NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: [email protected] or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
2026 VT 41
No. 25-AP-200
Chavis Murphy Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Washington Unit,
Civil Division
Nicholas Deml and Michael Lyon May Term, 2026
Timothy B. Tomasi, J.
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Marco Kushner, Prisoner’s Rights Office, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Robert C. Menzel, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Respondent-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Nolan and Drescher, JJ., and Richardson, Supr. J.,
Specially Assigned
¶ 1. NOLAN, J. Petitioner Chavis Murphy is serving a sentence of twenty years to life
in the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) for a second-degree murder conviction. For the
first four months of 2021, he received earned-time sentence reductions for good behavior under a
law that went into effect in 2020. 28 V.S.A. § 818. The next year, however, the Legislature
amended the law to exclude inmates who committed second-degree murder and other specified
serious crimes, if they were sentenced on or before January 1, 2021. Petitioner, who falls into that
category, challenged the constitutionality of the law, asserting that it violates his due process rights
and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. We discern no constitutional violation. Procedural due process requirements do not apply to legislative actions like the 2021
amendment to § 818, and a law that promotes the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting
victims’ retributive expectations while not burdening any fundamental right of petitioner does not
run afoul of substantive due process or our Common Benefits Clause. We therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2. For almost forty years, Vermont allowed inmates to earn reductions in their
sentences if they maintained good behavior and participated in programming while in custody.
2019, No. 56, § 1(a)(1). After repealing the law in 2005, the Vermont Legislature revived the
program in 2019 through 28 V.S.A. § 818, which established a new earned-time program and
required the DOC to file a proposed rule to implement the program. 2019, No. 56, § 2. The law
provided that inmates eligible for earned-time credit under § 818 could earn a reduction of five
days from their sentence for each month that they were “not adjudicated of a major disciplinary
rule violation; [were] not reincarcerated from the community for a violation of release
conditions . . . ; and compl[ied] with a merit-based system designed to incentivize offenders to
meet milestones identified by the [DOC] that prepar[ed] offenders for reentry.” Id. § 2(b)(2). It
excluded from earned-time credit inmates sentenced to life without parole, inmates on probation
or parole, and offenders eligible for a reduction of term under 28 V.S.A. § 811. Id. § 2(b)(1).
¶ 3. The Legislature amended the statute in 2020 to make the program effective on
January 1, 2021, and to increase the monthly sentence reduction from five to seven days, among
other changes. 2019, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 14(a), (b)(2). The Legislature also removed the law’s
requirement that inmates comply with a “merit-based system” to receive sentence reductions,
effectively making the application of earned-time credits automatic rather than discretionary. Id.
§ 14(b)(2); see 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(2) (awarding eligible inmates with sentence reductions if they
are “not adjudicated of a major disciplinary rule violation” and “not reincarcerated from the
community for a violation of release conditions”).
2
¶ 4. Shortly after it went into effect in 2021, Senator Richard Sears proposed a bill that
would exclude from the program individuals serving time for certain serious felonies, including,
as relevant here, inmates convicted of second-degree murder. S.18, 2021-2022 Gen. Assemb.,
Bien. Sess. (Vt. 2021). Then Attorney General T.J. Donovan testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that he asked Senator Sears to submit the amendment after victims and their families
who had received notification of the program contacted him with their concerns. Attorney General
Donovan explained that the impetus for this amendment was to protect expectations of victims and
their families who relied on prosecutor representations that perpetrators would serve their
sentences, particularly promises made in connection with plea bargaining and agreements. Though
some senators voiced concern about the bill and that it would create disparities among inmates,
the amended statute passed and took effect on April 26, 2021. 2021, No. 12, § 2.
¶ 5. As a result of the 2021 amendment, any person serving a sentence for a
disqualifying crime on January 1, 2021, could no longer earn sentence reductions after April 26,
2021. 2021, No. 12, § 2(b)(5); see 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5) (“[A]n offender who was serving a
sentence for a disqualifying offense on January 1, 2021 shall not earn any earned time sentence
reductions under this section after the effective date of this act.”); see also 28 V.S.A.
