Opinion issued September 18, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-26-00336-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF K.A. AND S.A., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 306th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 24CP0083
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J.A. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to two
children: K.S. and S.A. (hereinafter “Kirby” and “Stella”).1 On appeal, she
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.
1
We refer to the minor children by pseudonyms to protect their confidentiality.
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
Background and Trial Evidence
This case originally involved four of Mother’s children: Kirby, six years old
at the time of trial; Stella, three years old at the time of trial, and twins who were
one and a half at the time of trial.2 In addition to the children involved in the trial,
Mother has two older children who each live with their fathers.
A. Removal
The Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter the
“Department”) became involved when Mother gave birth to twins in August 2024,
who were born premature and tested positive for cocaine. Mother admitted to the
Department caseworker that she had a drug problem and had been using cocaine,
ecstasy, marijuana, and alcohol during pregnancy. Mother said that she began
using drugs after her own mother died in March 2024. The Department filed its
petition for conservatorship and termination and was granted emergency temporary
managing conservatorship of Kirby, Stella, and the twins. The twins were placed
together in foster care once discharged from the hospital, and Kirby and Stella
were placed in another foster home with the owner of the daycare they attended
five days a week. Foster Mother had known Mother for about three years, since
Stella was six months old.
2
This suit originally included Mother’s twin children, D.G. and D.G., but following
the bench trial, the court severed the case involving the twins and issued two
separate final orders of termination. The severed suit involving the twins is
currently on appeal in the Fourteen Court of Appeals, No. 14-26-00344-CV.
2
B. Mother’s History
At trial, the caseworker testified that Mother had a lengthy history with the
Department concerning substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, and
domestic violence incidents between Mother and Kirby’s father. The Department
first became involved with Mother in 2013 when her oldest child tested positive for
cocaine at birth. Mother admitted that she used cocaine during the pregnancy,
completed an inpatient drug treatment program while participating in FamilyBased Safety Services, and testified at trial that she completed drug treatment,
parenting, and counseling services during the 2013 case.
In 2022, the Department became involved again when Kirby’s father was
supposed to be watching the children while Mother was at work, but Kirby, age
one, was found alone in the apartment, and his older sibling, age 4, was wandering
alone outside.
In addition, both Mother and Kirby’s father’s older daughter reported that
Kirby’s father physically abused them. The older daughter said he pushed her
down. Mother reported during her psychological evaluation in March 2023 that her
relationship with Kirby’s father was “toxic” and involved mental and physical
abuse. She obtained a restraining order against him.
Mother also reported in her psychological evaluation that she was diagnosed
with major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder while in juvenile detention and
3
had not had any medication since 2012. She had a history of substance abuse that
began when she was 14 years old. She completed counseling, parenting, domestic
violence, and psychological services during the 2022 case.
The caseworker testified at trial that following the Department’s
involvement in 2022, Mother remained in a relationship with Kirby’s father and
had a child with him.3 When the caseworker first met Mother in September 2025,
Mother told her about many relationship issues with Kirby’s father, including
domestic violence. The caseworker testified that Kirby’s father has a significant
criminal history that involves assault, burglary, and possession of illegal
substances.
C. Family Service Plan and Progress
The Department created a Family Plan of Service for Mother that became a
court order. The Department was worried about Mother’s ability to provide
adequate supervision for Kirby, Stella, and the twins, her inability to maintain
sobriety and address her mental health, and that if Mother continued to use drugs
and engage with drug users, her children would be at risk of exposure to toxic
chemicals or death. To address the Department’s concerns, the service plan
required Mother to maintain stable housing and employment and to complete a
3
DNA testing showed the twins have different fathers. Kirby’s father is the father
of one of the twins. He has six other children from other relationships who are not
in his care. After trial, the court terminated his parental rights to Kirby and the
twin he is related to, and he is not a party to this appeal.
4
variety of classes, assessments, and recommendations including: parenting classes,
a domestic violence education course, a psychological assessment, a psychiatric
assessment, a drug and alcohol assessment, random drug testing, substance abuse
counseling, and individual counseling.
The caseworker testified that after Mother completed a drug and alcohol
assessment and inpatient substance abuse program, she later relapsed on cocaine.
Following her relapse, Mother completed a second assessment and began
substance abuse counseling, but she failed to attend sessions for three months
leading to trial. When she last submitted a drug test to the Department in
September 2025, the results were positive for cocaine. Despite repeated requests,
Mother did not submit drug tests during the five months preceding trial. Kirby’s
father also tested positive for cocaine several times during the case, and he failed to
submit several drug tests.
