Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc.

majority opinion

25-1697-cv

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

August Term 2025

Argued: April 27, 2026

Decided: September 21, 2026

No. 25-1697-cv

A NDOWAH N EWTON,

Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,

LVMH M OËT H ENNESSY L OUIS V UITTON I NC .,

R ODNEY C. P RATT ,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

No. 1:23-cv-10753, Loretta A. Preska, Judge.

Before: B IANCO and M ENASHI , Circuit Judges, and

B RINDISI , District Judge. ∗

In 2019, Plaintiﬀ-Appellant Andowah Newton ﬁled a lawsuit

in New York state court against her employer, DefendantAppellee LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc. (“LVMH”),

alleging that she was sexually harassed and assaulted at work and then was retaliated against for reporting and opposing that conduct. The New York state court eventually compelled that

case to arbitration because Newton had signed an arbitration agreement when she started working at LVMH. In 2022, LVMH

terminated her employment and about a year later, Newton ﬁled a lawsuit in federal court asserting claims of retaliation in violation of federal, state, and local law against LVMH and her former supervisor, Defendant-Appellee Rodney C. Pratt. She

also sought leave to amend her complaint to consolidate her

claims that were pending in arbitration with those that she ﬁled in court. In doing so, she argued that the Ending Forced

Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”) enabled her to invalidate the otherwise-binding arbitration agreement she signed.

As relevant here, the district court dismissed the retaliation claims in her initial complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because it concluded that Newton had not alleged that she engaged in any protected activity of which

Defendants were aware and which was suﬃciently close in time to her termination to raise an inference of retaliation. The district court also denied Newton’s cross-motion for leave to amend

because it concluded that the claims she sought to add remained

∗

Judge Anthony J. Brindisi, of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.

subject to the arbitration agreement.

We disagree with the district court’s ﬁrst conclusion, but agree with its second one. We conclude that Newton’s initial complaint plausibly alleged retaliation in violation of federal, state, and local law. In particular, Newton has plausibly alleged that she engaged in a protected activity when she refused to meet with her supervisor to discuss settling her claims that were pending in arbitration and she was terminated under circumstances raising a plausible inference of retaliation. However, we aﬃrm the

district court’s denial of Newton’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. The claims Newton sought to add had accrued prior to the eﬀective date of the EFAA and did not reaccrue thereafter as part of a continuing violation, rendering the statute

inapplicable.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

M AX R ODRIGUEZ , Law Oﬃce of Max

Rodriguez PLLC, New York, New York, for

Plaintiﬀ-Appellant.

M AAREN A. S HAH , Quinn Emanuel Urquhart

& Sullivan, LLP, New York, New York (JanPhilip Kernisan, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &

Sullivan, LLP, Washington, D.C., and Aviva

Grumet-Morris, Winston & Strawn LLP,

Chicago, Illinois, on the brief), for DefendantsAppellants.

Roya Vasseghi, Vasseghi Law Group, Fairfax,

Virginia, for Amici Curiae Artemis Collective,

Crime Victims Treatment Center, Just

Solutions, Lift Our Voices, National Center on

Sexual Exploitation, National Crime Victim

Law Institute, National Organization for

Victim Advocacy, National Organization for

Women Foundation, Ultraviolet, Victim

Rights Law Center, Womankind, and Women

Lawyers on Guard, in support of Plaintiﬀ-Appellant.

J OSEPH F. B IANCO , Circuit Judge:

In 2019, Plaintiﬀ-Appellant Andowah Newton ﬁled a lawsuit

in New York state court against her employer, DefendantAppellee LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc. (“LVMH”),

alleging that she was sexually harassed and assaulted at work and then was retaliated against for reporting and opposing that conduct. The New York state court eventually compelled that

case to arbitration because Newton had signed an arbitration agreement when she started working at LVMH. In 2022, LVMH

also sought leave to amend her complaint to consolidate her

claims that were pending in arbitration with those that she ﬁled in court. In doing so, she argued that the Ending Forced

Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”) enabled her to invalidate the otherwise-binding arbitration agreement she signed.

Defendants were aware and which was suﬃciently close in time to her termination to raise an inference of retaliation. The district court also denied Newton’s cross-motion for leave to amend

because it concluded that the claims she sought to add remained subject to the arbitration agreement.

inapplicable.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background 1

Newton is a Black and Afro-Latina attorney who began

working for LVMH as litigation counsel in 2015. In that role, she managed legal disputes and active litigation for more than 25 luxury brands that are part of LVMH’s portfolio. She was later

1 The factual summary below is derived from the allegations in the

complaint, which we must accept as true in reviewing a motion to

dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

promoted to Vice President, Legal Aﬀairs, and received various positive performance reviews.

The complaint alleges that shortly after she joined LVMH in

2015, Lloyd Doran, the Director of Property and Facility

Operations, began a “persistent and invasive campaign of sexual harassment” against Newton. App’x at 22. The complaint

describes the ﬁrst incident, which occurred in May 2015, as

follows. Doran came to Newton’s oﬃce to discuss making

repairs and hanging framed artwork, but before leaving her

oﬃce, Doran “lingered in the doorway,” “stared” at Newton

“long enough that she began to feel uncomfortable,” and stated: “You are so pretty. And that beautiful smile . . . I just can’t get enough of it.” Id. Newton then “recoiled” and Doran left her oﬃce. Id. Then every three to four weeks, Doran would “linger” outside of Newton’s oﬃce and “leer” at her in a sexually

suggestive manner. Id.

The second incident allegedly occurred in September 2015.

According to the complaint, Doran entered Newton’s oﬃce again to discuss oﬃce repairs and artwork hanging while she was

seated at her desk in front of her computer. During this

discussion, “under the guise of having to call a colleague,” Doran “suddenly and without warning lunged his body across and on

top of [Newton’s], thrusting his pelvis and genitals into her face and pressing his body ﬁrmly against hers as he reached across her body for her phone.” Id. at 23. Newton was thus “pinned

against her chair” and left “stunned and terriﬁed.” Id. She then “frantically” pushed her wheeled chair away from her desk and jumped up from her chair to “mak[e] clear that the contact was unwanted.” Id. She also “chided” Doran, and he left without

saying anything further to Newton. Id.

The complaint further alleges that, at some point after these incidents (although the complaint does not specify when),

Newton informally told Frank Martinez, LVMH’s Employment

Counsel, about Doran’s conduct, but that he ignored her

comments, quickly changed the subject, and did not ask for any details. Then, at a company event in 2015 or 2016, Doran

approached a cocktail table at which Newton was standing with a few other female colleagues. Once Doran arrived, he “made a point of kissing each woman twice—once on each cheek.” Id. at 24. As he approached Newton, he attempted to kiss her on the cheeks as well, but Newton “leaned her face and body backwards so that he could not reach her.” Id. In response, Doran “loudly exclaimed”: “What? No ‘bises’ for me?” 2 Id. After Newton

responded “no,” Doran stated: “Oh, come on it’s a celebration.” Newton then walked away.

According to the complaint, in 2017 and 2018, Doran’s alleged “leering” and Newton’s informal reporting to Martinez

continued. In one incident in fall 2017, Newton and a colleague were speaking in Newton’s oﬃce when Doran “inexplicably

entered” Newton’s oﬃce and sought to be included in the

conversation, but eventually left. Id. at 25. Newton’s colleague told Newton that Doran’s actions were “weird” and “creepy” and also later described Doran as “lurking” and “lingering” around Newton’s oﬃce. Id. In another January 2018 incident, when

LVMH’s headquarters ﬂooded, Newton rushed to save important

ﬁles and documents. When she did so, Doran did not oﬀer any

help, but instead just leered and “ogled” her. Id. at 26.

After another instance of “leering” on May 30, 2018, Newton

emailed Martinez and an unnamed real estate lawyer at LVMH

to complain about Doran’s behavior. When Martinez did not

2 The complaint explains that “bises” are the pair of kisses that French

people who are familiar with each other commonly use to greet each other

or say goodbye.

respond, Newton called him, “pleading with him to do

something to stop the harassment.” Id. at 28. In response,

Martinez told her that he couldn’t report Doran’s conduct

“because he worked for the legal department, not HR.” Id.

