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State v. James

2026-09-21

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

[Cite as State v. James, 2026-Ohio-3683.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF LORAIN )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25CA012308

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

ONEYA JAMES COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO

Appellant CASE No. 24CR111576

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 21, 2026

SUTTON, Judge

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Oneya James appeals the judgment of the Lorain County

Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.

I.

Relevant Background Information

{¶2} This appeal arises from an incident involving fraud and theft. Mr. James was

indicted on one count of telecommunications fraud, in violation of R.C. 2913.05(A), a felony of

the fifth degree; one count of receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a felony

of the fifth degree; one count of misuse of credit cards, in violation of R.C. 2913.21(B)(2), a

misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of petty theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3),

a misdemeanor of the first degree.

{¶3} Mr. James pleaded not guilty to all counts in the indictment. Additionally, Mr.

James waived his constitutional right to a trial by jury and elected to proceed with a bench trial.

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After considering the testimony and evidence, the trial court found Mr. James guilty on all counts.

The trial court sentenced Mr. James to 3 years of community control.

{¶4} Mr. James appealed raising two assignments of error for our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE.

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Mr. James argues the State did not present sufficient

evidence to support his convictions for telecommunications fraud, receiving stolen property,

misuse of credit cards, and petty theft.

{¶6} Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out

this review, our “function . . . is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether

such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id.

Telecommunications Fraud

{¶7} R.C. 2913.05(A) states:

No person, having devised a scheme to defraud, shall knowingly disseminate,

transmit, or cause to be disseminated or transmitted by means of a wire, radio,

satellite, telecommunication, telecommunications device, telecommunications

service, or voice over internet protocol service any writing, data, sign, signal,

picture, sound, or image with purpose to execute or otherwise further the scheme

to defraud.

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“‘Defraud’ means to knowingly obtain, by deception, some benefit for oneself or another, or to

knowingly cause, by deception, some detriment to another.” State v. Boyd, 2025-Ohio-2811, ¶ 11

(9th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2913.01(B).

{¶8} A person acts “knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the

person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A

person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably

exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such

knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its

existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.”

R.C. 2901.22(B).

{¶9} Here, the State presented testimony and evidence from M.E., the victim of fraud,

D.D., a former employee of the Avon Best Buy, Detective William Quinn with the City of Avon

Police Department, and Detective Daniel Mulcahy with the City of Avon Police Department.

{¶10} M.E. testified she received an email from Best Buy on March 5, 2023, indicating

she had placed an order with the Avon Best Buy for a Sonos-Arc Soundbar in the amount of

$958.49. M.E., however, did not order the Sonos-Arc Soundbar from Best Buy. M.E.’s Chase

Freedom Card was charged for this item and M.E. called to dispute the charge with her credit card

company as fraudulent. M.E. also instructed the credit card company to cancel the card with the

fraudulent charge and send her a new card.

{¶11} On March 6, 2023, M.E. received another email from Best Buy informing her that

the Sonos-Arc Soundbar was ready for curbside pickup at the Avon Best Buy store. At that time,

M.E. attempted to contact the Avon Best Buy to inform them that she had not made or authorized

that purchase. M.E. could not get through to the actual store before receiving a third email that

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the item was picked up at 10:30 a.m. M.E. reported this incident to the Avon Police Department.

M.E. testified she did not know Mr. James and did not give him consent to use her credit card to

purchase this item or to access her email account.

{¶12} D.D., a former employee of the Avon Best Buy, testified he received and filled an

electronic order for curbside pickup of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar on March 6, 2023. D.D. recalled

an African American male in the driver’s seat of a monotone dark colored SUV and a passenger

in the front passenger’s seat of the vehicle. D.D. explained that Best Buy generates a unique

numeric code for each curbside pickup order that an employee checks to make sure the correct

individual is receiving the order. When D.D. approached Mr. James’ vehicle with the order, Mr.

James showed him the unique numeric code for that order on a cell phone Mr. James was holding.

D.D. then placed the Sonos-Arc Soundbar in the backseat of Mr. James’ vehicle through an open

window.

{¶13} After M.E. reported this issue to the Avon Police Department, Detective Mulcahy

testified he went to the Avon Best Buy to review the surveillance video from the exact time the

item was picked up. In so doing, Detective Mulcahy identified a black Nissan Rogue. The video

showed D.D. place the item in the backseat of the black Nissan Rogue after having contact at the

driver’s side window. The vehicle was parked in a curbside pickup spot. After viewing the

surveillance video, Detective Mulcahy then reviewed city intersection cameras with license plate

readers that are located near the Avon Best Buy.

{¶14} Detective Mulcahy identified a black Nissan Rogue with the license plate A-M-EL-A travelling eastbound on Chester Road from State Route 83 at 10:28 a.m. going toward the

Best Buy, then travelling southbound on State Route 83 from Chester Road at 10:33 a.m., leaving

the Best Buy. Detective Mulcahy testified he used the national LEADS database to identify Mr.

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James as the registered owner of the Black Nissan Rogue with the license plate A-M-E-L-A. After

doing so, Detective Mulcahy scheduled a photo lineup with D.D., because D.D. conveyed to him

that he was “pretty confident that he’d be able to identify the driver.” As part of the photo lineup,

Detective Mulcahy used Mr. James’ driver’s license photo and 5 filler photos of random

individuals.

{¶15} Detective Quinn testified he administered the photo lineup to D.D. because he had

nothing to do with the investigation and therefore had “no influence over this case whatsoever.”

Detective Quinn indicated the department likes to have a “blind administrator” of photo lineups to

avoid any influence on the witness or victim. D.D. selected Mr. James as the person who showed

him the unique numeric code and picked up the Sonos-Arc Soundbar on March 6, 2023, with “good

confidence between a 7 and an 8.” D.D. check marked “yes” for the identification of Mr. James.

{¶16} In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. James knowingly committed the crime

of telecommunications fraud. M.E. did not give Mr. James consent to use her email or credit card

for the purchase of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar. Mr. James arrived at the Best Buy approximately 1

hour after M.E. received an email indicating the Sonos-Arc Soundbar was ready for curbside

pickup. Mr. James showed D.D. the unique numeric code for pickup of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar,

that was sent to M.E., on a cell phone Mr. James was holding. D.D. placed the Sonos-Arc Soundbar

in the back of Mr. James’ vehicle through an open window. Mr. James drove away with the SonosArc Soundbar in his possession.

{¶17} Accordingly, Mr. James’ conviction for telecommunications fraud is supported by

sufficient evidence.

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Receiving Stolen Property

{¶18} R.C. 2913.51(A) states:

No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of another knowing or having

reasonable cause to believe that the property has been obtained through commission of a

theft offense.

“Receipt and retention of property implicate possession which may be either actual or

constructive.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-3604, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Moorer, 1987 WL

12884, *1 (9th Dist. June 10, 1987). “Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly

exercises dominion and control over the object, even though the object may not be within his

immediate physical possession.” Id.

{¶19} As indicated above, the State presented testimony and evidence that M.E. did not

authorize Mr. James to use her email and credit card for the purchase of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar

from Best Buy. Mr. James arrived at the Best Buy approximately 1 hour after M.E. received an

email indicating the Sonos-Arc Soundbar was ready for curbside pickup. Mr. James pulled into a

curbside pickup spot and showed D.D. the unique numeric code on a cellphone he was holding to

authorize pickup of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar. Footage from the Best Buy surveillance video

showed D.D. placing the Sonos-Arc Soundbar in a vehicle registered to Mr. James as the owner.

D.D. identified Mr. James as the driver of the vehicle. Mr. James drove away from the Best Buy

with the stolen Sonos-Arc Soundbar in the backseat of his vehicle.

{¶20} In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of

fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. James committed the crime of

receiving stolen property.

{¶21} Accordingly, Mr. James’ conviction for receiving stolen property is supported by

sufficient evidence.

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Misuse of Credit Cards

{¶22} R.C. 2913.21 states:

(B) No person, with purpose to defraud, shall do any of the following:

(2) Obtain property or services by the use of a credit card, in one or more

transactions, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the card has

expired or been revoked, or was obtained, is retained, or is being used in violation

of law[.]

R.C. 2901.22(A) states: “[a] person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to

cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain

nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific

intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” Indeed, “the state was not required to demonstrate

intent only through direct evidence but could establish intent through circumstantial evidence.

