MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 99
Docket: Pis-25-160
Argued: February 3, 2026
Decided: September 17, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ. Majority: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ. Concurrence: STANFILL, C.J.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
WILLIAM BRADBURY
LAWRENCE, J.
[¶1] William Bradbury appeals from a judgment of conviction of one
count of unlawful sexual touching (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A) (2023),1
and two counts of indecent conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 854 (2026), entered
by the trial court (Piscataquis County, Haddow, J.) after a jury trial. Bradbury
argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence of two of the required elements
of unlawful sexual touching—the victim’s lack of acquiescence and his criminal
negligence with regard to the victim’s lack of acquiescence—to support his
1 Because 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A) has been amended since the date of the crime, P.L. 2023 ch. 280,
§ 5 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A) (2026)), we cite the statute that was in effect when Bradbury committed the crime. This amendment changed the language of the statute from “has not expressly or impliedly acquiesced in,” which is at issue in this appeal, to “has not consented to.” To this end, the Legislature defined “consent” to mean “a word or action by a person that indicates a freely given agreement.” P.L. 2023, ch. 280, § 1 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 251(E-1) (2026)).
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conviction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
use evidence that it had not timely provided to Bradbury in discovery for the
purposes of cross-examining Bradbury at trial. Contrary to Bradbury’s
contentions, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his
conviction for unlawful sexual touching. As to his second argument, we agree
that the State’s conduct in this case is concerning; however, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the State to use the
late-disclosed evidence in cross-examining Bradbury. Although we remand the
matter to correct a clerical error in the written judgment and commitment, we
otherwise affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
[¶2] Viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
the State, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 2023 ME 64, ¶ 5, 303 A.3d 640.
[¶3] In the summer of 2023, two sisters, one thirteen or fourteen years
old and one sixteen years old at the time, lived on the same road as Bradbury.
During that summer, the sisters would go swimming in the Piscataquis River,
and to get there, they would walk towards the end of the road their family lived
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on. Bradbury lived at the end of the road by the river. The swimming area near
where Bradbury lived was sandy and easier to access than other areas the
sisters sometimes used for swimming.
[¶4] When the sisters went swimming, Bradbury would go down to the
area where they were and watch them. On at least two occasions while
Bradbury watched the sisters, he exposed his genitals to the sisters. While
swimming, the sisters could see Bradbury’s genitals as he was standing on the
shore. Bradbury would also masturbate while the sisters were by the river. At
other times, he showed the sisters sexually explicit photos and videos of
himself. When he did this, the sisters would stay silent and try to ignore him.
[¶5] Throughout that summer, the sisters would go with their family to
Bradbury’s house for barbecues. At one of the barbecues, the younger sister
fell asleep at Bradbury’s home. At the time, the family and Bradbury were good
friends, and the sisters’ mother felt comfortable leaving the younger sister to
sleep on Bradbury’s couch while the rest of the family went home. While the
younger sister was sleeping, Bradbury started touching her. When the younger
sister began to wake up, she felt Bradbury pull down her shirt and put his
mouth on her breast and could feel wetness on her breast. She was half asleep
and her eyes were still closed while this was occurring. When the younger
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sister opened her eyes, she saw Bradbury standing near the couch she was
sleeping on, facing her, and masturbating. She could see Bradbury’s genitals.
Bradbury and the younger sister were the only two people at Bradbury’s home
when she woke up. The younger sister then stood up and told Bradbury that
she was leaving. Bradbury backed up, stared at her, and told her he would give
her a ride home because he had told her mother that he would. Bradbury drove
the younger sister home, and she sat in the back seat of the car so he could not
touch her. This episode occurred after at least one prior incident during which
Bradbury engaged in inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature in the sisters’
presence.
B. Procedural History
[¶6] In May 2024, the State charged Bradbury with six offenses, including
two counts of unlawful sexual touching (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A)
(Counts 1 and 2), and four counts of indecent conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 854(1)(B)-(C) (Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6). Count 1 alleged unlawful sexual
touching of the older sister, and Count 2 alleged unlawful sexual touching of the
younger sister. Bradbury entered a plea of not guilty to all counts, and the case
proceeded to trial.
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[¶7] The court held a two-day jury trial on March 19 and 20, 2025.
Before trial began, Bradbury’s counsel indicated that he believed that Bradbury
would testify in his own defense. Toward the end of the first day of trial but
before the State rested, Bradbury’s counsel again indicated that Bradbury was
likely going to testify. The State later rested, and Bradbury made a motion for
acquittal as to Count 2, the charge of unlawful sexual touching of the younger
sister. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(a). Bradbury argued that the younger sister
testified that she was not touched. The court denied Bradbury’s motion. At the
end of the first day of trial, the parties and court agreed to merge the counts
charging indecent conduct by merging Count 3 with Count 5 and Count 4 with
Count 6.