Instead, Martinez suggested that Newton confront Doran

directly.

Newton took Martinez’s advice, and emailed Doran directly.

In the email, she told Doran to stop his “ongoing pattern” of “inappropriate behavior” and “harassment” that included

“loitering,” “leering,” making remarks about Newton’s

appearance, and invading Newton’s personal space—all of which was “unwanted and unwelcome.” Id. at 28–29. Newton also

stated that if Doran’s behavior continued, she would formally report him to LVMH’s Human Resources Department (the “HR

Department”). In addition to sending this email to Doran,

Newton then forwarded this email to Martinez and the real estate lawyer. After receiving Newton’s email, Martinez called Newton “enraged” and “stated repeatedly in an accusatory tone that he ‘now ha[d] to report this.’” Id. at 29 (alteration in original).

The next day, LVMH opened an internal investigation into

Newton’s allegations. The investigation was conducted by

LVMH’s Senior Director of Talent Development, Emma Ancelle.3 Ancelle interviewed Newton about her accusations, but Newton says Ancelle’s questions were “accusatory” and did not evince any concern about the alleged instances of sexual harassment or assault. Instead, the complaint alleges that Ancelle was “far more concerned about how [Newton’s] email could reﬂect on

3 The complaint also alleges that the internal investigation was supervised

and guided by Martinez, Louise Firestone (LVMH’s General Counsel),

Gena Smith (LVMH’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources), and

outside counsel Rex Sessions of Winston & Strawn LLP.

[LVMH’s] ‘branding’ and image than she was on the actual sexual harassment that [Newton] had experienced.” Id. at 32. Ancelle also met with Doran, and after that meeting, she allegedly told Newton that she had concluded that “this was all ‘just a

misunderstanding’ or ‘miscommunication,’ and that the matter was considered closed.” Id. Newton also says Ancelle reprimanded her for sending the email to Doran, and suggested that Newton apologize to Doran.

According to the complaint, troubled by LVMH’s handling of

the internal investigation, Newton ﬁled a formal complaint with the HR Department, and requested an investigation by an

“outside, impartial, and unbiased expert.” Id. at 35. Newton was then summoned to a meeting by LVMH’s General Counsel Louise

Firestone. In this meeting, Firestone allegedly “chastised”

Newton and told her that as professional women, there are

“certain things we have to put up with” and “sacriﬁces we have to make.” Id. at 36–37.

Nonetheless, Firestone agreed to hire an external investigator to look into Newton’s allegations. Part of that investigation involved another interview of Newton. The complaint alleges

that, during that interview, the investigator made various

insensitive remarks including that people may view Newton as “a troublemaker” and “thin-skinned” and that, because LVMH is a French company, its employees “look at these things

diﬀerently.” Id. at 38. Approximately one month after the

interview, the HR Department informed Newton that the

investigator had not found a violation of company policy or the law.

The complaint further alleges that, after this second

investigation, Newton began experiencing a campaign of

retaliation. For example, Firestone—as Newton’s supervisor—

allegedly began to “chip away” at Newton’s authority and

autonomy in the oﬃce by asserting more control over her cases. Id. at 41. In addition, in 2019, Firestone gave Newton a negative oral performance review, despite glowing reviews in prior years. According to the complaint, in 2019 and 2020, LVMH continued to engage in a pattern of retaliatory acts. See, e.g., id. at 49–54 (detailing twenty-three alleged instances of retaliation between May 2019 and January 2020, including instances of exclusion, ostracism, and removal of job duties); id. at 56–57 (detailing ﬁve alleged instances of retaliation between April 2020 and

September 2020, including instances of excluding Newton from a “high proﬁle” litigation matter and denying her request to visit a virtual legal conference).

In addition, the complaint alleges that LVMH retaliated

against Newton in connection with her requests to work remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic. In September 2020, after months of fully remote work due to the COVID-19 pandemic, LVMH

notiﬁed employees that they would be required to return to the oﬃce two days per week. Newton requested an exception

because of certain medical conditions that she believed put her at a higher risk for COVID-19. Thereafter, Newton and LVMH

engaged in a series of extended back-and-forth discussions

regarding Newton’s requests to work remotely, and LVMH’s

requests for notes from medical providers that documented

Newton’s need to work remotely. At least one of the notes that Newton provided explained that she needed to work remotely

because of her “signiﬁcant anxiety as a result of a pattern of harassment towards her” and “depression related to her

workplace environment.” Id. at 67. On April 20, 2021, LVMH

denied Newton’s continued request to work remotely, and in

response, Newton went on disability leave for approximately

three months. After returning for a few months, in November

2021, Newton requested to work remotely for six months based

on a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, but LVMH

again requested documentation and further information.

On November 16, 2021, Newton testiﬁed before Congress, in

front of the House Committee on the Judiciary, about the alleged sexual harassment, assault, and retaliation she experienced at LVMH. The complaint alleges that LVMH’s retaliation

“intensiﬁed” after her congressional testimony through a “long series of delay tactics, extended periods of non-response,

dismissiveness, and outrageous actions,” including similar

allegations of questioning the basis for her medical exemption to LVMH’s in-oﬃce policy. Id. at 73.

On March 3, 2022, President Biden signed the EFAA into law.

See 9 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Newton was present at the White House for the bill’s signing. Three weeks later, on March 25, 2022, LVMH both denied Newton’s renewed request to work remotely

and refused to consider her for a promotion for which she asserts she was qualiﬁed.

From April 2022 to June 2022, the complaint alleges that:

(1) Defendants attempted to exclude her from a legal group

retreat hosted by LVMH’s outside counsel Winston & Strawn,

and when she attended anyway, she received “disdainful looks,” App’x at 74–75; (2) Defendants did not introduce her to a new department intern; (3) Firestone “repeatedly berated her” for alleged underperformance, id. at 76; (4) Firestone gave Newton a time-consuming assignment while Newton was on vacation; and

(5) Newton was the only attorney on her team who was not

invited to Firestone’s farewell dinner in July 2022.

On July 25, 2022, Defendant Rodney Pratt replaced Firestone

as Newton’s direct supervisor when he joined LVMH as its Chief Legal Oﬃcer. The next month, Pratt requested a “‘one-on-one’ meeting with [Newton] without attorneys present to ‘discuss or negotiate a settlement’ of her claims against [LVMH].” Id. at 76.

She was “[s]cared and appalled” by this request and declined it— although she also alleges in a diﬀerent paragraph that she “did not respond to his request.” Id. at 77. According to the complaint, Newton’s declination (or non-response) to Pratt’s invitation was an assertion of her right to be free from sex discrimination and that after this, Pratt became “infuriat[ed]” and “suddenly and drastically changed the rules” for her and began retaliating against her. Id.

In particular, the complaint alleges the following retaliatory acts occurred after Pratt’s request to meet: (1) in August 2022, Pratt required Newton to obtain “preapproval before she agreed to speak on any panel or at any conference,” id.; (2) in September or October 2022, unspeciﬁed Defendants “objected to Ms.

Newton speaking on a keynote panel” at a conference, 4 id.; (3) in October 2022, Pratt “insert[ed] himself in communications on [Newton’s] matters while simultaneously excluding her from

other very important communications on her matters,” id. at 78; (4) in late October 2022 and early November 2022, in weekly oneon-one meetings Pratt “generally ignored [Newton] while she

spoke, except to sometimes agitatedly criticize her,” id.; (5) on November 30, 2022, Newton was “excluded” by LVMH from a

“farewell dinner” for a departing employee, which was co-hosted by LVMH and an outside law ﬁrm, id. at 78–79; (6) on the same day, LVMH hosted a sale open to employees, but “went out of its

4 According to the complaint, Newton spoke at the conference anyway.

Speciﬁcally, she spoke on a panel titled “Leading by Example: How

Women Successfully Passed the Most Bipartisan, Transformational Law

Ending the Silencing of Sexual Misconduct Claims” at a “Women,

Inﬂuence, and Power in the Law” conference. App’x at 77–78. The

complaint does not allege that anyone at LVMH was aware that Newton

spoke at this conference, or of what Newton said on the panel.

way to exclude and not invite Ms. Newton,” id. at 79; (7) on December 1, 2022, Newton was ﬁred from her position at LVMH, which was done in a way designed to publicly humiliate her; and (8) after her ﬁring, LVMH was slow to return her personal eﬀects, did not pay her a bonus, a matching charitable contribution, and other ancillary beneﬁts.

