IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Brian Oller, Sep 18 2026, 9:05 am
Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
DoorDash, Inc. and Trey Culvey,
Appellees-Defendants
September 18, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CT-425
Appeal from the Porter Superior Court
The Honorable Michael A. Fish, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
64D01-2206-CT-004906
Opinion by Judge Felix
Judges Altice and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 1 of 19
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] A DoorDash driver ran a stop sign, crashed into Brian Oller, and then left the
scene to finish the delivery he was making for DoorDash. Oller survived being
ejected from and pinned under his truck, and he sued both DoorDash and its
driver. DoorDash filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to
Oller’s independent negligence claim against it, arguing that it did not owe
Oller a general duty of care. The trial court agreed with DoorDash and granted
its motion. The trial court also denied Oller’s motions to compel discovery
based on its ruling on DoorDash’s motion. Oller now appeals, raising two
issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting DoorDash’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings; and
2. If the trial court did so err, whether its denial of Oller’s motions to
compel discovery from DoorDash must be reversed.
[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts of DoorDash’s business and the crash are presented as alleged in
Oller’s complaint.
DoorDash’s Business
[4] DoorDash “is a multi-billion-dollar corporation that operates nationwide” and
“conduct[s] business in the State of Indiana.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 2 of 19
DoorDash’s “business model is the delivery of food, beverage, alcohol, and
other items from stores and restaurants to [DoorDash’s] customers.” Id. at 24.
This business model “is predicated on the speed of deliveries of orders from the
restaurants to its customers.” Id. DoorDash’s drivers—known as “Dashers”—
“are compensated on the sheer volume of orders each ‘Dasher’ delivers.” Id.
That is, “[t]he more trips or orders [a Dasher] complete[s], the more the
‘Dasher’ is compensated.” Id. And “a ‘Dasher’ must complete one order in
order to be ready to receive the next order.” Id. A Dasher’s tip is also “reliant
upon the speed at which the ‘Dasher’ gets the order to the customer.” Id.
Because of “this compensation structure, ‘Dashers’ have an economic incentive
to complete trips or orders as quickly as possible.” Id.
[5] DoorDash “communicates with ‘Dashers’ by and through [its] mobile
application and cellular telephones.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 24.
DoorDash’s app “allows ‘Dashers’ to receive and accept orders, communicate
with [DoorDash], communicate with restaurants, and communicate with
customers.” Id. DoorDash “encourages its ‘Dashers’ to communicate with its
customers directly regarding the status of the customer’s order,” which can
“lead[] to higher customer satisfaction which in turn results in high customer
reviews[,] repeat usage of [DoorDash]’s application and services,” and
“increas[es DoorDash]’s revenue over time.” Id. at 25. DoorDash’s app also
has a “navigational component that identifies the optimum route the company’s
‘Dasher’ must take in order to ensure the best route so that the customer
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 3 of 19
receives the order as fast as possible.” Id. In addition to the app, DoorDash
“also communicates with its ‘Dashers’ via cell phone text messages.” Id.
[6] Considering DoorDash’s business model, methods of communication, and
navigational support, “a ‘Dasher’ is financially encouraged to operate a vehicle
as quickly as possible while also relying nearly exclusively on the ‘Dasher[’s]’
cellular telephone while doing so.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 25.
Furthermore, DoorDash does “not obligate its ‘Dashers’ to abide by any
specific policies or procedures for operating a motor vehicle in conjunction with
the use [of] a cellular device.” Id. at 26.
The Crash
[7] Just before 5:00 p.m. on July 31, 2020, while delivering an order for DoorDash,
Trey Culvey was driving a sedan westbound on “CR 550 W” (the “County
Road”), Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 26, and approaching State Road 149; Oller
was driving a pickup truck southbound on State Road 149 and approaching the
County Road. As Oller drove through the intersection of State Road 149 and
the County Road, Culvey “completely disregarded the stop sign westbound and
violently collided into the driver’s side of” Oller’s truck. Id. at 27. The impact
caused Oller’s truck “to rotate counter clockwise [sic] and . . . barrel roll
southbound on State Road 149.” Id. Oller was “ejected” from his truck and
“land[ed] in the ditch on the east side of State Road 149.” Id. Oller’s truck
“landed on top of him.” Id. While “witnesses to the collision . . . dragged
[Oller] from underneath his pickup truck . . . and resuscitated him,” Appellant’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 4 of 19
App. Vol. II at 27, Culvey left the scene on foot to complete the DoorDash
order.