The caseworker reported that Mother completed a psychological assessment,
a psychiatric assessment, and a parenting class, and she engaged in individual
counseling sessions until October 2025.
Despite the Department providing resources, the caseworker did not believe
that Mother had stable housing. Mother told the caseworker that she resides with
the children’s maternal grandfather, whose criminal history prevents him from
5
being an approved placement for the children. Mother did not provide any other
relative placement options.
The Department could not verify employment for Mother despite requesting
pay stubs. Six months before trial, Mother told the caseworker she had an
“appointment” at a motel, but she never provided verification of employment.
Mother, Kirby’s father, and the children had visitation throughout the case
coordinated by the Department. Mother and Kirby’s father arrived in the same car
for visits and attended together. At times, Kirby’s father called Department
employees “derogatory names.” Foster Mother confirmed that Mother was
appropriate during visits with Kirby and Stella. When visits started, they were held
at Foster Mother’s daycare, but they later switched to an offsite location. Foster
Mother testified that during a visit between Mother, Kirby’s father, and the
children at the daycare, Kirby’s father “got upset and left.” Foster Mother did not
want the visits and any disruptive behavior associated with them to jeopardize her
business, so she requested that the Department move them elsewhere.
When asked about barriers to reunification with the children, the caseworker
responded that the primary risks remain Mother’s continued use of drugs and
untreated mental health issues and concerns about the stability of her home and
employment. For the Department to consider a monitored return, Mother needed to
demonstrate six consecutive months of sobriety, and she had not. Mother’s
6
inability to maintain sobriety “derailed” the Department’s original goal of family
reunification. The caseworker also testified that Mother was supposed to return to
therapy after she relapsed, but she never did. The caseworker testified that Mother
has not mitigated the reasons for which the children came into care, and the
Department believes it is in the children’s best interest for her rights to be
terminated so that they can be adopted.
D. Children’s Progress and Placement
According to Foster Mother, Kirby and Stella had been placed with her for
about 17 months. The children are considered part of the family, including
extended family. When Kirby entered her care, he had “little behavior issues” and
was fragile. Since living with her, he has become a happy child who loves school.
When he first came to her home, he could not read or write his name, but now he is
exceeding expectations at school. Foster Mother reported that Kirby attends
therapy twice a month for struggles related to missing his maternal grandmother.
She also made sure Stella attended medical appointments for a heart murmur that
was resolved on its own. Foster Mother said she hopes to adopt Kirby and Stella if
parental rights are terminated, and it would be her goal to maintain the strong bond
they have with the twins. The four children see each other every day at her
daycare, and Foster Mother developed a close relationship with the twins’ foster
parent that she intends to continue.
7
Foster Mother keeps in contact with Mother by text message and video calls
with the children, which the children enjoy, and she hopes to maintain a
relationship with Mother and facilitate visits with her and the children if Mother
maintains sobriety. Mother also attends the church where Foster Mother’s husband
is the reverend. Mother told Foster Mother that she hopes that Foster Mother will
keep the children and that she did not want Kirby’s father to have them. The courtappointed special advocate testified that she has visited the children in their
placement, and they are well adjusted. The caseworker affirmed that the children
are well cared for by Foster Mother and that it is the Department’s goal that Foster
Mother adopt Kirby and Stella.
Dr. K. Johnson testified that she worked with Kirby and Stella as their
therapist and case manager. Dr. Johnson began working with Kirby when he was
four years old. He struggled with emotional dysregulation and appropriate conflict
resolution and had a difficult time with the death of his maternal grandmother and
separation from Mother. Dr. Johnson reported that he has “come a very long way”
now that he has stability and a structured environment with rules and boundaries.
He was academically underachieving, but after working with the school and Foster
Mother at the daycare, he is excelling academically and on the honor roll. He
remains very protective of his younger siblings. At first, he did not want Stella or
the twins to interact with other children during daycare. Dr. Johnson explained that
8
she worked on Kirby’s coping skills so that he understood that it was okay to share
his siblings. According to Dr. Johnson, Kirby expresses attachment to Mother but
also says that his mother is “sick,” and therefore, he cannot live with her. Kirby
told Dr. Johnson that he does not want to live with his father. Kirby considers
Foster Mother and her husband his family and expressed a desire to continue living
with them.
Dr. Johnson began working with Stella when she turned three years old.
Stella has attachment disorder, anger management issues, and ADHD. She
struggles with excessive separation anxiety. Dr. Johnson confirmed that Stella has
also expressed a desire to continue living with Foster Mother.
