[Cite as G.R. v. B.H., 2026-Ohio-3666.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
G.R. Court of Appeals No. OT-26-005
Appellee
Trial Court No. 20204067
v.
B.H. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 18, 2026
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Heather J. Fournier, for appellant.
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SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant-mother, B.H., appeals a judgment from the Ottawa County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting appellee-father, G.R.’s motion for legal
custody of the parties’ minor child, N.R. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Father and Mother are the parents of N.R. born in October 2019. In August
2022, the parties entered into a shared parenting agreement. On February 4, 2025, Mother filed a motion in the juvenile court for a contempt order and a motion for change
of parental rights and responsibilities. Mother claimed that on multiple occasions, Father
interfered with her parenting time and also failed to provide N.R. with clothing and
transportation to school and appointments. On May 7, 2025, Father moved the court to
order Mother to show cause for her alleged contempt of the shared parenting order on ten
occasions. After an unsuccessful mediation attempt, the court returned the matter to its
docket. On June 20, 2025, Father moved the court to terminate the shared parenting plan
and to name him residential parent.
A. Hearing on the Motions
1. Mother’s case
{¶ 3} On September 23, 2025, the matter proceeded to a hearing before a
magistrate, with Mother, pro se, testifying on her own behalf. Mother testified that she
got a new job and Father initially agreed to work with her new schedule. In January
2025, on multiple occasions Mother got off work and Father would say it was too cold to
exchange N.R. She made three to four police reports documenting the issue. During this
same period, Father kept N.R. home from preschool on six occasions.
{¶ 4} Mother stated that after arguments between the two escalated, Father began
picking N.R. up on Thursdays from school rather than her home; her daughters were
upset because they could not tell him goodbye for the weekend. There had been ongoing
transportation problems due to Father not having a car. Mother claimed that N.R.
became ill after visits with Father who lived in his mother’s basement.
2.
{¶ 5} Mother testified that if she had to work during her weekend with N.R., she
agreed to let Father have him rather than taking him to a babysitter. If Father’s oldest son
was visiting, he would text saying that he was keeping N.R. so they could spend time
together —this impacted her parenting time. Mother acknowledged that the shared
parenting agreement sets forth specific days and times for each parent to have N.R., but
stated that she initially varied the schedule because she was trying to help Father out.
{¶ 6} During cross-examination, Mother agreed that the parties were not able to
follow the shared parenting plan and that she wanted full custody with Father having
standard visitation. Mother acknowledged that she does not speak to her family because
they are “not good people.”
2. Father’s case part 1
{¶ 7} Maternal grandmother, T.H., testified that she has not spoken to Mother in
over a year and sees N.R. only when Father needs childcare help. T.H. believes Mother
is unstable and needs professional help. The last time she spoke with Mother she
attended a family party under the influence. Mother drove T.H.’s spare car to the party
because she had recently been in an accident involving alcohol with children in the car.
Mother left with the children after her father would not let her drink shots of alcohol.
{¶ 8} T.H. stated that Mother frequently uses vulgar language in front of her
children and on at least one occasion, used inappropriate physical discipline with her
older daughter. T.H. does not feel that Mother is giving N.R. the attention that he needs;
she explained that Mother has good intentions but “has issues that are not allowing her to
do the right things.”
3.
{¶ 9} T.H. testified that Father is a good dad and lives in a more stable
environment. T.H. has no concerns with Father though she admits that he is also not
perfect. She believes that it is in N.R.’s best interest for Father to be named residential
parent and legal custodian.
{¶ 10} N.R.’s maternal aunt, C.H., testified that she feels that Father can provide a
more stable environment for him. She similarly recounted Mother’s intoxication at a
family party and that following an argument she left with her children. Mother also told
her that she and her boyfriend smoked marijuana before arriving at the party.
{¶ 11} N.R.’s paternal grandmother, K.S., testified that her biggest concern
regarding the parties’ parenting plan is Mother’s volatility and her fear of its impact on
N.R. Mother wants her demands met immediately and if she is not satisfied, she
withholds N.R. from coming to their home or sends “crazy off-the-chart” texts. For
example, K.S. and Father try to help with N.R.’s care when Mother is working, but any
time they are not available she blames Father for any repercussions from work. Mother
uses a lot of vulgarities and has called K.S. various derogatory terms. K.S. stated that
Mother’s temper and anger is a problem in that as soon as she gets irritated, “[s]he goes
for the jugular.”
{¶ 12} K.S. believes that if Father is awarded custody, he will honor and facilitate
Mother’s parenting time. He will also facilitate N.R. seeing both sides of his extended
family. He has no mental or physical problems preventing him from being a full-time
parent. Father and N.R. stay in a finished basement in K.S.’s home. It has a kitchen,
bathroom, and three bedrooms.