The complaint also alleges that Newton engaged in the

following additional protected activities after declining Pratt’s invitation to meet: (1) she accepted an award from the Crime Victims Treatment Center and, in her acceptance speech, asserted her rights to be free from sex discrimination in her workplace; (2) she spoke on a keynote panel at a conference in which she similarly asserted her rights; and (3) she posted twenty-four posts on various social media platforms about the anniversary of her congressional testimony and the retaliation she experienced at LVMH.

II. Procedural History

In April 2019, Newton ﬁled a complaint in New York State

Supreme Court alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in

violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”)

and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), based

on the allegations described above that occurred prior to April 2019. See Complaint, Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., Index No. 154178/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2019), Dkt. No. 1. LVMH moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court

denied, but the First Department subsequently reversed that

decision—based on the arbitration agreement LVMH and

Newton signed on December 17, 2014, before she began her

employment with LVMH—and compelled Newton’s case to

arbitration. See Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 140 N.Y.S.3d 699 (1st Dep’t 2021).

On June 1, 2021, pursuant to the First Department’s decision, Newton initiated an arbitration proceeding against LVMH,

Doran, Firestone, Martinez, LVMH CEO Anish Melwani, and

Gena Smith—an HR employee at LVMH—for sexual harassment

under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, retaliation under the

NYSHRL and NYCHRL, aider and abettor liability, and

violations of the federal Equal Pay Act and the New York Equal Pay Act.

In August 2021, Newton initiated a second arbitration in which she sought a ruling that revisions LVMH had made to its antiharassment policy abrogated the arbitration agreement she had signed. The second arbitration was consolidated with the ﬁrst, and the arbitrator decided that Newton’s sexual harassment

claim was arbitrable and dismissed Newton’s second arbitration that challenged the arbitrability of her claims. 5

On May 19, 2023, Newton ﬁled a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and

the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on November 24, 2023.

On December 11, 2023, Newton ﬁled the complaint in this

action, which asserts the following claims: (1) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against LVMH; and (2) retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against Pratt. Newton also ﬁled a proposed order

to show cause seeking an order enjoining Defendants from

continuing the arbitration, and a letter seeking a premotion conference regarding Newton’s intended motion for leave to

5 LVMH also initiated a separate arbitration proceeding against Newton to

recover attorney’s fees and costs that accrued in connection with LVMH’s

motion to compel arbitration and the ensuing appeal to the First

Department. On March 7, 2024, the arbitrator issued an award granting

LVMH almost $500,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.

amend the complaint to add her claims that were pending in

arbitration. The district court then set a brieﬁng schedule for Defendants to ﬁle a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss, and for Newton to ﬁle a cross-motion to enjoin the ongoing

arbitration and to amend her complaint.

On August 23, 2024, the district court (1) denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, 6 (2) granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and (3) denied Newton’s crossmotions to enjoin the arbitration and for leave to amend. See generally Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 746 F. Supp. 3d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The district court entered judgment accordingly in favor of Defendants. Newton then moved,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(6), to alter or amend the judgment and sought permission to further replead her claims. On July 2, 2025, the district court denied the reconsideration motion to the extent it sought to vacate the decision to dismiss Newton’s claims with prejudice and to deny her cross-motion to amend. See Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy

Louis Vuitton Inc., No. 23-CV-10753 (LAP), 2025 WL 1826583, at *3– 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2025). The district court also denied Newton’s request to enjoin the pending arbitration. 7 Id. at *6.

Newton timely appealed from the judgment and the district

court’s order denying relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b). 8

6 This holding is not at issue on appeal because Defendants have not

appealed it.

7 The district court granted Newton’s request—made pursuant to Rule

52(b)—to vacate its prior ﬁnding that her cross-motion to amend was

made in bad faith. See Newton, 2025 WL 1826583, at *5. That ruling is not

at issue in this appeal.

8 On March 31, 2026, after brieﬁng and oral argument before this Court was

complete, the arbitrator issued a post-hearing award in favor of LVMH

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Newton argues that the district court erred by

dismissing her retaliation claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), denying her cross-motion for leave to amend, denying her crossmotion to enjoin the then-ongoing arbitration, and denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment to permit repleading. We address her arguments regarding the dismissal of her retaliation claims ﬁrst.

I. Newton’s Retaliation Claims

We review the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation

claims in Newton’s initial complaint de novo, accepting as true all factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiﬀ. Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2023). To survive dismissal, the pleadings must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), i.e., the pleaded facts must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

and other defendants that are not parties to this case on all of Newton’s

claims. Thus, Newton’s argument that the district court erred by denying

her cross-motion to enjoin the arbitration is moot now that the arbitration

has ended. See PolyOne Corp. v. Westlake Vinyls, Inc., 937 F.3d 692, 702 (6th

Cir. 2019). The arbitration award has also been conﬁrmed by a New York

state trial court. See Appellees’ Aug. 5, 2026, R. 28(j) Ltr. (attaching the

state court judgment conﬁrming the award). Thus, in a Rule 28(j) letter,

Defendants suggest that the award has preclusive eﬀect on the claims

Newton sought to add to this lawsuit, and factual issues relevant to those

claims. Id. at 1–2. However, because we conclude in any event that the

district court did not err in denying Newton’s motion for leave to amend,

we need not decide what preclusive eﬀect, if any, the arbitration award

would have with respect to the claims in the proposed amended

complaint.

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted).

A. The Applicable Law of Retaliation

Title VII makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful

practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testiﬁed, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Thus, this antiretaliation provision contains an “opposition clause” and a “participation clause.” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 275 (2009); accord Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2012). Only the former kind of protected activity is relevant here.9

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiﬀ asserting a Title VII retaliation claim under the opposition clause must plausibly allege that “(1) defendants discriminated—or took an adverse employment action—against [her], (2) because [she] has opposed any unlawful employment practice.” Vega v. Hempstead Union

Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is any action that could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL contain similar prohibitions on

unlawful retaliation. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(7). To succeed on a NYSHRL or NYCHRL

retaliation claim, a plaintiﬀ “must demonstrate that she took an

9 The “participation clause” is triggered only once a plaintiﬀ ﬁles a charge

with the EEOC. See Townsend, 679 F.3d at 49. Here, Newton did not do

so until May 19, 2023, well after the alleged retaliation at issue in this case.

action opposing her employer’s discrimination and that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably

likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., 124 F.4th 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2024). 10

Before proceeding to consider how these principles apply to

Newton’s claims, we brieﬂy discuss timeliness as it relates to the scope of Newton’s claims. Title VII claims that accrue more than 300 days before a plaintiﬀ ﬁles a charge with the EEOC are timebarred. 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 2010). Newton ﬁled her EEOC charge on May 19, 2023. Therefore, consideration of her Title VII claim is limited to violations that accrued after July 23, 2022. Similarly, Newton’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are

limited to events occurring after July 25, 2022. Although

retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject

to a three-year statute of limitations, see Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d)), those claims are brought against only Pratt individually, he did not join LVMH until that date, and he cannot be held liable for alleged retaliation in which he was not personally involved. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157–59 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining

10 Newton does not argue that there is any material diﬀerence between the

Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL legal standards articulated above as

applied to this case.

