured an improved sentencing range for
Catrell, from 15-25 years to 13-20 years, while the plea counts remained unchanged.
With respect to the remaining Peterseim factors, we have already
found no merit to Catrell’s argument that the trial court failed to comply with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), and he does not otherwise argue that he was not provided with
a full Crim.R. 11 plea hearing. Catrell does argue that he was confused at the hearing
with respect to whether any threats or promises were made. He cites the passage in
which he appears to reference his brother:
THE COURT: . . . Has anyone threatened or promised you anything to
enter this plea besides what’s been stated on the record?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
THE COURT: Something different that’s been stated on the record?
Sir, is there anything different — so that agreed recommended sentence
is 13 to 20 years. Are you saying something different was promised to
you?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: It wasn’t a promise. They told me a
plea — I’m sorry, I can plead guilty and give him more time.
(Tr. 29.) Catrell neglects to mention that the trial court did not stop there. It
immediately addressed Catrell’s apparent confusion to ensure he understood the
parameters of the plea:
THE COURT: . . . I don’t know how they can give him more time, but
do you understand that right now, there is an agreed sentence? I’m
going to abide by those agreements, right?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you think there’s going to be — something else is
going to happen besides that?
DEFENDANT CATRELL ALLEN: No.
(Tr. 29-30.)
Catrell does not take issue with the remaining Peterseim factors. Our
independent review of the record confirms that Catrell received a complete and
impartial hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court provided
Catrell with new counsel for purposes of the plea hearing. New counsel filed a
supplemental motion to withdraw the plea. At the hearing itself, the trial court
provided Catrell with ample time and opportunity to articulate and expound upon
the reasons for withdrawal already articulated in his two written motions. Finally,
while Catrell ultimately argues that the trial court made the wrong decision, he does
not contend it failed to give his plea-withdrawal request full and fair consideration.
We next turn to the additional, nonexhaustive factors used by Ohio
courts. The State argued at the hearing, and on appeal, that it would have been
prejudiced by the withdrawal of the plea. It noted that the case had been pending
for over a year and was “set for trial three separate times, always continued at the
request of the defendant.” (Tr. 69.) It noted that the parties had begun jury selection
when Catrell and Carlton decided to plea and that the State would be prejudiced by
further delay because “memories fade” and “witnesses move.” (Tr. 69.) It further
noted that both defendants had failed to appear on their scheduled sentencing date,
“further delaying all of this.” (Tr. 69.) We conclude that this factor would favor
denial of the motion.
We disagree with the State, however, that the timing of the motion was
not reasonable. While Catrell waited nearly a month to file his pro se motion to
withdraw the plea, this was still more than two weeks before the initially scheduled sentencing. While the motion “was arguably timely,” however, “this alone is
insufficient to warrant granting the motion” because, as noted above, “no one factor
is conclusive in a trial court’s determination on a presentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea.” Walcot, 2013-Ohio-4041, at ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Fish, 104 Ohio
App.3d at 240 (1st Dist. 1995). “Given the overwhelming factors weighing against
the granting” of Catrell’s motion, however, “we find this factor insignificant.”
Walcot at ¶ 22.
We next turn to the reasons Catrell gave for his motion. Some of his
complaints regarding his attorney have already been addressed and rejected. His
claim that counsel had not prepared for trial is not supported by the record, and
during the plea hearing Catrell confirmed in open court that he was satisfied with
counsel’s representation. (Tr. 30.) Catrell’s claim that trial counsel failed to seek
severance was refuted by the trial court. (Tr. 16.) Furthermore, even if counsel had
not requested to be tried separately, Catrell concedes on appeal that this would be
acceptable trial strategy.
Catrell’s claim that he was pressured by counsel into taking the plea is
likewise not supported by the record or by relevant case law. “The fact that a
defendant may have felt ‘pressured’ to enter a guilty plea is not a sufficient basis
upon which to withdraw a plea in the absence of evidence of coercion.” State v.
Pames, 2022-Ohio-616, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). Catrell claims that counsel told him Carlton
would be sentenced to 40 years in prison if he failed to agree to the proposed plea.
We first observe that the transcript reflects an observation by defense counsel that if the defendants lost, their minimum exposure was likely to be over 38 years in
prison. Discussion with counsel of a worst-case scenario, however, falls under the
category of advice, not coercion. An attorney “expressing his opinion of the strength
of the state’s case and giving a recommendation as to the plea deal does not amount
to coercion; rather, it is merely evidence of his defense counsel doing his job.”
Walcot at ¶ 24. See also Pames at ¶ 38.
In addition, Catrell’s complaints regarding the package plea deal echo
the recent case of State v. Hughey, 2025-Ohio-3152 (8th Dist.). In that case, Hughey
likewise contended that “he was coerced into the package plea because his brother
wanted to plead guilty and he did not want to prevent him from doing so[.]” Id. at
¶ 29.
In rejecting Hughey’s arguments, this court observed that it “has held
that ‘a defendant is not deprived of due process where an offer of a plea bargain is
conditioned on acceptance by codefendants.’” Hughey at ¶ 29, quoting State v.