4.
{¶ 13} During cross-examination, K.S. acknowledged that Mother also
accommodated Father’s work, school, and car situation as it relates to the shared
parenting agreement. She agreed that N.R. needs to have access to his sisters, Mother’s
children, and his brother, Father’s son. K.S. explained that the maternal grandmother of
Father’s oldest son, now 14 years old, has custody of him. At the time of his birth, Father
was still in high school and not mature or stable enough to raise him. They have a good
relationship and spend time together. Father’s third child is being raised by the child’s
mother and Father sees him when she feels it is appropriate. K.S. explained that the
mother is doing a good job parenting and Father respects her judgment. She stated that
Father has a good relationship with the mothers of his other children.
3. Scheduling
{¶ 14} At the close of the testimony for the day, the parties discussed dates to
conclude the hearing. Mother objected to later dates because she “put in an expedited
position” for the case. The court set the hearing’s continuation for October 22. On
September 26, 2025, Father’s counsel moved to continue the trial due to a conflict. On
October 8, 2025, the court, sua sponte, set the matter for October 21, noting that the rules
required the case be concluded by the end of October. On October 17, Mother moved to
continue the date stating that she hired an attorney after looking for “the past few
months,” that she needed time to consult with the attorney, and that the attorney was not
available on the scheduled date. Mother also emailed the court stating that her attorney
would be available on either October 27 or 28. The court denied both motions, again
noting that the Supreme Court of Ohio guidelines dictated that the matter needed to be
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resolved. The court further observed that Mother’s attorney had not filed an appearance
in the matter and that the case had been pending for seven months.
4. Father’s case part 2
{¶ 15} On October 21, the hearing reconvened and Father testified regarding the
ten incidents forming the basis of his show cause motion. Most involved Mother’s
refusal to give N.R. to Father on his parenting days. Father also claimed that Mother
refused to allow him access to important documents relating to N.R.
{¶ 16} Father testified that he is currently employed as a line cook at a restaurant.
He worked full-time but scaled back his hours while attending community college in
computer information systems. He believes that he should have full custody of N.R.
because he has a better support system, and will provide him with “love, care, more than
hate and anger.”
{¶ 17} He testified that he has three children; his oldest is 15 and the two younger
are 6. He sees his eldest on an every-other-week and weekend basis but because of his
involvement in various activities, it has decreased. He sees the other son when mother
allows it. All the boys have gotten along well. Father testified that he lives in the family
home with his mother, stepfather, and two siblings and that N.R. has his own room with
his own bed, closet and dressers.
{¶ 18} Father stated that he has no mental or physical issues that would impede his
ability to care for N.R. Father felt that between he and Mother, he would be more likely
to honor court-ordered parenting time and would facilitate contacts with Mother. He also
had concerns with Mother not having N.R. complete several packets of preschool work,
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especially during his last year. Father admitted that N.R. missed a few preschool days
while under his care due to either illness or the weather.
{¶ 19} Father testified that he and N.R. have an “inseparable bond” and that he
gets sad when it is time for him to go. N.R.’s paternal grandmother and Father’s
stepfather are very loving towards him and are very willing to help. While in Father’s
care, maternal grandmother sees N.R. as often as she is able; she is not able to see him
when he is with Mother.
{¶ 20} Mother has displayed anger and violence towards Father and her other
children in front of N.R. Father testified regarding numerous text messages where
Mother used a lot of profanity and degrading and demeaning language towards Father.
He could not explain the source of Mother’s anger. The text messages, which included
dates during the proceedings, were admitted into evidence.
{¶ 21} Father stated that if he received legal custody of N.R. he would continue
with his IEP and medical appointments and let Mother know about any appointments.
Father feels that it is in N.R.’s best interest to award him legal custody and would support
every other weekend parenting time for Mother; he acknowledged that the court’s
standard order includes Wednesdays.
{¶ 22} Mother cross-examined Father regarding the incidents forming the bases of
his show cause motion. The court ultimately prohibited any questioning specifically
relating to the shared parenting agreement noting that neither party followed the
agreement and that the court would, in fact, be terminating it.
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{¶ 23} Father admitted that he did not attend N.R.’s kindergarten screening or
open house because he had to work. He agreed that he had not personally attended an
IEP meeting but did provide input by phone. Father admitted to taking N.R. to less than
five bi-monthly speech therapy appointments over two years. Father has never taken
N.R. to the dentist claiming that Mother did not inform him of the appointments. Father
stated that N.R. is with one of his grandmothers when he is working or in school. He
admitted to smoking marijuana but denied being around his children while high.