11 A claim “accrues” “when the plaintiﬀ has a complete and present cause

of action.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S.

799, 810 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other

words, “the time a claim ‘accrues’ means the point at which the statute of

limitations clock starts ticking.” Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 112 F.4th

74, 87 (2d Cir. 2024).

that, under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, individual

defendants must have “actually participate[d]” in the conduct giving rise to the claims). Moreover, because the complaint does not allege any relevant conduct that occurred between July 23rd and 25th, 2022, we begin our analysis by looking at the

complaint’s allegations after July 25th. With that scope deﬁned, we now consider whether the complaint plausibly alleges that Newton engaged in protected activity and that such activity

caused one or more adverse employment actions.

B. Protected Activity

An employee engages in “opposition” to unlawful

employment practices (and thus engages in protected activity) when she engages in “any activity designed to resist or

antagonize; to contend against; to confront; resist; or withstand discrimination.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 317 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation modiﬁed); see also Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 354 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that protected activity under the NYSHRL is “action taken to protest or oppose

statutorily prohibited discrimination”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 46 (2d Cir. 2025) (analyzing protected activity under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL in tandem). This can

include “making complaints to management” or “protesting

against discrimination by industry or by society in general.” Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). Thus, “when an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in a form of employment

discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.” Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added) (citation modiﬁed). Finally, in the Title VII context, to constitute protected activity, the employer must have

“understood, or could reasonably have understood, that the

plaintiﬀ’s opposition was directed at conduct prohibited by Title VII.” Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998). We have applied that same standard to

NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims. See, e.g., Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 122– 23; accord Rojas v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 107 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying this requirement to a NYSHRL claim); Fattoruso v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC, 525 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (same, to a NYCHRL claim).

Here, the complaint alleges that Newton engaged in two

categories of protected activity after July 2022. In August 2022, she refused to meet with Pratt to discuss settlement and, in three instances in October and November 2022, she spoke out in a

public forum or on social media to assert her right (and all women’s rights) to be free from sex discrimination in the

workplace. As to the ﬁrst category, the district court concluded that refusing to meet with Pratt did not constitute a protected activity. Newton, 746 F. Supp. 3d at 157. With respect to the second, the district court concluded that Newton did not

plausibly allege that Defendants were aware of Newton’s

statements. Id. at 157–58.

We disagree with the district court’s ﬁrst conclusion. Under these factual circumstances, Newton has plausibly alleged that her refusal to meet with Pratt to discuss a potential settlement of her then-pending claims against LVMH (and others) was a

protected activity.

As an initial matter, ﬁling a lawsuit, an EEOC charge, or

arbitration demand that alleges violations of Title VII, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL unquestionably constitutes a

protected activity. See Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Vega, 801 F.3d at 92. This is because, at its core, ﬁling a claim against an employer making such accusations is an

assertion by the plaintiﬀ that he or she believes that they have been wronged in a way that violates the antidiscrimination

statutes. The document that initiates a civil action is called a complaint, after all. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.

If initiating a claim constitutes an assertion that the plaintiﬀ was wronged, refusing to end a pursuit of that same claim with a settlement can—depending on the context—constitute a

continuation of the same assertion. The relevant question is whether the employer understood or could reasonably have

understood that the plaintiﬀ’s refusal was an assertion of her continued opposition to the employer’s unlawful employment

practices in violation of Title VII. Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 292. If so, the refusal is a protected activity. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271.

Under Defendants’ interpretation of Title VII, Pratt could have explicitly stated to Newton that he was terminating her because she refused to meet with him to settle the case and she would still have no retaliation claim based on his conduct because her refusal did not constitute protected activity. That interpretation not only deﬁes the plain meaning of “oppose” in the text of Title VII, but also contradicts our above-referenced precedent which makes

clear that “opposition,” for purposes of a retaliation claim, includes “any activity designed to resist or antagonize; to

contend against; to confront; resist; or withstand discrimination.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 317 (citation modiﬁed). Thus, such

opposition can potentially include not only the ﬁling of a

discrimination lawsuit itself, but also other statements made, activities pursued, or positions taken by a plaintiﬀ during the course of that discrimination lawsuit—such as a deposition,

settlement discussions, a trial, or an appeal. See, e.g., Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiﬀ’s Title VII appeal to D.C. Court of Appeals six years after

the original protected activity of ﬁling a discrimination complaint with an administrative agency was itself a protected activity). Context is key in making this determination because it informs what the employer could have reasonably understood. Cf.

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (emphasizing that “[c]ontext matters” in determining whether an act of retaliation is materially adverse).

Here, based on the allegations regarding the context of

Newton’s refusal to meet with Pratt, we conclude that the

complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants understood or could reasonably have understood that her refusal constituted

continued opposition to Defendants’ alleged unlawful

employment practices. By August 2022, when Newton refused to meet with Pratt, she had been vigorously, continuously, and

publicly asserting that Defendants had engaged in unlawful

employment practices for more than three years. For example, she ﬁled a complaint in New York state court, opposed a motion to compel arbitration, and ﬁled an arbitration demand when her opposition was ultimately unsuccessful. Moreover, outside of the formal legal proceedings, she spoke out publicly, including

before a congressional committee, asserting that she had been harassed and assaulted by Doran and retaliated against by LVMH and various of its employees. In this context and at this stage in the litigation, in which we must draw “all inferences . . . in the plaintiﬀ’s favor,” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 306–07, Newton has plausibly alleged that when she refused to meet with Pratt to discuss settlement, he could have reasonably understood that refusal as communicating her continued belief that she had been wronged by Doran and LVMH’s discriminatory conduct, and

that she wanted acknowledgement and legal redress for those

wrongs. That constitutes opposition and, thus, protected activity.

See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277. 12

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

Their primary argument is that Newton’s refusal to meet with Pratt was not a protected activity because she “does not allege she told Pratt she was doing so in order to continue objecting to alleged misconduct.” Appellees’ Br. at 32. To be sure, at this stage of the litigation, the precise way that Newton

communicated her refusal is unclear. On one hand, the complaint alleges that Newton “refused” Pratt’s request to meet. App’x at 77. On the other, the complaint asserts that, “[a]fter she did not respond to [Pratt’s] request,” he began to retaliate against her. 13 Id.

12 To be clear, our holding should not be read to establish a per se rule that

refusing to settle a pending claim always constitutes a form of opposition

to unlawful employment practices. What an employer can reasonably

understand such a refusal to communicate depends on the full context of

the refusal. Nor should our holding necessarily preclude a diﬀerent

ﬁnding in later stages of this lawsuit. The fact that Newton has plausibly

alleged a protected activity based on her refusal to engage in settlement

discussions in her discrimination lawsuit at the motion to dismiss stage

does not necessarily mean that the district court at summary judgment or

a factﬁnder at trial would reach that determination under the applicable

standard based on the evidence available at that time. In other words,

Newton has met her minimal pleading burden, but we express no view

as to whether she will be able to sustain her evidentiary burden at later

stages of the case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11

(2002) (distinguishing between pleading burdens and evidentiary

standards such as the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework); see also

Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing

the continued eﬀect of Swierkiewicz post-Iqbal).

13 Defendants state in their brief that the invitation to meet and Newton’s

declination were both sent through counsel. See Appellees’ Br. at 33.

However, Defendants do not cite anything in the complaint for this

factual assertion and, at the motion to dismiss stage, we are “limited” to

“the allegations in the complaint.” Nunes v. CNN, Inc., 31 F.4th 135, 142

(emphasis added). Thus, based on the allegations in the

complaint, Newton’s declination did not contain an explicit

statement opposing unlawful employment practices and may not have been an aﬃrmative statement at all.