‘[D]irect evidence of a fact is not required, and circumstantial evidence may be more certain,

satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence. Intent can be proved from underlying facts and

circumstances.’” (Citations omitted) State v. Green, 2025-Ohio-1096, ¶ 83 (6th Dist.), quoting

State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 (1991).

{¶23} Here, testimony and evidence proved M.E. did not authorize Mr. James to utilize

her credit card or email account to purchase the Sonos-Arc Soundbar from Best Buy. M.E.’s credit

card was charged $958.49 for this item which she disputed as fraudulent. Mr. James arrived at the

Avon Best Buy approximately one hour after M.E. received email confirmation that the SonosArc Soundbar was ready for curbside pickup. Mr. James showed D.D. the unique numeric code

that was emailed to M.E. for authorization to pick up the Sonos-Arc Soundbar and drove away

with the item. Mr. James held himself out to be the person who made the purchase of the SonosArc Soundbar, albeit with M.E.’s credit card.

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{¶24} In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. James purposely defrauded M.E. by use

of her credit card to purchase the Sonos-Arc Soundbar from Best Buy.

{¶25} Accordingly, Mr. James’ conviction for misuse of credit cards is supported by

sufficient evidence.

Petty Theft

{¶26} R.C. 2913.02(A) states, “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of

property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services

in any of the following ways: . . . (3) [b]y deception[.]

{¶27} This Court has stated the “purpose to deprive may be inferred from circumstantial

evidence.” State v. Riley, 2010-Ohio-1350, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.); see also State v. Hoffmeier, 2018-Ohio-2553, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Warfel, 2017-Ohio-5766, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.) (“Proof of

intent is often derived from circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence will seldom be available.”).

{¶28} Here, the evidence supports Mr. James took possession of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar

after fraudulently using M.E.’s credit card and email account to make the purchase. Mr. James

deceived Best Buy when he showed D.D., a former Best Buy employee, a unique numeric code,

sent to M.E., in order to take possession of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar. As such, a fact finder could

reasonably infer Mr. James intended to deprive Best Buy of the Sonos-Arc Soundbar by deception

when he used M.E.’s credit card and email, without consent, to show the authorization code and

then knowingly took possession of the item.

{¶29} In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. James committed the crime of petty

theft.

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{¶30} Accordingly, Mr. James’ conviction for petty theft is supported by sufficient

evidence.

{¶31} Mr. James’ first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR

THAT DEPRIVED [MR.] JAMES OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS

GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN

OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY FINDING MR. JAMES GUILTY OF

ANY OF THE CHARGES IN THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE THE

CONVICTION[S] [ARE] AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

EVIDENCE.

{¶32} In his second assignment of error, Mr. James argues his convictions are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Mr. James, however, in making this argument, relies solely upon

the argument set forth in his first assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

{¶33} “[S]ufficiency and manifest weight are two separate, legally distinct arguments.”

State v. Vincente-Colon, 2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). Sufficiency tests the State’s burden of

production while manifest weight tests its burden of persuasion. See State v. Ross, 2023-Ohio1185, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). Thus, manifest weight challenges concern the reliability or believability of

the State’s evidence, not its adequacy. See State v. Yatson, 2022-Ohio-2621, ¶ 69 (9th Dist.).

{¶34} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is

required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier

of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.

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1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.).

{¶35} Here, Mr. James correctly articulated the legal standard for a challenge to the

manifest weight of the evidence. However, Mr. James did not present an independent manifest

weight argument in his brief. Instead, Mr. James stated:

Once again, for the reasons attached to in the brief, there is simply no evidence in

the record to support that Mr. James is guilty of any of the offenses for which he is

indicted.

The law and arguments raised in [Mr. James’] First Assignment of Error regarding

lack of sufficient evidence are incorporated within this Assignment of Error while

also establishing same independently herein. The evidence [weighs] heavily

against conviction and [Mr. James] is entitled to a new trial.

{¶36} Upon review, Mr. James has not presented this Court with a manifest weight

argument. We will not create one on his behalf. See State v. Austin, 2025-Ohio-4543, ¶ 40 (9th

Dist.); State v. Filip, 2017-Ohio-5622, ¶ 42 (9th Dist.); see also App.R. 16(A)(7).

{¶37} Mr. James’ second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶38} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. James’ assignments of error are overruled. The

judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

BETTY SUTTON

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

KENNETH A. NELSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and KIRSTEN E.R. COLLINS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.