§ 818(c)(1)(A) (listing disqualifying offenses as murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
lewd or lascivious conduct with child, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated
sexual assault of child). Individuals sentenced for the same crimes after January 1, 2021, remained
eligible to earn sentence reductions under the law. 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5). Inmates rendered
ineligible could continue to earn credits from January 1, 2021, through April 26, 2021, but not
after April 26, and they retained any credit earned before then. 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5) (providing
that amended statute “shall not be construed to limit or affect earned time that an offender has
earned on or before the effective date of this act”). The DOC promulgated Rule #21-011 to
implement the amendment. Vermont Department of Corrections APA Rule #21-011, Earned Time
3
Rule, https://outside.vermont.gov/dept/DOC/Policies/Earned%20Time%20Rule%2021-011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4PL-JP86].
II. Facts and Procedural History
¶ 6. These facts are undisputed. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second-degree
murder in 2018 and sentenced to serve twenty years to life in January 2019. He is currently in
custody of the DOC. Under the initial version of § 818, petitioner had the opportunity to earn
sentence reductions. Petitioner earned sentence reductions for January 2021, February 2021,
March 2021, and April 2021. After the 2021 amendment, petitioner became ineligible for further
earned-time credit because he was serving a sentence for second-degree murder on January 1,
2021. See 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5), (c)(1)(A) (providing that “an offender who was serving a
sentence for a disqualifying offense on January 1, 2021, shall not earn any earned time sentence
reductions under this section after the effective date of this act,” and listing murder—including
second-degree murder pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2301—as “disqualifying offense”). Petitioner
retains the earned-time credits he received from January to April 2021, and he will receive a
sentence shorter than his minimum sentence as a result.
¶ 7. In 2021, petitioner filed a pro se complaint in the civil division pursuant to Vermont
Rule of Civil Procedure 75, seeking a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to sentence
reductions for his good behavior after April 26, 2021. Counsel from the Prisoners’ Rights Office
subsequently entered an appearance on behalf of petitioner and moved the court to stay the action
pending final decision in a parallel federal lawsuit challenging the validity of 28 V.S.A. § 818.
After the federal court ruled in favor of the DOC, Baird v. Deml, No. 2:22-CV-00165, 2023 WL
5978232 (D. Vt. Sept. 12, 2023), petitioner amended his complaint to claim that the 2021
amendment to § 818 violated his right to due process and the Common Benefits Clause. Petitioner
subsequently moved for summary judgment on the same grounds arguing that Baird was not
binding on state courts, and that the trial court should conduct its own analysis. The DOC cross4
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the federal district court had rejected these arguments
in a persuasive legal analysis that should be adopted by the trial court.
¶ 8. Like petitioner, the plaintiff in Baird v. Deml was convicted of second-degree
murder before January 1, 2021, and earned sentence reductions for January 2021 through April
2021 under the first iteration of § 818. Baird, 2023 WL 5978232, at *1. And like petitioner,
moreover, the plaintiff argued that the 2021 amendment violated her federal and state due process
rights and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.1 Id.
¶ 9. Analyzing the plaintiff’s due process claim as a procedural one, the federal district
court held that the amendment did not violate due process guarantees under the Vermont or U.S.
Constitutions because the plaintiff had no cognizable liberty interest in the “opportunity” to earn
future sentence reductions. Id. at *3-4. After following this Court’s three-step framework for
analysis, the court further held that the amendment did not violate the Common Benefits Clause.
Id. at *5-6; see In re Hodgdon, 2011 VT 19, ¶ 23, 189 Vt. 265, 19 A.3d 598 (summarizing threestep inquiry under Common Benefits Clause analysis as “(1) what part of the community is
disadvantaged by the legal requirement; (2) what is the governmental purpose in drawing the
classification; and (3) does the omission of part of the community from the benefit of the
challenged law bear a reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose?” (quotations
omitted)).
¶ 10. The court identified the community disadvantaged by the amendment as those
inmates in DOC custody it excluded from credit eligibility because they were sentenced for
1
The Baird plaintiff also argued that the amendment violated the U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it “extends her incarceration by prolonging the date that she would be entitled to consideration for parole or release from incarceration.” Id. at *6 (quotation and alterations omitted). The court held that the amended law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not impose a punishment more severe than the punishment authorized by law when the plaintiff committed the offense. Id. at *7. Petitioner did not raise an Ex Post Facto Clause claim here.
