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Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
EMY OJEKWE v. CONNECTICUT TRANSIT
DISTRICT CONSORTIUM
(AC 47389)
Alvord, Seeley and Flynn, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant, following a jury trial, and its denial of his motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the basis of inappropriate remarks made by the defendant’s counsel during opening statements. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, as the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he was so prejudiced by the improper remarks of the defendant’s counsel during opening statements that he failed to receive a fair trial.
The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw filed by the plaintiff’s counsel on the day of trial, as the dispute between the plaintiff and his counsel appeared to relate primarily to the admissibility of evidence and trial strategy and the court reasonably could have concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to discharge counsel on the day of trial.
The plaintiff’s claim that his constitutional due process rights were violated by the defendant’s purported indiscriminate use of peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race was not reviewable on appeal, as the plaintiff did not raise this claim at any time before the jury was sworn and, thus, it was not timely raised, and no record existed to review such claim.
This court declined to consider the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly admitted a surveillance video into evidence, as the claim was inadequately briefed.
Argued February 10—officially released September 22, 2026
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for the defendant’s alleged
negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee;
verdict and judgment for the defendant; thereafter, the
court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, denied *
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict, and the
plaintiff appealed to his court. Affirmed.
Emy Ojekwe, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Edward P. Brady III, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Emy Ojekwe, appeals from the judgment for the defendant, Connecticut Transit District Consortium doing business as
Greater Bridgeport Transit Authority, rendered following a jury verdict and from the denial of his motion to
set aside the verdict and for a new trial. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the basis of inappropriate remarks made by the defendant’s
counsel during opening statements, (2) improperly denied
his counsel’s motion to withdraw and the plaintiff’s
request to represent himself, (3) improperly denied his
motion to set aside the verdict on the basis of unfair
exclusion of potential jurors based upon race, and (4)
improperly admitted surveillance video into evidence.1
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff commenced the present action in June
2021 and revised his complaint in February 2022. The
plaintiff, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair for
mobility, alleged in a single count that he was injured
on September 24, 2020, while exiting a bus owned and
operated by the defendant. Specifically, he alleged: “To
assist handicapped passengers, like the plaintiff, the
bus is equipped with a wheelchair lift ramp that allows
wheelchairs to be lowered to the ground. The ramp opens
and extends outward, creating a surface which lowers disabled passengers and their wheelchairs onto the ground.
Once the ramp is on the ground, the passenger rolls off
the ramp onto the sidewalk. . . . While the ramp is in
1
The plaintiff raises one additional claim on appeal. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
motion, an employee, agent and/or servant of the defendant stands near the passenger to assist in the entering
and exiting of the bus. . . . As the plaintiff was lowered to the ground and began to ride his wheelchair onto the
sidewalk, the ramp began to ascend and close before the
plaintiff had a chance to completely exit the ramp.” The
plaintiff alleged that the employee “did not ensure that
the platform remained open and secure to the ground,
and when said platform closed, the ramp’s upward motion
caused the plaintiff’s wheelchair to violently fall backwards and hit the ground, causing the plaintiff . . . serious injuries . . . .” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused injury to his left hand,
left shoulder, back, neck, abdominal region, and both
hips. He further alleged that he required “emergency
treatment, physician care, X-rays, CT scans, imaging and
orthopedic treatment.” The plaintiff alleged that he was
required to spend substantial sums of money for medical care and that his wheelchair had suffered extensive
damage, resulting in a total loss of use.
In its April 2023 answer, the defendant denied the
plaintiff’s claim of negligence and asserted a special
defense, claiming that, if the plaintiff had sustained any injuries, such injuries were proximately caused by the
plaintiff’s own negligence. The plaintiff filed a reply, in which he denied the allegations of the special defense.
A jury trial was held on November 28 and 29, 2023. The
plaintiff testified and introduced video and documentary
evidence. The defendant presented the testimony of Daisy
Bryant, the bus operator, and introduced video evidence.
After closing arguments of counsel, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the defendant, which the court,
Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, accepted.
On December 8, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to set
aside the verdict and for a new trial. Therein, he asserted, among other allegations, that the defendant’s counsel
had made inappropriate remarks during opening statements and claimed that three peremptory challenges
made by the defendant’s counsel “were prejudicial and a
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
successful attempt to have an American jury pool, with
nobody born outside of the continental [United States].”