Litigation
[8] Oller survived the wreck, and on June 7, 2022, he sued Culvey and DoorDash.
Oller asserted two claims against DoorDash: (1) DoorDash is vicariously liable
for Culvey’s negligence and (2) DoorDash is independently liable for negligence
(the “Independent Negligence Count”).1 For the Independent Negligence
Count, Oller alleged that DoorDash “owed a duty to the general public,
including [to Oller], to act reasonably, safely, and not cause harm to other
persons and property by and through its business and/or business practices.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 35. DoorDash allegedly breached this duty in
relevant part by (1) designing and maintaining a business model that is built on,
encourages, and incentivizes distracted or otherwise unsafe driving; and (2)
designing and maintaining a mobile application that requires regular and
frequent use by Dashers while they are driving without any safeguards to
prevent distracted driving.2
[9] Oller further alleged as follows:
73. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant DOORDASH
has had clear and direct knowledge, data, and information, that
1
Oller’s vicarious liability claim is not at issue in this appeal.
2
In the Independent Negligence Count, Oller also alleged that DoorDash had negligently hired, trained, and
supervised Culvey. At the trial level and now on appeal, the parties focus solely on Oller’s allegations
regarding DoorDash’s business model and app. We limit our review accordingly.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 5 of 19
its business model, business practices, and mobile application
encourage[], incentivize[], and in fact cause[] “Dashers” to
operate motor vehicles on the roadway in a careless, negligent,
and/or reckless manner.
74. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant DOORDASH
has had clear and direct knowledge, data, and information (or at
least access thereto), that its “Dashers” operate motor vehicles
carelessly, negligently, and/or recklessly on the roadway,
including but not limited to exceeding posted speed limits,
disregarding traffic control devices, and otherwise operating
aggressively.
75. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant DOORDASH
has been included in numerous lawsuits that allege the same or
similar acts of negligence, yet Defendant DOORDASH has
consciously chose[n] not to change its business model, business
practices, and/or mobile application to address the safety
concerns and risks to the general public, including Plaintiff
OLLER.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 37.
[10] On June 18, 2025, DoorDash filed a motion pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule
12(C)3 for partial judgment on the pleadings. DoorDash argued it was entitled
to judgment in its favor on the Independent Negligence Count because it does
not owe a duty to motorists, such as Oller, with respect to its business and
3
“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.” Ind. Trial Rule 12(C). The recent amendment to Indiana Trial Rule 12 did not
alter the substance of Subsection (C). See Order Amending Rules of Trial Procedure, No. 26S-MS-8 (Ind.
June 9, 2026). Compare T.R. 12(C) (effective Jan. 1, 2007, to June 30, 2026), with T.R. 12(C) (effective July
1, 2026).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 6 of 19
business practices. Oller opposed the motion. Additionally, after DoorDash
filed its Trial Rule 12(C) motion, Oller filed two motions to compel discovery
from DoorDash.4
[11] The trial court granted DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion. Because the trial
court determined its decision to grant DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion
“significantly alter[ed] the landscape of discovery,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at
21, it denied Oller’s motions to compel. The trial court also “determine[d]
there [was] no just reason for delay and expressly direct[ed] the entry of
judgment for . . . DoorDash and against [Oller] as to [the Independent
Negligence Count] only.” Id. at 22. This appeal ensued.5
Discussion and Decision
1. The Trial Court Erred by Granting DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C)
Motion
[12] Oller contends the trial court erred by granting DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C)
motion. We review a trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 12(C) motion de novo.
KS & E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017) (citing Veolia Water
Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l Trust Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). To the extent
4
Oller failed to include in his Appendix all filings related to his motions to compel. See Ind. Appellate Rule
50(A). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice
thereof. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1162 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201
of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).
