SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
September 17, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0960. DICKERSON v. DICKERSON.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
In this estate administration case, Darrin Joseph Dickerson appeals from a
superior court order reversing a probate court judgment that appointed him as the
personal representative of the estate of his deceased brother, Stephen Herbert
Dickerson. Darrin contends that the superior court erred by recognizing Stephen’s
foreign marriage to Erika Priscila Florencio Dickerson, who prevailed in the superior
court on her caveat objecting to Darrin’s petition for letters of administration. Because
the superior court correctly ruled that Stephen’s marriage to Erika was recognized by
Brazilian law and had not been invalidated at the time of Stephen’s death, we affirm.
The undisputed factual record reflects that Stephen was a pilot for UPS,
regularly flying in and out of Brazil. In 2015, he met Erika, a Brazilian citizen, at a
birthday party for a mutual friend. They soon began a romantic relationship and
eventually lived together in Campinas, Brazil. In April 2021, during the COVID-19
pandemic, they decided to “make it official by getting married” in Brazil. Erika
changed her name and obtained a Brazilian passport under her new name. Stephen left
Brazil shortly thereafter and retired from his job, but he did not return, apparently due
to travel restrictions during the pandemic. After leaving Brazil, Stephen resided in
Effingham County.
In February 2023, Stephen died intestate unexpectedly, having maintained a
long-distance relationship with Erika without telling friends or family about the
marriage. That month, Darrin filed a petition for letters of administration in the
Probate Court of Effingham County, seeking to become the administrator of
Stephen’s estate. The petition listed Darrin and their mother as Stephen’s only heirs,
and it represented that Stephen was not married at the time of his death. The next
month, Erika filed a caveat and objection, seeking to be recognized as Stephen’s wife.
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In November 2023, the probate court held a hearing, which included testimony
from Erika, Darrin, a witness to the wedding, and Brazilian law experts testifying for
each side. Following the hearing, the probate court ruled that the marriage was invalid
because the publication of the marriage application was six days short of the fifteen
days required by Brazilian law. Therefore, it denied Erika’s caveat.
Erika filed a petition for review in the superior court. Based on the probate
court record and additional oral argument, the superior court reversed the judgment
of the probate court, ruling that a valid Brazilian marriage certificate had been issued
(despite any procedural irregularity), and in the absence of any subsequent judicial
invalidation, it was binding at the time of Stephen’s death. Darrin now appeals.
In a single enumeration, Darrin contends that because of the procedural defects
apparent under Brazilian law, the superior court erred by ruling that the marriage was
valid and should be recognized under Georgia law. We disagree.
This case presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Chen v.
Chen, 362 Ga. App. 99 (866 SE2d 635) (2021). As a general principle, under OCGA
§ 1-3-9,
[t]he laws of other states and foreign nations shall have no force and
effect of themselves within this state further than is provided by the
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Constitution of the United States and is recognized by the comity of states.
The courts shall enforce this comity, unless restrained by the General
Assembly, so long as its enforcement is not contrary to the policy or
prejudicial to the interests of this state.
(Emphasis added.) Consistent with this,
[w]hile the full faith and credit clause does not apply to judgments and
decrees of foreign countries, we may nonetheless recognize and enforce
foreign judgments by application of the doctrine of comity. ... [A]
judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the
parties, upon regular proceedings and due notice or appearance, and not
procured by fraud, in a foreign country, by the law of which, a judgment
of one of our own courts, under like circumstances, is held conclusive of
the merits, is conclusive as between the parties in an action brought upon
it in this country, as to all matters pleaded and which might have been
tried in the foreign court. It is also required that the foreign judgment be
grounded on those fundamental concepts of justice [and public policy]
to which we are accustomed. ... In examining such a contention, we are
not so concerned with whether the rule applied by the foreign court is
precisely the same as under Georgia law, as we are primarily concerned
with whether the foreign rule is consistent with or repugnant to our
underlying goals, values, and objectives.
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Knothe v. Rose, 195 Ga. App. 7, 8 (392 SE2d 570) (1990) (cleaned up). See also
Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 377(2) (31 SE2d 818) (1944) (“Comity alone
could authorize recognition of the Mexican divorce.”).
With respect to marriage, “[t]he status ... is a personal one, and its validity is
conclusively determined by the law of the State creating it; and if validly created there,
it will be recognized and given effect here, though the procedure by which it was
created under the foreign law is different from that required here.” Watson v. Watson,
208 Ga. 512, 517(3) (67 SE2d 704) (1951) (citation omitted; discussing the validity of
an out-of-state adoption).
Here, Darrin argues that the marriage certificate was invalid because it was
issued before the elapse of the required 15-day notice period under Brazilian law.1 But
assuming that the notice period had not elapsed, both parties’ experts testified that
under Brazilian law, the marriage certificate remains valid and binding once issued
until a subsequent judicial act invalidates it.2 For example, after identifying what he
1
Neither party submitted Brazilian law, instead relying on the testimony of witnesses qualified as experts in Brazilian law. Both experts explained that the law requires a 15-day public proclamation period prior to issuance of the marriage license.
2
The marriage certificate itself did not reflect the publication date.
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characterized as procedural flaws, Darrin’s legal expert testified that “[t]his is enough
grounds to request the invalidation of the marriage before a Brazilian judge.” He
nevertheless agreed that the marriage certificate had been issued, such that “until the
judge decides that it’s invalid [in a subsequent proceeding], it is valid.” Similarly,
Erika’s expert testified that “we do have a valid marriage certificate ... [n]o question
about that. ... Only a [Brazilian] judge’s decision could [invalidate it].”
Put simply, it is undisputed that the marriage certificate might have been
voidable due to a procedural irregularity, but it is not void ab initio under Brazilian
law. Nor was any proceeding initiated in Brazil to challenge the validity of the
certificate before Stephen’s death or at the time of the probate court proceeding.
There is no allegation or evidence that the marriage certificate was obtained through
fraud or deceit, that either party lacked capacity, or that it otherwise violated Georgia
public policy. And even in cases of fraud or incapacity, Georgia law explicitly
recognizes the distinction between void and voidable contracts. See generally OCGA
§§ 13-3-24(a) (“The contract of ... a mentally incompetent person who has never been
adjudicated to be ... mentally incompetent ... is not absolutely void but only
voidable[.]”), 13-3-20(a) (“Generally the contract of a minor is voidable.”);
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Stoudemire v. HSBC Bank USA, 333 Ga. App. 374, 375 (776 SE2d 483) (2015) (“A
void contract is one that has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of being ratified,
while a voidable contract is one that is unenforceable at the election of the injured
party.”); Lively v. S. Heritage Ins. Co., 256 Ga. App. 195, 198(2) (568 SE2d 98) (2002)
(“[F]raud does not automatically void a contract; rather, it renders it voidable at the
election of the injured party.”) (citing OCGA § 13-5-5); Mrozinski v. Pogue, 205 Ga.
App. 731, 736(3) (423 SE2d 405) (1992) (“[C]ontracts entered by minors … are
merely voidable but not void, and … the minority of an individual does not in and of
itself prohibit that individual from entering a contract.”).
In light of the undisputed status of the marriage certificate under Brazilian law,
and the absence of a repugnancy to Georgia policy under principles of comity, the
superior court correctly concluded that the probate court erred as a matter of law by
failing to recognize Erika as Stephan’s legal spouse. Accordingly, we affirm the
superior court’s judgment reversing the probate court.
Judgment affirmed. Davis and Whitaker, JJ., concur.
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