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State v. Khan
ECKER, J., with whom D’AURIA and DANNEHY,
Js., join, dissenting. The majority concludes that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to redact the name of the plaintiff in error, Jane Doe, from the
official court transcript in this case, even though General Statutes § 54-86e codifies a statutory presumption
that the names, addresses, and identifying information
of victims of sexual assault should be kept confidential absent a reason for public disclosure. I respectfully disagree. Section 54-86e is not punitive or penal in nature but, instead, a civil, administrative, or regulatory statute, which protects victims of sexual assault from the
embarrassment, humiliation, and harassment that may
accompany the public disclosure of their identities. As
such, and because redaction of Doe’s name from the
official court transcript will not affect the trial court’s judgment, I would conclude that “the trial court retains jurisdiction, even after judgment is rendered . . . .” State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 498, 825 A.2d 63 (2003).
For multiple reasons, I also am unable to agree with
the majority’s conclusion in part II of its opinion that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Doe’s postjudgment motion to redact her name from
the official court transcript because she failed to file a writ of error when the trial court’s judgment became
final. Contrary to the majority’s view, Doe’s motion is
neither a collateral attack on the judgment nor an effort to circumvent “our hierarchical court system.” Part II
of the majority opinion. Trial courts have continuing
jurisdiction under § 54-86e to enter protective orders
shielding the confidentiality of the names of victims
of sexual assault from public disclosure. The court presiding over the criminal trial of the defendant in error Saifullah Khan had ordered Doe to use her full name
at the trial. Doe’s motion was filed in the same case in which the prior order was entered, and Doe has alleged
a change in circumstances since the rendering of final
judgment that would justify vacating or modifying the
prior order, namely, Khan’s alleged “lengthy campaign
to harass [Doe] by disseminating her name [publicly].”
State v. Khan
Doe’s motion was not a procedurally impermissible substitute for a writ of error.
I
STANDING AND AGGRIEVEMENT
I begin my analysis with an examination of whether
Doe had standing to file her postjudgment motion in the
trial court as a nonparty to the underlying criminal action and, if so, whether she was aggrieved by the dismissal of her motion for the purpose of filing the present writ of error. The majority does not reach these issues, which
were raised by this court as possible alternative grounds for granting the writ of error and have been addressed by the parties in supplemental briefs. Because I ultimately conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed Doe’s postjudgment motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, I will first address, as a threshold matter, whether the writ of error may be granted on either of these alternative grounds. This analysis has the additional benefit of foreshadowing some of the same principles that support my conclusion that the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Doe’s claim for relief.
A
Standing
Doe contends that she had standing in the trial court
to request the redaction of her name from the official
court transcript by virtue of § 54-86e, which protects
the confidentiality of the names, addresses, and identifying information of victims of sexual assault. Khan
and the state both respond that Doe lacked standing to
move to open the judgment of acquittal in the trial court because she did not have a specific, personal, or legal
interest that was specifically and injuriously affected by the trial court’s dismissal of her motion. Khan further
claims that Doe is not a “victim” under § 54-86e because he was acquitted of the sexual assault crimes with which
State v. Khan
he was charged, and, therefore, no such crimes occurred. I agree with Doe.
“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State
v. Bradley, 341 Conn. 72, 79, 266 A.3d 823 (2021); and
necessitates an inquiry into “whether the person whose
standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of the issue . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 80. To establish standing, a movant must
demonstrate either classical or statutory aggrievement.
See, e.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves,
262 Conn. 480, 486, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “Classical
aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. . . .
Second, the party must also show that the [challenged]
decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 486–87.
Unlike classical aggrievement, statutory aggrievement “exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in
cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation
grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation. . . . In order to determine whether a party has standing to make a claim under a
statute, a court must determine the interests and the
parties that the statute was designed to protect. . . .
Essentially the standing question in such cases is whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting persons in the
[movant’s] position a right to judicial relief. . . . [Stated differently, the movant] . . . must be within the zone of interests protected by the statute.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) McKay v. Longman,
332 Conn. 394, 410, 211 A.3d 20 (2019). Whether a
movant falls within the zone of interests protected by
a statute is an issue “of statutory interpretation, over
State v. Khan
which [the reviewing court] exercise[s] plenary review,
guided by well established principles regarding legislative intent.” Id., 411; see also General Statutes § 1-2z.
Section 54-86e provides in relevant part that “[t]he
name and address of the victim of a sexual assault . . . and such other identifying information pertaining to such
victim as determined by the court, shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only upon order of the Superior
Court . . . .” On the basis of the statutory text, I agree with the Appellate Court that “[t]he purpose underlying § 54-86e is clear. It aims to protect victims of sexual assault by reducing unnecessary harassment and embarrassment in court, and by encouraging the disclosure
of sexual assaults.” State v. Bennett-Gibson, 84 Conn.
App. 48, 69, 851 A.2d 1214, cert. denied, 271 Conn.
916, 859 A.2d 570 (2004). The interests of victims of
sexual assault in protecting their names, addresses, and identifying information from public disclosure is precisely the type of interest that the statute was intended to protect, and, therefore, Doe had statutory standing
in the trial court to file her motion to redact her name from the official court transcript.
Although Doe was a sexual assault victim within the
meaning of § 54-86e at the time of trial,1 Khan contends that the jury’s not guilty verdict stripped Doe of victim status. This claim lacks merit. It is well established that a not guilty verdict “does not mean . . . that a [crime] did not occur. It has long been recognized that criminal juries in the United States are free to [return] not guilty verdicts resulting from compromise, confusion, mistake, leniency or other legally and logically irrelevant factors. . . . Consequently, an acquittal is not to be taken as the
1
See State v. Damato-Kushel, 327 Conn. 173, 181, 173 A.3d 357 (2017) (“the arrest warrant constitutes a sufficient determination of [an individual’s] status as a victim”); see also General Statutes § 1-1k (defining “victim of crime” and “crime victim” as “an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as a result of a crime and includes immediate family members of a minor, incompetent individual or homicide victim and a person designated by a homicide victim in accordance with section 1-56r”).
State v. Khan
equivalent of a finding of the fact of innocence; nor does it necessarily even reflect a failure of proof on the part of the prosecution.”2 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 257 Conn. 587, 603, 778
A.2d 875 (2001). Doe was a victim of sexual assault within the protective scope of § 54-86e prior to and throughout the criminal trial—i.e., when Khan was presumed to be
innocent—and that designation also remained in effect
during the postjudgment proceedings in the trial court,
regardless of the jury’s verdict. To conclude otherwise
would undermine the statute’s clear and obvious purpose
of encouraging victims to report sexual assault crimes by protecting them from the harassment, embarrassment,
and retaliation that may accompany the public disclosure of their names, addresses, and identifying information.