5
On August 27, 2026, we held oral argument at the Jewish Community Center in Indianapolis, Indiana. We
thank all those in attendance for their attentiveness and hospitality, and we thank counsel for all parties for
the quality of their advocacy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 7 of 19
the trial court’s decision presents a question of law, we review such a question
de novo, as well. Brooks v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 272 N.E.3d 490, 494 (Ind.
2025) (citing Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016)), reh’g denied
(Feb. 13, 2026).
[13] A Trial Rule 12(C) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bayer
Corp. v. Leach, 147 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (citing KS & E
Sports, 72 N.E.3d at 898). We will affirm a trial court’s decision to grant a Trial
Rule 12(C) motion “only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that
under no circumstances could relief be granted.” KS & E Sports, 72 N.E.3d at
898 (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5). Like the trial court, we “base our
ruling solely on the pleadings,” and “we accept as true the material facts alleged
in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5).
[14] DoorDash filed a Trial Rule 12(C) motion as to the Independent Negligence
Count. To recover on this claim, Oller must show: (1) DoorDash owed Oller a
duty; (2) DoorDash breached that duty through conduct that fell below the
appropriate level of care; and (3) DoorDash’s breach caused injury to Oller. See
Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024) (citing
Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016)).
DoorDash argues only that it did not owe a duty to Oller. “Absent a duty,
there can be no breach and, hence, no liability.” Pennington v. Mem’l Hosp. of S.
Bend, Inc., 223 N.E.3d 1086, 1096 (Ind. 2024) (citing Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at
386). Whether DoorDash owed Oller a duty of care “is a question of law for
the court to decide.” Id. (quoting Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386–87).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 8 of 19 [15] If an “alleged duty is well-established, there is no need for a new judicial
redetermination of duty.” Yost v. Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 515 (Ind. 2014)
(quoting Paragon Fam. Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ind. 2003),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1096 n.2). If,
however, the alleged duty has not previously been established, we use the Webb
test to determine whether a duty exists; that test requires us to balance three
factors: (1) the parties’ relationship, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to
the injured person, and (3) public policy concerns. Doe #1 v. Ind. Dep’t Child
Servs., 81 N.E.3d 199, 206–07 (Ind. 2017) (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992,
995 (Ind. 1991), disapproved in part on other grounds by Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at
391).
[16] Oller argues that DoorDash owed him a general duty of protection from the
risks and dangers of its business model and app. To determine whether
DoorDash owed Oller this duty, he urges us to apply the Webb test. DoorDash
counters that applying the Webb test is unnecessary because the pertinent duty
question was already resolved in Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473
(Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 822 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 2004). We first examine
whether Williams controls, and, because we conclude it does not, we then apply
the Webb test.
a. Williams Does Not Control
[17] In Williams, Terry Williams and Kellie Meagher were involved in an
automobile accident, and at that time, “Meagher was allegedly using a cellular
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 9 of 19
phone furnished by Cingular.” 809 N.E.2d at 475. Williams sued Cingular for
negligence, alleging in relevant part that it “was negligent in furnishing a
cellular phone to Meagher when it knew, or should have known, that it would
be used while the user operated a motor vehicle.” Id. Cingular filed a Trial
Rule 12(B)(6) motion, which the trial court granted. Id.
[18] Williams appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that Cingular owed her a
duty. Williams, 809 N.E.2d at 475. This court disagreed. The Williams panel
applied the Webb test and determined that (1) there was “no relationship
between Cingular and Williams that would create a duty on the part of
Cingular,” id. at 477; (2) there was not “a high degree of foreseeability that the
sale of the phone would result in an accident,” id. at 478; and (3) placing a duty
on Cingular in this scenario was not sound public policy because drivers bear
the “responsibility” of “driv[ing] with due care” and “Cingular cannot control
what people do with the phones after they purchase them,” id. at 478. On
balance, “Williams’[s] attenuated relationship with Cingular and the . . . public
policy considerations substantially outweigh[ed] any foreseeability of the harm
at issue,” so the Williams panel determined that “Cingular did not owe a duty of
care to Williams.” Id. at 479. The Williams panel thus affirmed the trial court’s
decision to grant Cingular’s Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion. Id.