However, these ambiguities do not render Newton’s refusal to meet an unprotected activity. The mere fact that Newton may not have speciﬁcally stated to Pratt that her refusal to meet was to continue objecting to unlawful employment practices is not

dispositive because such an explicit statement is not required. Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized that conduct or

communications that reveal opposition, even implicitly, can

constitute protected activity. See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277 (“Countless people were known to ‘oppose’ slavery before

Emancipation, or are said to ‘oppose’ capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it ‘opposition’ if an

employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory

practices not by ‘instigating’ action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to ﬁre a junior worker for discriminatory reasons.”); accord Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 479 (2011) (concluding that opposition under the NYCHRL does not require an explicit statement that the plaintiﬀ is a victim of discrimination). Therefore, so long as such implicit conduct or communications put an employer on notice that the plaintiﬀ is opposing conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination statutes, it can suﬃce as protected activity. Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 292. In short, drawing all

inferences in Newton’s favor, that notice has been plausibly alleged even if she merely failed to answer Pratt’s request to meet

(2d Cir. 2022).

with him regarding settlement of her discrimination lawsuit. In other words, Pratt could have reasonably concluded that her

unwillingness to respond to that request was another expression of her opposition to the employer’s discriminatory conduct.

Next, the cases that Defendants rely on—and which the

district court relied on, see Newton, 746 F. Supp. 3d at 157—are not binding on us and, in any event, are distinguishable. For

instance, Defendants rely on Bottge v. Suburban Propane, 77 F. Supp. 2d 310 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). There, the plaintiﬀ was ﬁred just before she would obtain a substantial increase in her employer’s contribution to her retirement beneﬁts. Id. at 312. Then, when she refused to sign a waiver of all discrimination claims, her

severance pay was withheld. Id. After these events, the plaintiﬀ ﬁled a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. The district court concluded there was no protected activity present at the time of the plaintiﬀ’s termination and the withholding of

severance pay because there was no “indicia in declining to sign a waiver suggesting that the employee has made a complaint.” Id. at 313. In other words, because the EEOC charge was the ﬁrst indication that the plaintiﬀ attributed her ﬁring to unlawful employment practices, her employer was “not on notice that her refusal to sign the waiver was related to a complaint of

discrimination.” Id. Similarly, in Pleener v. New York City Board of Education, the plaintiﬀ refused to sign a release of claims before she ﬁled an EEOC charge or a lawsuit. No. 05 CV 973 (ARR), 2007 WL 2907343, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2007). Because there was thus “no evidence . . . suggesting that [the defendants] w[ere] aware, based on plaintiﬀ’s refusal to sign, that she intended to sue them,” the district court concluded that there was no protected activity. Id. In sum, in both cases, the employers could not have

reasonably interpreted the plaintiﬀs’ actions as opposing

unlawful employment practices because the plaintiﬀs had not yet

alleged (formally or otherwise) that they experienced harassment or discrimination.

Here, by contrast, when Newton declined to meet with Pratt,

Defendants were undoubtedly aware that Newton believed that

she experienced discrimination at LVMH, including harassment and an assault. She had been speaking out against the alleged mistreatment and vigorously litigating to seek compensation for years. Thus, the context and timeline of Newton’s refusal to discuss settlement explains why a reasonable employer could

have understood her refusal diﬀerently than the employers in Bottge and Pleener.

Finally, Defendants resort to policy arguments to support

their position. In particular, they contend that, if refusing to discuss settlement can constitute a protected activity, “parties would have signiﬁcant disincentives to initiate settlement

discussions, undermining the strong public policy favoring

settlement, and even court ordered settlement communications could lead to retaliation claims.” Appellees’ Br. at 33. As a threshold matter, “policy concerns cannot trump the best

interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 346 (2022). In any event, it is diﬃcult to imagine how this holding will have a chilling eﬀect on settlement negotiations. It will hardly come as a surprise to employers, who are already well aware that retaliation against an employee for ﬁling a

discrimination lawsuit violates Title VII, that they also cannot retaliate against that same employee for refusing to settle the case. Moreover, it would make no sense, in light of the text and

purpose of Title VII, to provide an employee with protection from retaliation from the initial ﬁling of a discrimination lawsuit, but then leave them unprotected if the employer for whatever reason did not retaliate upon such ﬁling, but rather chose to retaliate (including by termination of employment) because of subsequent

statements made or positions taken by the employee in

connection with settlement discussions or other aspects of the ongoing litigation.

In sum, based upon the facts alleged in this complaint, we

conclude that Newton has plausibly alleged that her refusal to meet with Pratt to discuss a potential settlement of her thenpending discrimination claims constituted protected activity under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. 14

C. Causation

Having determined that Newton has plausibly alleged a

protected activity, we now proceed to consider whether she has plausibly alleged causation between her protected activity and her termination on December 1, 2022. 15

To state a Title VII, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL retaliation claim,

the plaintiﬀ must plausibly allege a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (Title VII); Harrington v. City of New York, 70 N.Y.S.3d 177, 180 (1st Dep’t 2018) (NYSHRL and NYCHRL). Under Title VII the plaintiﬀ must ultimately show “but-for” causation. Univ. of

14 Because we conclude that Newton has alleged a protected activity in

connection with her refusal to meet with Pratt to discuss settlement of her

claims in August 2022, and has plausibly alleged a retaliation claim based

on that protected activity for reasons discussed infra, we need not address

whether the district court also erred in determining that her statements at

a public forum and on social media in October and November 2022 did

not constitute protected activity because she did not suﬃciently allege the

employer’s awareness of such activity.

15 Defendants do not contest that Newton’s termination constitutes an

adverse employment action. See Appellees’ Br. at 29; see also Edelman, 141

F.4th at 45–46 (concluding that termination is an adverse employment

action under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL).

Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, however, the plaintiﬀ need only show

“that retaliatory animus was a motivating factor, that is, that it played any role at all in the challenged conduct.” Edelman, 141 F.4th at 49 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, under any of these statutes, one available method of plausibly alleging causation is to do so “indirectly by timing: protected activity followed closely in time by adverse

employment action.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90; accord Harrington, 70 N.Y.S.3d at 181. “We have not drawn a bright line to deﬁne the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too

attenuated to establish [the requisite] causal relationship.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, “our caselaw teaches that a period of several weeks to several months may establish the required causal

relationship.” Ziparo v. CSX Transp., Inc., 160 F.4th 314, 336 (2d Cir. 2025).

Here, Newton’s refusal to meet with Pratt occurred on an

unspeciﬁed date in August 2022, and she was informed of her

termination on December 1, 2022. App’x at 76. Thus, the time between the refusal and the termination is as much as four

months. We have previously held that similar amounts of time are suﬃcient to suggest causation. See, e.g., Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have

previously held that ﬁve months is not too long to ﬁnd the causal relationship.”); Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (ﬁve months); Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-Op Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001) (four months).

Importantly, “[w]here temporal proximity is not the only

evidence that bears on a causal connection, we have recognized that the lapse in time between the protected activity and adverse action can be longer.” Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 277–

78 (2d Cir. 2023). That additional evidence of causation can arise in the context of an ongoing discrimination lawsuit brought by the employee. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446–47 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that adverse actions within one month of receipt of plaintiﬀ’s deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit approximately one year earlier where harassment was ongoing throughout litigation), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N., 548 U.S. 53; Mosleh v. Howard Univ., No. 19-CV-00339 (CJN), 2020 WL 956527, at *8

(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2020) (noting that “retaliatory conduct that occurred during the course of litigation, long after the original protected activity, may suﬃciently indicate a temporal causation link”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, in looking at “the facts as a whole,” we can also consider

intervening patterns of “antagonism” or a “drumbeat of

retaliatory animus” that do not themselves necessarily rise to a level of an adverse employment action. Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 626 (2d Cir. 2018). Such additional facts inform our “judgment about the permissible inferences that can be

drawn from temporal proximity in the context of particular

cases.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.”).

Here, Newton does not rely solely on temporal proximity to

plead causation. Instead, Newton has also alleged that she

experienced repeated instances of antagonism and retaliatory animus between refusing to meet with Pratt and her termination. For example, she alleges she was required to seek preapproval from Defendants before she agreed to speak on any outside

panels; that Defendants objected to her speaking on an outside keynote panel; that Pratt unnecessarily inserted himself into some of Newton’s matters while also excluding her from others; that Pratt ignored Newton in weekly one-on-one meetings except to criticize her; that she was excluded from a farewell dinner for a departing employee in the legal department; and that she was not invited to a sale hosted by LVMH that was otherwise open to LVMH employees.

