J-A12029-26
2026 PA Super 205
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CAMERON SERRANO : No. 1869 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007113-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2026
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, granting Cameron Serrano’s pretrial motion to suppress a firearm.1 Upon careful review, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
The suppression court summarized the relevant facts as follows:
On August 26[,] 2024, Officers [Daniel] Ransom and [Brendan]
McCauley were on patrol in a marked police vehicle. They were
both in uniform. Officer Ransom received a phone call from a
fellow officer, Officer Thomas.[2] [Officer Thomas] reported seeing
a person of interest, [] Serrano, standing near the intersection of
Reese and Somerset [Streets] in Philadelphia.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The Commonwealth properly certified that the suppression court’s order would terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). See Notice of Appeal, 7/21/25.
2 Officer Thomas’s first name does not appear in the record.
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[Officer Thomas] reported that [] Serrano was wearing a white Tshirt, shorts, and had a black fanny pack. A moment later, [Officer
Thomas] sent [a] photograph of [] Serrano [to Officers McCauley
and Ransom], as well as gave Officer Ransom [] Serrano’s date of
birth. Officer Ransom used the on-board police computer and
performed a warrant search.
The results of that search indicated that there was an active arrest
warrant for [] Serrano. Officers McCauley and Ransom drove to
the intersection of Reese and Somerset [Streets]. There were
several people milling around the general area of the intersection.
There was also a tent set up on a nearby sidewalk.
Upon arriving, [] Serrano was seen to be crouching behind a
parked pick-up truck. As the police [] vehicle stop[ped], []
Serrano popped up and began to back away. Officer Ransom
exited [his] vehicle and attempted to engage [] Serrano. []
Serrano continued to move away from the officers. Officer
Ransom asked to speak with [] Serrano[, who] subsequently
began running away.
After a brief chase, Officer Ransom and another officer c[aught]
[] Serrano and place[d] him under arrest. [Serrano] did not have
any keys to the truck on his person. Meanwhile, Officer McCauley
was looking around the area of the vehicle where [] Serrano had
been seen crouching. During this visual search, Officer McCauley
s[aw] a black [] satchel on the truck bed floor in the rear of the
pick-up truck.
The truck bed had four walls, approximately a foot and a half
high[] each. [T]he tailgate was closed, creating a box-like area
defining the rear of the truck. There was no cover over the truck
bed. It was open to the air.
Officer McCauley reached into the truck bed and removed the
satchel. He subsequently took the satchel to the police vehicle
and searched it, wherein[] he found [a] gun. [Officer McCauley]
secured the gun in the police vehicle and joined Officer Ransom in
completing the arrest of [] Serrano.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/24/25, at 4–6.
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On August 27, 2024, Serrano was charged with three firearm offenses 3
related to the gun the police found in the satchel. See Criminal Complaint,
8/27/24. Serrano filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on January 28, 2025,
which sought to suppress the firearm. The suppression court held a hearing
on the motion on June 18, 2025. At the close of the hearing, the parties made
argument, and the suppression court held its decision in abeyance and set a
date to reconvene for a decision on June 24, 2025. See N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 6/18/24, at 35–51.
When the hearing resumed on June 24, 2025, the suppression court
placed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), and stated:
Officer McCauley seized the satchel from the rear of the truck bed
without the required warrant and without any applicable exception
to the warrant requirement. The satchel was seized in violation
of [] Serrano’s constitutional rights under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. And the subsequent search of the satchel was [the]
fruit of that unconstitutional seizure. And the gun found in the
satchel is hereby suppressed.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/24/25, at 10.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:
3 Serrano was charged with possession of firearm prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6105(a)(1); firearms not to be carried without a license, id. at § 6106(a)(1); and carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia. Id. at § 6108.
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Did the [trial] court err by ordering suppression where [Serrano]
did not establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in an open bed of a parked truck into which he discarded his illegal
gun, where: the truck was legally parked and unoccupied; the
truck’s lights and engine were off; [Serrano] was simply standing
on the sidewalk next to the truck but otherwise demonstrated no
possessory or privacy interest in the truck; and when [Serrano]
was apprehended, no car keys were found on him?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
In its brief, the Commonwealth argues that it carried its preliminary
burden of establishing Serrano had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
truck bed into which he placed the bag containing the firearm. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 12. Because it did so, the Commonwealth asserts, the burden of
persuasion shifted to Serrano to prove he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the truck, and Serrano did not meet that burden. Id. The
Commonwealth asserts that the suppression court failed to consider the
totality of the circumstances when it stated the only evidence of Serrano’s lack
of expectation of privacy in the truck was the absence of car keys on his
person/in his possession, ignoring evidence that Serrano demonstrated no
connection to the parked truck apart from crouching behind it, and fled on
foot when the police attempted to engage him. Id. at 14–16, 16–17.
