FIFTH DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MERCIER P. J., and PADGETT, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
September 18, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1568. HUNTER v. THE STATE.
PADGETT, Judge.
Jordan Hunter was indicted, along with other co-defendants, and charged with
the offenses of kidnapping, theft by taking (felony grade), sexual battery, aggravated
sexual battery, conspiracy to commit rape, rape, false imprisonment and financial
transaction card fraud.1 Following a jury trial in which Hunter was tried separately
from the other co-defendants, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on
two counts but found him guilty of theft by taking, sexual battery, a second count of
sexual battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, conspiracy to
commit rape and false imprisonment. On a later date, Hunter entered a guilty plea to
1
OCGA §§ 16-5-40; 16-8-2; 16-6-22.1; 16-6-22.2; 16-4-8 and 16-6-1; 16-6-1; 16-5-41 and 16-9-33, respectively.
the offense of kidnapping and the remaining charge of rape was dismissed. Hunter
filed a timely motion for new trial which was denied and he appeals from that ruling,
arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative
prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants a new trial. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm.
Hunter has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, we review
only that evidence which is relevant to his enumerations of error and which provide
context and factual background to address the enumerations raised on appeal. Eaker
v. State, 315 Ga. 202, 203(1) (881 SE2d 673) (2022). On the date in question, the
victim, her husband and other friends visited an establishment that had three different
bars in the same vicinity. During the night, the victim consumed several different
drinks and became inexplicably incoherent.2 Without anyone in her party noticing, she
took her purse, left the bar and walked outside.
2
There was testimony about the effects of drugs such as GHB, Ketamine and Rophypnol which can be used to adulterate beverages but because these drugs are quickly metabolized by the body, there was no evidence of those drugs being in the victim’s system. However, experts testified that the victim’s reported symptoms were “classic GHB symptoms.”
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Hunter and three other individuals occupied a car and were parked near the
bars. They observed the victim on the sidewalk and noticed that she was stumbling
and struggling to keep her balance. Hunter called over to her and she entered their car.
The car left the area and Hunter began making plans with his uncle via telephone calls
to identify a place where they could take the victim to have sexual relations with her.
As they traveled, Hunter began molesting the victim who, by this point, was
completely incoherent and unresponsive. Hunter also removed the victim’s
underwear and tossed them out the rear window of the moving vehicle.
Hunter and the three other individuals in the car with the victim met up with
his uncle in another part of town. They followed Hunter’s uncle to an apartment
complex and the victim was taken into an apartment, leaving two of the co-defendants
in the vehicle. Hunter and two co-defendants removed the victim from the car by
grabbing her feet and legs and carrying her into the apartment. The two co-defendants
remaining in the car took that opportunity to look through the victim’s purse, taking
things of value. At some point during the night, the victim’s wedding ring was stolen.3
3
There were inconsistencies in the evidence relative to the stolen ring. However, on appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and leave issues such as conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence for the jury to resolve. Beckett v. State, 372 Ga. App. 139, 140(1) (903 SE2d
3
After a period of time, those in the apartment called or texted the co-defendants
in the car and advised that they needed additional condoms. The co-defendants in the
car purchased condoms with the victim’s credit card and provided them to the codefendants in the apartment. Those in the car later used the victim’s credit cards that
morning to purchase fast food and additional condoms.
The victim came to her senses and testified that when she became coherent,
Hunter was on top of her and was vaginally penetrating her. The victim panicked,
pushed Hunter off of her and walked into the living room of the apartment. There she
noticed a number of other men, including one who was standing between her and the
door. She realized that she had no underwear, shoes, wedding ring, purse or phone.
She asked for her phone, which the men refused to give her. She had no idea where
she was or how she had gotten there. At trial, the victim identified Hunter as the man
who was on top of her when she came to her senses at the apartment. She also
identified the other co-defendants and explained the role each man played in the
incident.
824) (2024).
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A brief negotiation ensued where the men demanded money from the victim.
After noting that she did not have her purse or wallet, she offered to pay the men cash
that she had stored in her home if they would take her home unharmed. They
eventually settled on the price of $5,000 for her safe return home. During the ride to
her home, Hunter again sexually molested the victim and demanded that she provide
oral sex to all of the individuals in the car. When the victim refused, the price that had
been negotiated for her safe return home was increased to $10,000.
Once they arrived at the victim’s home, the victim entered her house and used
her nanny’s cell phone to contact her husband and law enforcement. When the victim
did not return with cash, the defendants began beating on the door but eventually gave
up and all got back into the car to flee the scene. Law enforcement officers arrived as
they were trying to leave. The officers were able to locate the victim’s purse, phone,
and a box of condoms in the car occupied by Hunter and the co-defendants. Hunter
and all co-defendants who occupied the car were taken into custody at the scene.
Officers located her wedding ring at the entrance to the jail in the path taken by one
co-defendant and they located her wallet in the possession of another co-defendant.
After investigation, officers were able to corroborate the location of the defendants’
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cell phones on the night in question with the testimony given at trial. Officers were
also able to identify the transactions made with the victim’s credit cards at locations
near the apartment complex and confirmed that at least one transaction involved the
purchase of condoms. The evidence showed that the victim was last seen by her
friends and family at the bar at 1:36 a.m., that she arrived at the apartment complex at
approximately 2:30 a.m. and that the call to police was made at 6:24 a.m.
At trial, Hunter noted in his opening statement, during cross examination of
several witnesses, and in his closing argument that the victim and her family had filed
a civil lawsuit against the bars involved and the apartment complex where the victim
was taken by the defendants, suggesting that her motivation in seeking a conviction
was based upon her desire to enhance her civil lawsuit. Two of the co-defendants
testified at trial, largely corroborated each other’s testimony and both implicated
Hunter.
