Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00160-CR
Christopher Michael Webb,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
18th District Court of Johnson County, Texas
Judge John Wilson Weeks, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. DC-F202400583
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christopher Michael Webb was convicted of one count of continuous
sexual assault of a child and one count of prohibited sexual conduct—a
habitual offense—and sentenced to life in prison on both counts. We affirm the
trial court’s judgments.
Because Webb does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, we will not discuss the facts of the underlying cases. INTRODUCTION OF VIDEO/PHOTOGRAPHS
In his first and second issues, Webb contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted State’s Exhibit 1, a video, and State’s Exhibits 4,
5, and 6, photographs, because the State did not establish the proper predicate.
We review a trial court's ruling on authentication issues for an abuse of
discretion. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). This
deferential standard requires an appellate court to uphold a trial court's
admissibility decision when that decision is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id. A trial court judge is given considerable latitude with
regard to evidentiary rulings. Id. Rule 901, which governs the authentication
requirement for the admissibility of evidence, requires the proponent of an
item of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a).
The authentication requirement is a liberal standard of admissibility.
Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015)). The proponent must only produce sufficient evidence that
a reasonable fact finder could properly find authenticity. Tienda v. State, 358
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Conclusive proof of authenticity
before allowing the admission of disputed evidence is not required. Fowler,
544 S.W.3d at 848. It is ultimately the jury's role to determine whether an
Webb v. State Page 2 item of evidence is indeed what its proponent claims; the trial court need only
make the preliminary determination that the proponent of the evidence has
supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the
proffered evidence is authentic. Id. at 848–49; Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595,
600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including direct
testimony from a witness with personal knowledge, comparison with other
authenticated evidence, or circumstantial evidence. Tienda v. State, 358
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 602 (noting
that authenticating evidence may be direct or circumstantial). Further,
authenticity may be established with evidence of “distinctive characteristics
and the like,” including “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with
all the circumstances.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
Video
The State sought to introduce a video which depicted Webb having sex
with H.H., the victim in this case and Webb’s daughter. Chief Deputy James
Saulter of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office received a video from an
informant who had, in Saulter's words, “always been credible and reliable and
given me very good information.” The video depicted Webb having sex with
Webb v. State Page 3 H.H. Saulter was able to identify Webb in the video because he had known
Webb for some time, working on Webb’s other cases. He identified Webb in the
video by Webb’s facial features and distinctive tattoos. Saulter also identified
H.H. in the video after meeting her in person and observing tattoos on her
which were also visible in the video. Through his investigation, Saulter
determined that a third party had taken the video. Regardless, he was
absolutely certain that the video depicted Webb and H.H. having sex and
testified that State’s Exhibit 1 was a fair and accurate copy of the video he
received from his informant.
At trial, Webb contended that because it was unknown who took the
video or whether the video was altered in any way prior to the State receiving
it, the “foundation” for the admissibility of the video was improper. On appeal,
Webb only raises the unknown alteration argument from trial. 1
Saulter had testified that he received the video from a reliable informant
who thought Saulter needed to see it. Saulter could identify Webb in the video
because of Saulter’s past familiarity with him and because of Webb’s tattoos.
After meeting H.H., Saulter could identify her as well in the video. Although
1
Webb adds to his argument on appeal, however, that because it was unknown whether the video was accurate, whether the recording device had any issues, or whether the device correctly and accurately recorded the events of that day, the trial court’s determination that the video had been properly authenticated was improper. We do not address these additional arguments because they do not comport with Webb’s argument at trial and thus, are not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Webb v. State Page 4 Saulter did not, and could not, say the video had not been altered before he
received it, it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court
to determine that Saulter provided sufficient evidence, through his knowledge
of Webb’s and H.H.’s physical features and tattoos and his certainty of his
ability to identify them in the video, that a reasonable juror could find the
exhibit was what the State purported it to be—a video of Webb having sex with
H.H. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video,
and Webb’s first issue is overruled.
Photographs
The State also sought to introduce photographs obtained from Webb’s
Facebook page depicting Webb in a white minivan which had been jointly
owned at one time by Webb and H.H.’s mother. Webb’s only complaint at trial
about the “foundation” for admissibility of these photographs was that the
sponsoring witness did not take the photographs. However, a sponsoring
witness is not required to be the person who operated the camera. Huffman v.
State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Standmire v. State, 475
S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. ref’d). Webb did not argue at
trial, as he argues on appeal, that the sponsoring witness, because she did not
take the photographs, could not testify whether the photographs were
tampered with or altered in any way. This argument made on appeal does not
Webb v. State Page 5 comport with the argument made at trial. Thus, it is not preserved for our
review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691-92
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Webb’s second issue is overruled.
HEARSAY
Next, Webb contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
the State to introduce a letter written by H.H. over Webb’s hearsay objection
because, Webb argues, the letter did not meet the “then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition” exception to the hearsay rule asserted by the
State.
A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Such statements are
inadmissible unless they fall under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
See TEX. R. EVID. 802, 803, 804. A recognized exception is Rule 803(3):
statements expressing the declarant's then-existing state of mind or emotional,
sensory, or physical condition. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(3).