Our standard of review of a Commonwealth appeal of a suppression
order is well-settled:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we
follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the
evidence from the defendant’s witnesses[,] together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
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findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the
record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however,
we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Toliver, 355 A.3d 920, 932 (Pa. Super. 2026), quoting
Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252–53 (Pa. Super. 2016).
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d
230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025), citing Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166 A.3d
357, 363–64 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, “an individual’s expectation of
privacy in the place searched must be established to invoke constitutional
protection.” Commonwealth v. Viall, 890 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2005),
citing Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa. 1989). An
expectation of privacy must be reasonable
[and] will be found to exist when the individual exhibits an actual
or subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In
determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is
legitimate or reasonable, the totality of the circumstances must
be considered[,] and the determination will ultimately rest upon a
balancing of the societal interests involved. The constitutional
legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the
subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on
whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the
surrounding circumstances.
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Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 552 (Pa. Super. 2009), quoting
Viall, 890 A.2d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. 1993).
The Commonwealth bears the initial burden to present evidence that the
defendant lacked an expectation of privacy; however, the defendant “bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to his reasonable expectation
of privacy.” See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297, 308 (Pa.
2025), citing Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 701 (Pa. 2014).
This burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence and may
be met by purely circumstantial evidence. See Anderson, 430 A.3d at 308–
09.
The suppression court supports its decision to suppress the evidence,
first, by defining the bed of a pick-up truck as a location in which an owner,
or someone else with an expectation of privacy in that truck, has just as much
right to privacy as in the interior of the truck; and, second, by finding the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden to prove Serrano had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. We disagree.
Because the suppression court’s analysis of the status of the open truck
bed presumes Serrano had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck as
a whole, we begin with the preliminary question of whether the
Commonwealth met its burden to demonstrate Serrano did not have such an
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expectation.4 The suppression court explained the burden-shifting framework
clarified in Enimpah, supra, which requires that the Commonwealth produce
evidence to demonstrate a defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location searched, which, if met, then shifts the burden to the
defendant to persuade the court he or she reasonably had such expectation.
Id., 106 A.3d 695; N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/24/25, at 7–8.5 The court
observed that, while a person using a vehicle without permission does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that vehicle, the person need not
have a common law property right in the vehicle; instead, it noted, courts look
to whether he or she is in lawful possession or control of the vehicle. Id. at
8, citing Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018).
The suppression court then reasoned:
In the present case, the only evidence the Commonwealth has in
support of its contention that [] Serrano lacked a privacy interest
was that he did not have keys to the vehicle on his person at the
time he was arrested by the police.
Under the circumstances of the present case, this does not allow
the [c]ourt to conclude that [] Serrano did not have an expectation
of privacy. [] Serrano was not seen operating the vehicle. Nor
was there any other suggestion that he had done so. The vehicle
was parked in a legal parking spot in a residential neighborhood ____________________________________________
4 Because we find the Commonwealth met its burden to prove the defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck, see infra, we need not reach the question of the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in an open truck bed.
5 The suppression court issued a statement in lieu of an opinion, rather than
a formal opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), referring this Court and the parties to its findings of fact and conclusions of law stated on the record at the suppression hearing. See Statement in Lieu of an Opinion, 9/3/25.
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in front of a house. There is no evidence about whether [] Serrano
lived in that neighborhood.
What evidence was available to the [c]ourt was that [] Serrano
was hanging around outside as a pedestrian for several minutes
before the police engaged him. Therefore, on the present record,
it is quite possible that [] Serrano was merely spending time
outside of his home in his own neighborhood. Under such
circumstances, there would be no reason for him to have the keys
to his vehicle on his person. Therefore, the lack of such keys does
not create the suggestion that the vehicle was not his.
Because the initial burden falls on the Commonwealth, the lack of
evidence falls squarely upon the Commonwealth. []
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/24/25, at 8–10.