{¶ 24} In December 2024, Mother began working first shift and Father agreed to
help get N.R. to preschool. Mother questioned Father regarding six days N.R. missed.
Father could not recall the specific issue with each date.
5. The magistrate’s and the court’s decision
{¶ 25} In the magistrate’s November 24, 2025 decision, the magistrate observed
that the parties repeatedly failed to follow the shared parenting agreement and that it was
“difficult for the Court to ascertain whose days are whose as the parties often changed
dates, times, and pickup locations[.]” Because both parties violated the shared parenting
agreement, their motions to show cause were denied.
{¶ 26} The magistrate noted the parties agreement that the shared parenting plan
should be terminated. Observing that the parties continuously failed to follow the
agreement, could not communicate civilly, and live approximately 30 minutes apart, the
magistrate also agreed that it was in N.R.’s best interest to terminate the shared parenting
plan. In determining a modified allocation of parental rights with respect to N.R., the
magistrate applied the best interest factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). The magistrate
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concluded that both parents desire custody of N.R. and that N.R. is bonded with Father
and his family and maternal grandmother through Father. Mother presented little
evidence regarding her bond with N.R., though she did indicate her love for the child.
The parents have no physical limitations but evidence was presented that Mother has
anger issues which may evidence mental health concerns. Finally, Mother frequently
changed shared parenting dates, times, drop off and pick up locations which she averred
were for Father’s benefit; he disputed this claiming that the changes often either
shortened or denied his visitation. After considering the statutory factors, the magistrate
concluded that it was in N.R.’s best interest for Father to be designated sole custodial
parent and residential parent for school purposes.
{¶ 27} On December 10, after independent review, the juvenile court adopted the
magistrate’s decision. Mother’s counsel filed a notice of appearance on December 11,
2025, and a request to object to the magistrate’s decision outside the 14-day time limit,
claiming that Mother received the November 24 magistrate’s decision in the U.S. Mail on
December 10. The court summarily denied the motion.
{¶ 28} This appeal followed
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 29} Mother raises the following three assignments of error:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in determining the best interest
of the minor child as it was not supported by competent evidence.
II. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother’s
request for a continuance.
9.
III. The trial court erred when it failed to allow Mother to call
witnesses to rebut Father’s witnesses’ testimony.
III. Analysis
A. Legal Custody and Best Interest
{¶ 30} A legal custody determination is generally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Blausey v. Blausey, 2019-Ohio-4506, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Miller v. Miller,
37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). Where, however, a party fails to comply with the
requirements of Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b), which provides for the timely filing of objections to a
magistrate’s decision, all but plain error is waived on appeal. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv). In
re G.H., 2024-Ohio-4943, ¶ 19-20 (6th Dist.). Addressing plain error on appeal, a court
may only reverse in “exceptional circumstances where error, to which no
objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process * * *.” In re Alyssa C.,
153 Ohio App.3d 10, 2003-Ohio-2673, 790 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 35 (6th Dist.),
quoting Goldfuss [v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116] at 122-123, 679 N.E.2d
1099. Thus, even if “we see significant difficulties in the evidence
supporting many of the magistrate’s findings and conclusions,” such
difficulties do not automatically rise to the level of plain error. In re Alyssa
C. at ¶ 36. To demonstrate plain error, appellant must identify “(1) a
deviation from a legal rule, (2) that the error was obvious, and (3) that the
error affected the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial process and therefore challenged the legitimacy of the underlying
judicial process.” State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565,
103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 41, citing Goldfuss at 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099.
In re C.G., 2023-Ohio-4239, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.)
{¶ 31} Because Mother neither timely filed objections to the magistrate’s decision
nor raises error relating to the juvenile court’s denial of her motion for leave, our review
is limited to plain error.
10.
{¶ 32} R.C.3109.04(E)(2)(c) provides that “[t]he court may terminate a prior final
shared parenting decree that includes a shared parenting plan approved under division
(D)(1)(a)(i) of this section upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever it
determines that shared parenting is not in the best interest of the children.” Under R.C.
3109.04(E)(2)(d), once the juvenile court terminates the shared parenting decree “the
court shall proceed and issue a modified decree for the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of the children under the standards applicable under divisions
(A), (B), and (C) of this section as if no decree for shared parenting had been granted and
as if no request for shared parenting ever had been made.”
{¶ 33} In allocating the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of a child
“in an original proceeding or in any proceeding for modification of a prior order of the
court making the allocation, the court shall take into account that which would be in the
best interest of the children.” R.C. 3109.04(B)(1).