[19] DoorDash asserts that Williams established the following categorical rule: a
“third-party technology compan[y],” Appellee’s Br. at 12, does not owe a duty
to the general motoring public concerning a product that company makes
available to motorists and which motorists choose to use while driving. Thus,
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DoorDash claims that as a “third-party technology compan[y],” id., it “fits
seamlessly into the same reasoning applied to Cingular Wireless, so there is no
need to wade through the three [Webb] factors again,” id. at 14. DoorDash
overstates the Williams panel’s holding. That panel conducted a fact-specific
Webb analysis and concluded Cingular did not owe Williams a general duty of
protection under the circumstances presented. The Williams panel’s conclusion
was not a broad pronouncement that all third-party technology companies do
not owe a duty of care to the general motoring public regardless of the product
they make available to motorists.
[20] Furthermore, as alleged in Oller’s complaint, DoorDash does not merely make
its app available to the general public like Cingular made cell phones available;
rather, DoorDash requires and financially incentivizes Dashers to use the app
while they are making deliveries through DoorDash’s business platform.
According to Oller’s complaint, this is not a case where Culvey could have
chosen not to use DoorDash’s app such that the wreck was solely due to
Culvey’s own choices, as was the case in Williams. We are instead faced with
allegations—which we must accept as true and from which we must draw
reasonable inferences in Oller’s favor—that demonstrate a much more involved
“third-party technology compan[y],” Appellee’s Br. at 12, whose business
practices and app actively encourage distracted or otherwise dangerous driving.
Again, taking the facts as alleged in Oller’s complaint as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor, we cannot say Williams resolves
the pertinent duty question here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 11 of 19
b. DoorDash Owed Oller a Duty under Webb
[21] Because Williams does not answer the question of whether DoorDash owed
Oller a duty, we use the Webb test to answer that question. Under that test, we
balance (i) the parties’ relationship, (ii) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to
the injured person, and (iii) public policy concerns. Doe #1, 81 N.E.3d at 206–
07 (citing Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995). We address each factor in turn.
i. The Parties’ Relationship
[22] The determination of whether a relationship exists that gives rise to a duty “is
not without difficulty.” Gariup Constr. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ind.
1988). “No better general statement can be made than that the courts will find
a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that
it exists.” Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 53, at 357–59 (5th ed.
1984)). Importantly, a duty-worthy relationship may be direct or indirect. See
Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995 (holding “privity is not always required” for a duty of
care to arise).
[23] Oller argues he had a relationship with DoorDash at the time of the wreck
because (1) “DoorDash knows that its vast fleet of Dashers use the public
roadways to deliver orders for DoorDash’s customers,” Appellant’s Br. at 26;
(2) “the use of public roadways by DoorDash’s Dashers to deliver DoorDash’s
orders to DoorDash’s customers is an essential element of DoorDash’s
business,” id. at 27; and (3) “DoorDash incentivizes, encourages, and assists its
Dashers to use those roadways in a manner which predictably leads to
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 12 of 19
collisions and accidents with other motorists,” id. The facts Oller alleged in his
complaint support these inferences, but it would strain credulity to say there is a
direct relationship between Oller and DoorDash.
[24] Nevertheless, Oller’s allegations and the reasonable inferences therefrom
establish that DoorDash’s business depends on Dashers using public roads,
DoorDash directs Dashers to take the fastest routes possible, and DoorDash
financially incentivizes speed and use of its app. DoorDash thus conducts its
business on public roads through its Dashers, thereby placing the general
motoring public, including Oller, in a predictable though indirect relation to
DoorDash’s operations. This is sufficient to establish an indirect relationship
between DoorDash and Oller. See Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995–96. Even with
that said, Oller and DoorDash’s indirect relationship has little if any weight in
favor of a duty given the relationship’s attenuated nature.
ii. The Reasonable Foreseeability of Harm to the Injured
Person
[25] To determine whether the harm suffered by the injured party was reasonably
foreseeable, we must evaluate “(1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad
type of harm.” Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (quoting Rogers v. Martin, 63
N.E.3d 316, 325 (Ind. 2016)) (citing Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 394). “We consider
the ‘general class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether
the harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected—without addressing
the specific facts of the occurrence.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rogers, 63
N.E.3d at 325). That is, “we assess ‘whether there is some probability or
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 13 of 19
likelihood of harm that is serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take
precautions to avoid it.’” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 392 (quoting Satterfield v.
Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 367 (Tenn. 2008)).
[26] For example, in Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., three people in a
bar were shot by another patron, and the three victims sued the bar for “failing
to provide security for its patrons,” “failing to search [the shooter] for
weapons,” and “failing to warn [the victims] that [the shooter] was armed and
dangerous.” 62 N.E.3d at 385–86. The bar filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing the shooter’s “criminal acts were unforeseeable,” so the bar
“had no duty to anticipate and take steps to prevent [the shooter]’s conduct.”
Id. at 386. After clarifying the test for foreseeability at the duty stage, the
Indiana Supreme Court determined the “broad type of plaintiff” was “a patron
of a bar” and the “harm” was “the probability or likelihood of a criminal attack,
namely: a shooting inside a bar.” Id. at 393. According to the Goodwin court,
“although bars can often set the stage for rowdy behavior, [it did] not believe
that bar owners routinely contemplate that one bar patron might suddenly shoot
another.” Id. at 393–94 (emphasis added). The Goodwin court thus concluded
“as a matter of law” that “a shooting inside a neighborhood bar is not
foreseeable.” Id. at 394.
[27] The broad type of plaintiff here is the general motoring public. The broad type of
harm is the probability or likelihood of an automobile wreck, namely a collision
with a delivery network company driver (“DNC driver”)—“an individual who
provides delivery services using a personal vehicle through a digital network,”
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Ind. Code § 8-2.1-17-5.7.6 A “digital network” is “an online enabled
application, software, website, or system offered or used by a [delivery network
company] to enable deliveries with DNC drivers.” Id. § -6.5(b).
[28] Because delivery network companies supply digital networks to their drivers as
the means by which the drivers provide delivery services, those companies must
routinely contemplate, and even potentially require, that their drivers will
personally use a mobile device to access those networks while driving. And
there is some probability or likelihood that such use will be a distraction to the
DNC driver and will lead to an injury-causing automobile collision. Thus,
unlike a bar shooting, a collision with a DNC driver is a predictable byproduct
of a delivery network company’s business. A reasonable person would
undoubtedly take precautions to avoid such anticipated, serious consequences.
It was therefore reasonably foreseeable that DoorDash’s business model and
app would lead to a wreck between one of its drivers (Culvey) and a motorist
(Oller). The reasonable-foreseeability-of-harm-to-the-injured-person factor
weighs in favor of imposing a duty.
6
“Delivery services” is “the fulfillment of a delivery request made by a [delivery network company] customer
through a digital network, including” the “pickup of a good” and “delivery of the good at the direction of a
DNC customer by a DNC driver”; this term “may include a series of deliveries at the direction of different
DNC customers.” Ind. Code § 8-2.1-17-5.5. A “delivery network company,” also known as a “DNC,” is an
entity that “does business in Indiana” and “uses a digital network to connect DNC customers to DNC drivers
to request the delivery of goods.” Id. § -5.3. Although “DNC driver,” “digital network,” “delivery services,”
and “delivery network company” were not part of the Indiana Code at the time of the wreck in this case, see
2023 Ind. Acts 3296–98 (adding I.C. §§ 8-2.1-17-5.2 to -5.7 and amending I.C. § 8-2.1-17-6.5 to add DNC
language), the concepts these terms represent apply to the facts alleged in Oller’s complaint.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 15 of 19
iii. Public Policy Concerns
[29] “Duty is not sa[c]rosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is
entitled to protection.” Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984)). “Various factors” may play into our policy
consideration, “including convenience of administration, capacity of the parties
to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, the moral blame attached
to the wrongdoer, and many others.”7 Gariup Constr. Co., 519 N.E.2d at 1227
(quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 53, at 357–59 (5th ed. 1984)).
[30] Indiana’s motorists have a reasonable and justifiable expectation that delivery
network companies like DoorDash will conduct their operations in a
reasonably safe manner, that is, without encouraging and financially
incentivizing distracted or otherwise dangerous driving. DoorDash nonetheless
contends that public policy does not weigh in favor of imposing a duty on it
here because it did not control Culvey or his vehicle. Culvey undoubtedly had
a personal and independent duty to not drive distracted or unsafely. But on the
facts as alleged in Oller’s complaint, the buck does not stop with Culvey.