Upon review, we are constrained to find the suppression court erred in
its analysis. Notably, although the court accurately identified the burdenshifting process, it did not mention the need to consider that test with respect
to the totality of the circumstances. This perhaps explains why it inaccurately
stated that the only evidence the Commonwealth presented to support
Serrano’s lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck was the fact
that keys to the truck were not found on Serrano’s person. However, the
court then proceeded to enumerate other facts that suggested a lack of
connection between Serrano and the truck. See id. at 8–9 (finding
Commonwealth also introduced evidence truck was legally parked on public
street in residential neighborhood, in front of house, and Serrano was not seen
operating truck and there was no suggestion he had done so); see also id.,
6/18/25, at 24 (Officer McCauley testifying he observed no one in truck and
no one taking ownership of truck). As the suppression court acknowledges,
the only apparent connection between Serrano and the vehicle was the fact
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that he was standing near the car, “hanging around outside as a pedestrian,”
when police arrived. See id., 6/24/25, at 9; see also id., 6/18/25, at 16
(Officer Ransom testifying he observed Serrano standing behind rear wheel of
truck, near truck bed); id. at 22–23 (Officer McCauley testifying he observed
Serrano “crouch[ing] down next to a red pick-up truck on the south side of
the street,” then “pop[ping] back up and [continuing] to walk eastbound []”);
id. at 31 (Officer McCauley testifying when he first saw Serrano, “he was
standing and then he crouched down behind the bed of the F-150”).
Ultimately, the trial court found that the lack of keys on Serrano’s person
“does not create the suggestion that the vehicle was not [Serrano’s].”
See id., 6/24/25, at 9 (emphasis added). However, as decades of federal and
state jurisprudence explain, ownership is not the litmus test for determining
a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle when a defendant
does not own that vehicle. See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. at
404–05 (one who owns and possesses car or home almost always has
reasonable expectation of privacy, but one need not have recognized common
law property interest to claim such expectation; similarly, legitimate presence,
standing alone, is insufficient to prove reasonable expectation of privacy; no
single metric or exhaustive list of considerations resolves question in all
cases); Anderson, 430 A.3d at 308 (finding “ownership of the property at
issue is not a requirement for a reasonable expectation of privacy[,]
notwithstanding the absence of ownership, evidence of lawful possession or
control of property generally suffices to demonstrate a reasonable expectation
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of privacy therein”). Proof of actual ownership is neither required nor
dispositive of the issue, and we would be hard-pressed to find lack of proof of
ownership should be treated any differently with regard to whether Serrano
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck.
We agree with Serrano that the Commonwealth’s burden is “no mere
formality,” and that if the Commonwealth “fails to present any evidence about
the defendant’s expectation of privacy, suppression must be granted.” See
Appellee’s Brief, at 8, citing Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 698. The instant case,
however, is not analogous to Enimpah, where the Commonwealth presented
no evidence at the suppression hearing, believing the burden was on the
defendant to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises
searched. Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 701. There, the trial court “was forced to
decide the motion based solely on which party bore the burden of production.”
Id. In the instant case, the Commonwealth did produce evidence. That
evidence, undeniably, did not show that Serrano did not own the vehicle. 6 But
failure to prove a negative is not required by any case law cited by the
suppression court, and the suppression court was obliged to consider the issue
under the umbrella of the totality of the circumstances, rather than limiting
its analysis to strict property ownership. The testimony before the
suppression court did not demonstrate indicia of Serrano’s ownership,
6 We note with displeasure that the Commonwealth did not take the relatively
simple step of running the pick-up truck’s registration, which would have made resolution of the issue on appeal far more straightforward.
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possession, or control of the vehicle apart from his proximity to the truck at
the time the officers arrived on the scene and Serrano’s placement of the bag
in the open truck bed; Serrano neither introduced contrary evidence nor
identified evidence presented by the Commonwealth to support a finding that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck.
In the cases cited by Serrano and the suppression court in which the
Court found a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle,
the officers observed the defendant inside that vehicle. See Anderson, 340
A.3d 297; Byrd, supra. In Anderson, the defendant was driving the vehicle
in which the police found contraband material, though the vehicle was
registered to a third party, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
the defendant had sufficiently demonstrated possession and control, and,
therefore, a reasonable expectation of privacy. 340 A.3d at 301–03, 309–10.
Similarly, in Byrd, the defendant was the driver, and only occupant, of the
vehicle in which the contraband items were found, and the United States
Supreme Court found he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle, even though the car was a rental he was not technically permitted to
drive. Even in Enimpah, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden to establish the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the defendant was a
passenger in the car in which law enforcement officers located the contraband
items.
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In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2005),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed an order suppressing contraband
items where the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant was
standing at the driver’s side of a parked car and tossed items into it. There,
the Court found the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the car he stood beside. Id. at 682–83. The Court noted there was
no evidence presented to suggest the defendant owned or otherwise had any
lawful connection to the car, and his placement of the firearm in the vehicle
was not enough to establish such a connection. Id. at 692. Furthermore, in
its analysis, the Court noted that “the facts at bar suggest far less of a
connection with the area searched than other cases in which this Court has
held that an expectation of privacy did not exist, i.e., cases where the
defendant was actually physically present inside the area searched.” Id.