5
disqualifying crimes before January 1, 2021.2 Id. at *5. The court explained that the Legislature’s
purpose in amending the law was “to protect the reasonable expectations of victims with regard to
the sentences served by those who have perpetrated crimes against them,” which was “a rational
legislative purpose and one the Vermont Legislature has repeatedly recognized.” Id. The court
reasoned that “[b]y excluding individuals who committed crimes before the enactment of § 818,
victims of those crimes are able to rely on the term of imprisonment imposed at sentencing” and
“defendants similarly have notice of the term of imprisonment at their sentencing and suffer no
increase of that term under § 818.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that the amended statute did not
violate the Common Benefits Clause as it “is neither overinclusive nor underinclusive,” “is wholly
prospective,” and “serves its intended legislative purpose.” Id. at *5-6.
¶ 11. Adopting Baird’s reasoning, the civil division concluded that the DOC was entitled
to summary judgment on both of petitioner’s claims. Petitioner appeals.
III. Standard of Review
¶ 12. In reviewing the trial court’s summary judgment decision, we apply the same
standard as the trial court. State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 VT 87, ¶ 14, 194 Vt. 625, 86
A.3d 981. “Summary judgment is appropriate when, taking all allegations made by the nonmoving
party as true, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see V.R.C.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). “We review the trial court’s conclusions of law,
particularly its constitutional decisions, de novo.” Green Mountain Future, 2013 VT 87, ¶ 15.
2
Though the court identified the disadvantaged community as those “inmates in DOC custody who were sentenced for certain crimes before April 26, 2021,” we infer that the court meant inmates sentenced for certain crimes on or before January 1,2021. Baird, 2023 WL 5978232, at *5 (emphasis added).
6
IV. Discussion
¶ 13. Here, we agree with the trial court and Baird that § 818 as amended in 2021
complies with federal and state due process guarantees and the Common Benefits Clause.
However, because petitioner’s due process arguments have procedural and substantive overtones,
we analyze his challenge under both constitutional rubrics. Infra, ¶ 16. Further, our reasoning in
reaching our procedural due process conclusion differs from that of Baird and the lower court
because we conclude that procedural due process requirements have no application to legislative
actions such as the § 818 amendment. Baird and the trial court’s decision are otherwise largely
consistent with ours.
A. Due Process
¶ 14. Petitioner first asserts that the DOC’s application of the amended 28 V.S.A. § 818
violates his right to due process under the Vermont and U.S. Constitutions. Petitioner argues that
by restoring the earned-time program in 2020 and “mak[ing] the application of earned-time credits
automatic rather than discretionary,” the Legislature “created a liberty interest in the ability to earn
those credits,” which “triggered [petitioner’s] right to due process before his entitlement to those
credits could be taken away.” Thus, although petitioner frames his argument as a challenge to
DOC’s application of § 818 as amended in 2021—asking this Court to “order DOC” to apply to
him the version of § 818 that preceded the 2021 amendment—his argument is, in substance, a
challenge to the validity of that amendment and a request that we invalidate it.
¶ 15. Both the Vermont and U.S. Constitutions guard against governmental deprivations
of liberty without due process, with Article 10 and Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution
considered equivalent to the federal Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parker v.
Gorczyk, 170 Vt. 263, 272, 744 A.2d 410, 416 (1999) (providing that “laws of the land” in Article
10 of Vermont Constitution is “synonymous” with “due process of law” provided in Fourteenth
Amendment of U.S. Constitution (quotation marks omitted)); Quesnel v. Town of Middlebury,
7
167 Vt. 252, 258, 706 A.2d 436, 439 (1997) (explaining that Article 4 of Vermont Constitution is
“equivalent” to federal Due Process Clause, but “does not create substantive rights, . . . it merely
provides access to the courts”); see Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10 (providing that no person can “be justly
deprived of liberty, except by the laws of the land”); Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4 (“Every person within
this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs
which one may receive in person, property, or character.”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). Thus,
we have relied extensively on federal jurisprudence in interpreting the Vermont Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., A.B. v. S.U., 2023 VT 32, ¶ 10, 218 Vt. 123, 298 A.3d 573 (“In general, our
cases have treated claims under Article 4 similarly to those made under the U.S. Constitution, and
we have employed the federal standards to evaluate Article 4 claims.”); Parker, 170 Vt. at 272,
744 A.2d at 416 (explaining that this Court’s “due-process jurisprudence has relied heavily on that
of the United States Supreme Court even when our decisions were ultimately based on the Vermont
Constitution”).
¶ 16. Petitioner does not clarify whether he seeks to invalidate the 2021 amendment to
§ 818 on procedural or substantive due process grounds. See Parker, 170 Vt. at 276, 744 A.2d at
418 (noting that due-process claim brought in that case had “both procedural and substantive
overtones”). Delineation matters because “procedural due process is concerned with the process
used to deprive a person of a protected interest,” while “the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause protects individuals against arbitrary government action irrespective of the
procedures used to take the action.” Mellin v. Flood Brook Union Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 215,
790 A.2d 408, 420 (2001) (citation omitted). We address each component in turn and conclude
that petitioner’s due process challenge fails on both grounds.
8
1. Procedural Due Process
¶ 17. If petitioner is arguing that the 2021 change to § 818 violated his procedural due
process rights, his claim fails because the amendment constituted a legislative action that is not
subject to procedural due process requirements. Under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions, courts
typically “ ‘examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second
examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.’ ” Conway v. Gorczyk, 171 Vt. 374, 376, 765 A.2d 463, 465 (2000) (quoting Ky. Dep’t
of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). However, this Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court have differentiated between legislative and adjudicative actions, and procedural due process
requirements do not apply to the former. See, e.g., Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, ¶ 20,
202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084 (explaining that procedural due process requirements “apply only with
respect to governmental adjudicative decisions rather than legislative decisions”); In re Stratton
Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 442, 600 A.2d 297, 300 (1991) (“Due process requirements apply to the
procedures that must be used in reaching agency determinations only if they are adjudicative,
rather than rulemaking or legislative, in nature.”); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. . . . Their rights are
protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or
remote, over those who make the rule.”).
¶ 18. This is because “[w]hen the [L]egislature passes a law which affects a general class
of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process—the legislative process.” 2 R.
Rotunda, J. Novak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 17.8(c)
at 251 (1986); see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (“[T]he legislative
determination provides all the process that is due.”). In general, “[f]airness (or due process) in
9
legislation is satisfied when legislation is enacted in accordance with the procedures established in
the state constitution and statutes for the enactment of legislation.” Richardson v. Town of
Eastover, 922 F.2d 1152, 1158 (4th Cir. 1991). The legislative process is constitutionally sufficient
because “[t]hose who disagree with the adoption of a legislative enactment can pursue relief
through the democratic political process.” Gould, 2016 VT 84, ¶ 20; see L C & S, Inc. v. Warren
Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n, 244 F.3d 601, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Legislation is prospective in
effect and, more important, general in its application. . . . The right to notice and a hearing, the
essence of [the concept of due process], are substitutes for the prospectivity and generality that
protect citizens from oppression by legislators and thus from the potential tyranny of electoral
majorities.”). A party may disagree with a law if they are disproportionately or particularly
affected by it, but that does not mean they may challenge it under the Due Process Clause. Gould,
2016 VT 84, ¶ 21.
¶ 19. In determining whether a governmental action is legislative or adjudicative, federal
courts have focused on different considerations, such as “the generality” and “prospectivity” of an
enactment, L C & S, Inc., 244 F.3d at 604, or “on the function performed by the decisionmaker,”
Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 36 n.7 (2d. Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). We have
considered similar factors in determining whether an agency action is legislative or administrative,
stating that courts must examine whether the action is a “policy determination, involving general
facts, and having a prospective application”—characteristics of the legislative function—or
whether it is “a determination of particular facts and past events”—characteristics of an
adjudicative proceeding. Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 80, 726 A.2d 477, 482 (1998).
¶ 20. Though the line between legislative and adjudicative action can sometimes be
difficult to discern, that is not the case here. The 2021 amendment grew out of the legislative
process. It applied generally to all inmates serving sentences for certain crimes on January 1, 2021.
See 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5) (providing that “an offender who was serving a sentence for a
10
disqualifying offense on January 1, 2021, shall not earn any earned time sentence reductions under
this section after the effective date of this act”). The amendment applied prospectively by
disqualifying certain inmates from earning sentence reductions after its enactment, while allowing
them to retain credits earned before it became effective. Id. (providing that amended statute “shall
not be construed to limit or affect earned time that an offender has earned on or before the effective
date of this act”). By any definition, the Legislature’s amendment of § 818 was a “legislative
action.”
¶ 21. Petitioner’s suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature also had
authority to amend § 818 to limit eligibility for earned-time credits. See State v. Saari, 152 Vt.
510, 515, 568 A.2d 344, 348 (1989) (explaining that Legislature “is entitled to make incremental
changes in the statutes of this state,” including by creating new offenses, adjusting fines for crimes,
prescribing new fines, and adjusting severity of sentences for crimes). And petitioner identifies
no deficiency in the amendment enactment process itself. See generally Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S.
115, 129-30 (1985) (noting legislative process must not be defective). Accordingly, the legislative
process having provided “all the process that is due,” petitioner’s procedural due process claim, to
the extent he brings one, must fail. Id. at 129 (quotation omitted); cf. id. (holding that “procedural
component of the Due Process Clause does not impose a constitutional limitation on the power of
Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits” even if
entitlement to public benefits is property interest under Due Process Clause, and reaffirming that
“welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels
[because] legislative determination provides all the process that is due” (quotations and alterations
omitted)).
11
2. Substantive Due Process
¶ 22. To the extent petitioner presses a substantive due process claim, it must also fail for
two reasons: the amendment did not concern a fundamental constitutional right, and it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.
¶ 23. The doctrine of substantive due process protects “those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quotations and citations
omitted). If a law burdens a fundamental right, courts apply strict scrutiny review, analyzing
whether the law’s “infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. at
721 (quotation omitted). If a law does not implicate a fundamental right, courts apply rationalbasis review, and it is petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that there is no conceivable rational
relation between the challenged [law] and a legitimate end of government.” Parker, 170 Vt. at
276, 744 A.2d at 419; see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (applying same standard to substantive dueprocess claim made under U.S. Constitution); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993)
(explaining that “narrow tailoring is required only when fundamental rights are involved”).
¶ 24. We have been clear that “[t]he computation of good-time credit does not implicate
fundamental rights.” Venman v. Patrissi, 156 Vt. 257, 258, 590 A.2d 897, 898 (1991); accord
Trivento v. Comm’r of Corr., 135 Vt. 475, 479, 380 A.2d 69, 72 (1977) (explaining that
distinctions in who is eligible for statutory good-time credit do not involve fundamental rights).
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Wolff v. McDonnell that the U.S. Constitution
“does not guarantee a good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison,” though a state
“may have the authority to create, or not, a [statutory] right to a shortened prison sentence through
the accumulation of credits for good behavior.” 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
12
¶ 25. Because the amendment did not burden a fundamental right, we apply rational basis
review. The Legislature amended § 818 to protect the expectations of victims and their families,
who did not know about the future possibility of earned-time credits at sentencing, that perpetrators
of particularly violent crimes would serve the entirety of the sentences they received. Supra, ¶ 4.
This Court recognizes that goal as a legitimate one. See Parker, 170 Vt. at 277, 744 A.2d at 419
(recognizing governmental goal of abiding by “public expectations that offenders will serve their
sentences”). Indeed, the purpose of honoring crime victims’ expectations—as part of the larger
legislative mandate “to ensure that [they] are treated with dignity and respect they deserve while
functioning in a system in which they find themselves through no fault of their own”—lies at the
heart of our Crime Victim’s Rights Act. 13 V.S.A. § 5303; see also 13 V.S.A. § 5305(a) (granting
victims and affected persons the right to request notification of defendant’s release, furlough,
escape, recapture, pardon or commutation of sentence, among others).
¶ 26. Section 818 is rationally related to this legitimate government goal. By restricting
earned-time credits to inmates sentenced for especially serious crimes after January 1, 2021, when
victims would be aware of the earned-time program, the law protects the expectations of victims,
their families, and the public. Cf. Parker, 170 Vt. at 277, 744 A.2d at 419 (holding that “policy of
not allowing violent felons to obtain furlough before serving their minimum sentences was
intended to protect the public and meet public expectations that offenders will serve their
sentences,” and thus plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim failed because “general rule
requiring violent felons to serve their minimum sentences before becoming eligible for parole
meets the rational basis standard”); Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526, 527 (11th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (concluding that statute which excluded prisoners serving sentences of more than ten years
from earning good time credit did not violate Due Process Clause because it was “rationally related
to the legitimate purpose of preventing the early release of serious offenders”). Petitioner therefore
cannot demonstrate a substantive due-process violation.
13
B. Common Benefits Clause
¶ 27. Petitioner alternatively contends that the DOC’s application of the amendment
violates the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. He argues that the law has an
impermissible disparate effect under the Clause because it bars him from receiving earned-time
credits while allowing other inmates convicted of the same offense and sentenced after January 1,
2021 to receive those credits. As with his due-process claim, we conclude that this challenge
amounts to an attack on the validity of the underlying legislation. We further conclude that the
amended law does not violate the Common Benefits Clause.
¶ 28. The Common Benefits Clause guarantees a “government . . . instituted for the
common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part
only of that community.” Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 7. When considering a challenge under the Clause,
this Court presumes that statutes are constitutional and gives deference to the Legislature’s policy
decisions. Vitale v. Bellows Falls Union High Sch., 2023 VT 15, ¶ 20, 217 Vt. 611, 293 A.3d 309.
Thus, the petitioner carries the heavy burden to show that a statute “does not bear a reasonable and
just relation to a governmental purpose and is therefore unconstitutional.” Id. ¶ 21; see also
Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 20, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A.3d 469 (explaining that “proponent of a
constitutional challenge has a very weighty burden to overcome” as we presume statutes are
constitutional and reasonable).
¶ 29. A challenge under the Common Benefits Clause requires this Court to determine
whether a part of a community has been denied a benefit, and whether that denial is reasonably
connected to the Legislative purpose. Vitale, 2023 VT 15, ¶ 46. Analyzing such a claim requires
us to (1) identify the portion of the community disadvantaged by the statute; (2) determine the
governmental purpose in creating that distinction; and (3) ascertain whether the distinction bears
14
a “reasonable and just relation” to the identified purpose. Hodgdon, 2011 VT 19, ¶ 23 (citing
Badgley, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 21).
¶ 30. To determine the part of the community disadvantaged by the law, we examine the
statute and identify the “nature of the statutory classification.” Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 215,
744 A.2d 864, 880 (1999); see id. (identifying exclusion of same-sex couples under a statute that
applies expressly to opposite-sex couples). Under the amendment, inmates in DOC custody
sentenced to a disqualifying crime on or before January 1, 2021 became ineligible to earn credits
following its passage. 28 V.S.A. § 818(b)(5), (c) (“[A]n offender who was serving a sentence for
a disqualifying offense on January 1, 2021 shall not earn any earned time sentence reductions
under this section after the effective date of this act.”). That group—inmates eligible for earnedtime credit under the 2020 version of § 818 but rendered ineligible under the 2021 change—is the
disadvantaged group.
¶ 31. The Legislature passed the amendment with the goal to protect the retributive
expectations of victims of violent crime and their families who had no inkling, at the time of
sentencing, that the sentences could later be reduced through earned-time credits. Supra, ¶ 4.
Having identified the disadvantaged group and the purpose behind the law’s distinction between
groups, this Court must consider whether the distinction bears a “reasonable and just relation” to
the purpose. Badgley, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 21 (quotation omitted); Baker, 170 Vt. at 213-14, 744 A.2d
at 878 (“Consistent with Article 7’s guiding principle of affording the protection and benefit of the
law to all members of the Vermont community, we examine the nature of the classification to
determine whether it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the State’s claimed objectives.”
(quotation omitted)). Three factors are pertinent to this analysis: “(1) the significance of the
benefits and protections of the challenged law; (2) whether the omission of members of the
community from the benefits and protections of the challenged law promotes the government’s
15
stated goals; and (3) whether the classification is significantly underinclusive or overinclusive.”
Baker, 170 Vt. at 214, 744 A.2d at 879.
¶ 32. It goes without saying that the opportunity to earn a seven-day reduction in time to
serve for each month of good behavior is significant for an inmate. On the other hand, the
amendment’s removal of that opportunity for inmates convicted of serious crimes prior to 2021
served the Legislature’s stated goal of affording crime victims and their families certainty in their
expectations concerning their perpetrator’s punishment. The Legislature’s decision to limit
eligibility for sentence reduction to inmates convicted of lesser offenses and those sentenced after
January 1, 2021 for the more serious tranche of crimes promotes the goal of honoring victims’
expectations regarding how long those offenders will be behind bars. The amendment reflects a
legitimate legislative judgment that eliminating this uncertainty for victims of certain serious
crimes, their families, and the public—none of whom were aware of any earned-time program at
sentencing—outweighs any accompanying detriment to the goals of cost-saving and incentivizing
rehabilitation for the perpetrators. We defer to that policy decision. See Badgley, 2010 VT 68,
¶ 38 (explaining that “we must accord deference to the policy choices made by the Legislature”).
¶ 33. Further, the amendment is not significantly over- or underinclusive. To honor
expectations the victims formed at sentencing hearings, it applies to inmates sentenced for certain
serious crimes—murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, lewd or lascivious conduct with a
child, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated sexual assault of a child—before
its effective date. See 28 V.S.A. § 818(c)(1)(A) (listing disqualifying offenses). It does not alter
inmates’ sentences, retract sentence reductions inmates have already earned, or deny inmates the
opportunity to earn credit other than those excluded in the amended law. Moving forward, criminal
defendants and victims will be able to consider—and to advocate based upon—the potential for
earned-time credits at the time of sentencing, consistent with the Legislature’s purpose of
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preserving public expectations. See Baird, 2023 WL 5978232, at *5 (explaining that defendants
and victims will be “on notice” of § 818 during sentencing going forward).
¶ 34. Citing advocacy before the Legislature by families in cases involving plea
agreements, petitioner calls the amendment overinclusive because it applies to inmates like him,
who were convicted after a jury trial, and not exclusively to those who pleaded guilty under a plea
agreement. As a corollary, he notes that none of those families from plea agreement cases
specifically petitioned the Legislature for a categorical exclusion from sentence reduction
eligibility based on the type of offense involved in their case or the date of their sentencing.
Because he took his case to trial—petitioner’s logic continues—his exclusion from the earnedtime program does not support the purported legislative interest in protecting victim expectations.
¶ 35. The Legislature did not, however, pass the amendment with a goal so narrow and
counterintuitive as petitioner asserts. The Legislature intended to protect victims whose cases went
to trial—where the defendant did not accept responsibility for his crime prior to conviction—as
much as it intended to protect the victims in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty and accepted
responsibility. By its terms, the benefits of § 818, as amended in 2021, inure to the benefit of both
kinds of victim, without distinction.3 28 V.S.A. § 818.
3
Further, even if we needed to consider petitioner’s proffered testimony, we could not necessarily conclude that the Legislature’s goals correspond directly with the limited testimony petitioner offers. Comments made by witnesses at committee hearings “are of little weight in determining legislative intent.” State v. Turner, 2021 VT 30, ¶ 15, 214 Vt. 464, 254 A.3d 204; see State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 39, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (Skoglund, J., concurring) (explaining that “courts are generally hesitant to resort to . . . statements of the purpose or nature of the proposed law made by committee members or other persons at the committee’s hearings,” because “[d]oing so would require one to consider what impact such statements may have made on the majority of legislators” (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted)). Moreover, the comments petitioner highlights can just as readily be interpreted as reflective of the witness’s polite instinct to speak only about their own personal experience—and not those of others. In any event, the proffered witness statements are not inconsistent with the purpose of the statute as reflected in its plain language.
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¶ 36. Petitioner also argues that the amendment contravenes the law’s original goals of
reducing incarceration costs and incentivizing rehabilitation. See 2019, No. 56, § 1. Even if that
proposition were true, it is the Legislature’s prerogative to amend the statutes of this state, Saari,
152 Vt. at 515, 568 A.2d at 348, and this Court’s “function is not to substitute our view of the
appropriate balance” of competing interests “for that of the Legislature,” Badgley, 2010 VT 68,
¶ 24.
¶ 37. In any event, we conclude the amendment’s purposes are consistent with the law
prior to its 2021 amendment. In addition to reducing costs and incentivizing good behavior, the
statute reflected a legislative intent to protect victims by requiring their notification of the passage
of the law and allowing them to opt into receiving updates about changes in the sentences. 28
V.S.A. § 818(4); 2019, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 14(4)(A). The amendment goes further in
advancing the Legislature’s goal of protecting victims, taking special measures for those who
endured the most serious of crimes. It was the province of the Legislature to enhance victim
protection in this fashion.
¶ 38. Accordingly, we conclude that the 2021 amendment to 28 V.S.A. § 818 does not
violate the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
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