7
Some courts, like the Williams panel and the trial court here, look to enacted or proposed legislation as part
of their public policy considerations. See also Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1081 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (considering I.C. § 9-21-7-1 in determining public policy). In particular, the trial court here
considered Indiana Code section 8-2.1-19.3-2. That statute deems DNC drivers “independent contractor[s],”
thereby precluding vicarious liability, unless the DNC and DNC driver have a written contract to the
contrary. I.C. § 8-2.1-19.3-2. The Independent Negligence Count—which was the only count subject to
DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion and is the only count before us on appeal—has nothing to do with
vicarious liability and instead focuses on DoorDash’s business model and app. Accordingly, Section 8-2.1-19.3-2 does not provide policy guidance for this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 16 of 19
DoorDash’s business financially incentivizes drivers like Culvey to not only
deliver as many DoorDash orders as possible, but also to use DoorDash’s app
while doing so. Indiana law cannot and does not countenance such
inducements when the consequences, as alleged in Oller’s complaint, are so
readily apparent and significant. See I.C. §§ 34-51-2-1 to -19 (Comparative
Fault Act); Abbas v. Neter-Nu, 261 N.E.3d 233, 244 (Ind. 2025) (citing Ind. Dep’t
Ins. v. Everhart, 960 N.E.2d 129, 137 (Ind. 2012)) (discussing joint-and-several
liability). This is especially true where, as here, the delivery network company
allegedly knew or should have known of the dangers occasioned by its business
practices and app design.
[31] DoorDash is responsible for its own business model and app design, so it is in
the better position to prevent future injuries stemming therefrom. But see
Williams, 809 N.E.2d at 479 (concluding Cingular had “no way of preventing
customers from using the phones [it sold] while driving”). And recognizing a
duty here will not require DoorDash to cease its business; it will require
DoorDash to either mitigate the risks associated with the distracted and
dangerous driving it currently financially incentivizes or subject itself to
potential liability. In this way, the duty is not a blanket duty on delivery
network companies to afford protection to all motorists but is instead a duty to
not financially incentivize dangerous conduct that would harm motorists. Nor
will recognizing this duty enter the realm of strict liability. See Goodwin, 62
N.E.3d at 394 (quoting Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 276 (Ind.
2003)) (“[S]trict liability in tort . . . ‘assumes no negligence of the actor, but
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 17 of 19
chooses to impose liability anyway.’”). Based on the foregoing, there are strong
policy concerns that weigh in favor of imposing a duty here.
iv. On Balance
[32] On balance, the foreseeability of the harm at issue and public policy concerns
weigh in favor of concluding DoorDash owed Oller a duty; neither of those
factors is outweighed by the attenuated relationship between Oller and
DoorDash. We therefore conclude DoorDash owed Oller a general duty of
protection from the risks and dangers of its business model and app which
financially incentivize distracted or otherwise dangerous driving.8 Accordingly,
the trial court erred by granting DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion.
2. Remand Is Appropriate for the Trial Court to Address Oller’s
Motions to Compel
[33] Oller argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to compel. Because we
have reversed the trial court’s grant of DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion—
the ruling on which its denials of the motions to compel were based—we
remand for reconsideration of Oller’s motions to compel. We pass no judgment
on whether Oller’s motions have any merit. That will be for the trial court to
determine on remand.
8
Because we conclude DoorDash owed Oller a general duty of care, we need not address Oller’s contention
that DoorDash also had a duty under Indiana’s Product Liability Act, I.C. §§ 34-20-1-1 to -9-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CT-425 September 18, 2026 Page 18 of 19
Conclusion
[34] In sum, the trial court erred by granting DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion,
so we reverse that decision. We remand with instructions for the trial court to
deny DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion and to reconsider Oller’s motions to
compel.
[35] Reversed and remanded.
Altice, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Arman G. Sarkisian
Stephen Brandenburg
Sarkisian, Sarkisian, & Associates, PC
Portage, Indiana
Larry G. Evans
Andrew T. Shupp
Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP
Valparaiso, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE – DOORDASH, INC.
Edward W. Hearn
Kyle J. Farris
Jacob N. Kokoris
Johnson & Bell, P.C.
Crown Point, Indiana
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