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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 25-CM-0490
MELVIN Q. YOUNG, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2024-CMD-010233)
(Laura Cordero, Judge)
(Argued June 9, 2026 Decided September 17, 2026)
Maya W. Lilly, Student Attorney, with whom Ashley Carter and Joshua Dansby, Supervising Attorneys, and Elone Mengistum and Sajeda Shaikh, Student Attorneys, were on the briefs, for appellant.
Elizabeth Gabriel, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb and Eric Hansford, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and DEAHL and HOWARD,
Associate Judges.
HOWARD, Associate Judge: Appellant Melvin Young was convicted in a
bench trial of unlawful entry of a motor vehicle (UEV) in violation of D.C. Code
§ 22-1341. Mr. Young contends that: (1) the government failed to present sufficient
2
evidence that he knowingly entered the motor vehicle without permission; (2) the
government failed to meet its obligations under D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16 by not
preserving evidence of the vehicle and its contents; and (3) that the government
committed a Brady violation by withholding source documents on Officer Justice
Bowman’s pending disciplinary investigations. We disagree and affirm the
conviction.
I. Background
On October 7, 2024, Jaellyn Brady-Dennis parked her car at an event she was
attending, but after the event her car was missing, so she called the police. The
responding officer reported her car as being stolen that same day. On October 10,
2024, Officer Justice Bowman was in a patrol car in Southeast Washington D.C.
when he noticed a parked car missing a driver-side door handle and an individual
sitting inside. Officer Bowman, noting the missing driver-side door handle as a sign
of a stolen vehicle, made a U-turn to better view the license plate, which upon
running the plate came back as stolen. As Officer Bowman turned the police car
toward the vehicle, Mr. Young exited the vehicle and walked away. At that point,
Officer Bowman turned his car back around toward Mr. Young and proceeded to
detain him since the vehicle was reported stolen. After re-running the vehicle’s
license plate number and confirming again that it was reported stolen, Officer
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Bowman placed Mr. Young under arrest. After arresting Mr. Young, Officer
Bowman called Ms. Brady-Dennis to inquire whether she had authorized anyone to
use the car. Ms. Brady-Dennis stated that she did not.
After arresting Mr. Young, Officer Bowman searched inside the vehicle and
found several articles of women’s clothing, including a purse belonging to Christina
Pardee. Ms. Pardee was present on the scene during Mr. Young’s arrest and stated
that she knew Mr. Young. Officer Bowman did not arrest Ms. Pardee because he did
not see her inside the vehicle at any time.
Ms. Brady-Dennis went to a tow yard to retrieve her belongings from her car
and noted that the car was in disarray. She noted that her belongings were missing
and that the car contained items that were not hers. She further noted a punched1
ignition, a missing door handle, bumper damage, scratched paint, and seat damage,
requiring extensive repairs.
On April 10, 2025, Mr. Young filed two pretrial motions to dismiss. First
pretrial motion to dismiss alleged that the government violated Super. Ct. Crim.
R. 16 and obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) for failing to
1
“Punched” refers to an ignition “that is completely removed from the car so it can be driven without a key.” Reyes v. United States, 933 A.2d 785, 789 n.3 (D.C 2007) (citation modified).
4
preserve evidence of the vehicle and its contents. The trial court denied the motion,
stating that, as Mr. Young was not charged with theft, the government did not need
to preserve the contents of the vehicle. Mr. Young’s second pretrial motion to
dismiss alleged that the government violated its discovery obligations under Brady
by failing to provide source material for two pending disciplinary investigations of
Officer Bowman. The trial court also denied this motion as it did not understand the
government to be required to produce source documents for pending disciplinary
investigations and Mr. Young did not provide precedent to support the proposition.
The case then proceeded to a bench trial. The bench trial concluded on April
21, 2025, and on the same day, the trial court returned a guilty verdict against
Mr. Young for UEV in violation of D.C. Code § 22-1341. Mr. Young was then
sentenced to ninety days of incarceration.
Mr. Young timely appealed, arguing that the government failed to provide
sufficient evidence that he had knowledge of the unlawful nature of his entry into
the vehicle. Mr. Young further argues that the trial court failed to issue appropriate
sanctions for the government violating Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16. Finally, Mr. Young
argues that the trial court erred when it failed to analyze whether the government
committed a Brady violation by withholding source documents on Officer
Bowman’s pending disciplinary investigations.