(citing cases) (italics omitted).
Thus, we find, under the totality of the circumstances, that the
suppression court erred in suppressing the gun on the ground that the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Serrano had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the police still searched Serrano’s bag
upon finding it. Thus, we must now consider whether Serrano had a
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reasonable expectation 7 of privacy in the bag found in the bed of the truck
and, if so, whether he abandoned the bag. If so, the Commonwealth claims,
the police did not violate Serrano’s Fourth Amendment rights by opening the
bag and finding the firearm. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18 n.7; N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 6/18/25, at 36–38.
A defendant cannot retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
property he or she has abandoned. See Commonwealth v. Coles, 317 A.3d
659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2024):
7 It is well-settled that:
[A] defendant charged with a possessory offense in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has automatic standing because
the charge itself alleges an interest sufficient to support a claim
under Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. This rule entitles a defendant to a
review of the merits of his suppression motion without a
preliminary showing of ownership or possession in the premises
or items seized. In addition to standing, though, a defendant must
show that he had a privacy interest in the place invaded or thing
seized that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 698 (emphasis added). “[E]vidence of lawful possession or control of property generally suffices to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy therein.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297, 308 (Pa. 2025).
The Commonwealth characterized the witnesses’ testimony as establishing that Serrano “stealthily placed his bag” in the truck bed when “police were within sight.” See Appellant’s Brief, at 14; see also Appellee’s Brief, at 12. However, the police officers testified that the officer who called them said Serrano was carrying a black fanny-pack-style bag, but that he was not holding the bag when they arrived; Officer McCauley located the bag when he looked over at the truck and saw the bag sitting in the truck bed, on the side closer to the sidewalk. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/18/25, at 8–9, 11, 16–17, 23, 24–25.
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Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be
inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.
All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged
abandonment should be considered. The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense but whether the
person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left
behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in
question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Barnette, 760 A.2d 1166, 1170–71 (Pa.
Super. 2000).
To prove abandonment, it is not enough to show that property was
placed in an area open to the public; the evidence must also demonstrate that
the individual attempted to dissociate him- or herself from the property. See
Commonwealth v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. Super. 2009) (evidence
established clear intent to relinquish control, and, therefore, abandonment,
where defendant discarded handgun under SUV parked on public street and
began to walk away from scene); Commonwealth v. Pizarro, 723 A.2d 675,
679 (Pa. Super. 1998) (finding abandonment where defendant placed supply
of drugs in bag so it was not in his immediate possession and then stood 10
to 15 feet away, only returning to bag when transacting sale);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 636 A.2d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 1994) (finding
bag abandoned where defendant “strategically” placed bag in tree in public
park, “not immediately visible to passersby,” stood 10 to 12 feet away, and
approached only to show potential customers drugs to sell; placement of bag
“constituted a conscious effort to dissociate himself from the bag in the event
there was police intervention”). Cf. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543–44
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(1990) (defendant who attempted to protect sack from search after throwing
it on hood of his car in response to police inquiry did not abandon sack);
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 595 A.2d 635, 637 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(defendant’s “equivocal act” of placing pouch on hood of nearby car
insufficient to demonstrate “clear intent to relinquish his interest in the
property,” as he did not walk away from car “or otherwise attempt to
dissociate himself further from the pouch;” facts are distinguishable from
cases where defendant “made clear an intent to abandon by discarding the
evidence”).
Serrano suggests there is a distinction between placing an item in a
truck bed, which is the property of a private owner, and leaving it in or on
publicly owned property, positing that it is more reasonable to expect privacy
in a location where another individual may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/18/25, at 37–38; Appellee’s Brief,
at 13–14. He cites no case law to support this proposition, and we have found
none. Rather, this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have found a
lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in items discarded in both publicly
owned property and property owned by a known or unknown third party. See,
e.g., Peterson, 636 A.2d at 618–19 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
bag located in storefront, regardless of fact that police did not know who
owned building before they broke into it and there was no conclusive proof
building had been abandoned); Coles, 317 A.3d at 664 (no reasonable
expectation of privacy where defendant discarded backpack in kitchen of
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adjacent house she had no permission to enter and then fled); Viall, 890 A.2d
at 423 (unreasonable for defendant to have expected privacy interest in bag
placed in common area of backseat of car in which he was travelling; area was
not shielded from view of many others in same space); Commonwealth v.