[¶8] Before resuming the trial on the second day, when Bradbury was
expected to testify, the State approached Bradbury’s counsel with several
images from Bradbury’s phone that it had obtained through an executed search
warrant. Some of the images were sexually explicit images of Bradbury.2 The
images were part of a 3,200-page comprehensive report that the State had
provided to Bradbury as part of discovery on March 7, 2025—twelve days
before the trial was set to begin. The State did not seek to introduce the images
2 The images were stills of the short videos that Bradbury had on his phone.
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in its case-in-chief because the discovery was late. Instead, the State wanted to
reserve the right to offer the images only during cross-examination of Bradbury
for impeachment purposes. Bradbury moved for the complete exclusion of the
images as a sanction for the discovery violation.
[¶9] The court denied Bradbury’s motion to exclude the images, agreeing
that the State could use them during the cross-examination of Bradbury
because they were relevant and came from his phone, a source familiar to him.
Therefore, the court concluded that the images would be admitted in evidence
in line with the State’s plan to introduce them if Bradbury elected to testify.
After conferring with defense counsel and engaging in a colloquy with the court,
Bradbury chose not to testify and rested.
[¶10] The court then instructed the jury on the law of unlawful sexual
touching and indecent conduct, explaining that there are multiple ways the
crime of indecent conduct may be committed and grouping Count 3 with
Count 5 and Count 4 with Count 6 in its instructions. Before releasing the jury
to deliberate, the court reviewed the verdict form, grouping Count 3 with Count
5 and Count 4 with Count 6 on the verdict form because they occurred during
the same time frame, and instructing the jury to return a single verdict on each
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pair of charges.3 After deliberating, the jury found Bradbury guilty on Count 2,
on merged Counts 3 and 5, and on merged Counts 4 and 6, but could not reach
a verdict on Count 1. With Bradbury’s consent, the State dismissed Count 1,
unlawful sexual touching against the older sister, and the court proceeded to
sentencing.
[¶11] The court sentenced Bradbury to six months of imprisonment on
Count 2, “and on the remaining counts[,] concurrent sentences of 60 days [of
imprisonment].” The judgment and commitment and docket record reflect that
the “remaining counts” were Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 and that the sixty days of
imprisonment was imposed on each count to be served concurrently with
Count 2.4 The court stayed Bradbury’s sentence pending appeal, and Bradbury
timely filed a notice of appeal. M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1); 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2026).
3 The court stated that “on Counts [3] and [5], it’s during the same time frame, but different parts
of the indecent conduct law. And if you were to . . . find not guilty on both, you would check not guilty. If you find . . . guilty on both, you would find guilty. But if you find guilty on either one, you would check guilty, and it’s the same thing with Counts [4] and [6].”
4 Where, as here, there is an inconsistency between the oral pronouncement of a defendant’s sentence and the written judgment and commitment, the oral pronouncement of the sentence controls, and we will uphold “the actual decision made by the sentencing court notwithstanding any inaccuracy reflected in the written judgment.” State v. Hutchinson, 593 A.2d 666, 667 (Me. 1991). The judgment and commitment form indicating convictions on Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 must be corrected to reflect a single conviction and sentence on merged Counts 3 and 5, and another single conviction and sentence on merged Counts 4 and 6, to avoid a violation of Bradbury’s right against double jeopardy. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 50; State v. Fleury, 2025 ME 18, ¶ 14, 331 A.3d 414. 8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶12] Bradbury argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to establish that the younger sister did not expressly or impliedly
acquiesce to the sexual touching, and that even if there was a lack of
acquiescence, it was so imperceptible that it could not constitute a gross
deviation from what a reasonable person would have understood from the
younger sister’s conduct.
[¶13] “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any trier of fact rationally
could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged.”
State v. DesRosiers, 2024 ME 77, ¶ 21, 327 A.3d 64 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶14] To convict a person of unlawful sexual touching under the version
of the statute in effect at the time of Bradbury’s conduct, the State was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the actor intentionally subjected
another person to “any touching of the breasts, buttocks, groin or inner thigh,
directly or through clothing, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire,” (2) the other person had “not expressly or impliedly acquiesced” to the
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sexual touching, and (3) the actor “fail[ed] to be aware of a risk” regarding
“whether the other person ha[d] acquiesced.” 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A);
17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(4)(B), 251(1)(G) (2026). “[T]he failure to be aware of the
risk, when viewed in light of the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct
and the circumstances known to the person, must involve a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would
observe in the same situation.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(4)(C).
