Rel: September 18, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0253
P.W.
v.
E.D., R.W., and Limestone County Department of Human
Resources
Appeal from Limestone Juvenile Court
(JU-25-256.01)
BOWDEN, Judge.
P.W. appeals from an order of the Limestone Juvenile Court ("the
juvenile court") denying her motion to intervene in a dependency matter
concerning E.W. ("the child") and her emergency motion for custody of
the child.
CL-2026-0253
P.W. raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the juvenile court
exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to intervene, (2) whether
the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency motion for custody,
and (3) whether the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing
on a postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. App. P. We
agree with P.W. that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying
the motion to intervene. P.W. was not a party to the underlying action,
so she lacks standing to appeal from the order denying the emergency
motion for custody. Finally, it was harmless error for the juvenile court
not to hold a hearing on the postjudgment motion because P.W. is
obtaining the same relief from this court that she could have obtained if
the juvenile court had held a hearing. Therefore, we reverse the juvenile
court's order as it pertains to the denial of the motion to intervene,
dismiss the appeal as it pertains to the denial of the emergency motion
for custody, and remand the cause to the juvenile court to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Background
The child was born on April 7, 2025. The record indicates that the
Limestone County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") removed
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CL-2026-0253
the child from the physical custody of E.D. ("the mother") because the
mother had tested positive for cocaine shortly after giving birth to the
child. DHR subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court on May 30,
2025, alleging that the child was dependent. The juvenile court entered
a shelter-care order on June 3, 2025, awarding temporary legal and
physical custody of the child to DHR.
DHR filed a "motion for DNA genetic testing" on July 28, 2025,
which was granted. The paternity-test results indicate that there is a
99.99% probability that R.W. ("the biological father") is the biological
father of the child. Based on the paternity-test results, the juvenile court
entered an order on November 18, 2025, that, in part, determined the
biological father to be the legal father of the child. The record indicates
that after the juvenile court entered that order, DHR discovered that the
mother had been married to M.J.D. when the child was born. Thus,
M.J.D. is presumed to be the child's legal father. See § 26-17-204(a), Ala.
Code 1975 (creating a rebuttable presumption that a man is the legal
father of a child under certain circumstances, including when "he and the
mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during
the marriage").
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CL-2026-0253
The juvenile court entered a judgment on July 29, 2025, finding the
child to be dependent. Legal custody of the child remained with DHR. A
court report filed by DHR on October 8, 2025, indicates that the
permanency plan for the child was "adoption by current foster parent"
with a concurrent plan of "relative placement." That report also indicates
that the child had been placed with J.W., the child's biological paternal
aunt, since June 11, 2025.
The juvenile court entered an order on November 18, 2025, finding
that the underlying matter "qualifie[d] … as a kinship guardianship
case" because the child had been placed with J.W. The juvenile court
found that the mother and the biological father had abandoned the child
and thus relieved DHR of its duty to make reasonable efforts to return
the child to them. See § 12-15-312(c), Ala. Code 1975 ("Reasonable efforts
shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of the child if
the juvenile court has determined … that a parent has done any of the
following: (1) Subjected a child to an aggravated circumstance against
the child ... and the risk of child abuse or neglect is too high for the child
to remain at home safely or to be returned home. An aggravated
circumstance includes, but is not limited to, … abandonment ….").
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CL-2026-0253
The juvenile court conducted a dispositional-review hearing and, on
December 12, 2025, entered an order noting that the permanency plan
for the child had changed to "kinship guardianship" with a concurrent
plan of "adoption by current placement." The child continued to be placed
with J.W., and legal custody of the child remained with DHR.
The juvenile court entered an order on December 19, 2025, noting
that J.W. had died suddenly and that the child had since been placed
with K.W.1 The juvenile court noted that DHR's counsel had stated that
DHR would need time to determine whether it would "continue with
kinship" and to locate M.J.D.