The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion. The court held argument on February 7, 2024. At the
conclusion of argument, the court denied the plaintiff’s
motion and issued a written order to that effect. This
appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
denied his motion to set aside the verdict and for a new
trial on the basis of inappropriate remarks made by the
defendant’s counsel during opening statements. The
defendant responds that, even if it is assumed that the
remarks were improper, they did not give rise to manifest
injustice. We agree with the defendant.
The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. The court, having
completed its introductory remarks to the jury, stated:
“So, we’ll begin now with the opening statements of the
attorneys. Once again, the opening statements are not
evidence.” After the opening statement of the plaintiff’s
counsel, the defendant’s counsel introduced himself and
began his opening statement, reiterating that, “as His
Honor indicated, opening statements are not evidence.
They’re just simply introductory remarks by the lawyers
on behalf of our clients. We’re advocates on behalf of
our clients.” After setting forth his statement regarding the incident and the plaintiff’s subsequent physical
therapy visits, the defendant’s counsel argued: “Now,
as His Honor indicated, and we talked a little bit about it during jury selection, credibility of witnesses. . . . [O]ne of your functions is to determine credibility, right. So,
let’s just talk about that very briefly.” The defendant’s
counsel then stated to the jury that the plaintiff was
born in Nigeria, had come to the United States more
than forty years ago, was not a United States citizen, had been convicted of insurance fraud, and spent six years in
prison. The defendant’s counsel continued: “He claimed
that he had a twin brother who died, and he sought to
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
collect close to $5,000,000 in life insurance proceeds. He was found guilty of insurance fraud, and convicted, and
sent to prison for six years for that. It goes to credibility, ladies and gentlemen. He also has been part of a workers’
compensation fraud . . . .” At that juncture, the court
sustained an objection made by the plaintiff’s counsel
and addressed the jury as follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, if there is evidence, and if there is any evidence of any conviction of a crime, you may not—you may only
consider that on the issue of truth and veracity, and not
on the facts of any particular case. Secondly, you are to
give no weight or no consideration whatsoever to the
fact that the plaintiff is or is not a citizen of the United States of America. Everyone has a right to come to court
and seek damages to which they are—they believe they
are entitled. It is their obligation however, to meet the
burden of proof, which I’ve explained to you and will
explain further on the—in the court’s charge on the law.
Please proceed.” The following colloquy then occurred:
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes. Everybody has a right
to come to court. Even the defendant agrees with that.
So that’s not the issue, but it does go to truthfulness,
veracity, and credibility—
“The Court: If it’s admissible.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: If it’s admissible.
“The Court: And it may not be.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: We’ll cross that bridge.
“The Court: No more discussion of that.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.”
After the jury was excused, the court heard argument on the admissibility of any evidence relating to
the plaintiff’s prior felony conviction. The plaintiff’s
counsel made an oral motion to exclude the evidence,
which the court granted.2
2
Subsequently, outside the presence of the jury, the defendant’s counsel again sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had been
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
In adjudicating the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial,
the court found that the “remarks made regarding
national origin, citizenship status, and the defendant’s
criminal conviction from twenty-four years ago were
improper, prejudicial, and designed to enflame the jury.”
The court noted that it had given a contemporaneous
instruction to the jury that, if there were to be any evidence of a conviction of a crime, such conviction could be considered only on the issue of truth and veracity. The
court further instructed the jury that it was to give no
weight to the remark that the plaintiff is not a United
States citizen and explained to the jury that “[e]veryone
has a right to come to court and seek damages to which
. . . they believe they are entitled.” Moreover, the court stated that it had “instructed the jury that opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence and should
not influence the jury’s understanding of the facts of the case.” (Emphasis omitted.) Finally, the court found no
evidence that the jury failed to follow the court’s instructions relating to the inappropriate remarks.
The following standard of review and legal principles
are applicable to our resolution of this claim. “When a
verdict should be set aside because of improper remarks of counsel, rather than because of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the remedy is a new trial. . . . Our standard of review for such a claim is whether the
court abused its discretion when it denied the motion. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given
to the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . .
“To determine whether the court abused its discretion in not granting the plaintiff’s motion to set aside
the verdict and for a new trial, we examine whether
the improper remarks made by the defendant’s counsel
deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial. In other words, we look to see whether permitting the verdict to stand in
light of the impropriety of counsel’s argument would
convicted of a felony. The plaintiff’s counsel objected, and the court sustained the objection.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
constitute a manifest injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that [he] suffered manifest
injury, that the remarks were unreasonable or that they
were flagrantly prejudicial. . . . If we determine that the remarks of the defendant’s counsel deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial, then the court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Audibert v. Halle,
198 Conn. App. 472, 484–85, 233 A.3d 1237 (2020); see
also Forrestt v. Koch, 122 Conn. App. 99, 107, 996 A.2d
1236 (2010) (“In seeking a new trial on [the ground of
improper remarks of counsel], a party’s burden of proof
is twofold. First, it must demonstrate that the challenged remarks in fact were improper. Then, the party must
show that the improprieties during argument warrant
a new trial.”).
In the present case, we conclude that the plaintiff
has failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he was
so prejudiced by the improper remarks that he failed
to receive a fair trial. First, we note that the improper
remarks occurred during opening statements. The court
instructed the jury on more than one occasion that opening statements are not evidence and should not be considered by the jury in deciding the facts of the case.3
Second, the improper remarks formed a relatively isolated incident.4 See Modaffari v. Greenwich Hospital,
157 Conn. App. 777, 785, 117 A.3d 508 (plaintiff failed
to meet burden to prove prejudice where impropriety was
3
The court prefaced closing arguments with the instruction: “Now, like the opening statements in the case, the closing arguments of the attorneys are not evidence.”
Finally, the court instructed the jury: “Certain things are not evidence and may not be considered by you in deciding what the facts are. These include the following. Number one, arguments and statements by the attorneys. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said to you in their opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence.”
4
Although the defendant’s counsel asked the plaintiff during crossexamination whether he was born in Nigeria and whether he came to the United States about forty years ago, the plaintiff’s counsel did not object to these questions and the defendant’s counsel did not allude to citizenship status or any criminal conviction.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
isolated incident and counsel did not attempt to revisit
improper statement), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 904, 122
A.3d 1279 (2015).
Moreover, following the objection by the plaintiff’s
counsel, the court immediately provided the jury with a
curative instruction, and the plaintiff has not provided
any indication that the jury did not abide by the court’s
curative instruction. “It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the court’s curative instructions in
the absence of some indication to the contrary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Finally, the plaintiff did
not move for a mistrial. See Forrestt v. Koch, supra, 122
Conn. App. 110 (improper remarks made during closing argument did not entitle plaintiff to new trial when
plaintiff’s counsel had not moved for mistrial or objected to jury instructions, including curative instruction provided by court); see also Kervick v. Silver Hill Hospital, 309 Conn. 688, 723, 72 A.3d 1044 (2013) (noting that,
despite claim on appeal that counsel’s conduct was so
improper as to require new trial, plaintiff did not at any point move for mistrial).
Additionally, we reiterate that “the trial court is in a
better position than an appellate court to evaluate the
damage done by remarks made [by counsel during] argument. Because it is difficult for an appellate court to view the remarks from the same vantage as the trial court, to
divine on which side of the impropriety line the remarks
fall, we give great weight to the trial court’s assessment of the situation. . . . A verdict should be set aside if there has been manifest injury to a litigant, and it is singularly the trial court’s function to assess when such injury has
been done since it is only that court which can appraise
the atmosphere prevailing in the courtroom.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Audibert v. Halle, supra,
198 Conn. App. 486. Having reviewed the record and
affording the trial court the discretion it is entitled to in assessing the prejudice caused by the remarks of the
defendant’s counsel, we conclude that the plaintiff has
not demonstrated that the remarks resulted in manifest
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
injury. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in
the court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.
II
The plaintiff’s second claim on appeal is that the court
improperly denied his counsel’s motion to withdraw
his appearance and the plaintiff’s request to represent
himself. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to this claim. On November 28, 2023, while exhibits were
being premarked, the plaintiff expressed that he was
“not being represented fully” and stated to his attorney,
“I recused you. I said to withdraw . . . .” Later that day, the court noted that a motion to withdraw had been
filed. Therein, the plaintiff’s counsel represented that
there existed a dispute between him and his client with
respect to the damages available relative to his wheelchair. The court stated: “I have a motion that was just
filed a moment ago. A motion to withdraw appearance
dated today’s date. And we have a jury waiting to hear
this case. The jury was picked to decide this case.” The
court then stated that the motion appeared to be predicated on the potential inability to introduce evidence
concerning damage to the wheelchair. The court stated:
“[U]nless you have something new, I’m going to deny
it because disappointment with the court’s ruling on
an issue of evidence is not a basis for withdrawal.” The
plaintiff’s counsel represented that the plaintiff was
asking him to withdraw. The court denied the motion.