[¶15] The record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally
find each element of unlawful sexual touching, 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A), beyond
a reasonable doubt. The jury was presented with evidence at trial of a
thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child who fell asleep and was left alone at the
home of a sixty-two-year-old adult—a home she never went to alone—after she
went to his home with her entire family for a barbecue. The younger sister did
not remain at Bradbury’s home voluntarily; she fell asleep and was never
awakened to be asked whether she wanted to leave with her family. She was
first asleep and then half asleep when Bradbury began sexually touching her
breast, and she could eventually feel wetness on her breast from where
Bradbury had put his mouth while her eyes were still closed. She never
expressed any consent to the touching. This conduct occurred at Bradbury’s
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home after at least one incident by the river during which Bradbury had
exposed his genitals to the sisters. During this episode, they ignored Bradbury
and waited for him to leave before walking up from the river to avoid any
interaction with him. The general circumstances of Bradbury’s prior
encounters with the sisters near the river together with his conduct involving
the younger sister in his home paint a picture from which a jury could
reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt both that there was a lack of
acquiescence by the younger sister and that Bradbury was criminally negligent
regarding the lack of acquiescence by the younger sister.5
B. Discovery Sanction
[¶16] Bradbury argues that the trial court’s approval of the State’s use of
the late discovery for impeachment only was an abuse of discretion and thus
deprived him of a fair trial. Despite arguing to the contrary in its briefing, the
State conceded at oral argument that there was a discovery violation. The State
has a duty under Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 16 to automatically
provide Bradbury “any . . . electronically stored information, [and] photographs
5Bradbury’s argument that a lack of objection or resistance to sexual touching equates to acquiescence is unpersuasive. A lack of acquiescence does not require an express protest to sexual touching. Instead, the statute prescribes that the lack of acquiescence can be implied, which means in certain circumstances a lack of acquiescence can be deduced without the victim rejecting or resisting, making the context just as important as what a victim did or did not do in certain circumstances. See 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(A).
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(including motion pictures and video tapes) . . . that the attorney for the State
intends to use as evidence in any proceeding or that were obtained or belong to
the defendant.” M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(a)(1), (2)(F) (emphasis added). The contents
of Bradbury’s cell phone, obtained from an executed search warrant,
undoubtably fall within that category, and thus the State was required to
disclose them no later than seven days after Bradbury entered a not guilty plea
or within fourteen days after the material came within the possession or
control of the attorney for the State. M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(b)(2), (5). The State
provided the automatically discoverable information many months later, in
March 2025, which was a clear discovery violation.6
[¶17] The State, on its own accord, elected not to use the evidence in its
case-in-chief but instead sought to utilize it for impeachment during
6 Although we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion, see infra ¶ 21, the State’s belated effort to look for additional discovery only as trial neared is nonetheless problematic. The State had a duty to make a diligent inquiry to determine whether any automatically discoverable information existed within their files, which includes law enforcement’s files. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(a)(1); State v. Hassan, 2018 ME 22, ¶ 19, 179 A.3d 898; State v. Poulin, 2016 ME 110, ¶ 18, 144 A.3d 574. Despite this duty, the State made no such effort to comply with its obligation, and it knew, or at least should have known, that a search warrant had been executed, and it should have reviewed the results of the search in order to ensure that it complied with the requirements of Rule 16. Instead, it waited until it was preparing for trial—nearly ten months after Bradbury was originally charged— and provided automatically discoverable information to Bradbury just twelve days prior to trial. This violation frustrated the purposes of discovery. See Poulin, 2016 ME 110, ¶ 29, 144 A.3d 574 (“The purposes of Rule 16 are to enhance the quality of the pretrial preparation of both the prosecution and defense and diminish the element of unfair surprise at trial, all to the end of making the result of criminal trials depend on the merits of the case rather than on the demerits of lawyer performance on one side or the other.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).
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cross-examination of Bradbury. The court found that there was no bad faith on
the part of the State and no undue or unfair prejudice in allowing the State to
use the evidence only for impeachment if Bradbury elected to testify.
[¶18] Although the discovery sanction at issue was proposed by the
State, it was approved by the court and so we review it as a court-ordered
sanction for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Poulin, 2016 ME 110, ¶ 28, 144
A.3d 574.
[¶19] “We look for a prejudicial effect on the defendant as a result of the
discovery violation, as mitigated—or not—by the trial court’s ruling. When a
defendant contends that a discovery violation and the court’s response to it
violated his or her right to a fair trial, we review the trial court’s procedural
ruling to determine whether the process struck a balance between competing
concerns that was fundamentally fair.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Sanctions for discovery violations “should be tailored to the
individual circumstances of each case, with a focus on fairness and justice.”
State v. Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, ¶ 10, 207 A.3d 191.
[¶20] We have examined sanctions for late discovery before. See State v.
Page, 2023 ME 73, ¶¶ 13-17, 306 A.3d 142; State v. Matatall, 2018 ME 155,
¶¶ 7-10, 196 A.3d 1293; Poulin, 2016 ME 110, ¶¶ 25-34, 144 A.3d 574. In State
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v. Poulin, we concluded that the State’s discovery violation had no prejudicial
effect upon the defendant and that allowing late discovery in evidence for the
limited purpose of impeachment “struck a balance between competing
interests that was fundamentally fair.” 2016 ME 110, ¶ 29, 144 A.3d 574. We
reasoned that the trial court “did not violate Poulin’s right to a fair trial when it
declined to permit him to use the State’s violation of Rule 16 as a shield against
the admission of probative evidence of guilt, were he to elicit testimony in
conflict with that evidence.” Id. ¶ 34. Likewise, in State v. Page, we held that
the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that was provided late for the
limited purpose of rebutting evidence presented or arguments made by the
defendant struck a fair balance between “the unfairness of the State’s late
discovery with the need to prevent Page from presenting a completely sanitized
defense.” 2023 ME 73, ¶¶ 8, 17, 306 A.3d 142; see also Matatall, 2018 ME 155,
¶¶ 7-10, 196 A.3d 1293 (reasoning that a defendant cannot use a discovery
violation as a shield to exclude evidence when the defendant chooses to testify
in direct contradiction to such evidence).
[¶21] Here, the trial court’s ruling allowed for a result that fairly struck
a balance between competing interests. Bradbury sought the complete
exclusion of the images as a sanction for the late discovery. Permitting the use 14
of the images only for impeachment is consistent with our prior cases. As we
reasoned in Poulin and Page, complete exclusion of the images would have
allowed Bradbury to shield himself from being confronted with the nude
images that corroborated the sisters’ testimony that he showed them videos of
his genitals and their testimony describing those videos. The sanction struck
the balance between any unfairness to Bradbury because of the late discovery
production and the State’s interest in being able to impeach Bradbury during
cross-examination, especially when there was no bad faith. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sanction that limited the State’s
introduction of evidence produced late in discovery while also preventing
Bradbury from completely shielding himself from challenges to his testimony
about the images and videos, promoting both fairness and justice.
[¶22] Although we do not determine that the sanction imposed by the
court for the late discovery was an abuse of discretion in the particular
circumstances presented here, the State’s conduct was, as we have noted,
problematic. See supra n.6. The same conduct in different circumstances could
yield a different result, where the State’s proposal adopted by the court here—
to limit the use of late-discovered evidence to impeachment purposes—may
not prove to be sufficient. Despite these serious concerns, however, the overall
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limitation on the use of the late discovery as applied here is ultimately
consistent with our case law to date and did not deprive Bradbury of a fair trial.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶23] There is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find
Bradbury guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful sexual touching of the
younger sister based on the circumstances and events that occurred while at
his home. Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Bradbury’s motion for sanctions due to the State’s discovery violation.
Although we affirm the judgment, we note the clerical error in the judgment
and commitment imposing sentences on counts that were properly merged
prior to sentencing and require correction of the judgment and commitment. 7
The entry is:
Remanded to the trial court to correct the
judgment and commitment form and the docket
entries to properly reflect the merger of Count 3
7 We also note that the docket record does not reflect that any of the counts were merged for sentencing. This error should also be corrected upon remand.
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with Count 5 and Count 4 with Count 6. As
corrected, judgment affirmed.
STANFILL, C.J., concurring.
[¶24] I agree with the Opinion of the Court. I write separately, however,
to express my increasing alarm at the frequency with which the State of Maine
is violating its simplest discovery obligations. See, e.g., State v. Johnson,
2026 ME 87, --- A.3d ---; State v. Pelletier, 2023 ME 74, 306 A.3d 614; State v.
Page, 2023 ME 73, 306 A.3d 142; State v. Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, 207 A.3d
191. I am particularly concerned that on appeal the State—until pressed by this
Court at oral argument and contrary to long-standing rules and precedent—
asserted that it did not violate its discovery obligations because the material
was in possession of law enforcement and not the District Attorney’s office.
See, e.g., State v. Robbins, 1997 ME 21, ¶ 7, 689 A.2d 603; Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 280-82, 282 n.21 (1999); State v. Eldridge, 412 A.2d 62, 67
(Me. 1980). I understand that many District Attorney’s offices are understaffed.
I also know that the vast majority of Maine’s prosecutors are acting in good
faith. Nonetheless, “when, as here and all too often, new information is obtained
on the eve of trial,” defendants are increasingly at risk of being unfairly
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surprised and prejudiced. State v. Dennis, 2024 ME 54, ¶ 35, 320 A.3d 396
(Stanfill, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The State must do better.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant William
Bradbury
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Eugene Abramov, Stud. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District 5, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine
Piscataquis County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2024-164
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY