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Eccleston v. Waterbury
THOMAS ECCLESTON v. CITY OF WATERBURY
(AC 48841)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and Seeley, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff, who had formerly been employed as a firefighter by the defendant city, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 15-8) for failure to make out a prima facie case. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to make out a prima facie case of wrongful termination of employment in violation of the statute (§ 21a-408 et seq.) governing the palliative use of marijuana. Held:
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that he had failed to make out a prima facie case of wrongful termination of employment under § 21a-408 et seq., as that claim was inadequately briefed, the plaintiff having asserted limited arguments that were bereft of legal analysis and either patently incorrect or conclusory and failed to adequately address the dispositive bases for the court’s conclusion.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that he had failed to make out a prima facie case of defamation, as that claim was inadequately briefed, the plaintiff having failed to challenge the court’s conclusion or to set forth any evidence in support of his prima facie case.
Argued March 17—officially released September 22, 2026
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the allegedly
wrongful termination of the plaintiff’s employment
under the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court, Massicotte,
J.; thereafter, the court, Massicotte, J., granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment
of dismissal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas Eccleston, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Joseph A. Mengacci, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. In this action, the plaintiff, Thomas
Eccleston, alleged wrongful termination of his employment in violation of the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act
(PUMA), General Statutes § 21a-408 et seq., and defamation of character against the defendant, the city of
Waterbury, his former employer. The plaintiff appeals
from the judgment of dismissal, rendered by the trial
court pursuant to Practice Book § 15-81 for failure to
make out a prima facie case. On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly concluded that he had
failed to make out a prima facie case of (1) wrongful
termination in violation of General Statutes § 21a-408p
(b) (3)2 and (2) defamation. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts, taking the plaintiff’s evidence as true and interpreting it in the light
1
Practice Book § 15-8 provides in relevant part: “If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. . . .”
2
General Statutes § 21a-408p (b) (3) provides: “No employer may refuse to hire a person or may discharge, penalize or threaten an employee solely on the basis of such person’s or employee’s status as a qualifying patient or caregiver under sections 21a-408 to 21a-408m, inclusive. Nothing in this subdivision shall restrict an employer’s ability to prohibit the use of intoxicating substances during work hours or restrict an employer’s ability to discipline an employee for being under the influence of intoxicating substances during work hours.”
Although PUMA has been amended by the legislature since the events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June 2021, No. 21-1, § 77; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the act.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
most favorable to him,3 and procedural history that are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff
was employed by the defendant as a firefighter with the
Waterbury Fire Department (fire department) in 1995.
In November 2015, the plaintiff entered into a “last
chance agreement” with the defendant in order to avoid
termination of his employment for conduct unrelated to
the present case. The last chance agreement provided,
inter alia, that the plaintiff “may be subject to immediate termination . . . [i]f [he] tests positive for alcohol (at the level of 0.04 or above) or a controlled substance.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In September 2017, the plaintiff was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder. The diagnosing physician
recommended medical marijuana as a treatment. The
plaintiff thereafter sought opinions from two additional
physicians, including Leela A. Panoor,4 who ultimately
prescribed him medical marijuana. On March 6, 2018,
the plaintiff obtained his medical marijuana card from
the Department of Consumer Protection.
On March 20, 2018, the plaintiff was called for a random drug test, and the result was positive for marijuana.
When the medical review officer informed the plaintiff
that he had tested positive for marijuana use, the plaintiff did not dispute the results and instead informed the
officer that he was a medical marijuana patient. The
plaintiff thereafter provided the defendant with his
medical marijuana card.5 At the recommendation of the
defendant’s department of human resources, the plaintiff
was placed on light duty status and directed to obtain
“a note from his physician that he was fit for duty as a
3
“In evaluating [the trial court’s decision on] a motion to dismiss, [t]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chen v. Hopkins School, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 543, 548, 86 A.3d 482 (2014).
4
The plaintiff did not call Panoor to testify at trial.
5
At trial, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff provided a valid medical marijuana card to the defendant after he tested positive for marijuana but before his employment was terminated.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
firefighter with his current card.” In a fitness for duty
certification dated March 30, 2018, Panoor certified that
the plaintiff was fit for full duty with no restrictions.