Clark, 746 A.2d 1128, 1132, 1133–34 (Pa. Super. 2000) (defendant’s
decision to place supply of drugs in weeded lot and lawn area “some distance
away” from where he conducted drug transactions established effective
abandonment of any reasonable expectation of privacy to them); Pizarro,
723 A.2d at 679 (defendant abandoned reasonable expectation of privacy in
bag when he deposited it on front lawn of property owned by unknown third
party, in “location readily accessible to anyone frequenting the corner”); In
Interest of J.J., 668 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. Super. 1995) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in bag defendant hid inside storm door of house which
he did not establish he owned or otherwise held reasonable privacy interest
in); Johnson, 636 A.2d at 659 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bag
placed in tree in public park, where it was “accessible to anyone frequenting
the park”); Commonwealth v. Anderl, 477 A.2d 1356, 1363–64 (Pa. Super.
1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where defendant hid contraband
on property of unknown third party).
In this case, Serrano, who was originally crouched behind the truck
when the officers first arrived on the scene, began to walk away from the truck
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(and the bag, which was already placed in the truck bed)8 when police
approached him, and eventually “fled,” leaving the bag behind in the bed of
the pick-up truck. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/18/25, at 11–12, 22–23,
31. Serrano did not remain near the vehicle or bag, as did the defendants in
Smith and Sanders, nor did his behavior suggest he intended to return to
retrieve the bag. These facts are consistent with a determination that, since
Serrano deposited the bag into a truck in which he appeared to have no
personal interest, the bag was abandoned, and the police were permitted to
recover and search it without a warrant.9
Because we find Serrano did not have a privacy interest in the truck, we
need not decide whether the suppression court correctly determined that the
open truck bed was protected by virtue of being part of the truck, and we
therefore decline to address the issue. 10
8 See n.7, supra.
9 Once property is abandoned, a defendant has “no standing to contest the
search and seizure of the items.” Coles, 317 A.3d at 664, quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 305 A.3d 1026, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2023).
10 The suppression court noted that neither the parties nor the suppression court were able to find case law addressing the status of an open truck bed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and, therefore, it appeared to be a question of first impression. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/18/25, at 6. It reasoned, however, that “[o]n balance, it seems that our society would define the bed of a pick-up truck as part of the vehicle warranting an expectation of privacy,” because “[i]t is not societally permissible for a stranger to climb into a pickup truck and begin rummaging around through the items contained in that space.” Id. at 7. It continued, saying that “[w]hile it may be easier for a person to accomplish such activity because of the relatively open nature of (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that space, it is still viewed as an issue that is expected to be honored as private and protected.” Id. at 7. It likened items located in the truck bed to “the chattels of a house. Outside and unsecured, it is still expected to be private and protected by the requirements of search warrants.” Id. at 7.
Though individuals indisputably enjoy privacy rights to their property, the United States Supreme Court has also noted that “[p]olice cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence, what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). It follows that even if an item is located inside an individual’s zone of private property, a suppression court must still consider whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, and our courts have done just that. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–48, 450–51 (1989) (defendant could not have reasonably believed his partially covered greenhouse was protected from aerial observation, even though it fell within curtilage of his residence, regardless of what he intended and expected); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 211–15 (1986) (no Fourth Amendment violation where law enforcement officers, via aerial observation, saw marijuana growing in defendant’s garden, which was surrounded by 10-foot fence; though yard was within curtilage of defendant’s home, and though defendant clearly manifested “subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy,” defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy where anyone flying over airspace who glanced down could see garden); Commonwealth v. Cihylik, 486 A.2d 987, 988, 991–92 (Pa. Super. 1985) (defendant did not have legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of garbage pit located beside barn on lot defendant was leasing, where pit was clearly observable from street but contents were not, lot was not fenced or enclosed but was closely surrounded by alleys and neighboring buildings, and it was clear defendant used pit as garbage dump and it was left open and accessible to anyone crossing lot; Court endorsed trial court’s finding that “the wide-open appearance of the pit, its location in an unfenced yard, the easy access provided by an adjoining public alley, and the proximity of other homes” make defendant’s expectation of privacy “not one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”). None of this is to say Serrano could not have prevailed in arguing that an open truck bed provides the same privacy protection as the interior of a vehicle; we simply note that it requires analysis.
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We conclude, therefore, that Serrano had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the pick-up truck, and his deposit of his bag inside it constituted
abandonment. Accordingly, because the trial court erred as a matter of law,
we reverse the trial court’s grant of suppression and remand for further
proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 9/18/2026
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