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II. Discussion
A. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Show Unlawful Entry Into a Vehicle
Mr. Young argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence
that he knew he did not have permission to enter the vehicle. Specifically, he
contends that the government presented no evidence establishing: (1) that he could
see the damage to the ignition; (2) that he fled from the police; or (3) that he
possessed recently stolen property.
This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo, “review[ing]
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving full play to the right of
the fact-finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable
inferences of fact.” Wiley v. United States, 264 A.3d 1204, 1209 (D.C. 2021)
(citation omitted). We make “no distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence.” Bynum v. United States, 133 A.3d 983, 987 (D.C. 2016) (citation
omitted). “[E]vidence is sufficient if . . . any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Glosser v. United
States, 318 A.3d 510, 516 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified). “In reviewing bench
trials, this court will not reverse unless an appellant has established that the trial
court’s factual findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.”
Dorsey v. United States, 902 A.2d 107, 111 (D.C. 2006) (citation modified).
6
D.C. Code § 22-1341 states that it is “unlawful to enter or be inside of the
motor vehicle of another person without the permission of the owner or person
lawfully in charge of the motor vehicle.” This court has not addressed the requisite
mens rea required to establish UEV. Mr. Young advances that the required mens rea
for UEV is that Mr. Young knew he did not have permission to enter the vehicle.
The government asserts that it assumes for purposes of this appeal that this standard
should apply and does not brief the issue further. This is an important question of
first impression, we do not have the benefit of fully contested briefing, and we had
serious questions at oral argument about the appropriate standard. We therefore
choose to save this question for a case where it is fully briefed and assume without
deciding, for purposes of this appeal, that the mens rea standard advanced by
Mr. Young is applicable here. 2
Relatedly, we have not yet ruled on what evidence is sufficient for the
government to establish a defendant’s knowledge in UEV cases beyond a reasonable
2
A “knowingly” mens rea aligns with the mens rea requirement for
unauthorized use of motor vehicles (UUV). See In re D.P., 996 A.2d 1286, 1288 (D.C. 2010) (stating that in a UUV case, the government must prove that the defendant-passenger was inside the vehicle knowing that the vehicle was being used without the owner’s consent); but see Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303, 305 (D.C. 2013) (stating that in an unlawful entry on property case, the government must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that their entry onto the property was without the owner’s consent).
7
doubt. As such, we articulate the requisite elements to prove UEV as follows: the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant entered a
motor vehicle; (2) the motor vehicle was owned by someone else; (3) that lawful
owner did not give the defendant permission to enter the motor vehicle; and—in line
with the mens rea we assume for this appeal—(4) when the defendant entered the
vehicle, he knew that he did not have the permission of the lawful owner or a person
with authority to give permission. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia, No. 5.405 (5th ed. 2026).
The first three UEV elements above are not in dispute in this case, so we focus
our analysis on the fourth element. Applying that standard, the evidence here was
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mr. Young knew that he lacked
permission to enter the vehicle. Here, the government presented evidence that the
vehicle had several obvious signs commonly associated with stolen vehicles,
including a missing driver side door handle, a punched ignition, and damage to the
interior and exterior of the vehicle. Officer Bowman testified that he saw Mr. Young
exiting the vehicle as the marked patrol cruiser approached. See Bynum, 133 A.3d at
988 (finding that defendant’s flight from vehicle supported an inference of guilty
knowledge). Moreover, Ms. Brady-Dennis testified that she did not know
Mr. Young or give him permission to be in her vehicle. Viewed in totality, this
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evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Young knew he lacked permission to enter the vehicle.
Mr. Young’s reliance on Agnew v. United States, 813 A.2d 192 (D.C. 2002),
and In re D.P., 996 A.2d 1286 (D.C. 2010), does not compel a different result. In
Agnew, this court found that the evidence of a “missing window, covered in plastic,
and [a] hardly obvious discrepancy in VIN numbers,” was insufficient without other
evidence to establish defendant’s knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. 813 A.2d
at 197. In comparison to Agnew, the government here relied on considerably more
evidence, including a punched ignition, a missing driver side handle, extensive
damage to the interior and exterior, Mr. Young’s conduct when Officer Bowman
approached the vehicle, and the owner’s testimony that she never gave Mr. Young
permission to enter. Taken together, the circumstantial evidence here is stronger than
the evidence presented in Agnew and can support a rational factfinder’s conclusion
that Mr. Young knew he did not have permission to be in the vehicle beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Likewise, In re D.P. is distinguishable. There, the defendant was seated in the
back seat of a vehicle along with several others, and the government failed to present
evidence that the defendant could see the punched ignition or otherwise know that
the vehicle was being used without the owner’s consent. 996 A.2d at 1287-88. Here,
9
although the government also did not present direct evidence establishing where
Mr. Young was seated or what damage he could see before entering the vehicle, the
trial court relied on additional circumstantial evidence not present in In re D.P.