Moreover, Newton alleges that the manner of her termination

by Pratt was a departure from company protocol and done to

humiliate her:

On or about November 28, 2022, for the ﬁrst time ever,

Defendant Pratt scheduled a mandatory in-person team

meeting for the entire Legal Department on Thursday,

December 1, 2022. . . . On or about November 30, 2022,

Defendant Pratt rescheduled his regular one-on-one

meeting with Ms. Newton to December 1, 2022. . . . When

Ms. Newton arrived at the meeting, she noted that

Defendant Louis Vuitton’s Human Resources Director

Jolie Shehadeh was also present. At the December 1, 2022

meeting, Defendant Pratt informed Ms. Newton that her

employment would be terminated eﬀective January 1,

2023. Ms. Newton was instructed to exit the oﬃce

“within the hour,” by 5 PM, and to leave her work

devices and badge in the oﬃce. At the discharge

meeting, Defendant Pratt explicitly stated that Ms.

Newton’s ﬁring was completely unrelated to her

performance. Upon information and belief, Defendant

Louis Vuitton’s protocol was to terminate previous

executives on Fridays at 8 AM, speciﬁcally so that no one

else would see or hear, and to avoid their humiliation in

front of their colleagues. Defendant Louis Vuitton

decided to use a diﬀerent practice when ﬁring

Ms. Newton as Defendant Louis Vuitton intended to—

and did—humiliate her by making her ﬁring as public as

possible. In fact, to make sure that Ms. Newton was as

publicly demeaned and dehumanized as possible, and so

that other employees could be reminded of what

happens to employees who report sexual harassment

and retaliation, Defendant Pratt scheduled the

unprecedented, highly unusual, mandatory, in-person

team meeting for 4 PM that very Thursday, immediately

after the meeting in which he ﬁred Ms. Newton, with the

express intent of making sure that all of her colleagues

were present to watch her public humiliation. Defendant

Louis Vuitton’s intended eﬀect took place—when the

team meeting ﬁnished, her colleagues returned from the

meeting just in time to see her frantically packing up her

personal items, sweating profusely, while the HR and

building staﬀ assigned to monitor her packing barked

their countdown at her: “7 minutes! . . . 2 minutes! . . . 30

seconds!”

App’x at 79–80.

Assuming the truth of these allegations and drawing all

inferences in Newton’s favor (as we must at the motion to dismiss stage), the combination of temporal proximity and these

antagonistic actions lead us to conclude that Newton has

plausibly alleged causation. See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he combination of reasonably close temporal proximity and the particular context in this case is suﬃcient to infer causation.”).

* * *

In sum, we conclude that Newton’s complaint plausibly

alleged a claim of retaliation under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.

II. Newton’s Motion to Amend

At the same time that Newton opposed Defendants’ motion to

dismiss before the district court, she also ﬁled a cross-motion to

amend her complaint, which the district court denied. Newton, 746 F. Supp. 3d at 160–62. For the reasons explained in more detail below, we conclude that Newton’s attempt to amend her

complaint was futile because the claims she sought to add were covered by a binding arbitration agreement.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[a] court should freely give leave” to amend “when justice so

requires.” Leave may be denied, however, “for good reason,

including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although “we ordinarily review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion,” Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich, 164 F.4th 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2026), when “the denial was based on an

interpretation of law, such as futility,” “[t]he denial of leave to amend is . . . reviewed de novo,” Gelbiom v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is futile to seek to amend to add claims that are subject to a binding arbitration agreement. See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, where proposed allegations would not lead to a “diﬀerent result,” amendment would be futile).

Newton’s cross-motion to amend sought to “consolidate” her

claims that were then pending in arbitration, and the retaliation claims that were pending in this lawsuit. Appellant’s Br. at 20. Thus, in the proposed amended complaint (the “PAC”),16

16 The version of the PAC in the Appendix is the version submitted by

Newton in connection with a premotion letter. See App’x at 131–219. The

version submitted with Newton’s actual cross-motion to amend diﬀers

slightly in that it contains some additional allegations. See Proposed

Amended Complaint, Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc.,

Newton sought to add ﬁve new Defendants: (1) Doran (the

alleged harasser); (2) Firestone (LVMH’s former general counsel); (3) Martinez (employment counsel at LVMH); (4) Melwani

(LVMH’s CEO); and (5) Smith (Senior Vice President of HR at

LVMH). It also sought to add four new claims: (1) sexual

harassment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in

violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against all Defendants;

(2) aider and abettor liability for the same conduct under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against all individual Defendants; (3) a

violation of the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), against all Defendants; and (4) a violation of the New York Equal Pay Act, N.Y. Labor Law § 190 et seq., against all defendants. 17

The parties do not dispute that the new claims in the PAC are (at least facially) subject to an arbitration agreement that Newton signed when she joined LVMH. We generally must enforce such

agreements. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). Newton argues, however, that the EFAA allows her to invalidate her arbitration agreement and bring all of her claims in court.

No. 23-CV-10753 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2024), Dkt. No. 37. In evaluating

Newton’s appeal, this Court analyzes the version actually submitted with

Newton’s cross-motion and refers to it as the “PAC.” See Fed. R. App. P.

10(a)(1) (deﬁning the record on appeal as, in relevant part, “the original

papers and exhibits ﬁled in the district court”); Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(2)

(“Parts of the record may be relied on by the court or the parties even

though not included in the appendix.”).

17 The PAC also contained the same two Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL

retaliation claims contained in Newton’s initial complaint. The only

diﬀerence is that, although the NYSHHRL/NYCHRL claim was

previously brought only against Pratt, the PAC sought to bring it against

all defendants.

The EFAA provides that:

[A]t the election of [a] person alleging conduct

constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual

assault dispute . . . no predispute arbitration agreement

. . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case

which is ﬁled under Federal, Tribal, or State law and

relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual

harassment dispute.

9 U.S.C § 402(a). However, the EFAA applies only “with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after” March 3, 2022. Pub. L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022). 18 A claim “accrues” at “the point at which the statute of limitations clock starts ticking.” Olivieri, 112 F.4th at 87. That point “depends on the nature of the claim, and is informed by common law

principles.” Id.

For the reasons explained below, we conclude each of the new claims that Newton sought to add in the PAC accrued prior to March 3, 2022.

A. Hostile Work Environment Claims

We ﬁrst consider those claims alleging a retaliatory hostile work environment in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

See Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2023) (discussing the standard for a “retaliatory hostile work

environment claim”). Fundamentally, those claims are based on Doran’s alleged “unwanted sexual advances” and “unwanted

verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature” directed towards Newton, and LVMH and its employees’ allegedly deﬁcient and

18 “It makes no legal diﬀerence that this provision is codiﬁed in a statutory

note, not the main body, of the United States Code.” Olivieri, 112 F.4th at

84 n.4.

retaliatory responses. PAC ¶¶ 353–54. These claims (and the

factual allegations underpinning them) are nearly identical to those contained in the arbitration demand that Newton ﬁled on June 1, 2021. Compare App’x at 248–310 (Newton’s 2021 arbitration demand) with PAC ¶¶ 1–258, 326–77. Thus, each of those claims accrued by June 1, 2021—before the eﬀective date of the EFAA, which renders it inapplicable.

In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, Newton argues that the continuing violation doctrine applies, which would mean that her claims reaccrued after the EFAA became eﬀective. Thus,

Newton contends that the district court “erred by denying [her] request for leave to amend the [c]omplaint to add her claims from the Sexual Misconduct Arbitration to this case because they were part of a retaliatory hostile workplace subject to the continuing violation doctrine that extended through [her] termination.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. We are unpersuaded.