Darling, 2017-Ohio-7603, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hlavsa, 2000 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4885 (8th Dist. Oct. 19, 2000). This court further explained:
“‘[T]here is no constitutional right to engage in plea bargaining.’”
Darling at id., quoting [State v. Cray, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 9344, *5
(8th Dist. Dec. 18, 1986)], citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977), and [North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970)]. “When defendants are advised by competent counsel
and are protected by the appropriate procedural safeguards, they are
presumptively capable of an intelligent and voluntary choice to plead
guilty and forgo trial.” Darling at id., citing State v. Franks, 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4756 (9th Dist. Oct. 7, 1998), citing Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978).
Hughey at ¶ 29. “The Darling Court recognized the coercive risk of package deals
but reasoned that the process required by Crim.R. 11 for accepting guilty pleas
safeguards defendants’ due process rights while also preserving the benefits of the
plea bargaining process.” Hughey at ¶ 30, citing Darling at ¶ 25.
In both Hughey and Darling, this court found no coercion stemming
from the package plea deal “because the defendant failed to . . . demonstrate error
with the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy.” Hughey at ¶ 30. We have already
determined there were no irregularities in the trial court’s plea colloquy. Catrell’s
coercion argument is not well taken.
Catrell also briefly argues that “pressure was very high” during
renewed plea negotiations because voir dire had already begun. (Appellant’s brief
at p. 9.) This court has consistently rejected such arguments. State v. McCargo,
2026-Ohio-3115, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.) (facing time pressure to accept or reject plea offer
is common and unexceptional); Pames, 2022-Ohio-616, at ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (“The
uncertainty associated with going to trial and the fear of being found guilty” and
possibly receiving a longer sentence, versus accepting a plea offer, “is a motivation
that underlies virtually all guilty pleas.”).
Catrell does not argue that he did not understand the nature of the
charges against him or the possible penalties. Indeed, any such contention is refuted
by the plea colloquy.
Catrell’s final argument stems from his claim of complete innocence.
“A defendant’s protestations of innocence,” however, “are not sufficient grounds for vacating a plea that was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered.” Heisa,
2015-Ohio-2269, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Minifee, 2013-Ohio-3146, ¶ 27
(8th Dist.), citing State v. Bloom, 2012-Ohio-3805, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). See also State
v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-1562, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). “The Heisa Court reasoned that any
defendant who seeks to withdraw his or her plea presumably does so based on some
claim of innocence.” Hughey, 2025-Ohio-3152, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). When presented
with a claim of innocence, “‘the trial judge must determine whether the claim is
anything more than the defendant’s change of heart about the plea agreement.’”
State v. Hoyle, 2016-Ohio-586, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), quoting Minifee at ¶ 27. It is wellestablished that a mere change of heart is an insufficient basis for withdrawing a
guilty plea. State v. Elliott, 2016-Ohio-2637, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.); Heisa at ¶ 23; State v.
Barrett, 2014-Ohio-1234, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).
As in Hughey, Catrell “did not enter an Alford plea, which is a guilty
plea with a contemporaneous protestation of innocence. See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Rather, he admitted complete guilt at his plea hearing.”
Hughey at ¶ 28. Indeed, as discussed above, this occurred after Catrell
acknowledged his understanding that his forthcoming guilty plea would constitute
a complete admission of guilt. A “defendant who has entered a guilty plea without
asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he [or she] has
completely admitted his [or her] guilt.” State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19.
Accordingly, Catrell’s new claim of innocence was contradicted by his prior
statements and admission of guilt. See Hughey at ¶ 28. Indeed, Catrell “did not claim innocence at any time during the plea negotiations or during the plea
colloquy.” State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). See also Fontanez,
2026-Ohio-3281, at ¶ 46 (observing that defendant “did not assert actual innocence
at any point in the plea colloquy”).3
Catrell, like the defendant in Jordan, “understood that he had the
option to proceed to trial.” Jordan at ¶ 29. Moreover, he did not allege any new
evidence or defense in his pro se motion to withdraw, his supporting affidavit, the
supplemental motion to withdraw filed by new counsel, or even at the pleawithdrawal hearing. He “did not offer any specific defense or fact revealing
innocence.” Wilder at ¶ 27. He offered no response at the hearing to the State’s
indication that his crimes were captured on video, that he was found in the same
home where many of the stolen narcotics were recovered, and that DNA evidence
tied him to firearms purportedly used in the robberies.4 “[T]he trial court could not
consider [his] claim of actual innocence without something to consider.” Id.
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in making its ruling and affirm the denial of Catrell’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Catrell’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
3 Catrell’s protestation that he “had maintained his innocence throughout the case,”
(appellant’s brief at p. 5), cannot be reconciled with the plea colloquy.
4 The video and DNA evidence were not introduced at the hearing. Accordingly, we
provide only the State’s description of the evidence without further comment, other than noting Catrell’s failure to offer any meaningful response.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR