FILED
Sep 17, 2026
09:00 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Crystal L. Evans Docket No. 2026-10-0780
v. State File No. 82584-2025
Schnellecke Logistics USA, LLC, et al.
Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge
Affirmed and Remanded
In this interlocutory appeal, the employee questions the trial court’s finding that she is unlikely to prevail at trial in establishing an entitlement to additional medical and temporary disability benefits. The employee was injured when she tripped over electrical cords at work, which resulted in right leg pain. The employer accepted the claim as compensable and authorized medical treatment with multiple physicians. The employer offered the employee light duty work consistent with her restrictions but subsequently terminated her employment due to repeated attendance issues. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employer had provided all the benefits to which the employee was entitled to date, and it denied her request for additional medical and temporary disability benefits. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.
Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Judge Pele I. Godkin and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.
Crystal L. Evans, employee-appellant, pro se
Andrew J. Hebar and Megan K. Bataille, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Schnellecke Logistics USA, LLC
Factual and Procedural Background
Crystal L. Evans (“Employee”) began working for Schnellecke Logistics USA, LLC (“Employer”) in August 2025. As an auditor, Employee ensured that shipments were correctly labeled and shipped to the appropriate location. On November 20, 2025,
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Employee reported an injury to her right leg when she tripped over electrical cords that had been taped to the floor. She reported the injury immediately but declined medical treatment at that time. The following day, however, she requested medical care and saw Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Jennifer Daughtrey at Physicians Care Walk-in Clinic (“Physicians Care”). Employee described the incident, and NP Daughtrey diagnosed her with pain in the right lower leg. She provided an injection, wrote a prescription for a course of steroids, and returned Employee to work with restrictions.
Employee returned to Physicians Care three days later, on November 24, at which time NP Daughtrey prescribed a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication and reiterated her work restrictions. She also referred Employee for an orthopedic evaluation of her right knee. At a return visit on December 2, 2025, Employee was diagnosed with
“[p]olyneuropathy, unspecified.” She was provided a Toradol injection, a prescription for Gabapentin, and a referral for physical therapy.
In response to the orthopedic referral, Employer provided a panel of specialists, from which Employee selected Dr. Benjamin Miller for evaluation of her right knee. During her first visit on December 8, Employee reported pain radiating from her hamstring to her calf that she rated as an 8 out of 10 in severity. She also complained of muscle pain and weakness and joint pain but “report[ed] no back pain.” X-rays of her lumbar spine, right hip, and right knee were read as normal. Dr. Miller diagnosed Employee with lumbar radiculopathy and returned her to work with restrictions. He ordered an MRI and referred her to be seen by the “spine team” after the MRI was performed.
The MRI ordered by Dr. Miller was performed on December 30, 2025, and
Employee saw Dr. Michael Calfee, another panel-selected provider, on January 6, 2026. After comparing an MRI of Employee’s lumbar spine that had been taken in 2023 with the one performed on December 30, Dr. Calfee noted that the more recent MRI revealed a central disc herniation at L4-L5 and that Employee displayed signs of radiculopathy and foot drop. He ordered a nerve study and referred her to physical therapy three times a week for two weeks. He also ordered a course of steroids and assigned work restrictions. He opined that her radiculopathy was more than 50% caused by her work-related injury.
Employee followed up with Dr. Calfee on January 27 and reported ongoing
complaints of leg pain. She told Dr. Calfee she had sought treatment at an emergency room on January 21 due to an episode of incontinence. Dr. Calfee noted that a repeat MRI performed during her visit to the emergency room was unchanged from the December 2025 MRI, and he opined that the incontinence was not related to the work injury. He also noted that the nerve study, which had been performed on January 8, was interpreted as normal. He observed that Employee showed signs of poor effort during physical testing and noted that her gait was normal and her straight leg raise testing was “equivocal.” He felt her radiculopathy was improved, although he stated that “she would deny that with her words.” He still believed she needed to see a spine surgeon, and he maintained her work restrictions.
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In response to Dr. Calfee’s referral, Employer provided another panel of specialists from which Employee selected Dr. Benjamin Weisenthal. She first saw Dr. Weisenthal on February 17, 2026, and reported sharp pains in her buttocks, which she described as a constant pain that could be incapacitating. Dr. Weisenthal reviewed the MRI and noted a central disc bulge at L4-5 that was not causing any significant canal stenosis or foraminal narrowing. He also observed there was no evidence of central canal stenosis throughout the lumbar spine. He stated that the only treatment he had to offer her was an intra-laminal injection, after which she would be at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) from his standpoint. He noted that she complained of “significant right lower extremity pain as well as low back pain that really does not match her clinical symptoms.” He released her to return to work without restrictions.
In an April 3 follow-up note, Dr. Weisenthal noted that, according to Employee, the intra-laminal injection had not relieved her symptoms. Dr. Weisenthal placed her at MMI with an 8% anatomical impairment rating. On April 10, he competed a Final Medical Report (“Form C-30A”) on which he reiterated his impairment rating and indicated he did not anticipate Employee would need any future medical treatment for her back condition.1
Also on April 3, Employee saw Dr. Charles Benson for right knee complaints. He diagnosed her with unspecified internal derangement of the right knee and a strain of the right quadriceps muscle. He ordered physical therapy, which she began on April 9. On April 28, the physical therapist observed that Employee had not seen much improvement and that physical therapy would be more beneficial to her if her participation improved. On May 22, 2026, Dr. Benson completed a Form C-30A on which he opined that Employee had reached MMI for her knee injury and retained no permanent medical impairment.
While Employee’s medical treatment was ongoing, she was terminated by Employer for allegedly violating its attendance policies. Employee’s disciplinary difficulties began on October 21, 2025, when she received a “documented counseling” for poor performance. She received a “first written warning” on November 17 and a “final warning” on December 5, both related to job performance. On January 27, 2026, she was given another “final warning,” this time related to her attendance. The warning informed her of the number of “attendance points,” or unexcused absences/tardies, she currently had and that another infraction could result in termination. On February 5, she was terminated following another violation of the attendance policy.2
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On May 18, 2026, Dr. Weisenthal responded to correspondence from Employer’s counsel, indicating that Employee’s final diagnosis was lumbar disc herniation with radiculopathy and that she had an impairment rating of 5%. The discrepancy in the impairment ratings is immaterial for purposes of the present appeal. 2
According to attendance records admitted into evidence, most of Employee’s attendance issues hinged on lateness.
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Employer’s representative testified that, between the date restrictions were assigned on November 21, 2025, and her termination on February 5, 2026, Employer was able to provide appropriate work within her restrictions. In addition, the affidavit of Chantelle Meess, Employer’s Safety Manager, verified that Employer would have continued
accommodating Employee’s work restrictions had she not been terminated for cause.
Employee filed a petition for benefit determination on February 5, 2026, in which she set out a series of complaints about the way her claim had been handled to date, including complaints regarding her medical care, her disciplinary actions, and her termination. A dispute certification notice was issued in March, and Employee filed a request for a hearing in April, which was set for June 24.3
In its July 2, 2026 expedited hearing order, the trial court denied Employee’s request for an order compelling Employer to pay unauthorized medical bills and temporary disability benefits. The court found that Employer timely authorized medical care and honored every referral for specialist care. The court also observed that there were no delays in medical treatment to justify the unauthorized care Employee sought and that she had offered no proof that the unauthorized treatment she received was reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the work accident. The court determined that Employer had presented sufficient evidence to establish that Employee was terminated for her violation of workplace policies and that Employee had not rebutted that evidence. Consequently, the court denied Employee’s request for benefits, and Employee has appealed.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2025). When the trial judge has had the opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable deference to credibility determinations made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “when it comes to deposition testimony, an appellate panel is in the same position as the trial court to make credibility determinations.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC, 2025 Tenn. LEXIS 514, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Thus, when medical proof is presented by deposition, “the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of the expert testimony.” Id. Moreover, the interpretation and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
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Prior to the date the expedited hearing was set, the court entered an order on June 16 instructing Employee to abstain from filing more documents before the expedited hearing, observing that Employee had filed documents on a near-daily basis.
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obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2025).
Analysis
On appeal, Employee raises numerous issues, which we combine and restate as a
single issue: whether the trial court erred in finding Employee did not present sufficient evidence to meet her burden of establishing she will likely prevail at trial in proving an entitlement to additional medical and temporary disability benefits.
Preliminary Matters
As an initial matter, we note that both parties filed motions prior to our receiving the record on appeal. On August 3, 2026, Employee filed a motion seeking to have certain evidence that was previously unavailable included in the record on appeal. On August 12, Employer filed a motion seeking to exclude Employee’s brief, which she filed one day late. Employer argued her brief was untimely and was not “admissible” due to certain content in the brief. On August 14, we filed an order holding Employer’s motion in abeyance until we received the record on appeal and issued a docketing notice. On August 17, Employee filed a response to Employer’s motion to exclude her brief, and, on August 18, we filed an order holding her August 3 motion and the issues raised in her August 17 response in abeyance until we received the record and filed a docketing notice.4
Employee’s motion to have “new evidence” included in the record on appeal is
denied. The Appeals Board will not consider on appeal documents or other information not properly admitted into evidence and considered by the trial court. As we have held previously,
[e]valuating a trial court’s decision on appeal necessarily entails taking into
account information the trial court had before it at the time the issues were
decided by the court, as opposed to the potentially open-ended universe of
information parties may seek to present on appeal following an adverse
decision. Thus, we will not consider on appeal testimony, exhibits, or other
materials that were not properly admitted into evidence at the hearing before
the trial judge.
Hadzic v. Averitt Express, No. 2014-02-0064, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 14, at *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 18, 2015). See also Tenn. Comp. R. &
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Later that day, Employee filed a motion for clarification of the August 18 order, characterizing it as identical to a prior order. However, the August 18 order clearly identifies the motions to which it applies and speaks for itself. The motion for clarification is denied.
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Regs. 0800-02-22-.02(2) (2023). Interlocutory orders, by their nature, are not final. If Employee has additional evidence she would like the trial court to consider, she may take appropriate steps in the litigation process to offer any such documentation into evidence.
Likewise, Employer’s motion to exclude Employee’s brief is denied. Employee’s
brief was a single day late, and Employee provided documentary support for her contention that she relied on incorrect information in calculating the deadline to file her brief. Employer has not demonstrated any prejudice caused by the single-day delay, and we exercise our discretion and decline to exclude it.
Unauthorized Medical Bills
Employee asserts that she was routinely “denied” medical care, which she claims justified her seeking unauthorized treatment. As a result, she contends Employer should be responsible for the bills arising from that unauthorized treatment. She also contends the trial court erred in finding Employer had not delayed or denied authorized treatment. Employer responds that it accepted her claim as compensable, initiated medical care timely, and honored every medical referral. It further noted that it has provided five separate panels of specialist physicians and has authorized all recommended treatment. It contends that the trial court’s order in this regard should be affirmed. We agree with Employer.
The record reflects that, over the course of approximately five months, Employer provided five separate panels of specialist physicians, authorized appointments with each panel-selected doctor, and approved all recommended treatment, including objective testing and physical therapy. Employee has provided no evidence that Employer ever denied a request for an appointment with an authorized physician. As we have noted previously, the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law places obligations on both employers and employees to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204, the portion of the statute governing the provision of medical care. See, e.g., Berdnik v. Fairfield Glade Cmty. Club, No. 2016-04-0328, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 32, at *13 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 18, 2017). This includes a requirement that Employee “accept the medical benefits afforded under this section.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2026). In general, an employee who is receiving authorized medical care cannot seek unauthorized care without giving the employer a reasonable opportunity to comply with its statutory obligations. See, e.g., Brown v. State, No. 01S01-9502-BC-00020, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 712, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 22, 1995). Here, the evidence supports a finding that Employer met its statutory obligations with respect to the provision of medical care. Moreover, Employee remains entitled at this interlocutory stage of the case to seek reasonable and necessary medical care caused primarily by the work accident from her authorized providers.
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In addition, Employee has not presented in admissible form any of the records or medical bills related to the treatment for which she seeks payment. Employee bears the burden of proving every essential element of her claim, see Scott v. Integrity Staffing Sols., No. 2015-05-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015), and she has presented no admissible evidence to date that would support an order for Employer to pay any such unauthorized medical expenses.
Temporary Partial Disability Benefits
With respect to her request for temporary disability benefits, Employee asserts that her termination was improper and retaliatory and that her absences were related to her work injury. Employer responded with evidence of Employee’s repeated tardiness and
unexcused absences. Employee had been given a final warning with respect to her attendance and had been given three warnings with respect to her performance. Employer also provided the affidavit of its Safety Manager, who testified that light duty work was available to Employee within her restrictions, that Employer had honored those restrictions until her termination, and that, had Employee not been terminated for cause, it would have continued to provide her work within those restrictions. Employee did not offer any admissible evidence to rebut this testimony. As with her entitlement to medical benefits, Employee bears the burden of establishing at this interlocutory stage of the case that she will likely prevail at a hearing on the merits. We agree with the trial court that she has not met that burden at this stage of the case.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the case. Costs on appeal have been waived.
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