Opinion issued September 15, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00125-CV
PHILLIP DAVID HASKETT, Appellant
V.
LINDSEY ARNOLD PITCHFORD, Appellee
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 20-TX-0080
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Phillip David Haskett appeals the trial court’s post-judgment
sanctions and turnover orders. We affirm.
Background
Haskett owned real property in Galveston County that Appellee Lindsey
Arnold Pitchford also claimed to own by adverse possession. In 2020, various
taxing authorities filed this suit to collect unpaid taxes on the property, naming
Haskett and Pitchford as defendants. The trial court rendered final judgment in
favor of the taxing authorities, and the property was sold to satisfy the judgment.
Excess funds from the sale were deposited into the trial court’s registry.
Both Haskett and Pitchford filed motions for the excess funds. The trial court
adopted the tax master’s recommendation that Pitchford’s motion be denied, which
Pitchford appealed to the trial court. See TEX. TAX. CODE § 33.74. The trial court
held a status conference on December 19, 2024, after which it entered a docket
control order setting the hearing on the appeal for February 17, 2025.
After the status conference, Haskett emailed Pitchford’s counsel asking for
dates for Pitchford’s deposition. Pitchford’s counsel asked Haskett to propose
dates, but Haskett unilaterally noticed Pitchford’s deposition for December 26.
Pitchford timely moved to quash the deposition notice, and the deposition did not
go forward. Haskett then unilaterally filed a notice of deposition for Judy Griffin
for Saturday, December 28. Pitchford timely filed a motion to quash, which stayed
the deposition. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.4. Haskett nonetheless took Griffin’s
deposition on December 28. Neither Pitchford nor his counsel attended, but
2
Haskett contacted Pitchford’s counsel afterward and told him a copy of the
transcript would be available.
Pitchford moved for sanctions for discovery abuse, asking that Haskett be
barred from using Griffin’s deposition and that Pitchford be awarded his attorney’s
fees. On January 12, 2025, Pitchford’s counsel obtained a January 24 setting for
the hearing on the motion, and he served Haskett with notice of the hearing on
January 20.
Haskett did not appear at the hearing. At its conclusion, the trial court
entered an order striking Griffin’s deposition testimony and awarding Pitchford
$700 in attorney’s fees as sanctions.
Meanwhile, Haskett had become a judgment debtor in another lawsuit. The
trial court presiding over the related litigation appointed a receiver to collect the
judgment. The receiver intervened in this suit and moved to have any excess
proceeds due to Haskett turned over to the receiver. The trial court granted the
receiver’s motion and issued a turnover order. Haskett now appeals.
3
Analysis
A. Challenges to the sanctions order
Haskett raises five issues challenging the sanctions order. We review a trial
court’s sanctions order for abuse of discretion. See Powell v. Fletcher, 695 S.W.3d
675, 679 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. denied.).1
Haskett first contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
sanctions when he was attempting to conduct discovery “within a 48-day discovery
window necessitated by Pitchford’s own frivolous claim to the excess proceeds.”
This argument is waived because Haskett made no objection in the trial court to the
length of the discovery period nor requested additional time to conduct discovery.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; WWW.URBAN.INC. v. Drummond, 508 S.W.3d 657,
678–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
Second, Haskett contends the trial court erred in awarding sanctions because
Pitchford’s claim to the excess proceeds was “utterly unmeritorious.” This issue
fails because sanctions against a party for discovery abuse are not dependent on
that party losing on the merits. See Westfall Family Farms, Inc. v. King Ranch,
Inc., 852 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied).
1
Where a trial court’s post-judgment order awarding monetary sanctions has been
reduced to judgment and authorizes its execution, it functions as a final judgment
and is subject to appeal. See Nnaka v. Mejia, No. 01-18-00779-CV, 2020 WL
425126, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
4
Third, Haskett challenges the sanctions because he received three days’
notice of the sanctions hearing, even though Pitchford’s counsel knew about the
hearing several days earlier. But the rules generally require three days’ notice of a
hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(b). Moreover, Haskett never objected in the trial court
that notice of the hearing was too short. This argument is waived.
Fourth, Haskett contends the trial court erred by not directing the court
reporter to make a record of the sanctions hearing. The burden of making an
appellate record demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion is on the
appellant. See Campos v. Cweren Law Firm PLLC, No. 01-22-00718-CV, 2024
WL 971672, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2024, pet. denied)
(mem. op.). By failing to appear at the hearing and ensure a record was made,
Haskett waived this argument.
Fifth, Haskett contends the trial court erred by issuing the sanctions order
without making findings of fact or conclusions of law. This issue is waived
because he cites no legal authority to support it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); 2017
Yale Dev. LLC v. Holtzapple Neal Props. Group LLC, No. 01-23-00305-CV, 2025
WL 1225107, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.). We overrule issues one to five.
5
B. Challenge to the turnover order
In his sixth issue, Haskett contends the trial court erred by issuing the
turnover order at a time when his motion to supersede the judgment was pending in
the related litigation.2 However, Haskett does not argue that the judgment was in
fact superseded and concedes in his brief that the trial court in the related litigation
denied his motion to supersede. See In re Greystar Dev. & Constr., L.P., ---S.W.3d ---, No. 24-0293, 2026 WL 1445481, at *4 (Tex. May 22, 2026) (“A
judgment may therefore be enforced even against parties whose appeal of the
judgment is pending if they have not superseded the judgment.”). We overrule
Haskett’s sixth issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s sanctions and turnover orders.
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson.
2
“[A] turnover order is a final, appealable judgment.” Burns v. Miller, Hiersche,
Martens & Hayward, P.C., 909 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
6