Thus, Doe was a sexual assault victim with standing in
the trial court to seek to protect her statutory interest in the confidentiality of her name under § 54-86e.
2
For example, in some cases, it is undisputed that a sexual assault occurred, and the sole factual issue to be resolved by the jury is the identity of the perpetrator. See, e.g., State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 386, 394, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987) (sexual assault case in which “the identity of the assailant [was] essentially the sole issue at trial”). In other cases, although the state failed to fulfill its burden of persuasion as to one or more of the essential elements of the sexual assault crimes with which the defendant was charged, double jeopardy principles would not bar a second trial on different sexual assault charges. See, e.g., State v. Alvaro F., 291 Conn. 1, 2–3, 10–12, 966 A.2d 712 (sexual assault in fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of injury to child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53-21 (a) (2) are not same crime for double jeopardy purposes), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 882, 130 S. Ct. 200, 175 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009); State v. Daren S., 236 Conn. App. 377, 400–402, 348 A.3d 855 (2025) (sexual assault in first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) and sexual assault in third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (3) are not same crime for double jeopardy purposes), cert. granted, 354 Conn. 906, 349 A.3d 297 (2026).
In making these observations, I do not suggest that the jury’s verdict in this case was the result of compromise, confusion, mistake, leniency or other irrelevant factors. I conclude only that, as a doctrinal matter, a jury’s not guilty verdict is not the legal equivalent of a factual finding that no crime occurred and, therefore, does not divest a sexual assault complainant of his or her status as a “victim” within the meaning of § 54-86e.
State v. Khan
B
Aggrievement
I next address whether Doe has appellate standing in
this court, that is, whether she was aggrieved by the
dismissal of her motion for the purpose of the present
writ of error.3 “[S]tanding for purposes of bringing an
action differs from the aggrievement requirement for
appellate review . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest
Warrant, 350 Conn. 633, 641, 325 A.3d 921 (2024).
“Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate standing, and
implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 638. “[O]ur cases consistently have applied only the classical aggrievement test to determine whether a plaintiff in error can bring a writ of error.” Id., 641. Under the classical aggrievement test, Doe must establish that she had “a specific,
personal and legal interest” in redacting her name from
the official court transcript that was “specially and injuriously affected” by the trial court’s dismissal of her
motion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 642.
Aggrievement does not “depend [on] prevailing on the
merits of the legal claim” raised on appeal or by way of a writ of error. Connecticut Independent Utility Workers,
Local 12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 312 Conn. 265, 276, 92 A.3d 247 (2014); see also State v. Skipwith, 326 Conn. 512, 526–27 and n.18, 165 A.3d 1211 (2017)
(distinguishing between whether plaintiff in error was
aggrieved and her ability to prevail on merits of her legal
3
For the reasons explained in part II of this opinion, I treat Doe’s motion as a request to redact her name from the official court transcript consistent with § 54-86e, rather than as a motion to open the final judgment of acquittal. See, e.g., Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 351, 63 A.3d 940 (2013) (“[i]n certain circumstances, this court previously has looked beyond the label of a motion to reclassify it when its substance did not reflect the label applied by the moving party”); In re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 413, 815 A.2d 113 (2003) (court is not bound by label affixed to motion and must “look to the substance of the relief sought by the motion rather than the form”).
State v. Khan
claim). It is clear to me that Doe was aggrieved by the
dismissal of her motion.
In State v. Skipwith, supra, 326 Conn. 512, this court
examined whether a nonparty victim in a criminal action
had appellate standing to file a writ of error challenging an adverse ruling in the trial court. The victim in Skipwith alleged that she had been deprived of her right under the victim’s rights amendment to make a statement at
the defendant’s sentencing hearing and filed a writ of
error in the Appellate Court, asking that the defendant’s sentence be vacated and the case remanded for a new
sentencing hearing at which she could exercise her right. See id., 514–16; see also Conn. Const., amend. XXIX (b). To determine whether the victim had appellate standing
in this court, we distinguished between an appeal and a
writ of error, noting that an appeal is a statutory remedy available only to parties, whereas a writ of error is a common-law remedy available to nonparties. See id.,
519–21. Compare General Statutes § 52-263 (providing
for appeals from final judgments of Superior Court, “if
either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge” (emphasis added)) with Practice Book § 72-1 (a)
(1) (codifying right to common-law writ of error from “a decision binding on an aggrieved nonparty” (emphasis
added)). Although nonparty victims do not have the
“right to appeal from rulings of the trial court” under
§ 52-263; State v. Skipwith, supra, 520; this court held in Skipwith that they have a common-law right to file a writ of error “in the absence of any constitutional provision or statute depriving this court of its common-law jurisdiction over writs of error . . . .” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id., 521. This is because nothing in
the state constitution or the General Statutes “deprives this court of its jurisdiction over writs of error seeking relief for a violation of the victim’s rights amendment” and because the legislative history of the victim’s rights amendment “reveals that the legislature expressly contemplated that victims would be able to seek relief both in the trial court and in the appellate courts.” Id., 522. The court in Skipwith therefore held that appellate courts
State v. Khan
have jurisdiction over writs of error arising from the
victim’s rights amendment. Id., 524–25.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court in Skipwith
recognized that the victim’s rights amendment provides
that it “shall not be construed as creating a basis for
vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief in
any criminal case . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 523. The court held that this proviso does not deprive appellate courts of jurisdiction over writs of error, reasoning that, “in ordinary usage, the phrase ‘appellate relief’ connotes relief granted on appeal from a judgment disposing of the case, not relief provided to a nonparty in connection with a collateral
issue that will not directly affect the substantive issues or the ultimate disposition of the case. . . . Indeed, the legislative history [of the victim’s rights amendment]
indicates that the purpose of the provision barring ‘appellate relief’ was to ensure that any relief provided would not deprive defendants of their existing substantive
rights; its purpose was not to deprive victims of any
appellate redress for a violation of their rights, even when providing relief would not affect the judgment or the
rights of the defendant.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. In other words, “the bar on appellate relief was intended to be the constitutional equivalent to General Statutes § 54-223, which provides that the ‘[f]ailure to afford the victim of a crime any of the rights provided pursuant to any provision of the general statutes shall
not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwise lawful
conviction or voiding an otherwise lawful sentence or
parole determination.’ ” Id., 524. Applying these principles to the facts in Skipwith, the court concluded that the victim had standing to file her writ of error because the writ “raised a pure question of law from a final judgment of the Superior Court that [was] binding on her
and by which she [was] aggrieved, namely, the ruling
of the trial court dismissing her motion to vacate the
defendant’s sentence.” Id., 526 n.18.4
4