1. Hunter argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to object to certain testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argument relating to the
impact these crimes had on the victim and her family. We conclude that while some
of the examples cited by Hunter could be properly characterized as victim impact
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evidence, other testimony cited by Hunter was either admissible or merely irrelevant
and did not implicate the prohibition against the admission of victim impact evidence.
We further find that the prosecutor’s argument was not improper.
“Under Georgia law, evidence about a crime victim’s personal characteristics
and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, and the
victim’s community generally is not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of a
criminal trial.” Walker v. State, 360 Ga. App. 211, 217(4) (860 SE2d 868) (2021)
(punctuation omitted). To prevail in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Hunter “must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that,
but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Cross v.
State, 377 Ga. App. 764, 776(4) (922 SE2d 447) (2025) (punctuation omitted). When
assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was
impacted by the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, we must evaluate whether
there was a substantial, not merely conceivable, likelihood of a different result. Id. at
776–77(4). If Hunter is unable to satisfy both prongs of this test, his claim of
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ineffective assistance fails. Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 139, 145(2) (891 SE2d 878)
(2023).
“The burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel’s deficient performance, though not impossible to carry,
is a heavy one.” Revere v. State, 302 Ga. 44, 49(2)(a) (805 SE2d 69) (2017)
(punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we give
deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless
clearly erroneous, but we review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Grant v.
State, 295 Ga. 126, 130(5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014).
The portion of the State’s closing argument cited by Hunter is not clearly an
improper comment on how the crime has impacted the victim. The prosecutor argued
that the victim was a happily married woman, a successful real estate agent and
struggled to admit that she had been the victim of these crimes — to include her initial
failure to report that she had been vaginally penetrated by Hunter. The argument was
based upon the facts elicited during trial, was an attempt by the prosecutor to address
the credibility of the victim and to explain both inconsistencies and similarities in the
victim’s testimony. We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was not
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objectionable and, therefore, Hunter’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to raise a timely objection to the argument. Hawkins v.
State, 376 Ga. App. 520, 527(2)(a) (920 SE2d 439) (2025).
“We have previously recognized that evidence of a purported rape victim’s
state of mind following the attack may corroborate her claim that she was raped.”
Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 633(3) (805 SE2d 103) (2017) (punctuation
omitted). While victim impact evidence is not generally admissible, such evidence is
admissible if it is “clearly probative of issues at trial.” Huff v. State, 367 Ga. App. 774,
778(3) (888 SE2d 575) (2023) (punctuation omitted). The prosecutor in this case
elicited testimony which established that the victim and her immediate family were in
therapy due to the sexual assault alleged in this case. Another witness testified that the
victim was not the same after the incident and was more emotionally closed off than
she had been before the incident. This evidence was admissible because there was
testimony from co-defendants suggesting that the victim entered the vehicle with the
defendants voluntarily at the beginning of her ordeal and that, during interviews with
officers, she failed to tell officers that she had experienced vaginal penetration. See
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Smith v. State, 244 Ga. App. 165, 167(2) (534 SE2d 903) (2000) (testimony that the
victim “had been a ‘basket case’ since the attack” was properly admitted to
corroborate the victim’s rape allegation).Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing
to object to this testimony. As we have repeatedly held, trial counsel does not perform
deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection. Hawkins v. State, 376 Ga. App. at
527(2)(a).
However, other testimony was elicited by the prosecutor which could be
characterized as victim impact testimony. The victim’s husband testified that the
crime damaged his entire family and that those impacts have become more “crazy”
as time passed. An employee of the victim’s husband testified that the victim’s
husband had become less involved with his business following the incident. During the
hearing on Hunter’s motion for new trial, trial counsel was asked why no objection
was raised when the witnesses were asked questions that invited victim impact
evidence. Counsel testified that he was unaware that the admission of such evidence
was improper.
Pretermitting whether the cited testimony constituted improper victim impact
evidence and was not merely irrelevant, we conclude that Hunter has not carried his
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burden of establishing that there was both error and a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial was impacted by the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Page
v. State, 372 Ga. App. 128, 137(4)(c)(i) (903 SE2d 815) (2024). The jury failed to
reach a verdict on the charges of rape and kidnapping with bodily injury, suggesting
that the jurors were not unduly prejudiced by the evidence presented. When
performing a prejudice determination in connection with a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we consider the totality of the evidence. Revere, 302 Ga.
49(2)(a). Given the overwhelming evidence of Hunter’s guilt on the charges of which
he was convicted, the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel does not support a
finding that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different in the absence of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Owens v.
State, 374 Ga. App. 56, 68(2)(b)(ii) (911 SE2d 330) (2025); Bunn v. State, 379 Ga.
App. 15, 20(4)(a) (929 SE2d 23) (2026).
2. Hunter also argues that his convictions should be reversed due to the
collective prejudicial effect of counsel’s ineffective representation. State v. Lane, 308
Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). We find that the cumulative prejudice from any
assumed deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance in failing to object to the two
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instances of alleged victim impact testimony is insufficient to show a reasonable
probability that the results of Hunter’s trial would have been different in the absence
of the alleged deficiencies. Bunn, 379 Ga. App. at 25(4)(i). In light of the strong
evidence of Hunter’s guilt for the offenses of which he was convicted, we conclude
that the cumulative effect of the errors made by trial counsel does not warrant a new
trial under the cumulative error test. Walker, 360 Ga. App. at 218(5).
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Mercier, P.J., concur.
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