On April 23, 2018, the plaintiff received a letter from
David J. Martin, then chief of the fire department,
informing the plaintiff that his employment was terminated (termination letter). The termination letter
summarized five reasons for the plaintiff’s termination, namely, violating the last chance agreement, two
workplace drug testing policies, and the substance abuse
testing policy of the collective bargaining agreement
between the city and the Waterbury firefighters association, Local L1339 (union), as well as “[e]ngaging in the
use of marijuana such that it has endangered the health
and wellbeing of others.” The plaintiff was never accused
of being under the influence of or consuming marijuana
while at work. The termination letter was courtesy copied to Scott Morgan, the defendant’s human resources
director; Linda Whibey, the defendant’s corporation
counsel; and John Schultz, the president of the union.
On April 27, 2018, soon after the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, an article was published in the
Waterbury Republican-American newspaper discussing the termination of the plaintiff’s and another firefighter’s employment.6 The article contained, inter alia,
several quotations that the author attributed to Martin
and summarized certain findings made at a disciplinary
hearing that had been held regarding the plaintiff.
On April 22, 2021, the plaintiff filed a two count complaint against the defendant. In the operative complaint,
which was filed on May 17, 2022, the plaintiff asserted
claims of (1) wrongful termination of employment in
6
Although the plaintiff submitted two articles as exhibits at trial, the court noted that the exhibits were simply “different versions of the same article,” and, therefore, it treated them as one article. The articles have different titles and authors, however, the articles’ texts are largely identical. Accordingly, for the purposes of simplicity, like the trial court, we treat the articles as one article.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
violation of § 21a-408p (b) (3)7 and (2) defamation of
character on the basis of statements made by Martin to
the newspaper and in the termination letter.8
On February 20, 2025, the trial court, Massicotte, J.,
commenced a bench trial at which the plaintiff testified
and called only Martin as a witness. The plaintiff also
introduced several exhibits in support of his claims,
namely, two separate portions of the collective bargaining agreement governing his employment with the
defendant, the defendant’s drug-free workplace policy,
the fire department’s random substance abuse testing
policy, a 2018 investigation report regarding the plaintiff’s positive marijuana test, the termination letter, the article, and the plaintiff’s fitness for duty evaluation
conducted by Panoor. The defendant’s counsel, during
7
The plaintiff originally brought these state court claims in federal court, along with claims alleging, against both the defendant and Waterbury mayor Neil O’Leary, “discriminatory discharge, failure to provide reasonable accommodations as required by the [Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA)], and retaliation in violation of the ADA.” Eccleston v. Waterbury, Docket No. 3:19-cv-1614 (SRU), 2021 WL 1090754, *3 (D. Conn. March 22, 2021). The District Court granted the defendant and O’Leary’s motion to dismiss with respect to the ADA claims. Id., *10. The District Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state court claims and “dismissed [those claims] without prejudice to refiling in state court.” Id., *11.
8
With respect to the defamation claim, the plaintiff further alleged in the complaint that two other agents of the defendant—namely, Administrative Officer Adam Rinko, who wrote a 2018 investigation report regarding the plaintiff’s positive marijuana test, and Morgan— made defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff in regard to the plaintiff’s positive test for marijuana and subsequent discharge. At trial, however, the plaintiff withdrew the allegations with respect to the statements made by Rinko and Morgan, leaving only Martin’s statements as the basis for the plaintiff’s defamation claim.
In its answer, the defendant asserted eight special defenses. The defendant asserted two special defenses as to the first count, namely, that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel insofar as it previously had been adjudicated before the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration. The defendant also asserted three special defenses as to the plaintiff’s defamation claim, namely, that the statements were true or matters of opinion, that the statements were not made with malice, and that the claim was barred insofar as the plaintiff was a public official at the time that the statements were made. Finally, the defendant also asserted three special
Eccleston v. Waterbury
cross-examination of Martin, also introduced two exhibits, namely, the last chance agreement and a laboratory
report indicating that the plaintiff had tested positive
for marijuana.
After the plaintiff rested his case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel orally moved to dismiss both counts of the
plaintiff’s complaint for failure to make out a prima facie case pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8. The court reserved
judgment on the defendant’s motion and afforded the
defendant an opportunity to present evidence in its
defense, which the defendant declined.
On June 11, 2025, after both parties filed memoranda
of law in support of their respective positions, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to make
out a prima facie case, reasoning that “[t]he plaintiff . . . did not present evidence to establish a prima facie case
for either of the counts in his complaint.” This appeal
followed.