P.W. filed a verified "motion to intervene and emergency petition
for custody" on February 5, 2026. Pertaining to the motion to intervene,
P.W. asserted that she is a biological paternal aunt of the child and had
been the primary guardian of the child since J.W. died. P.W. further
asserted that she was a fit and capable parent, was willing and able to
provide for the child, and that she intended to adopt the child. Pertaining
to the emergency motion for custody, P.W. asserted that she had passed
all of DHR's background checks and home studies, had enrolled and
1K.W.'s relationship to the child is unclear.
5
CL-2026-0253
continued to participate in foster-parent courses recommended by DHR,
was a licensed foster parent, and had complied with a safety plan for the
child initiated by DHR on January 21, 2026. P.W. further asserted that
she was willing and able to provide a capable and consistent home life for
the child and could care for the child without DHR's intervention. P.W.
alleged that DHR had notified her on February 4, 2026, the day before
she filed the motion, that it was removing the child for a "better"
placement. P.W. alleged that there was no basis for DHR to conclude that
she was not a fit and capable guardian for the child and that removing
the child from her home would negatively impact the child's well-being.
DHR opposed both motions.
The juvenile court conducted a hearing on February 13, 2026, and
entered an order on March 11, 2026, denying the motion to intervene and
the emergency motion for custody without making specific findings of
fact. P.W. filed a "motion to alter, amend or vacate" the juvenile court's
March 11, 2026, order on March 25, 2026, arguing that the juvenile court
had "abused its discretion in denying [the] Motion to Intervene" and
noting only that the juvenile court had prematurely ruled on the
emergency motion for custody. Although P.W. "request[ed] oral
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CL-2026-0253
argument," the record indicates that the juvenile court did not conduct a
hearing on the postjudgment motion.
P.W. filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court's March 11,
2026, order on March 25, 2026. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co. v. G&S Glass &
Supply Co., 69 So. 3d 124, 130 (Ala. 2011)(" '[A] denial of a motion to
intervene is always an appealable order.' " (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Raine, 905 So. 2d 832, 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004))). The notice of appeal
became effective on April 7, 2026, when the juvenile court entered an
order denying the postjudgment motion. Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P.
Standard of Review
The standard of review for a denial of a motion for permissive
intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion. See M.S. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 391 So. 3d 890, 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023).
" ' " 'A court exceeds its discretion when its ruling is
based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when it has acted
arbitrarily without employing conscientious judgment, has
exceeded the bounds of reason in view of all circumstances, or
has so far ignored recognized principles of law or practice as
to cause substantial injustice.' " ' "
Russell v. Russell, 430 So. 3d 911, 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)(quoting Ex
parte Malone, 12 So. 3d 60, 62-63 (Ala. 2008)).
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CL-2026-0253
Under the ore tenus rule, we presume that a juvenile court's
findings are correct unless they are plainly and palpably wrong. M.P. v.
DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1085 (Ala. Civ. App.
2023). "[I]n the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will
assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its
judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous." Ex parte
Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996).
Analysis
I. Whether the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying the
motion to intervene
P.W. argues that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by
denying the motion to intervene because, she says, none of the
discretionary factors regarding permissive intervention disfavored her
intervention. We agree.
As a general proposition, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed to
allow intervention. See Root v. City of Mobile, 592 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Ala.
1992). Still, a trial court must consider the following factors when an
applicant seeks permission to intervene in a matter: (1) whether the
motion to intervene was timely filed, (2) whether the applicant's claim or
defense and the main action share a common question of law or fact, and
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CL-2026-0253
(3) whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.2 Rule 24(b); see M.S.,
391 So. 3d at 895-96.
Nothing in the language of Rule 24(b) expressly prohibits a trial
court from considering factors other than the ones enumerated in the rule
when ruling on a motion to intervene. Cf. Holland v. Eads, 614 So. 2d
1012, 1016-17 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a trial court should consider,
among other factors, the existence of any extraordinary circumstances
suggesting or cautioning against intervention when ruling on a Rule
24(a) motion to intervene for the purpose of unsealing the record).