{¶ 34} In determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1),
the court shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division
(B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as to the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the
wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;
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(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting
time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments,
including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child
support order under which that parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense
involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a
neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been
adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been
determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the
basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the
household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually
oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of
the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of
the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the
household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission
of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject
of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the
commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that
either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused
child or a neglected child;
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared
parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s
right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to
establish a residence, outside this state[.]
{¶ 35} Mother contends that the court failed to consider all the relevant testimony
in making findings under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c), focusing only on Mother’s “flaws”
while disregarding Father’s issues, that the court made unsupported assertions about
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Mother’s mental health while ignoring testimony about Father’s, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e),
and that the court failed to consider all the testimony when considering the parent most
likely to facilitate parenting time, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f).
{¶ 36} Upon careful review of the testimony presented at the hearing and the
magistrate’s decision, this is not an exceptional circumstance impacting the fundamental
fairness of the judicial process. While acknowledging that both parties failed to follow
the shared parenting plan, the magistrate noted Mother’s anger issues and her pattern of
changing days, times, and pickup and drop-off locations. These findings were derived
from the testimony presented at the hearing and, as such, the magistrate’s and the juvenile
court’s decision that it was in N.R.’s best interest to name Father as his custodial and
residential parent does not amount to plain error. Mother’s first assignment of error is not
well-taken.
B. Continuance to Retain Counsel
{¶ 37} Mother’s second assignment of error asserts that the juvenile court erred by
denying her request for a continuance to secure counsel while her third assignment of
error claims that the court denied her request to call rebuttal witnesses.
{¶ 38} Notably, Mother did not request to call rebuttal witnesses. Toward the end
of the hearing the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: Ma’am I have addressed your request for a continuance.
You – this matter – you filed this matter in February.
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: And it didn’t go to trial until September. The Court gave
you ample opportunity to secure counsel.
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[MOTHER]: And I would like counsel to rebuttal against the witnesses and
the testimonies is why I seeked [sic] counsel.
On review, this exchange is properly characterized as further argument relating to her
request for a continuance to retain counsel and it will be addressed accordingly.
{¶ 39} A juvenile court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. In re A.P., 2018-Ohio-3818, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing In re Edward
M., 2005-Ohio-3354, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981).
An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re R.H., 2025-Ohio-1377, ¶ 69 (6th Dist.), citing
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 40} Former Juv.R. 23 provided that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only when
imperative to secure the fair treatment for the parties.”1 This court has previously upheld
the denial of a continuance where “‘the reason for the request’ was ‘in the hands of the
party requesting a continuance.’” T.S. v. A.T., 2020-Ohio-6871, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.), quoting
T.M. v. J.H., 2011-Ohio-283, ¶ 91 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 41} In T.S., appellant sought a 30-day continuance to secure counsel four days
prior to a custody hearing. The magistrate denied the motion finding that the matter had
been pending for over a year and that appellant had been previously represented by
counsel. Id. at ¶ 5. On the date of trial, appellant asked her current attorney to withdraw
1
Effective July 1, 2026, the rule has been revised and renumbered as Juv.R. 18(B)(3). 14.
as counsel of record and the court granted counsel leave to withdraw. Id. at ¶ 6.
Appellant then proceeded pro se, without renewing her request for a continuance. Id.
{¶ 42} On appeal, the court determined that appellant’s discharge of her attorney
at the start of trial caused her need for a continuance and that and her subsequent choice
to represent herself, which included calling witnesses “and conducting herself at all times
as a party wishing to proceed to trial,” demonstrated that the court did not “force” her to
represent herself at trial. Id. at ¶ 24, 28.
{¶ 43} T.M v. J.H., similarly found that where appellant’s attorney withdrew to act
as a fact witness, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance where the
hearing was longstanding and rescheduling “would have involved the coordination of the
parties, the court, the guardian ad litem and many attorneys.” Id. at ¶ 91. The court
observed “that since the reason for the request for a continuance was the withdrawal of
co-counsel to provide witness testimony, the preparation and timing of the request with
respect to new counsel was in the hands of the party requesting a continuance.” Id.
{¶ 44} Here, the matter commenced in early February 2025. At no time up to and
including the end of the first day of trial in September did Mother express the desire to
retain counsel. In fact, Mother expressed frustration with waiting until October 22 to
conclude the hearing in the proceeding she termed “expedited.” After the court moved the
hearing date up by one day, Mother stated that she needed a continuance until October 27
or 28 in order for her counsel to be present. At that time, counsel had not appeared in the
case.
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{¶ 45} Because the case had been pending for several months, the court scheduled
the hearing’s conclusion nearly a month out, and the fact that Mother’s attorney did not
appear in the matter until after the court’s final judgment, the juvenile court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to continue. Mother’s second and third
assignments of error are not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 46} Upon due consideration, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Mother is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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