On the merits, however, the court in Skipwith concluded that the Appellate Court had properly dismissed the victim’s writ of error
State v. Khan
Consistent with Skipwith, I conclude that, as a victim
of sexual assault, Doe has appellate standing to advocate for her own personal interest in the privacy of her name under the confidentiality provisions codified in
§ 54-86e. Nothing in our constitution, statutes, or case law deprives the appellate courts of this state of their common-law authority over writs of error seeking relief
for the alleged violation of a victim’s constitutional or statutory rights. See id., 522; see also In re Criminal
Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant, supra,
350 Conn. 639–40 (requirement that statute expressly
grant right to appellate review “is antithetical to the
purpose of a writ of error, which is to afford a nonparty appellate review of an adverse judgment when there is no express legislative fiat for doing so”); State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492, 499, 811 A.2d 667 (2002) (“[t]he writ of
error . . . is a concept deeply rooted in our common law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 54-86e
provides Doe with a specific, personal, and legal interest in the confidentiality of her name as a victim of sexual assault, which was specially and injuriously affected
by the dismissal of her motion. See, e.g., State v. Skipwith, supra, 326 Conn. 526 n.18 (victim was aggrieved
by dismissal of motion to vacate defendant’s sentence);
see also State v. Damato-Kushel, 327 Conn. 173, 176,
180–81, 173 A.3d 357 (2017) (victim was aggrieved by
denial of his request to attend in-chambers, off record
pretrial plea negotiations). Moreover, as explained in part II of this opinion, Doe’s request for relief is not barred by the victim’s rights amendment or § 54-223 because it
concerns “a collateral issue that will not directly affect the substantive issues or the ultimate disposition of
the case.” State v. Skipwith, supra, 523. In short, Doe
was aggrieved by the dismissal of her motion to redact
her name from the official court transcript pursuant to
§ 54-86e.
because it sought “a form of relief—an order requiring the trial court to vacate the defendant’s sentence—that is barred by the prohibition on appellate relief contained in the victim’s rights amendment.” State v. Skipwith, supra, 326 Conn. 526; see id., 526–27.
State v. Khan
Khan contends that Doe was not aggrieved by the
dismissal of her motion because she “has not identified a single instance of harassment, harm, or concrete injury
resulting from her name appearing in the transcript.”5
This argument is inconsistent with the principle that
“[a]ggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bradley, supra, 341
Conn. 80; accord State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 532,
847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct.
424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004). The allegations in Doe’s
motion were sufficient to establish the possibility of an adverse impact on her statutory interest in preserving
5
Alternatively, Khan contends that Doe was not aggrieved by the dismissal of her motion to redact her name from the official court transcript pursuant to In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant, supra, 350 Conn. 633, in which this court held that private citizens lack “a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. . . . [Private citizens] are not classically aggrieved because they have a general interest, no different from that of any other member of the community, in the arrest of [the individuals who allegedly violated the law].” (Citation omitted.) Id., 646. The holding in In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant is limited to the unusual circumstance in which a private party pursues the criminal prosecution or nonprosecution of another. As explained in that case, “the formal initiation and prosecution of criminal offenses is usually the domain of public officials,” and, “even [when] the [l]egislature has given a private party the opportunity to seek a criminal complaint . . . the denial of a complaint creates no judicially cognizable wrong.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 645.
Unlike the private citizens in In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant, Doe does not seek the criminal prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Instead, she seeks to protect her own statutory interest in the confidentiality of her name under § 54-86e. Doe’s statutory interest in the confidentiality of her name, address, and identifying information under § 54-86e is not generalized, abstract, or widely shared by all members of the community. To the contrary, the confidentiality interests codified in § 54-86e are specific, particularized, and narrowly tailored to victims of certain enumerated crimes, including various degrees of sexual assault. See General Statutes § 54-86e. In light of Doe’s statutory interest in the confidentiality of her own name as a victim of sexual assault, Doe was aggrieved by the trial court’s dismissal of her motion to redact the official court transcript to protect her name from public disclosure.
State v. Khan
the confidentiality of her name under § 54-86e. In her
motion, Doe alleged that, since the trial court’s judgment, Khan “has embarked on a lengthy campaign to
harass [Doe] by disseminating her name” and has “stated
that he would do everything [he] can to get [Doe] to
break, including ‘spend[ing] thousands of dollars to keep [news] articles [containing Doe’s name] circulating on
the Internet for years . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe further alleged that Khan had used the
public availability of her name in this case against her in a federal tort action, citing it as a reason to avoid judicial sanctions for broadcasting her name online. See Khan v.
Yale University, Docket No. 19-cv-01966 (KAD), 2025
WL 328791, *5 (D. Conn. January 29, 2025); see also
part III of this opinion. Based on these allegations, the court’s dismissal of the motion was sufficient to establish a possible adverse effect on Doe’s statutory interest in the confidentiality of her name under § 54-86e.
II
POSTJUDGMENT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICITON
The remaining question, which is the focal point of
my disagreement with the majority, is whether the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Doe’s motion to redact her name from the official court transcript under § 54-86e after final judgment was rendered. Before addressing in detail what I find lacking in the
majority’s analysis, it will be useful to review the precedent that casts light on the existence and parameters of a trial court’s postjudgment subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case. Although the general principles are
well established, the precise contours of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction after judgment are nuanced
and multifaceted.
Connecticut’s trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and, “[i]n the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of [their] jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Khan
State v. Butler, 348 Conn. 51, 67, 300 A.3d 1145 (2023). Under the common law, a trial court generally lacks
jurisdiction to open or modify a criminal judgment after it has become final. See, e.g., id., 72 (“[w]hen the information, which contains the charges and establishes the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is dismissed, the court’s jurisdiction is extinguished because there is then no valid charging document pending before the court to confer
jurisdiction on it”); State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 429, 432, 969 A.2d 166 (2009) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on motion to dismiss filed after entry of nolle prosequi); State v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 491 (“[t]he jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates
when the sentence is put into effect, and that court may no longer take any action affecting the sentence unless it has been expressly authorized to act” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). The rendering
of a judgment of acquittal is a final judgment. See State v. Paolella, 210 Conn. 110, 120, 554 A.2d 702 (1989)
(judgment of acquittal is final judgment that “concludes the rights of the parties regarding the charges of which the defendant has been acquitted” and “achieves the same finality as the imposition of a sentence since it terminates the prosecution of the charges to which it applies and
negates the possibility of an imposition of a sentence”).
There are some important exceptions to the general
rule regarding the termination of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction after the execution of a criminal
judgment. “For example, the legislature has authorized
the court to modify the terms of probation, even after
a sentence is imposed; see General Statutes §§ 53a-29
(c), 53a-30 (c) and 53a-32 (d); and to hear a petition for a new trial filed following sentencing. See General Statutes § 52-270 (a).” State v. Butler, supra, 348 Conn. 69. Under the common law, trial courts also have continuing
jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner. See, e.g., State
v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 835, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010)
(expiration of trial court’s jurisdiction after imposition of sentence “presupposes a valid sentence, [and] it long
State v. Khan
has been understood that, if a court imposes an invalid
sentence, it retains jurisdiction to substitute a valid
sentence” (emphasis in original)); State v. Lawrence,
281 Conn. 147, 155, 913 A.2d 428 (2007) (“for the trial
court to have jurisdiction to consider [a] claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of the categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has
jurisdiction to review”).
Another exception to the general rule is that trial
courts retain jurisdiction to enter certain postjudgment orders that do not affect the judgment or the sentence
imposed. For example, trial courts can correct clerical
errors in the judgment, sentence, or record at any time. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 502 n.1, 944
A.2d 947 (“a clerical error in a judgment may be corrected at any time”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S. Ct. 271, 172 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2008); State v. Dayton, 176 Conn.
App. 858, 871–72, 171 A.3d 482 (2017) (“a court retains
the inherent authority to correct, sua sponte, a clerical error in the judgment at any time” because “[a] clerical error does not challenge the court’s ability to reach the conclusion that it did reach, but involves the failure to preserve or correctly represent in the record the actual decision of the court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court’s jurisdiction in this respect is “separate and distinct” from its jurisdiction to open or modify the judgment; Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 496, 47 A.
755 (1901); because “the record is a history of the court proceedings, [and] the power to make it speak truthfully is one of necessity belonging to every court of record, and may be exercised” at any time, even after judgment is
rendered, so long as “notice [is provided] to the adverse party.” Id., 496–97.
Trial courts also have continuing jurisdiction to effectuate nonpunitive statutory provisions that do not affect the original judgment or the sentence imposed. In State
v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 484, this court considered whether, after the execution of the defendant’s
sentence, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to make
State v. Khan
the factual findings necessary to trigger mandatory sex
offender registration under General Statutes § 54-251,
a provision in the statutory scheme commonly referred
to as Megan’s Law. See id., 485–86. The defendant in
that case claimed that the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction after the rendering of final judgment; id., 488–89; and the state responded that the trial court did not need to open or modify the judgment or sentence to
“[effectuate] the regulatory purpose of Megan’s Law.”
Id., 489. This court agreed with the state, explaining
that registration under Megan’s Law is nonpunitive
under the two part test adopted in State v. Kelly, 256
Conn. 23, 92–94, 770 A.2d 908 (2001), which examines
whether (1) “the legislature had intended the statute to be criminal or civil, in other words, ‘punitive in law’ ”; State v. Waterman, supra, 492–93; and (2) “even if not
punitive in law, the statute was nevertheless ‘punitive
in fact,’ that is, whether the statute was so punitive
in fact that it could not be seen as civil in nature.” Id., 493. Under this test, the court in Waterman held that
Megan’s Law was not punitive in law or fact because it
was not enacted with punitive intent and did not implement a punitive regime. Id., 493–98. Instead, it was a
civil regulatory requirement, the purpose of which was
to protect public safety. Id., 492. Because “the [trial] court merely was effectuating the regulatory purpose
of Megan’s law” and “the defendant’s sentence was not
affected by the . . . court’s factual finding” regarding sex offender registration; id., 497; “the trial court retain[ed] jurisdiction, even after judgment [was] rendered . . . .” Id., 498.
Pursuant to Waterman, this court has held that trial
courts have continuing jurisdiction after final judgment is rendered in criminal actions to enter orders (1) granting the state permission to use reasonable force as a means of obtaining a criminal defendant’s DNA sample
under General Statutes § 54-102g; see State v. Banks,
321 Conn. 821, 830–36, 146 A.3d 1 (2016); (2) modifying a condition of probation to add a requirement that
the defendant pay restitution to the victim pursuant
State v. Khan
General Statutes § 53a-30 (a); see State v. Fowlkes, 283 Conn. 735, 736–45, 930 A.2d 644 (2007); and (3) imposing a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to
General Statutes § 53a-40e. See State v. Alexander,
269 Conn. 107, 111–19, 847 A.2d 970 (2004); see also
State v. Mieles, 351 Conn. 765, 778, 333 A.3d 1096
(2025) (“a standing criminal protective order is nonpunitive and may be issued postsentencing”). In each
of these cases, the trial court retained jurisdiction to effectuate the nonpunitive intent, purpose, and effect
of the statutory provision at issue because the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction did not affect its judgment or any sentence imposed. See State v. Banks, supra, 837 (trial
court retained jurisdiction to grant state permission to use reasonable force to obtain DNA sample pursuant to
§ 54-102g because “the statute is neither punitive in law or in fact and therefore does not affect the defendant’s original sentences”); State v. Fowlkes, supra, 743, 744
(trial court retained jurisdiction to modify conditions
of probation to order restitution because “probation
is not punitive” and “[r]estitution simply serves the
state’s rehabilitative interest in having a defendant take responsibility for his conduct through the act of making the victim whole”); State v. Alexander, supra, 117, 119
(trial court retained jurisdiction to issue restraining
order under § 53a-40e because intent, purpose, and effect of statute was “to protect victims from further abuse
and not to punish the defendant” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In short, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to implement statutory provisions that are
essentially regulatory or civil in nature.6
Applying the foregoing legal principles to this case,
I am convinced that the trial court had subject matter
6
Our case law also establishes that a trial court’s postjudgment authority to implement civil or regulatory statutes in criminal cases does not always depend on an explicit statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction. In Fowlkes, this court held that trial courts retain subject matter jurisdiction to effectuate nonpunitive statutes in criminal cases, unless the statute at issue is “jurisdictional in nature”; State v. Fowlkes, supra, 283 Conn. 746; and expressly restricts “the time in which a court” may act. Id., 746–47. In that case, the court held that a trial court retained
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jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Doe’s motion
seeking the redaction of her name from the official court transcript. Section 54-86e, which codifies a default rule that the names, addresses, and identifying information
of victims of sexual assault shall be kept confidential
unless there is a court order directing otherwise, is a civil, administrative, or regulatory statute that is nonpunitive in both law and fact. Section 54-86e is not punitive in law because its text reveals that the purpose of the statute is not to punish the offender, but to protect the victim. See, e.g., State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 832–33 (examining statutory text to ascertain legislative purpose); see also General Statutes § 1-2z. Section 54-86e provides in relevant part that “[t]he name and address of the victim of a sexual assault . . . and such other identifying information pertaining to such victim as determined by the
court, shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only upon order of the Superior Court . . . .” As the Appellate Court has observed, the statute “aims to protect victims of sexual assault by reducing unnecessary harassment
and embarrassment in court, and by encouraging the
disclosure of sexual assaults.” State v. Bennett-Gibson, supra, 84 Conn. App. 69.
It also is clear that § 54-86e is not punitive in fact. A statute is punitive in fact “if the punitive effect of the statute is so substantial that it swallows the regulatory or civil purpose of the statute.” State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 834. The inquiry is guided by asking “whether
the challenged action has historically been regarded
as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
jurisdiction to modify a defendant’s conditions of probation to order restitution under § 53a-30 (a), even though the statute did not explicitly authorize the trial court “to impose a condition of probation subsequent to the initial sentencing and prior to the defendant’s commencement of his period of probation.” Id., 745. Likewise, in State v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 497–98, State v. Alexander, supra, 269 Conn. 117, 119, and State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 837, this court held that the trial court in each case had continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive statutory provisions after final judgment was rendered, despite the absence of an express grant of legislative authority to act postjudgment. See General Statutes §§ 53a-40e, 54-102g and 54-251.
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finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 835. None of these factors indicates that § 54-86e has a punitive effect. The statute implements
a wholly nonpunitive remedy that “serves the purpose
of protecting the victim.” State v. Alexander, supra,
269 Conn. 118.
The name by which a victim is identified in the transcript is a collateral issue that does not impact the criminal judgment or any sentence that may be imposed. A
defendant, like Khan, who has been found not guilty of
the crimes with which he was charged will remain not
guilty of those offenses regardless of whether the victim’s name is redacted from the official court transcript and substituted with a pseudonym, initials, the notation “name omitted,” or a black box. A postjudgment order
protecting the confidentiality of a victim’s name under
§ 54-86e will not alter the trial court’s judgment, modify the jury’s factual findings, or expose a criminal defendant to punishment.7 Because redaction of a victim’s name,
address, and identifying information under § 54-86e is
7
At oral argument before this court, Khan’s counsel acknowledged that the judgment of acquittal will remain intact regardless of the possible redaction of Doe’s name but suggested that such redaction may subject Khan to unspecified collateral consequences, such as an adverse impact on his immigration status. The connection between the relief sought by Doe and Khan’s concerns about his immigration status are opaque at best. In any event, case law establishes that adverse collateral consequences do “not automatically convert an otherwise regulatory statutory scheme into a penal statute.” State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 835; see id. (§ 54-102g was not punitive, even though “refusal to submit a DNA sample can result in a criminal prosecution pursuant to § 54-102g (g)”); State v. Alexander, supra, 269 Conn. 118–19 (§ 53a-40e was not punitive, even though it prohibits “the defendant from doing something that would otherwise be legal, i.e., being in the vicinity of the victim,” and “subjects the defendant to punishment . . . if he violates it”).
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nonpunitive, the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to rule on Doe’s motion.
I recognize that Doe titled her motion an “Emergency
Motion To Open Case for Limited Purpose and for Order,”
but courts “are not bound by the label affixed to [a party’s] pleading . . . .” BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn.
194, 210, 990 A.2d 853 (2010). In ascertaining the nature of a motion, courts must “look to the substance of the
relief sought by the motion rather than the form.” In
re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 413, 815 A.2d 113 (2003).
The substance of the relief sought in Doe’s motion was
clear—she requested “an order instructing the court
reporter to redact [her] name from the transcript in this case by replacing all references to [her] first name with ‘Jane,’ all references to [her] last name with ‘Doe,’ and all references to [her] full name with ‘Jane Doe.’ ” To the extent that any ambiguity regarding the relief requested existed, Doe urged the trial court to disregard the title of her motion, stating that she “does not believe the court needs to open anything to grant her request” and that she is seeking only “[a]n order concerning the transcript.” It “would exalt form over substance” to conclude that the
title of Doe’s motion divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Haley B., supra, 415.
I find further support for my conclusion in the well
established principle that “courts retain supervisory
authority over documents in their possession”; Rosado
v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn.
168, 216, 884 A.2d 981 (2005); and in General Statutes
§ 51-36, which governs the retention, reproduction,
destruction, and disposal of court records. Section 51-36 (b) provides in relevant part that “any judge of the Superior Court may order that official records of evidence or judicial proceedings in said court . . . including official notes and tapes of evidence or judicial proceedings concerning title to land, taken more than seven years prior to the date of such order by any stenographer or official court reporter, be destroyed by the person having the
custody thereof.” The term “ ‘official records of evidence
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or judicial proceedings’ includes . . . the transcripts of all proceedings held in the matter, including voir dire.” General Statutes § 51-36 (e) (3); see also General Statutes § 51-36 (c) (3) (providing for destruction or disposal of all exhibits “[i]n any case in which a person has been found not guilty . . . upon the expiration of ninety days from the date of final disposition of such case”); cf. General Statutes § 54-142a (a) (providing for erasure of court
records “in any criminal case . . . [in which] the accused, by a final judgment, is found not guilty of the charge or the charge is dismissed”); Practice Book § 7-13 (f) (“[i]n cases in which there has been neither a conviction nor the payment of a fine on any charge, the file shall be destroyed upon the expiration of three years from the date of disposition”). Given that trial courts have subject matter
jurisdiction to order the destruction of an official court transcript after final judgment is rendered, I perceive
no reason why they lack subject matter jurisdiction to
order the redaction of victims’ names, addresses, and
identifying information from an official court transcript after final judgment is rendered.8
The majority does not analyze whether a postjudgment order under § 54-86e is punitive in nature or will
affect the judgment of the trial court. Instead, the
majority concludes that, although a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil,
8
Khan argues that a trial court’s postjudgment jurisdiction over court records is limited to purely ministerial actions like the destruction of records. The premise of Khan’s argument is flawed because the destruction of records itself is not ministerial. The relevant statute provides that trial courts “may” order the destruction of court records, including transcripts, under certain circumstances. General Statutes § 51-36 (b) (“any judge of the Superior Court may order that official records of evidence or judicial proceedings . . . be destroyed” (emphasis added)). “The word may, unless the context in which it is employed requires otherwise, ordinarily does not connote a command. Rather, the word generally imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 252 Conn. 115, 122, 742 A.2d 1257 (2000). Thus, trial courts are permitted, but are not required, to exercise their discretion to order the destruction of a transcript under § 51-36 (b).
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administrative, or regulatory statutes following the
rendering of a final judgment of conviction, it lacks
jurisdiction to do so following the rendering of a final judgment of acquittal.9 See part I of the majority opinion.
I find no persuasive force to this distinction in the
current context, and the majority offers no reasoning
beyond the declarative statement that the court’s jurisdiction disappears once its judgment has become final.
In particular, the majority provides no reason why the
outcome of a criminal trial should be determinative of
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. I have found no Connecticut authority, and the majority cites none,
to support its assertion that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil, administrative, or regulatory statutes “only after the conviction of a defendant, not an acquittal.”10 Id.
9
The majority also concludes that, because Doe alleged in her motion that the prior order of the trial court, B. Fischer, J., requiring her to state her full name on the record was a “mistake” under § 54-86e, her motion impermissibly seeks to reverse a final judgment. See part I of the majority opinion. Due to its failure to engage in the necessary doctrinal analysis, the majority does not come to grips with the fact that Doe’s use of the word “mistake” to describe Judge Fischer’s order carries no jurisdictional consequences. For the reasons explained in part III of this opinion, Doe’s motion was not a collateral attack on the trial court’s judgment. Nor, contrary to the majority’s assertion, did Doe’s motion seek reconsideration of Judge Fischer’s order. Doe’s motion was not titled a motion for reconsideration, and it was not treated as a motion for reconsideration by the trial court or the parties. As previously explained, in ascertaining the nature of Doe’s motion, the court must “look to the substance of the relief sought by the motion rather than the form.” In re Haley B., supra, 262 Conn. 413. Doe’s motion must be construed “broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically,” and read “in its entirety in such a way as to give effect . . . to the general theory [on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 128, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023). Construing Doe’s motion broadly and realistically consistent with the general theory on which it proceeded in the trial court, Doe’s motion must be considered as a postjudgment motion to redact her name from the official court transcript under § 54-86e and not converted by this court into a motion to reconsider Judge Fischer’s order.
10
The only case cited by the majority within a stone’s throw of this assertion, State v. Butler, supra, 348 Conn. 51, is nothing like the
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In the absence of applicable Connecticut precedent,
I find persuasive out-of-state authority addressing the
scope of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to
implement nonpunitive civil, administrative, or regulatory statutes following the rendering of a judgment of
acquittal. In State v. Brawley, 171 N.H. 333, 335–36,
195 A.3d 113 (2018), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered whether a trial court had continuing
jurisdiction, after a judgment of acquittal was rendered, to require a defendant to reimburse the costs of his public defense under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:9 (2001).
The defendant in that case claimed that, “in light of his acquittal, [he] was ‘unconditionally discharged’ from
the criminal case,” and the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. State v. Brawley, supra, 336. The
court rejected this argument, holding that § 604-A:9 conferred continuing jurisdiction on trial courts to recoup a criminal defendant’s “costs and expenses after the
disposition of an action without regard to the nature of the disposition, i.e., conviction, acquittal, or dismissal.” Id., 338. Likewise, I would hold that § 54-86e confers
continuing jurisdiction on the trial courts to protect
the names, addresses, and identifying information of
victims of sexual assault, regardless of the nature of
the disposition, i.e., conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. present case. See part I of the majority opinion. In Butler, this court held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open and vacate a judgment of dismissal and to reinstate criminal charges against the defendant, even though the dismissal was premised on factually inaccurate and erroneous information. See id., 54–55, 74. Consistent with the well established general principles discussed in the body of this opinion, this court held that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction to open and substantively change the outcome of a final judgment in a criminal case without a basis for continuing jurisdiction. See id., 69–71. In arriving at its conclusion, the court in Butler recognized that there were exceptions to the well established general principles, none of which was applicable. Id., 73. Because Butler did not address, much less foreswear, a trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil, administrative, or regulatory statutes that do not necessitate any alteration, modification, or opening of a final judgment of acquittal, the majority’s reliance on it is misplaced.
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III
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE JUDGMENT
Although the majority’s conclusion in part I of its
opinion is dispositive of the present writ of error, it
proceeds to conclude in part II that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Doe’s motion to redact
her name from the official court transcript for an additional reason, namely, because the posttrial court, Vitale, J., lacked the authority to reverse or modify the prior
order of the trial court, B. Fischer, J., after that order had become final and appealable.11 The majority’s conclusion is fundamentally flawed for several reasons.
The precise basis for the majority’s jurisdictional holding is unclear, but the majority appears to conclude that Doe’s motion is a collateral attack on Judge Fischer’s
prior order.12 Although the majority does not use the
11
All references to the trial court hereinafter are to Judge Vitale. 12
The majority’s position is equally groundless to the extent that it suggests that Doe’s postjudgment motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See part II of the majority opinion. First and foremost, res judicata does not divest a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. See M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9, 19 n.6, 312 A.3d 1040 (2024) (although doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent parties “from relitigating any barred claims, they do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction”). Second, even if the doctrine implicated the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is inapplicable to the present case because, among other reasons, Doe was not a party to the criminal action or in privity with the state. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 320 Conn. 146, 156–57, 129 A.3d 677 (2016) (“[g]enerally, for res judicata to apply, four elements must be met: (1) the judgment must have been rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent actions must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have been an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully; and (4) the same underlying claim must be at issue”); see also part I of this opinion. “Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts. Rather, it is, in essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that [res judicata] should be applied only when there exists such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights so as to justify preclusion. . . . [T]he crowning consideration . . . [is] that the interest of the party to be precluded must have been sufficiently represented in the prior action so that the application of [res judicata] is not inequitable.” (Citation
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term collateral attack or cite our collateral attack jurisprudence, the public policy concerns on which the majority relies—finality, appealability, and our hierarchical court system—are the same principles that animate our
collateral attack jurisprudence. I therefore analyze the majority’s holding using the collateral attack framework.
Our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a collateral attack on a final judgment. See, e.g., Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 771, 143 A.3d 578
(2016). The reason for the prohibition against collateral attacks is that “[t]he law aims to invest judicial transactions with the utmost permanency consistent with
justice. . . . Public policy requires that a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records [on]
which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. A party who “deems himself wronged by the court’s
decision” may challenge that decision, for example, by
way of appeal or a writ of error, and, “[i]f he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these
or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him
in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, supra, 166–67. The state and the victim in a criminal action are not in privity because they do “not share the same legal interests or rights . . . .” Virzi v. Berger, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 31, 2018) (67 Conn. L. Rptr. 299, 299). In a criminal action, the state does not represent the legal interests of the victim; the state represents the legal interests of the people of the state of Connecticut. See, e.g., State v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330, 342–43, 39 A.3d 1105 (2012) (“It is a basic tenet of the criminal justice system that prosecutions are undertaken and punishments are sought by the state on behalf of the citizens of the state, and not on behalf of particular victims or complaining witnesses. . . . A criminal prosecution is a public matter and not a contest between the defendant and his victims, or their relatives.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Because Doe’s legal interests and rights were not represented by the state in the underlying criminal action, it would be inequitable to bar her request for relief under the doctrine of res judicata.
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and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults [on] it.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
There are two types of collateral attacks. “First, [a]
collateral attack is an attack [on] a judgment, decree or order offered in an action or proceeding other than that in which it was obtained, in support of the contentions of an adversary in the action or proceeding . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v.
Tope, 345 Conn. 662, 672, 286 A.3d 891 (2022). Second,
a collateral attack may occur within the same action or
proceeding if the judgment has become final and the
court lacks continuing jurisdiction to modify the challenged order or to open the final judgment. Id.; see, e.g., Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 118 n.7, 70 A.3d
13 (2013) (trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to
modify alimony orders under General Statutes § 46b-86
(a) “upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances after the date of the original order”); Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 543–44,
985 A.2d 1052 (2010) (“[o]ur jurisprudence concerning
the trial court’s authority to overturn or to modify a
ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with
continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally [issued] the ruling”); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 220 (“the trial court . . . ha[s] inherent power to vacate or to modify the protective orders in [a] withdrawn [case]”).
Doe’s motion plainly is not the first type of collateral attack because it was filed in the same action or
proceeding in which Judge Fischer issued his original
order. Resolution of the issue therefore turns on whether Doe’s motion is the second type of collateral attack, that is, whether the trial court had continuing jurisdiction
to modify Judge Fischer’s order or to open the final
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judgment of acquittal. As explained in part II of this
opinion, Doe’s motion did not challenge the final judgment of acquittal, and the trial court was not required
to open or modify the final judgment of acquittal to
grant Doe the relief she requested. The issue presented
is therefore further limited to a single narrow question: Did the trial court have continuing jurisdiction to modify Judge Fischer’s order denying the state’s request to
shield Doe’s name from public disclosure?
Before addressing the merits of that question, it is
worth noting, as a predicate matter, that, at trial, it was the prosecutor who requested that Doe be permitted to
proceed without using her full name on the record and
who failed to provide Judge Fischer with the statutory
authority required to support that request. As a sequestered witness, Doe was not present in the courtroom when Judge Fischer issued his order and, therefore, was not in a position to object to the ruling. Although the prosecutor indicated that he wanted to inform Doe of Judge Fischer’s ruling, the record does not reflect whether he did so. In her postjudgment motion to redact her name from the
official court transcript, Doe states that she “believed her name was not publicly available through the transcript”
until she discovered otherwise during the course of the
federal litigation. It is therefore unclear whether Doe, as a nonparty to the criminal action, was aware of Judge Fischer’s order or had an opportunity to challenge it by way of a writ of error prior to the filing of her postjudgment motion. See footnote 12 of this opinion.
Without explaining its reasoning, the majority suggests in a footnote that Doe’s use of the terms “error”
and “mistake” in her motion to describe Judge Fischer’s
order somehow deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
to grant Doe the relief she requested.13 See footnote 11
13
Doe’s use of these terms, whether necessary or not for jurisdictional purposes, presumably refers to the fact that Judge Fischer’s order was made without any express consideration of the presumption of confidentiality embodied in § 54-86e, which the prosecutor failed to bring to Judge Fischer’s attention in response to his inquiry. Judge Vitale also implied that Judge Fischer’s order was erroneous, stating that, “at
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of the majority opinion. This assertion is flawed for two reasons. First, as a legal matter, the majority takes its eye off the jurisdictional ball by fixating exclusively on the motion’s characterization of Judge Fischer’s ruling
rather than looking to the relief sought by the motion,
which was an order to redact the transcript to shield
Doe’s name from public disclosure under § 54-86e in light of Khan’s alleged campaign of harassment after final
judgment was rendered. The trial court’s jurisdiction is defined by reference to the relief sought in Doe’s motion. See In re Haley B., supra, 262 Conn. 413. Second, the
majority’s conclusion is also incorrect as a factual matter because, as explained hereinafter, the relief sought in Doe’s motion was not premised exclusively on Judge
Fischer’s alleged trial error, but also on the postjudgment events that the motion set forth as grounds for the relief requested under § 54-86e.
An order under § 54-86e is a type of protective or sealing order that shields from public disclosure confidential information (i.e., sexual assault victims’ names,
addresses, and identifying information) contained in
judicial documents in the custody and control of the
court. Cf. Practice Book § 42-49A (sealing or limiting
disclosure of documents in criminal cases). It is well
settled that trial courts have inherent continuing jurisdiction after a judgment is rendered “to revisit protective orders” regarding judicial documents “when a change in
circumstances or pertinent law makes it equitable to do
so . . . .” Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 216; see also United States v.
Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 719, 721 (5th Cir. 2015) (reviewing lower court’s ruling on motion to modify protective
order filed eleven years after judgment was rendered in
criminal case and observing that such motions “are not a part of the trial and punishment process that is criminal law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Dornsbach, 730 F. Supp. 3d 897, 903–904 (D. Minn.
2024) (exercising inherent authority to rule on motion to the trial level . . . by statute, the name should have been protected. . . . For whatever reason, that didn’t happen.”
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modify protective order filed after rendering of judgment of acquittal); United States v. Craigue, 573 F. Supp. 3d 584, 596 (D.N.H. 2021) (granting postjudgment motion
to modify protective order because courts have inherent
power over protective orders, “even after judgment” is
rendered (internal quotation marks omitted)). Control
over “the entry or modification of a protective order . . . is a matter falling peculiarly within the discretion of the [trial] court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46, 53 (D. Mass. 2012).