However, we have held that a court should refrain from considering the
ultimate merits of the claim to be heard following intervention when
ruling on a motion to intervene. M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897 (holding that the
2
"Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
… In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
9
CL-2026-0253
Calhoun Juvenile Court appeared to be "improperly influenced" by facts
pertaining to the suitability of the maternal grandparents as custodians
because the trial court had referred to those facts in its order denying the
motion to intervene).
Hence, when exercising its discretion to rule on a motion to
intervene, a trial court must, at a minimum, consider the three
discretionary factors enumerated in Rule 24(b), and it may not consider
the ultimate merits of the potential intervenor's claim to be heard
following a permitted intervention.
A. Timely motion to intervene
Our supreme court has applied the following factors when
determining whether a motion to intervene was timely:
" ' "(1) [T]he length of time during which the would-be
intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of his
interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene;
(2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of
the would-be intervenor's failure to apply as soon as he knew
or reasonably should have known of his interest; (3) the extent
of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if his petition is
denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances
militating either for or against a determination that the
application is timely." ' "
10
CL-2026-0253
Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 131 (quoting QBE Ins. Corp. v. Austin
Co., 23 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Ala. 2009), quoting in turn United States v.
Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983)).
P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter to assert a claim
for custody of the child. The earliest date that P.W. knew or reasonably
should have known that she had an interest in the underlying matter
was in December 2025, when she began caring for the child. P.W. filed
the motion to intervene approximately two months later, on February 5,
2026. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 131-32 (holding that a party
had acted promptly to protect its interest by filing a motion to intervene
six weeks after the filing of a complaint, which weighed in favor of finding
that the motion to intervene was timely). Furthermore, P.W. expressed
an interest in advocating for the child's best interests in the motion to
intervene. See M.C. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 374 So. 3d 711, 720-21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)(holding that the trial court did not err by
allowing foster parents to intervene in an action that had been pending
for a year and to assert a claim for custody because the foster parents had
an interest in advocating for the best interests of the child).
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CL-2026-0253
Nothing in the record indicates that DHR, the mother, or the
biological father were prejudiced because P.W. sought to intervene in
February 2026 rather than December 2025. After J.W. died in December
2025, the juvenile court noted in an order that DHR's attorney had stated
that DHR would need time to determine whether it would "continue with
kinship" and to locate M.J.D. The motion to intervene was the next
document that was filed in the underlying matter.
As we have stated, P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying
matter to seek custody of the child. P.W. must intervene in the
underlying matter because P.W. may not commence a separate action to
seek custody of the child. See J.S. v. Greene Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
[Ms. CL-2025-0181, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2025)("[The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-101
et seq.,] does not authorize a relative seeking the custody of a dependent
child to commence a separate child-custody action for the purpose of
adjudicating the custody of the dependent child."). Thus, P.W. would be
prejudiced if she is not allowed to intervene. Id. at ___ ("[A] person who
is seeking custody of a dependent child but who is not already being
considered a placement option for the child by the juvenile court should
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CL-2026-0253
file a motion to intervene in the dependency proceeding regarding the
child.").
There are unusual circumstances in this case, but those
circumstances militate for a determination that the motion was timely.
As we have discussed, DHR had placed the child with J.W. pursuant to a
permanency plan of "kinship guardianship," but J.W. died in December
2025. The record indicates that P.W. became the child's guardian when
J.W. died and that DHR notified P.W. on February 4, 2026, that it was
removing the child from her care. P.W. filed the motion to intervene the
next day. Furthermore, the record indicates that DHR discovered that
the mother was married to M.J.D. when the child was born after the
juvenile court had adjudicated the biological father to be the child's legal
father. The record also indicates that DHR's attorney informed the
juvenile court that DHR would need time to assess the permanency plan
and to locate M.J.D. In other words, P.W. sought to intervene in the
underlying matter the day after DHR had notified her that it was
removing the child from her care and about two months after DHR had
indicated that it needed time to locate M.J.D., who must be added as a
party to the underlying matter. See § 26-17-603, Ala. Code 1975 ("The
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CL-2026-0253
following individuals must be joined as parties in a proceeding to
adjudicate parentage: (1) the mother of the child; and (2) a man whose
paternity of the child is to be adjudicated." (emphasis added)).