“Decisions regarding the withdrawal of counsel are
evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard.” Tolman v. Banach, 82 Conn. App. 263, 265, 843 A.2d 650
(2004); see also McNamara v. McNamara, 207 Conn.
App. 849, 860, 263 A.3d 899 (2021). This court previously has stated that “[a] [party] has no unbridled right
to discharge counsel on the eve of trial . . . . In order to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel there
must exist exceptional circumstances.” (Emphasis in
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosenfeld v.
Rosenfeld, 115 Conn. App. 570, 578, 974 A.2d 40 (2009).
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the court
acted within its discretion in denying the motion to
withdraw filed by the plaintiff’s counsel on the day of the trial. The dispute between client and counsel appeared
to relate primarily to the admissibility of evidence and
trial strategy. The court reasonably could have concluded
that no exceptional circumstances existed to discharge
counsel on the day of trial. Accordingly, we reject the
plaintiff’s claim.
III
The plaintiff next claims that his constitutional due
process rights were violated by the defendant’s purported
“indiscriminate use of peremptory strikes to exclude
jurors of color,” and the trial court’s ruling that it could not address this claim, which was raised for the first time in his motion for a new trial. The defendant responds that the record is inadequate to review the plaintiff’s claim
on the basis of his failure to raise the claim in a timely manner. We agree with the defendant.
The plaintiff briefs his claim solely under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 69 (1986).5 The plaintiff did not object at any time 5
In Batson, “the United States Supreme Court recognized that a claim of purposeful racial discrimination on the part of the prosecution in selecting a jury raises constitutional questions of the utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. . . . The court concluded that [a]lthough a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his [or her] view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried . . . the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause forbids [a party] to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jose A. B., 342 Conn. 489, 503, 270 A.3d 656 (2022); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1991) (extending holding in Batson to civil cases).
Both parties and the trial court treated the plaintiff’s claim as a claim made pursuant to Batson. Likewise, on appeal, the plaintiff does not cite Practice Book § 5-12 or § 16-5.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
to the use of peremptory challenges to raise a claim of
improper bias. See State v. Myers, 126 Conn. App. 239,
260–61, 11 A.3d 1100 (“Our Supreme Court has set a
bright line rule that a Batson challenge is timely if [a
party] raises it at any time before the jury is sworn. . . . [A]ny Batson claim not timely raised is deemed to have
been waived.” (Citations omitted.)), cert. denied, 300
Conn. 923, 14 A.3d 1006 (2011).
In the present case, the plaintiff did not raise his claim at any time before the jury was sworn. Rather, the plaintiff raised this claim in his posttrial motion for a new
trial, which was filed after the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendant. Thus, the trial court properly
determined that no record existed to review such a claim.
Because the plaintiff’s claim was not timely raised, it is not reviewable on appeal.
IV
In one paragraph of his principal appellate brief, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly admitted a
surveillance video into evidence.6 We conclude that this
claim is inadequately briefed.
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory
attention in the brief without substantive discussion or
citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Booth v.
Park Terrace II Mutual Housing Ltd. Partnership, 217
6
We note that there were two videos admitted into evidence in the present case. The first was offered into evidence by the plaintiff, and the second was offered into evidence by the defendant, without objection from the plaintiff.
Ojekwe v. Connecticut Transit District Consortium
Conn. App. 398, 434, 289 A.3d 252 (2023). “We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not
to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C. B. v.
S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022).
The plaintiff devotes only one paragraph of his principal appellate brief to this claim. “Although the number
of pages devoted to an argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative, relative sparsity weighs in favor
of concluding that the argument has been inadequately
briefed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v.
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 805,
256 A.3d 655 (2021). The plaintiff does not include any
citation to the trial court record or legal authority. See C. B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 630 (brief containing no statement of facts, minimal relevant citation to
record, and almost no citation to applicable legal authorities was inadequate). Lastly, the plaintiff’s brief lacks
any legal analysis. See Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App.
84, 91, 349 A.3d 614 (2026) (claim inadequately briefed
when brief was bereft of legal analysis).
Accordingly, we consider this claim to be inadequately
briefed and decline to address it.7
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
7
The plaintiff raises an additional claim on appeal concerning the defendant’s counsel. In one paragraph covering two pages of his brief, the plaintiff asserts that it “was intentional, deliberate, prejudicial and punitive in nature for the defense to continuously err before the court.” See Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra, 337 Conn. 803 (“briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the same reasons expressed in part IV of this opinion, this claim is inadequately briefed, and we decline to review it.