We note that the plaintiff filed this appeal and his
appellate briefs as a self-represented party. On November
10, 2025, Attorney Norman A. Pattis filed an appearance
in addition to the plaintiff and thereafter represented the plaintiff at oral argument before this court. Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
Practice Book § 15-8 provides in relevant part that,
“[i]f, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal,
and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the
plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. . . .”
This court has explained that “[t]he standard for determining whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case, under Practice Book § 15-8, is whether the plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence that, if believed, would
establish a prima facie case, not whether the trier of fact defenses as to both counts, namely, governmental immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to mitigate damages.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
believes it. . . . For the court to grant the motion [for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to . . . § 15-8], it must
be of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make
out a prima facie case. In testing the sufficiency of the
evidence, the court compares the evidence with the allegations of the complaint. . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which,
if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts
which it is adduced to prove. . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted
in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every
reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s]
favor. . . . Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case is a question of law, over which our review is
plenary.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) J. R. v. N. K., 232 Conn. App. 434, 440, 337
A.3d 14, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 958
(2025). The plaintiff’s evidence must meet a “relatively
low standard” in order to withstand the defendant’s
§ 15-8 motion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moss
v. Foster, 96 Conn. App. 369, 378, 900 A.2d 548 (2006).
Having set forth our standard of review, we now turn to
the issues raised on appeal.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
concluded that he had failed to make out a prima facie
case of wrongful termination in violation of PUMA.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court “erred
in failing to apply the controlling McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817,
36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1978) (McDonnell Douglas)] burden
shifting framework” to his claim.9 Because this claim is
9
“In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on an adverse employment action under the burden shifting analysis enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas . . . and adopted by [our Supreme Court] in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53–54, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990) . . . the complainant must prove that: (1) [he] [was] in the protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) . . . the adverse action occurred
Eccleston v. Waterbury
inadequately briefed, and because the plaintiff has failed to address the dispositive bases for the court’s conclusion, specifically, its rationale for rejecting the application of McDonnell Douglas in a case for wrongful termination
under PUMA, we conclude that his claim is inadequately
briefed and, therefore, decline to review it.
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to our consideration of this claim. In the first count of
the operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant wrongfully had terminated his employment
solely on the basis of his status as a qualified patient
in violation of PUMA pursuant to § 21a-408p (b) (3).
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that “the [defendant]
engaged in unlawful employment practices by enforcing a ‘last chance’ agreement that was a pretext for
discrimination . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that, “[b]y putting [the plaintiff] on administrative leave and
then [having] been lawfully prescribed marijuana . . . the defendant implemented [its] policies without regard to
the [Connecticut] statutes prohibiting adverse employment action on the basis of having a marijuana card.”
When the defendant moved for dismissal under Practice Book § 15-8, it argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to introduce evidence of pretext, as required
under the burden shifting framework that was established in McDonnell Douglas. The plaintiff, also relying
on McDonnell Douglas, argued, inter alia, that he had
made out a prima facie case of wrongful termination
under PUMA.
In concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish
a prima facie case under PUMA, the court first noted
that it “disagree[d] that, for the purpose of deciding a
motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 15-8 in a PUMA
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. . . . The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision in question. The employee then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Long v. Putnam, 236 Conn. App. 290, 300–301, 347 A.3d 178 (2025).
Eccleston v. Waterbury
case, the burden shifting test in McDonnell Douglas
applies.” The court explained that “[t]he elements of a
claim under our discrimination laws are materially different than the elements of a PUMA claim,” and “[t]he
elements of a claim under PUMA eliminate the possibility
of burden shifting.” The court reasoned that, “[u]nlike an employment discrimination claim under General Statutes
§ 46a-60,10 the legislature has made it an element of the
plaintiff’s case to prove that there is no nondiscriminatory explanation for the defendant’s decision.” (Footnote
added.) The court explained: “In addition to requiring
a plaintiff to prove that he was a qualifying patient and
was discharged, PUMA requires a plaintiff to prove, as
an element of his claim, that the sole reason for the plaintiff’s discharge was because of his status as a qualifying patient. In other words, the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving that the defendant has no other legitimate
reason to terminate him aside from his status as a qualifying patient. The cause of action under PUMA places
the burden of persuasion and production on the plaintiff
for each element of the plaintiff’s claim.” (Emphasis in
original.) The court further reasoned: “The legislature
could have, but did not, add qualifying patients to the
protected classes in employment discrimination claims.