We acknowledge that DHR presented evidence during the February
13, 2026, hearing that may be relevant to whether P.W. should be
awarded custody of the child.3 To the extent that the juvenile court
considered that evidence when ruling on P.W.'s motion to intervene, that
was improper. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 896. Moreover, that evidence does
not relate to the timeliness of the motion to intervene.
3DHR presented evidence during the February 13, 2026, hearing
indicating that it was concerned that the child was "going from home to
home, different men holding her," including the biological father, when
the child was in the care of P.W. There was also evidence presented
during the hearing indicating that DHR was concerned that P.W. had
asked for financial assistance from her family to help take care of the
child and that P.W. was releasing confidential information regarding the
matter to her family. There was also evidence indicating that P.W. and
B.W., a biological paternal uncle of the child, had remained in DHR's
parking lot for more than two hours after releasing the child to DHR on
February 4, 2026. Laquandria Ferrell, a DHR caseworker assigned to the
case, testified that she became concerned and took the child out a back
door and "put her in a rental vehicle so that [Ferrell] could safely
transport her without being followed." Ferrell also testified that she had
received reports that P.W. and B.W. had driven to different family
members' homes to identify the child's new placement.
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Based on the foregoing discussion of the four factors to be applied
in assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene, we conclude that
P.W.'s motion to intervene was timely.
B. Common question of law or fact
Next, we must consider whether P.W.'s "claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common." Rule 24(b). As we
have stated, P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter to obtain
custody of the child. Both child-custody and dependency actions concern
the best interests of the child. See Ex parte Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 288 So. 3d 483, 500 (Ala. 2019)(plurality opinion)(" '[W]e have long
stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary
concern is the best interests and welfare of the child.' " (quoting W.T.M.
v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580-81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003))). Thus, there is a
common question of fact between P.W.'s child-custody claim and the
underlying matter.
C. Undue delay or prejudice
Finally, we must consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties to
the underlying matter. See Rule 24(b). Based on our review of the record,
15
CL-2026-0253
neither the mother nor the biological father have meaningfully
participated in the underlying dependency matter. Before P.W. filed the
motion to intervene, the juvenile court had entered an order relieving
DHR of its duty to exercise reasonable efforts to return the child to the
mother and the biological father because it found that they had
abandoned the child. Further, we cannot discern how P.W.'s intervention
would prejudice the adjudication of the rights of DHR. As we have stated,
the record indicates that DHR's attorney informed the juvenile court in
December 2025 that DHR would need time to reassess the permanency
plan and to locate M.J.D. The next document that was filed in the
underlying matter was the motion to intervene. Additionally, P.W.'s
custody claim and the underlying matter both involve the child's best
interests. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 133 ("Furthermore,
Parker's intervention will not unduly prejudice G & S because, as
previously stated, G & S's action and Parker's counterclaim involve at
least one common question of fact."). Thus, P.W.'s intervention will not
unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the mother, the biological father,
or DHR.
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D. Conclusion
The juvenile court did not make any specific findings of fact when
it denied P.W.'s motion to intervene. Thus, we assume that the juvenile
court found that the three discretionary factors set forth in Rule 24(b)
weighed against allowing P.W. to intervene. See Ex parte Bryowsky, 676
So. 2d at 1324. However, as we have explained, none of the three
discretionary factors militate against allowing P.W. to intervene. And to
the extent that the juvenile court considered any evidence pertaining to
the suitability of P.W. as a custodian for the child when it ruled on the
motion to intervene, that was improper. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897.
Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by
denying P.W.'s motion to intervene, and we reverse the juvenile court's
March 11, 2026, order as it pertains to the denial of the motion to
intervene.4
4In light of our holding in M.S. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
391 So. 3d 890, 897 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), it may be a better practice for
trial courts to rule on a motion to intervene before considering any
evidence pertaining to the merits of the potential intervenor's claim to be
heard following intervention.
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CL-2026-0253
II. Whether the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency motion
for custody
P.W. argues that the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency
motion for custody "based on … speculative and unsupported evidence"
pertaining to her ability to protect the child. P.W.'s brief, pp. 36-37. As
we have discussed, the juvenile court did not allow P.W. to intervene, so
P.W. was not a party to the underlying matter. See B.V. v. Macon Cnty.
Dep't of Hum. Res., 14 So. 3d 171, 175 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)("B.V. and
D.V. failed to successfully intervene in the instant case, and, therefore,
they are not parties in this case."). Because P.W. was not a party to the
underlying matter, she lacks standing to appeal from the denial of the
emergency motion for custody. See id. (holding that foster parents lacked
standing to appeal from a juvenile court's judgment dismissing their
child-custody petition because they had failed to successfully intervene
in the underlying matter). Accordingly, we dismiss P.W.'s appeal as it
pertains to the denial of the emergency motion for custody.5 See Goodyear
5We note that the juvenile court's denial of the motion to intervene
was not an adjudication on the merits of P.W.'s underlying claim for
custody of the child. See Ex parte A.B., 290 So. 3d 833, 836 (Ala. Civ. App.
2019)("[T]he denial of the custodians' motion to intervene was a judgment
on the merits of that controversy -- the propriety of the request to
intervene. … We cannot conclude, therefore, that the denial of the
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Tire & Rubber Co. v. Moore, 900 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004)("[B]ecause the company in the present case lacks standing to seek
appellate review …, we must dismiss this appeal.").
III. Whether the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on
the postjudgment motion
P.W. argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a
hearing on the postjudgment motion because, she says, it had "probable
merit." P.W.'s brief, pp. 27-29.
Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a postjudgment motion
"shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be
heard thereon." Our supreme court has held that the "failure to grant a
hearing on a motion for new trial pursuant to [Rule] 59(g) is reversible
error only if it 'probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the
custodians' motion to intervene … was an adjudication on the merits of
the custodians' dependency and custody claims, such that the doctrine of
res judicata would apply to bar those claims in the custodians' action.").
Further, the juvenile court's denial of the emergency motion for custody
was an interlocutory order and does not preclude P.W., after
intervention, from pursuing permanent custody of the child. See
Strickland v. McClendon, 193 So. 3d 740, 742 (Ala. Civ. App.
2015)("Because an emergency custody order is intended to address
exigent circumstances that may abate, such an order is considered under
Alabama law to be interlocutory in nature pending a later final
determination as to custody based on evidence adduced at a trial by the
competing parties, i.e., a pendente lite order.").
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parties.' " Kitchens v. Maye, 623 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (Ala. 1993)(emphasis
added). Otherwise, it is harmless error. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. ("No
judgment may be reversed or set aside … unless in the opinion of the
court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an
examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error
complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the
parties.").
Because we are reversing the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order
as it pertains to the denial of the motion to intervene, P.W. is obtaining
the relief that she could have obtained on that issue if the juvenile court
had held a hearing on the postjudgment motion. See Hollander v. Nichols,
19 So. 3d 184, 197 (Ala. 2009) (holding that the trial court's failure to hold
a hearing on a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 was harmless
error because the movant had obtained the relief on appeal that he could
have obtained if the trial court had held a hearing on the motion and
because the remainder of his claims had no probable merit).
Thus, P.W. has not demonstrated that the juvenile court "probably
injuriously affected [her] substantial rights" by failing to hold a hearing
on the postjudgment motion. Rule 45.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court's March 11, 2026,
order is reversed as it pertains to the denial of P.W.'s motion to intervene;
the appeal is dismissed as it pertains to the denial of P.W.'s emergency
motion for custody; and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
21