Specifically, the trial court credited the evidence of the damage to the car, Mr. Young
exiting the vehicle upon Officer Bowman approaching, and Ms. Brady-Dennis’
testimony that she did not give Mr. Young, the sole occupant of the car at the time,
permission to be in the vehicle.
Mr. Young correctly identifies that the government did not present evidence
to establish where he was seated in the vehicle or what damage he observed before
entering the vehicle. Additionally, the government did not present direct evidence
that he exited the vehicle because he saw Officer Bowman approach. However,
under our sufficiency of the evidence standard, the government “need not negate
every possible inference of innocence” or present direct evidence of Mr. Young’s
knowledge so long as a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knowingly entered the vehicle without permission. Bynum, 133 A.3d at 987.
As such, we find that the evidence, while not overwhelming, was sufficient to
support the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Young knew that he did not have permission
to enter the vehicle.
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B. The Government Did Not Violate Rule 16
Mr. Young argues that the trial court erred when it declined to sanction the
government for violating Rule 16 by failing to preserve the vehicle and its contents.
He argues that the car and its contents were material because: (1) some of the items
in the vehicle belong to Ms. Pardee; (2) the car may have had forensic evidence that
may have contradicted the government’s witness testimony; and (3) the photos the
government provided were insufficient without forensic evidence. Mr. Young argues
that, as he was seeking dismissal, the trial court should have determined whether the
government acted in bad faith, pursuant to the standard in Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51 (1988). Because we ultimately conclude that the government did not
violate Rule 16, we need not address any points regarding sanctions.
This court reviews a trial court’s discovery rulings, including a Criminal Rule
16 decision, for abuse of discretion. See Weems v. United States, 191 A.3d 296, 300
(D.C. 2018). “Rule 16 imposes upon the government a range of discovery
obligations, including . . . an obligation to disclose, upon a request by a defendant,
(1) ‘[d]ocuments and [o]bjects,’ including videos, and (2) ‘the results or reports of
any physical . . . examination[s].’” Askew v. United States, 229 A.3d 1230, 1241
(D.C. 2020) (citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(1)(E)-(F)). “These items must be
‘within the government’s possession, custody, or control’ [and] ‘material to
11
preparing the defense,’ which is not a ‘high’ ‘threshold.’” Id. (citation omitted). Rule
16 imposes a duty of preservation on the government to ensure that the government
can fulfill these obligations. See Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318, 327-28
(D.C. 2003).
A “defendant need only establish a reasonable indication that the requested
evidence will [] [1] lead to other admissible evidence, [2] assist the defendant in the
preparation of witnesses or in corroborating testimony, or [3] be useful as
impeachment or rebuttal evidence.” Koonce v. District of Columbia, 111 A.3d 1009,
1013 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1164 (D.C. 2006)).
Mr. Young however failed to establish that the vehicle and its contents were
material to the preparation of his defense. Although Rule 16’s materiality threshold
is low, a defendant must still demonstrate a reasonable indication that the requested
evidence would be material to preparing the defense. See Koonce, 111 A.3d at 1013;
Askew, 229 A.3d at 1241.
Mr. Young argues that the vehicle could have provided forensic evidence;
revealed additional information about Ms. Pardee’s involvement; or allowed him to
rebut the government’s theory that he knowingly entered the vehicle. However, at
the time the vehicle was released, the government had no reasonable basis to expect
that forensic testing would produce evidence relevant to the sole charge of unlawful
12
entry. See Crocker v. United States, 253 A.3d 146, 154-55 (D.C. 2021) (stating that
the government’s preservation duty extends only to evidence that it reasonably
expects to be material to the “defendant’s development of a defense”). As the trial
court noted, Mr. Young was not charged with theft, receiving stolen property, or any
possessory offenses, and the officers therefore did not collect the vehicle’s contents
as evidence of the charged crime. Cf. id. at 155 (discussing the materiality of a stolen
car and its contents in a theft case where that car was used in a string of robberies
and contained evidence from those robberies). And Ms. Brady-Dennis, who had
already been deprived of her vehicle and would be further deprived in doing
significant repairs to it, had an interest in the speedy return of her property, especially
given that this case involved no possessory offenses and the government provided
the defense with “sufficiently informative” photographs of the car. See id. at 156
(discussing the “desirability of returning stolen property to their rightful owners
without undue delay,” the court acknowledged that “[i]n some cases [it] may be so
. . . [that] photographs taken in [that] case [are] ‘sufficiently informative’ to
substitute for defense inspection of the [vehicle]”).
Even more fatal to Mr. Young’s contention, the information that he argues the
physical evidence would have established was otherwise available to him for his
defense. The government produced photographs and body-worn camera footage
showing the interior and exterior of the vehicle. Mr. Young also cross-examined
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Officer Bowan regarding Ms. Pardee’s belongings and argued that those belongings
supported his theory that he believed that she had authority over the vehicle. Despite
Mr. Young declining to call Ms. Pardee as a witness, he still had an opportunity to
argue this theory with the evidence available to him. Thus, we do not see a way in
which the physical evidence would have provided helpful material information
beyond that, such that the government should have reasonably foreseen the need to
preserve it for the defense. We conclude that the government preserved evidence
that it reasonably expected would fall within the scope of discoverable evidence
under Rule 16 and discern no error by the trial court in concluding that the vehicle
and its contents were not material.
C. Brady Violation
Mr. Young argues that the government committed a Brady violation when it
withheld source documents on Officer Bowman’s pending disciplinary
investigations. He contends that the source documents would have provided
impeachment material because Officer Bowman’s credibility was central to the
government’s case.
Whether a defendant has established a Brady violation by the government
presents a mixed question of fact and law. Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094,
14
1120 (D.C. 2011) (citation omitted). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the prosecution to
disclose to the defense, upon request, material evidence—including impeachment
evidence—that is favorable to the accused.” Id. at 1106 (citing Brady v. Marshall,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). There are three components of a Brady violation: “[t]he
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,
either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Id. at 1109
(quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). If the first two
components are met, and there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different, then there is a
Brady violation. See id. (quoting Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 971 (D.C.
1993)).
Assuming that the evidence is favorable to Mr. Young and was suppressed,
Mr. Young fails to establish that the source documents would have led to a different
outcome, thus prejudicing him. Officer Bowman’s testimony was important to the
government’s case because he testified as to (1) Mr. Young being in the car prior to
the arrest and (2) the physical condition of the car upon further investigation.
15
However, the outcome of the case did not solely rely on his testimony. During its
ruling, the trial court also credited Ms. Brady-Dennis’s testimony that her car was
stolen and that she did not give Mr. Young permission to enter the car. The trial court
also credited the physical evidence of the punched ignition, missing door handle,
and damage to the interior and exterior of the vehicle. Therefore, we are not
convinced that the result would be different had Officer Bowman been discredited
in some way by these source documents.
Mr. Young also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
motion to dismiss without conducting an in camera review of the source documents.
While it is true that the trial court could not have known whether the source
documents were material without reviewing them, Mr. Young failed to request such
examination at the trial level. As such, the issue is unpreserved, and we can only
review his request for plain error. See Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1267
(D.C. 2014); see also Perry v. United States, 36 A.3d 799, 818 (D.C. 2011) (“To
obtain reversal of a conviction under plain error review, an appellant must show
(1) error, (2) that is plain or clear, and (3) that affects substantial rights”). We cannot
conclude that the trial court erred in a manner that affected Mr. Young’s substantial
rights by failing to sua sponte conduct an in camera review of the source documents
for at least two reasons. First, as the trial court noted, Mr. Young did not show that
these documents regarding pending disciplinary investigations were material, he
16
simply pointed to the possibility. Additionally, where we have already concluded
that Officer Bowman’s credibility was not a linchpin in this case, we cannot
conclude that the failure to sua sponte review the material affected Mr. Young’s
substantial rights. As a result, Mr. Young’s Brady challenge fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
So ordered.