A trial court's ruling on a hearsay objection is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Green v. State, 713 S.W.3d 865, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). It will
not be reversed unless it “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within
which reasonable people might disagree.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 268
Webb v. State Page 6 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
H.H. testified at trial. By then, she was 23 years old. During direct
examination, the State handed H.H. State’s Exhibit 9, a note which H.H.
agreed she wrote on March 20, 2014, and was in her handwriting. H.H.
testified that in the note, she described her sexual activity with Webb which,
at the time the note was written, was “non-stop and constantly.” On redirect,
H.H. said she did not remember writing the note but verified that the
handwriting was hers and that everything in it was true and correct. She also
agreed that she wrote her thoughts at the time in the note and that no one
made her write them down.
The State offered the note into evidence. Webb objected to its
introduction on the basis of hearsay, among other reasons not at issue here.
The State then asserted the note was offered as an exception to hearsay under
Rule 803(3), the “then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition”
exception. After reading the text of Rule 803(3) and reviewing the exhibit, the
trial court overruled Webb’s objection and admitted the note into evidence. The
State then again elicited from H.H. that the note was written in March of 2014,
and that, in it, she discussed her feelings, what was happening with Webb, and
why she may have been inappropriately touching others at that time. The
State put the note on a screen for the jury to see and read it in its entirety to
Webb v. State Page 7 them:
Well, why is it hard to keep my hand—hands to myself? Well, in
fighting wise, it is not hard for me to back off, unless you're
standing over there and constantly hitting me, then I will hit you
back. But otherwise, like just touching others, well, I have a lot of
reasons. I’m like that, like I’ve been away from my parents and my
grandparents, and when my dad was around, he raped me nonstop,
and I have had a hard time finding love from anyone. So I pretty
much daydream by touching other girls slash boys. It’s the fact
when I touch people, I feel like someone is actually there for me,
and that’s why I am pretty much what you call sexually active. And
would think if you had been—and you would think if you have been
raped, you don't want to be touched, but it's different for me. It
gives me a feeling somebody loves me, nothing like I’ve ever felt,
and it’s scary, but I’ve made it.
On appeal, Webb contends that statements admitted under Rule 803(3)
are usually spontaneous remarks about pain or some other sensation which
the declarant makes at the time the sensation is experienced and because the
State did not inquire about what H.H. was feeling at the time she wrote the
note, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it.
Although Webb is correct that some caselaw has noted that statements
admitted under the Rule 803(3) exception are usually spontaneous remarks
about pain or other sensation made by the declarant while the sensation, not
readily observable by a third party, is being experienced, see Power v. Kelley,
70 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied), that is not the
only fact pattern in which the exception may be applied. See Martinez v. State,
17 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (statement of fear falls within Rule
Webb v. State Page 8 803(3) hearsay exception); Tate v. State, 981 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (Keller, J., concurring) (“[A] statement that expresses an intent to kill
should be admissible under R.803(3).”); Caballero v. State, 695 S.W.3d 467, 484
n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d) (statement by declarant
that he was going to kick in someone’s teeth could qualify as a then-existing
mental or emotional condition); Pena v. State, 864 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1993, no writ) (statement that declarant wanted to leave
defendant but felt economically trapped properly admitted as exception to
hearsay under Rule 803(3)). If it was, the different examples of a then-existing
state of mind “(such as motive, intent, or plan)” or emotional, sensory, or
physical condition “(such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health)” offered in
the exception would be unnecessary. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(3). H.H.’s
statements in her note at least qualify as statements of mental feelings as she
was writing them. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling Webb’s hearsay objection, and his third issue is overruled.
UNPRESERVED COMPLAINTS
In his last three issues, Webb complains that the State made two
improper arguments during its closing punishment argument and that the
trial court erred in failing to ask whether Webb had a reason why the sentences
should not be pronounced against him as required by article 42.07 of the Texas
Webb v. State Page 9 Code of Criminal Procedure. Webb did not object to any of these alleged errors.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held, and recently reaffirmed, that
the right not to be subjected to improper jury argument is forfeited by the
failure to object. See Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (applying the principles of Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993)); see also Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).
Further, a complaint about the court's failure to follow article 42.07 must be
preserved for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see Tenon v. State, 563
S.W.2d 622, 623–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that nothing was
preserved for review when appellant failed to object to the trial court's failure
to follow article 42.07); Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2024, no pet.); Eisen v. State, 40 S.W.3d 628, 637 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet.
ref'd).
Webb acknowledges that he did not object at trial regarding any of the
errors raised in his last three issues. Regardless, he argues that we should
reach the merits of his issues. None of Webb’s arguments in these issues
persuade us to bypass the established preservation requirements.
Accordingly, because Webb did not object, his fourth, fifth, and sixth issues are
not preserved and are overruled.
Webb v. State Page 10 CONCLUSION
Having overruled Webb’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
LEE HARRIS
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 17, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM
Webb v. State Page 11