Dr. Johnson reported that she observed a recent visit where Kirby’s father
exhibited “underlying abusive,” abnormal verbal and emotional behavior toward
Stella that made Stella very uncomfortable. Stella wandered to another table in the
restaurant and attempted to climb into another man’s lap. Mother called her back to
her table, and Kirby’s father met Stella as she walked, picked her up, squeezed her
arms, and kissed her while whispering harsh words to her.4 Dr. Johnson affirmed
that Kirby’s father’s behavior of whispering harsh words to Stella while holding
her tightly and kissing her is a marker of domestic violence. Dr. Johnson could tell
4
According to Dr. Johnson, Kirby’s father said, “You over there getting in another
man’s lap. We don’t play that motherfucking shit.”
9
it made Stella uncomfortable and that Kirby’s father was using manipulation,
control, and subtle fear with Stella.
Dr. Johnson opined that it would be in both children’s best interests for them
to remain in their current placement.
E. Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that she relapsed during the case after completing outpatient
substance abuse treatment twice. She admitted that she last used cocaine “[m]aybe
three weeks ago.” Though she confirmed she had participated in 12-step programs
in 2013 and 2022, she could not name the second or third steps of the program.
When asked, Mother said she stopped participating in drug testing during the case
because “y’all mind already made up” and “it ain’t going to be out of [her] system
in 30 days.” She said her triggers for relapses include being away from her
children, stress, depression, and guilt. She confirmed that there is a correlation
between being off her psychiatric medication and relapsing, and she said
sometimes she does not take the medication because she is waiting for prescription
refills.
Mother testified that she currently lives with her father, the children’s
maternal grandfather. She said she was unemployed, with her last job being a
motel for about three months before quitting the month before trial. She said she
was focused on her mental health and getting through “all of this” before finding a
10
new job. She said she sees a therapist every two weeks and takes psychiatric
medications. She denied that Kirby’s father had ever hit, pushed, or put his hands
on her. She said that allegations of domestic violence were “a misunderstanding.”
She did not recall telling the Department in 2022 that she experienced domestic
violence or testifying to the same previously. She testified on cross-examination
that she did not recall telling the Department that Kirby’s father had assaulted her
so severely she miscarried a baby. Mother denied that she is in a relationship with
Kirby’s father but admitted she is intimate with him. She said that Kirby’s father
may have tested positive for cocaine because he had sex with her.
Mother affirmed that she has a good relationship with Foster Mother and
believes her children are well cared for. Mother said she was not asking the court
to place the children with her immediately, but she wants all four of the children to
be placed with Kirby’s father’s sister, S.C., so they are not separated. S.C. had not
met the twins.5 Mother was not opposed to restrictions on her visitation and
admitted that the behavior she engaged in during the case is dangerous and that it is
unfair for her children’s lives “to be put on hold while their parents decide whether
or not they’re going to engage in services.”
5
The Department completed a preliminary home study on S.C., but it was unclear at
the time of trial whether her home would be viable for the children. The
caseworker testified that the Department had “some pretty serious concerns” about
her as a placement. Mother previously told the caseworker that she did not want
her children placed with S.C., and Mother also communicated concerns with S.C.
to Foster Mother.
11
F. Trial Court’s Ruling
At the conclusion of trial, the court found predicate grounds for termination
under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and found that
termination was in the best interest of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions), (E) (endangering conduct),
(O) (continued substance abuse after completion of court-ordered treatment).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights to Kirby and Stella was
in the children’s best interest.6
A. Standard of Review
The U.S. Constitution, Texas Constitution, and Texas Family Code protect
parents’ “natural and fundamental right to direct their children’s upbringing.” In re
K.N., No. 24-0081, — S.W.3d —, —, 2026 WL 1614378 at *6 (Tex. June 5,
2026). To that end, the government must “clear[] a high bar” to justify terminating
a parent’s right to parent her child. Id.; see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, — S.W.3d
—, —, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (reemphasizing that
terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect
children from serious harm . . .[and] may be exercised only in the absence of other
6
Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings on predicate acts. See TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O).
12
legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722
S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))).
To support termination under this heightened standard, the Department must
present clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the
acts listed in section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) termination is in the best interest of the
child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id.
§ 101.007. This standard “is unforgiving” and “the government may not sever the
legal ties between parents and children without clearing [this] high bar.” K.N., —
S.W.3d — at —, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6–7.
When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination
proceeding, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding and decide “whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005)
(discussing elevated standard of review in parental termination cases). We assume
that any disputed facts were resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable
factfinder could have done so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. When “no reasonable
factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” that the matter on which the
13
Department bears the burden of proof is true, we “must conclude that the evidence
is legally insufficient.” Id.