Instead, they established a different cause of action
containing different elements for a case under PUMA.
Accordingly, absent any guidance from the legislature
or a binding court decision, the court concludes that a
prima facie case under PUMA requires the plaintiff to
offer some evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to
10
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability, physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness, status as a veteran, or status as a victim of domestic violence . . . .”
Eccleston v. Waterbury
establish that the sole reason for his discharge was his
status as a qualifying patient, and there was no other
legitimate reason for his discharge, taking the plaintiff’s evidence as true and interpreting it in the best light for the plaintiff.”
The court then considered whether the plaintiff had
introduced sufficient evidence that, if believed, would
satisfy a prima facie case of termination in violation
of PUMA. The court concluded that the plaintiff “presented no facts in support of the claim that the reasons
listed for his 2018 termination were simply a pretext to
terminate him in violation of PUMA. He provided no
evidence to support the claim that the real motivation
in this case to terminate him was because of his status
as a qualifying patient under PUMA. He provided no
direct or circumstantial evidence that would call into
question the real motivation behind the reasons used
by the [defendant] to terminate him. He produced no
evidence that the defendant allowed other firefighters to
remain on active duty while using marijuana or that the
reasons listed for his termination were not legitimate,
leaving only his status as a qualifying patient as a basis for termination.”
The court thereafter “examine[d] the reasons provided
by the defendant for termination to determine if the
plaintiff ha[d] made his prima facie case.” The court
first addressed the plaintiff’s alleged violation of the
last chance agreement, concluding that the last chance
agreement made clear that the plaintiff’s employment
could be terminated for any use of a controlled substance, including marijuana, and provided no exception for
medical marijuana. The court further concluded that,
under the express terms of the last chance agreement, the
plaintiff had waived his rights under PUMA. The court
then examined the plaintiff’s alleged violation of the
substance abuse testing policy of the collective bargaining agreement and his alleged “endanger[ment] of the health
and well-being of others.” The court similarly concluded
that, because the plaintiff failed to put on any evidence
Eccleston v. Waterbury
that would demonstrate that the defendant’s reasons
for terminating the plaintiff’s employment “[were] not
worthy of belief, or more likely than not [they were]
not the true reason for termination, the plaintiff ha[d]
failed to show that he was terminated solely for his use
of marijuana” and, therefore, could not make out a prima
facie case under PUMA. The court declined to address the
defendant’s other reasons for terminating the plaintiff’s
employment, noting that it “found that the plaintiff
[had] failed to make a prima facie case that the sole reason for his discharge was because of his status as a qualifying patient by examining three of the reasons listed, any one
of which defeats the plaintiff’s case.”
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly concluded that he failed to make out a prima facie
case of termination in violation of PUMA. Specifically,
the plaintiff claims that the court improperly failed to
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework
to his claims.11 In support of this claim, the plaintiff
asserts that “[t]his framework has been expressly adopted
by Connecticut courts . . . and applies with equal force
to claims brought under [PUMA].” (Citation omitted.)
The plaintiff continues, “[r]ather than adhering to this
well established sequence, the trial court erroneously
collapsed the framework by requiring the plaintiff to
refute the defendant’s proffered justifications at the
11
In his statement of issues, the plaintiff also claims that the court “improperly placed the burden on [him] to disprove the [defendant’s] justifications at the prima facie stage.” The plaintiff, however, has not provided a meaningful analysis of this claim. Instead, the plaintiff only baldly asserts that, “[r]ather than adhering to . . . [the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework], the trial court erroneously collapsed [that] framework by requiring the plaintiff to refute the defendant’s proffered justifications at the prima facie stage, effectively shifting the burden prematurely.” We therefore decline to address this claim as inadequately briefed. See, e.g., C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (“Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Eccleston v. Waterbury
prima facie stage, effectively shifting the burden prematurely. This misapplication contradicts long-standing
precedent that the plaintiff’s initial burden is not onerous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finally, the
plaintiff asserts that “[c]ourts have explicitly applied
the McDonnell Douglas framework to claims under
PUMA, recognizing that qualified medical marijuana use
constitutes a protected status. . . . By refusing to apply this framework, the trial court imposed an improperly
heightened standard on the plaintiff and deprived him
of a fair adjudication.” (Citation omitted.)
Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the plaintiff’s briefs, we conclude that this claim is inadequately briefed, and, therefore, we decline to address it. “We
repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to
review issues that have been improperly presented to
this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,
rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order
to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and
efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their
arguments in their briefs.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349
A.3d 614 (2026). This court also has declined to address
claims because they are inadequately briefed where the
party “fail[s] to address the dispositive bases for the
court’s conclusion . . . .” Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 692, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024), cert. denied, 351
Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).
We recognize that the plaintiff was a self-represented
litigant at the time that he drafted his appellate briefs. The appellate courts of this state “have emphasized that
it is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and . . . to construe the rules of practice liberally in [their] favor . . . . The courts adhere to this rule to ensure that [self-represented] litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of legal education and
Eccleston v. Waterbury
experience . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co., 350 Conn. 557, 569–70,
325 A.3d 1048 (2024). Nevertheless, “[a]lthough we are
solicitous of the rights of [self-represented] litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and procedure as those qualified to practice law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Idlibi v. Connecticut State Dental
Commission, 231 Conn. App. 171, 173 n.1, 333 A.3d
196 (2025).
In the present case, to the extent that the plaintiff
claims that, by failing to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to his claims, the court
applied an incorrect legal standard to his claim of wrongful termination of employment in violation of § 21a-408p
(b) (3), that claim is inadequately briefed. The limited
arguments asserted by the plaintiff in support of this
claim are bereft of legal analysis and are either patently incorrect or conclusory. See, e.g., State v. Coltherst,
192 Conn. App. 738, 757, 218 A.3d 696 (2019) (“[i]t is
not enough merely to mention a possible argument in
the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s
work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh
on its bones” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d,
341 Conn. 97, 266 A.3d 838 (2021). First, the plaintiff
argues that courts previously have applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. The plaintiff
cites only to Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co.,
LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 326 (D. Conn. 2017), in support of
this proposition. Such reliance is misplaced in that the
District Court in Noffsinger made no mention of McDonnell Douglas in its assessment of the plaintiff’s claims
and, therefore, did not apply the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting framework. See generally id. The plaintiff also baldly asserts that the court imposed an improperly heightened burden on him, but he has cited no case
law in support of that assertion and has not explained
how that burden was improperly heightened, especially
given the court’s conclusion that PUMA requires that he
produce some evidence to demonstrate that his employment was terminated solely on the basis of his status
Eccleston v. Waterbury
as a qualifying patient. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunn v.
Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 304, 327 A.3d 982 (2024)
(“[c]laims are also inadequately briefed when they . . .
consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of
relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the
record” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly,
although the plaintiff argues that courts must apply
McDonnell Douglas in the absence of direct evidence,
he has not explained how that legal principle applies to
the facts of this case and has not addressed the court’s
reasoning, which led it to a contrary conclusion in the
context of PUMA. See, e.g., id. (“[t]he parties may not
merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, the plaintiff has not adequately addressed
“the dispositive bases for the court’s conclusion”; Sicignano v. Pearce, supra, 228 Conn. App. 692; namely, that
the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case that the sole reason for his discharge was his status as a qualifying patient under PUMA. Although the plaintiff argues that
it was improper for the court to require him to present
evidence that would refute the defendant’s proffered
justifications for termination when his burden is “not
onerous,” the plaintiff has not addressed or even mentioned the court’s reasoning for declining to apply the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to assess
whether, for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8, the plaintiff made
out a prima facie case. The plaintiff has not addressed
the court’s analysis of PUMA, or its conclusion, based
on the text of PUMA, that “[t]he cause of action under
PUMA places the burden of persuasion and production
on the plaintiff for each element of the plaintiff’s claim,” including demonstrating that he was terminated solely
on the basis of his status as a qualifying patient, thereby “eliminat[ing] the possibility of burden shifting.” By
failing to even discuss the grounds on which the court
based its decision not to apply the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting framework to his claims, the plaintiff
has failed to address the dispositive bases for the court’s
Eccleston v. Waterbury
conclusion. See Sicignano v. Pearce, supra, 228 Conn.
App. 691–92. Accordingly, his brief is inadequate for this court to conduct any meaningful review of this claim.12
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
concluded that he failed to make out a prima facie case
of defamation. The defendant contends that, because the
plaintiff has failed to challenge the court’s conclusion
that he failed to present evidence that would support
certain elements of his prima facie case, we should affirm the court’s judgment. We agree with the defendant.
The following additional facts, taking the plaintiff’s
evidence as true and viewing it in the light most favorable to him, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In the second count of his operative
complaint, the plaintiff alleged “defamation of character” on the basis of certain statements allegedly made by
Martin “to the . . . newspaper that [the plaintiff’s] use of medical marijuana endangered others and constituted
criminal conduct,” as well as Martin’s statement in the
termination letter “that [the plaintiff] endangered the
health and well-being of others . . . which was courtesy
copied to others, including the defendant’s city attorney
. . . .”
In support of his claim, the plaintiff introduced into
evidence the article, which discusses two employees,
one of whom was the plaintiff, whose employment with
the fire department had been terminated on the basis of
results from the fire department’s random drug testing program. The article’s author attributes several
12
As noted herein, under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. In the present case, the court concluded that, in order to establish a prima facie case under PUMA, the plaintiff was required to prove that his employment was terminated solely on the basis of his status as a qualifying patient. The court found that he failed to do so. We therefore agree with the acknowledgement by the plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument before this court that the court’s rejection of the application of McDonnell Douglas to a claim of wrongful termination under PUMA did not affect the outcome of this case.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
statements to Martin.13 The article also includes a reference to a disciplinary hearing in which the plaintiff was
found to have “engaged in the use of marijuana to the
endangerment of the health and well-being of others . . . .” The article’s author, however, does not attribute that
reference to Martin.
In its brief in support of its Practice Book § 15-8 motion, the defendant argued, inter alia, that “the plaintiff ha[d] failed to present a prima facie case that any statements
made by Martin in the . . . [article] were defamatory,
that he suffered any damage to his professional and/or
personal reputation in the community, that he sustained
any personal and/or emotional injuries and that he sustained a loss of earnings.” The defendant also contended
that, insofar as the plaintiff claimed that the termination letter was released to the media by Martin, the plaintiff
“clearly presented no evidence of Martin’s involvement
[in that release].”14 The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that
13
The court identified the following statements as attributable to Martin: “ ‘Our [fire] department is made up of very conscientious professionals . . . .This is not indicative of the overall population of our [fire] department. These are two isolated incidents and people shouldn’t think it’s a reflection on the whole job.’ The program of random screening began after a change in the union contract, Martin said. Previously, the [fire] department could call for a test if concerns were raised about a particular individual, he said. Martin said the [fire] department dealt with the positive tests swiftly. ‘We take the safety of our members and the public very seriously,’ Martin said. ‘These are things we don’t tolerate.’ ”
14
The defendant also argued that “any statements made by Martin are protected by a qualified privilege,” and that, insofar as malice might “defeat” that qualified privilege, “[t]he plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence of malice by Martin.” The defendant further contended that “[a]nother privilege that would apply in this case is the privilege of fair comment” and that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that he made efforts to mitigate damages. The trial court never made any conclusions concerning the defendant’s assertion of those privileges, or whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of malice. In this appeal, the defendant has not renewed its claim that it would be entitled to either privilege for these statements.
The defendant also argued that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence of damages. The trial court did not address the issue of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence as to damages, and the defendant has not renewed this argument on appeal.
Eccleston v. Waterbury
“[t]he defendant does not dispute that the statement is
per se defamatory, nor does the defendant dispute [that]
the statement was published.”
The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed
to produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of defamation. The court first explained: “To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff was required to
submit some evidence to support each of the elements
of a defamatory statement. A defamatory statement is
defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him. . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1)
the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the
defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third
person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a
third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s reputation suffered
injury as a result of the statement.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)
Regarding the article, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to establish his prima facie case
because “[n]o statement reported to be made by . . . Martin was consistent with the plaintiff’s allegations.” The court explained: “Even so, none of the statements attributed to
. . . Martin identified the plaintiff and were defamatory
or were proven to be false. His statements were broad
statements about the [fire] department’s procedure and
concerns.” In addition, the court reasoned that “[t]he
article includes a reference to a disciplinary hearing
that found that the plaintiff engaged in the use of marijuana to the endangerment of the health and well-being
of others, but the plaintiff produced no evidence that
. . . Martin made that statement to the author or that
the statement was false.” Regarding the termination
letter, the court reasoned: “The plaintiff provided no
evidence that the letter was published to third parties.