In her motion, Doe alleged that, after the entry of
Judge Fischer’s order, “Khan ha[d] embarked on a
lengthy campaign to harass [Doe] by disseminating
her name.” Following the judgment of acquittal, Khan
sued Doe, Yale University, and several of its employees
in federal court. See generally Khan v. Yale University, 511 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D. Conn. 2021), vacated in
part, 85 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2023). In her motion, Doe
alleged that she had been granted permission to proceed pseudonymously in the federal action and that
Khan had been ordered not to disclose her name publicly. “[T]hrough discovery in the [federal action], [Doe] obtained an email that . . . Khan had written in which . . . Khan stated that he would do everything [he could] to
get [Doe] to break, including ‘spend[ing] thousands of
dollars to keep [news] articles [containing Doe’s name]
circulating on the Internet for years . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The concerns expressed by Doe
in her motion filed in the present matter were confirmed by the judge presiding over the federal action. United
States District Court Judge Kari A. Dooley stated that
she was concerned about “the tenor and tone” of Khan’s
social media posts because they “feel less like his plan is to have his rights vindicated as it is to exact retribution, and that is not the purpose of the use of our courts . . . . [T]here is a sense of an intent to intimidate. There is a sense of an intent to harass. The idea of sort of mobilizing the Internet—I mean, this is borderline doxing,14 and 14
“ ‘Doxing’ refers to the practice of revealing an individual’s private information online, especially as a form of revenge.” United States v. Cantwell, 64 F.4th 396, 399 n.4 (1st Cir. 2023).
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it’s very concerning.” (Footnote added.) Doe’s motion
further alleged that “Khan’s harassment . . . has exposed her to a risk of retaliatory harm. For example, after . . . Khan posted [Doe’s] real name and commented on her
ethnicity on social media on [December 25, 2023], a third party posted [Doe’s] real name and information about
where she works on a forum for extremists that has a
swastika embedded in its logo.”15 The gravity of these
factual allegations certainly warranted consideration of whether the change in circumstances since the judgment
of acquittal had altered the balance of interests under
§ 54-86e such that Doe’s name should be shielded from
public disclosure.
The foregoing analysis explains why the majority is
incorrect when it states that, when Doe sought a ruling vacating or modifying Judge Fischer’s order, “she
functionally asked Judge Vitale to exercise appellate
authority over Judge Fischer’s appealable order.” Part
II of the majority opinion. Doe was not asking the trial court to exercise appellate authority; she was asking
the trial court to exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate an order denying a request to protect
the name of a sexual assault victim from public disclosure under § 54-86e. Because trial courts have continuing
jurisdiction to enter nonpunitive sealing or protective
orders after judgment is rendered, Doe’s motion did not
offend our hierarchical court system or constitute a collateral attack over which the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Mieles, supra, 351 Conn. 781–82 (standing criminal protective order may
be issued postjudgment if, inter alia, there is “additional evidence, not presented to the sentencing court, [which] 15
The federal action was recently dismissed, in part because Khan violated the court’s order prohibiting him from publicly disclosing Doe’s identity. See Khan v. Yale University, Docket No. 3:19-cv-01966 (KAD), 2026 WL 851198, *1, *6, *13 (D. Conn. March 27, 2026), appeal filed (2d Cir. April 2, 2026) (No. 26-830). Judge Dooley described the violation as “egregious” and “shocking,” stating that “[i]t appears that [Khan] will not be deterred.” Id., *13. The propriety of the dismissal of the federal action currently is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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indicates that a standing criminal protective order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public”).16
Lastly, the majority’s concern regarding judge shopping is wholly unfounded. See part II of the majority
opinion. Doe filed her postjudgment motion in the same
underlying action or proceeding in which Judge Fischer’s order was issued—the same case, parties, docket
number, and judicial district. The assignment of Doe’s
motion to Judge Vitale, instead of Judge Fischer, was
an internal court management decision over which Doe
had no control.17 The record does not support the majority’s assertion that, absent dismissal of Doe’s motion
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, litigants will be “encourage[d] . . . to seek review by ‘[j]udge shopping’ within the same court . . . .” Id.; see Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 28, 188 A.3d 1 (2018) (rejecting notion that litigant engaged in “judge shop16
Although four out of the nine pages in Doe’s motion are devoted to describing in detail the postjudgment events that merit shielding her name from public disclosure under § 54-86e, the majority chooses to focus only on Doe’s allegation that Judge Fischer made a “mistake” at trial. See footnote 11 of the majority opinion. Judge Fischer’s alleged mistake does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to grant Doe the relief she requested in her motion. “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hepburn v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827, 838–39, 312 A.3d 1 (2024). For the reasons explained in part III of this opinion, trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to vacate or modify an order concerning the confidentiality of a sexual assault victim’s name under § 54-86e on the basis of an alleged change in circumstances. Because Doe alleged in her postjudgment motion that there had been a change of circumstances that would warrant granting her the relief she requested under § 54-86e, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Doe’s postjudgment motion to redact her name from the official court transcript.
17
Judge Fischer is presently a judge trial referee sitting in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area twenty-three.
State v. Khan
ping” by filing timely motion to reconsider in same case after retirement of justice on prior panel), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019); cf. Holcombe v. Holcombe, 22 Conn. App. 363, 365, 576
A.2d 1317 (1990) (“[t]here is no requirement that the
same judge rule on all matters arising after a dissolution judgment”).
IV
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
merits of Doe’s motion to redact the official court transcript to protect her name from public disclosure under
§ 54-86e. As with most common-law rules, there are
exceptions to the jurisdictional principles on which the majority relies precisely because cases often arise involving subtle factual variations, and the judiciary requires flexibility to resolve these disputes in a fair and just manner. The present case illustrates the adaptability
of our common law, which is flexible enough to facilitate compliance with the legislative policy expressed in § 54-86e by permitting the trial court to entertain Doe’s postjudgment motion to redact her name from the official court transcript, while simultaneously safeguarding the
finality of the underlying judgment in all substantive
respects, doing no harm to the rights of either party.
Although Khan raises various arguments pertaining
to the prejudice he would suffer if Doe’s motion were to be granted, namely, the importance of preserving the
historical accuracy of the record, the constitutionality of § 54-86e, and the defense of laches, these arguments
pertain to the merits of Doe’s motion to redact the official court transcript, rather than the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that motion. The
trial court did not reach the merits of Doe’s motion,
and I express no opinion on whether the motion should
be granted. I conclude only that the final judgment of
acquittal did not deprive the trial court of subject matter
State v. Khan
jurisdiction over Doe’s motion to redact her name from
the official court transcript under § 54-86e. Because I
would grant the writ of error and order further proceedings on Doe’s motion, I respectfully dissent.