The continuing violation doctrine is a diﬀerent way of

determining when a claim accrues. It applies to unlawful

employment practices that “cannot be said to occur on any

particular day,” because they “are based on the cumulative eﬀect of individual acts.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). For example, a hostile work environment claim is generally subject to the continuing violation doctrine. Id.; see also Olivieri, 112 F.4th at 91 (NYSHRL); St. Jean Jeudy v. City of New York, 37 N.Y.S.3d 498, 500 (1st Dep’t 2016) (NYCHRL).

However, to trigger the doctrine, the timely and untimely acts must be “suﬃciently related” such that they constitute part of the same “unlawful employment practice.” McGullam v. Cedar

Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lozada v. Hook, 54 N.Y.S.3d 688, 689 (2d Dep’t 2017) (explaining that, under the NYSHRL, timely and untimely instances must be “speciﬁc and related”);

Taylor v. City of New York, 207 F. Supp. 3d 293, 302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same for the NYCHRL). 19 To determine whether the

requisite relationship between timely and untimely acts has been shown, we consider a variety of factors, including “the

commonality of the environment in which the incidents took

place (and whether a change in environment is due to intervening action by the employer), the nature of the incidents, and the temporal discontinuity between the incidents.” 20 McGullam, 609 F.3d at 80–81 (Calabresi, J., concurring). At bottom, this is a ﬂexible inquiry necessitated by the “context as fact-speciﬁc and sensitive as employment discrimination and as amorphous as

hostile work environment.” Id. at 77 (majority op.).

We have held that “[a] discrete discriminatory act, such as

termination, within the limitations period may not only support a claim for damages, it may also render a hostile work

environment claim timely if it is shown to be part of the course of discriminatory conduct that underlies the hostile work environment

19 Newton does not argue that there is any diﬀerence between the relevant

requirements articulated in McGullam (a Title VII case), and the

requirements applicable to NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims. See

Appellant’s Br. at 31–32.

20 Other circuits look to similar factors. See, e.g., Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines,

844 F.3d 914, 923 (10th Cir. 2016) (applying a non-exhaustive and ﬂexible

analysis that looks to, inter alia, the “type, frequency, and perpetrator” of

the harassment); Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech.

Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 740 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 13, 2017) (looking to

whether “the pre- and post-limitations period incidents involved the

same type of employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and

were perpetrated by the same managers”) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at

120–21); Shiba v. Mullin, 174 F.4th 1025, 1034–35 (7th Cir. 2026) (similar);

Clay v. Credit Bureau Enters., Inc., 754 F.3d 535, 539–40 (8th Cir. 2014);

(similar); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2005)

(similar); Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168–69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (similar).

claim.” King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 561 (2d Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original). In doing so, we emphasized that “[a]n unrelated discrete act, diﬀerent in kind from the conduct giving rise to the hostile environment, does not trigger the continuing violation doctrine.” Id.

When the continuing violation doctrine is applicable, it means that the claims in question “do not accrue . . . until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of the hostile work

environment.” Olivieri, 112 F.4th at 88 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, when the continuing

violation doctrine applies to certain claims, they “accrue, and reaccrue, each time a defendant commits an act that is part of the same course of harassing conduct.” Id. We applied the

continuing violation doctrine in the context of the EFAA in

Olivieri and conﬁrmed that the EFAA is triggered if a hostile work environment claim reaccrues pursuant to the continuing

violation doctrine after the eﬀective date of the EFAA. Id. at 91– 92.

We conclude that the continuing violation doctrine is

inapplicable here. Indeed, Newton eﬀectively admitted as much before the district court. In response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss or compel arbitration Newton herself described the

relationship between her pre- and post-EFAA allegations as

follows:

[T]he claims currently before [the arbitrator] are diﬀerent

from those here; the former include sexual harassment,

assault, and pay inequity, whereas the claims here do

not; and the retaliation claims here are materially diﬀerent

because the pending retaliation claims in arbitration are

comprised primarily of retaliatory hostile work environment

while the retaliation claims in the instant proceeding arise

primarily out of Defendants’ retaliatory discharge of

Ms. Newton from her employment, denial of reasonable

accommodation, and denial of promotion.

Plaintiﬀ’s Memorandum of Law at 18–19, Newton v. LVMH Moët

Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., No. 23-CV-10753 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2024), Dkt. No. 37 (emphasis added). To be sure, this statement in Newton’s brief was in response to Defendants’ argument that the EFAA was inapplicable because Newton had elected to

arbitrate her claims, and overall, she still argued that the continuing violation doctrine applied to her claims. We thus do not consider Newton to have waived or forfeited application of the continuing violation doctrine.

However, we agree with Newton’s statement regarding the

material diﬀerence in her retaliation claims for purposes of the continuing violation doctrine because the pre- and post-EFAA allegations of retaliation are not suﬃciently related such that they are “part of the [same] course of discriminatory conduct.” King, 96 F.4th at 561 (emphasis omitted). We reach this decision

primarily because as alleged in the PAC, the “who,” and the

“how” of the alleged harassment and retaliation diﬀered between the two relevant time periods. See Montanus v. Columbia Mgmt. Inv. Advisers, LLC, No. 25-CV-2798 (PAE), 2025 WL 2503326, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2025) (“Since Olivieri, courts in this Circuit have emphasized that the continuing violation doctrine does not

permit a litigant to pursue claims based on conduct predating the EFAA by citing later dissimilar acts.”) (collecting cases).

With respect to the “who,” Newton’s pre-EFAA allegations

center around Doran and Firestone. The core harassment that

Newton alleges is Doran’s alleged sexual harassment of Newton from 2015 to 2020 21 and the one alleged instance of sexual assault

21 Although it is not entirely clear from the PAC when Doran’s alleged

harassment ended, it alleges that Doran announced his retirement in

in 2015. Moreover, the primary perpetrator of the alleged preEFAA retaliation was Firestone—LVMH’s General Counsel and

Newton’s boss. 22 In contrast, the post-EFAA retaliation that Newton alleges was perpetrated almost entirely by Pratt. By the time of the EFAA’s eﬀective date on March 3, 2022, Doran had already retired from LVMH, and Firestone retired shortly

thereafter on July 25, 2022. Accordingly, that the alleged

perpetrators of the relevant unlawful employment practices

diﬀered pre- and post-EFAA supports our conclusion that the

two periods do not constitute a continuing violation. See Purcell v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech. - Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 931 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The lack of overlap between alleged harassers . . . points against ﬁnding a continuing violation.”).

Next, we consider the “how”—i.e., the type and characteristics of the alleged unlawful employment practices. They also diﬀered pre- and post-EFAA. Most obviously, all of Doran’s alleged acts of sexual harassment and assault occurred well before the

eﬀective date of the EFAA—and did not reoccur post-EFAA. In

addition, based on the allegations in the complaint, the character of the alleged retaliation changed too. Pre-EFAA, the alleged retaliation was carried out by, inter alia, conducting “sham” investigations that found no wrongdoing, PAC ¶¶ 96–139; giving Newton a series of negative performance reviews, id. ¶¶ 147–50, 184–85, 219; refusing to involve Newton in the interviewing and hiring of interns, id. ¶¶ 152–53, 170; prominently celebrating Doran, id. ¶¶ 156–57; denying the allegations in Newton’s

October 2020. PAC ¶ 200.

22 Newton also alleges various retaliatory actions committed by Martinez,

Melwani, and Smith, see, e.g., PAC ¶¶ 90–95, 132–35, 156, 162, 170, 244, but

she does not allege any post-EFAA actions by these individuals.

original state court complaint, id. ¶¶ 158–64; unnecessarily monitoring whether Newton was working on remote workdays,

id. ¶ 170; putting up unreasonable obstacles to granting Newton’s requests to work remotely, id. ¶¶ 188–99, 216–19, 225–29, 233–58, 263–65, 269, 277; and delaying disbursement of matching

donations to the charity Newton founded in memory of her

brother, id. ¶¶ 203–11.

Post-EFAA, the nature of the alleged unlawful employment

practices was diﬀerent. Gone are any allegations of sexual

harassment or assault. As to retaliation, the alleged post-EFAA conduct, as noted supra, is based primarily upon her termination which we conclude is “[a]n unrelated discrete act, diﬀerent in kind from the [pre-EFAA] conduct giving rise to the [retaliatory] hostile environment” alleged in the PAC. King, 96 F.4th at 561. Moreover, the other more minor post-EFAA instances of alleged retaliation—such as requiring Newton to obtain pre-approval

before speaking on an outside panel or at an outside conference and objecting to one such request, id. ¶ 296–97; simultaneously micromanaging certain of Newton’s matters, and excluding her from others, id. ¶ 301; ignoring her in meetings, id. ¶ 302; and not inviting her to a farewell dinner and a sale for LVMH employees, id. ¶¶ 304–05—are generally diﬀerent in kind from the pre-EFAA allegations of retaliation. In short, this substantial lack of overlap in the type and character of the alleged unlawful employment practices pre- and post-EFAA further supports our conclusion that there was no continuing violation. See McGullam, 609 F.3d at 78.

To summarize, we hold that the proposed new retaliatory

hostile work environment claims in the PAC accrued prior to the EFAA and did not reaccrue after the EFAA pursuant to the

continuing violation doctrine, and thus it would have been futile to allow Newton to amend to add these claims.

B. Unequal Pay Claims

We similarly conclude that Newton’s proposed unequal pay

claims under the Federal Equal Pay Act and its New York analog accrued before the EFAA’s eﬀective date. 23 Claims under these statutes accrue with each paycheck reﬂecting an unlawful pay disparity. See Nakahata v. N.Y.–Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that causes of action under the FLSA and NYLL “accrue[] on the next regular payday following the work period when services are rendered”); see also Kellogg v. Ball State Univ., 984 F.3d 525, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing this “paycheck accrual rule”). However, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Newton’s equal pay claims because “a claim of discriminatory pay is

fundamentally unlike other claims of ongoing discriminatory

treatment because it involves a series of discrete, individual wrongs rather than a single and indivisible course of wrongful action.” Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Rsch., 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997).

As an initial matter, Newton has forfeited any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that her equal pay claims accrued before the EFAA because she neglected to make that argument in her brief. See Appellant’s Br. at 28–41. However, even assuming arguendo that Newton had raised that argument, the PAC does

not contain any allegations regarding Newton’s post-EFAA pay, let alone post-EFAA allegations that would plausibly support a claim under either the Federal or New York equal pay acts.

Instead, Newton’s equal pay allegations are limited to the period from 2015 to 2020. See PAC ¶¶ 47–55. Accordingly, Newton’s

23 These claims are analyzed according to similar standards with minor

diﬀerences not relevant here. See Edelman, 141 F.4th at 41–42 & n.4.

equal pay claims accrued well before the EFAA’s eﬀective date, they are subject to the arbitration agreement, and her eﬀort to add them in the PAC was thus futile.

C. The Meaning of “Case” & “Dispute” in the EFAA

Newton also argues in the alternative that, even if the claims she sought to add in the PAC accrued before the eﬀective date of the EFAA, the EFAA operates to invalidate her predispute

arbitration agreement as to her entire case, regardless of when each of its constituent claims accrued. According to Newton, because (1) the EFAA invalidates an arbitration agreement as to an entire “case” and (2) the PAC is part of the “case,” the EFAA invalidates the arbitration as to the claims in the PAC.

Assuming arguendo that Newton’s ﬁrst contention is correct, 24 her argument fails at the second step. The claims in the PAC are not part of a “case” in court for the simple reason that a proposed amended complaint is not operative until a motion for leave to amend is granted. See 6 W RIGHT & M ILLER ’ S F EDERAL

P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 1484 (3d ed. 2025) (“[I]f an

amendment that cannot be made as of right is served without

obtaining the court’s leave or the opposing party’s consent, it is without legal eﬀect.”); Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th

24 Whether the EFAA can operate to invalidate a predispute arbitration

agreement as to an entire lawsuit or only as to sexual harassment or

assault causes of action within that lawsuit is the subject of an appeal

pending before a diﬀerent panel of this Court. See Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law,

P.C. et al., No. 24-3223-cv. We express no opinion on this question. That

our disposition of this case results in some of Newton’s claims proceeding

in court and others proceeding in (a now-concluded) arbitration is a result

of the EFAA’s non-retroactivity provision and the unusual procedural

posture of this case, not our interpretation of “case” in the substantive

provisions of the EFAA.

Cir. 1998) (noting that “an amendment that has been ﬁled or

served without leave of court or consent of the defendants is without legal eﬀect”). Indeed, under the local rules governing proceedings before the district court in this case, a proposed amended complaint is not automatically rendered operative even when a district court grants a motion to amend under Rule 15. Instead, a new pleading must be separately ﬁled within seven days of the order granting the Rule 15 motion. See S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 15.1(b) (2024) (available at

https://perma.cc/PM2R-7W2S). Thus, the new claims in the PAC were never part of the “case” Newton ﬁled in court.

Next, Newton argues that, even if her claims accrued preEFAA, the statute applies to “any dispute . . . that arises or accrues on or after” the EFAA’s eﬀective date. Pub. L. No. 117–90 § 3 (emphasis added). According to Newton, because she ﬁled this lawsuit on December 11, 2023, the dispute arose after the EFAA’s eﬀective date, and it is thus applicable. Id. Several of our sister circuits have interpreted “dispute” in the EFAA context. See Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 111 F.4th 895, 898 (8th Cir. 2024) (explaining that a dispute under the EFAA arises when an employee “assert[s] any right, claim, or demand against” the employer and the employer “registered disagreement” with the employee’s position); Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortg., LLC, 135 F.4th 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that a dispute under the EFAA arises “when the parties became adverse to one another”); Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., 133 F.4th 240, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2025) (same).

However, we need not delve into this question of statutory

interpretation to reject Newton’s argument. Instead, we assume without deciding that there is a diﬀerence “between the date on which a dispute arises and the date on which a claim accrues when interpreting the eﬀective date provision.” Memmer, 135

F.4th at 418 (Thapar, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with such an interpretation). Moreover, we assume the interpretation of the term “dispute” under the EFAA that is most favorable to Newton, namely, “when the parties became adverse to one another.” Id. at 409 (majority op.). Here, even under that interpretation, the “dispute” between Newton and LVMH arose at least by the time Newton ﬁled her initial discrimination lawsuit in state court in April 2019, well before the eﬀective date of the EFAA, and not when Newton subsequently ﬁled her federal lawsuit with

additional claims in 2023.

Accordingly, the meaning of “case” and “dispute” in the

EFAA do not change our conclusion that the new claims in the PAC do not trigger the EFAA and remain subject to the binding arbitration agreement. We thus decline Newton’s request to

“conﬁrm retroactivity in this case,” Appellant’s Br. at 51, contrary to Congress’s command. 25

25 To be clear, our conclusion that it was futile for Newton to add the new

claims in the PAC does not necessarily preclude her “from using the prior

acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Morgan, 536

U.S. at 113; see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (“A

discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge . . . may

constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the

status of a current practice is at issue.”); Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210,

220 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[E]vidence of earlier promotion denials [falling

outside of the limitations period] may constitute relevant ‘background

evidence in support of a timely claim,’ and we will consider it as such.”)

(quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). Thus, we express no view as to whether

any of the pre-EFAA allegations can be used as background to support

her claim for a retaliatory termination.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, although we conclude that the district court

erred in dismissing Newton’s retaliation claims contained in her initial complaint, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Newton’s cross-motion to amend to consolidate the claims in the initial complaint with the claims that were (at the time) pending in arbitration. 26 We thus AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

26 To the extent that Newton argues that the district court erred by denying

her subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment on the same

grounds, we ﬁnd those same arguments similarly unpersuasive, for the

reasons set forth supra.

Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc.

Authorities cited

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