The plaintiff state[d] in his brief that the [defendant
does] not dispute that the letter was published, but the
record does not reflect any admission by the defendant
Eccleston v. Waterbury
that the letter was published to a third person. It is the plaintiff’s burden to present some evidence to show that
the defendant published the accusation in the letter to a
third person. He did not meet his burden.”15
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that he failed to establish his prima
facie case of defamation.16 In so asserting, however, the
plaintiff has failed to challenge the court’s conclusions
that he failed to produce evidence in support of certain
elements of his prima facie case. Accordingly, we conclude that this claim, too, is inadequately briefed, and
we therefore decline to address it.
Specifically, regarding the article, the plaintiff has
not claimed that the court improperly concluded that
he failed to introduce any evidence of a defamatory
statement made by Martin that was consistent with the
plaintiff’s claims or that identified the plaintiff to a
third party, both of which would be required in order to
15
The court further noted that, insofar as the plaintiff’s claim was based on Martin’s sending the letter to John Schultz, president of IAFF Local L1339, “[p]roviding a copy to the [plaintiff’s] agents is not providing a copy to third parties. IAFF Local L1339 was [the plaintiff’s] representative in the termination proceedings including a grievance filed on his behalf with the state Department of Labor’s State Mediation and Arbitration Board. . . . As [the plaintiff’s] chosen representative, IAFF Local L1339 was not a ‘third party.’ ” (Citation omitted.)
16
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant acted with malice, and that, therefore, “[e]ven if the challenged statements fall within a qualified privilege, that privilege was clearly abused.” As discussed previously in this opinion, however; see footnote 14 of this opinion; the trial court made no conclusions concerning the defendant’s assertion of qualified privilege, and we therefore decline to address this claim. See, e.g., State v. Bard, 354 Conn. 556, 560, 354 A.3d 721 (2026) (“[o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will [an appellate] court consider a claim . . . that has not been raised and decided in the trial court” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, insofar as the plaintiff claims that “[t]he trial court erred in dismissing the defamation claim without [a] factual inquiry into malice,” because the plaintiff has not claimed that he is a public figure, malice is not relevant to his prima facie case. See, e.g., Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 628, 969 A.2d 736 (2009) (“[i]f the plaintiff is a public figure . . . the plaintiff also must prove that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice”).
Eccleston v. Waterbury
make out his prima facie case of defamation. Similarly,
with respect to the termination letter, the plaintiff has
not claimed that the court improperly concluded that
he had failed to introduce evidence that would show
that Martin published the termination letter to a third
party, which also is a requisite element of a prima facie
case of defamation. Because the plaintiff has not challenged the court’s conclusion that he failed to produce
evidence in support of the elements establishing his
prima facie case of defamation, we conclude that the
plaintiff has abandoned any such claim. See, e.g., Stanley v. Scott, 222 Conn. App. 301, 306, 304 A.3d 892
(2023) (“the plaintiff’s complete failure to challenge
what the trial court actually decided in its memoranda
of decision operates as an abandonment of his claims”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 945, 308 A.3d 34 (2024). Moreover, although the
plaintiff argues that he had made out a prima facie case
of defamation, he has failed to cite to any evidence that
he presented to the trial court that supports this claim.
See, e.g., Local 84, Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists & Allied Crafts of the
United States, its Territories & Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC
v. Francis, 138 Conn. App. 77, 92, 51 A.3d 401 (2012).
His brief, therefore, “lacks any analysis of the relevant
issue on appeal.” Id.
We reiterate that we recognize that the plaintiff was
a self-represented litigant at the time that he drafted
his appellate briefs, however, “the solicitous treatment
we afford a self-represented party does not allow us to
address a claim on his behalf when he has failed to brief
that claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stanley
v. Scott, supra, 222 Conn. App. 306. Because the plaintiff has failed to challenge the court’s conclusions as to the
previously mentioned elements of his prima facie case
of defamation, or to set forth any evidence in support
of that prima facie case, his brief is inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of his challenge to the
Eccleston v. Waterbury
trial court’s dismissal of his defamation claim. See, e.g., Sicignano v. Pearce, supra, 228 Conn. App. 691–92.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.