In reviewing the evidence’s factual sufficiency, we consider the entire
record, including disputed evidence. Id. The evidence is factually insufficient if,
considering the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could not have resolved in favor of the finding is so significant that the factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction. Id.; In re A.C., 560
S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings, and we cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.
2006) (per curiam). The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility
and demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 109.
Mother contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in Kirby
and Stella’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2) (requiring that trial
court find that termination is in best interest of child). “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of
art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is
accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013)
(quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). There is a strong
presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with the
14
child’s natural parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam);
In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no
pet.). Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also
presumed to be in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). The bestinterest inquiry is “child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and
development.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).
To determine whether parental termination is in a child’s best interest, courts
may consider the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the desires of the child;
(2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child; (3) the present
and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of
the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons
seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the
child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the
parent’s acts or omissions. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These factors are not
exhaustive, and evidence is not required on every factor to support a finding that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Id.; In re D.R.A., 374
S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Courts may
consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the
15
evidence as well as direct evidence when conducting a best interest analysis. In re
E.N.T., No. 01-25-00346-CV, 2025 WL 30383879, at *38 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[T]he State need not prove all of the
factors as a condition precedent to parental termination, ‘particularly if the
evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of
the child.’” In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, pet. denied) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002)).7
A parent’s past conduct is probative of her future conduct when evaluating
the child’s best interest. See In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, no pet.). A factfinder may also infer that past conduct endangering
the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the
parent when assessing the best interest of the child. See In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d
462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Evidence supporting
7
We may also consider the statutory factors under Texas Family Code Section
263.307, including (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
(2) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family
or others who have access to the child’s home; (3) the willingness and ability of
the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services, and to
cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (4) the
willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and
personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (5) whether the child’s
family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child with
minimally adequate health and nutritional care, a safe physical home environment
and an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; and (6) whether an
adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is
available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b); In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112,
116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
16
termination under one of the predicate grounds listed in section 161.001(b)(1) may
also be considered in support of a finding that termination is in the best interest of
the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding same evidence may be
probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) grounds and best interest).
B. Analysis
Mother’s continuing pattern of illegal drug abuse “implicates most of the
Holley factors” and will support a finding that termination is in the children’s best
interest. In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,
pet. denied). A parent’s continuing pattern of drug use implicates an “attendant risk
to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child[ren].” In re R.R.A.,
687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024) (stating continued drug use supports a
finding of endangerment). Mother has a lengthy history with cocaine addiction,
including giving birth to children in 2013 and 2024 who tested positive for
cocaine. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (stating parent’s drug
use during pregnancy “supports a finding of direct injury to the child[ren]”). After
the twins’ birth and the Department’s involvement, Mother successfully completed
an inpatient substance abuse program, but she later relapsed. She testified at trial
that she last used cocaine three weeks before trial, and she stopped submitting to
drug testing required by the Department for the five months before trial. The last
drug test in the record was positive for cocaine in September 2025. Mother’s
17
decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the termination suit,
when she was at risk of losing her children, supports the trial court’s best interest
finding. In re. A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
pet. denied). When as here the evidence shows the parent returned to drug use after
rehabilitation, the factfinder may reasonably find that the parent will likely
continue using drugs and therefore continues to pose a risk to her children’s
wellbeing. See, e.g. Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 254–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
(en banc) (holding mother’s use of cocaine during pregnancy endangered child and
failure to abstain from drug use despite rehabilitative efforts allowed factfinder to
reasonably find she could continue to endanger child in affirming trial court’s bestinterest finding).
Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds
for termination may constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that
termination is in the best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.8 She admitted at
trial that she engaged in dangerous conduct throughout the case, continued using
cocaine, was unemployed, and could not provide for the children. She did not
8
While Mother challenges only the best interest finding on appeal, her failure to
challenge the statutory findings itself does not mean that the best interest finding is
supported. See In re H.S., No. 24-0307, — S.W.3d —, 2026 WL 1614496, at *5
(Tex. June 5, 2026) (reversing best interest finding without reviewing predicate act
findings).
18
submit to required drug testing, and she stopped participating in therapy to address
her mental health needs. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that
Mother failed to demonstrate her willingness or ability to provide the children with
a safe, stable, drug-free environment. See In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (“Stability and permanence are
paramount in the upbringing of children.”).
The record also showed that the children were thriving in their current
placement. The Foster Mother hoped to adopt them, and desired to continue
facilitating a relationship between them and the twins. Foster Mother also hoped to
keep the children connected with Mother, provided Mother maintained sobriety.
Dr. Johnson testified that the children’s emotional well-being had improved once
they were in a stable home environment. While Mother concedes that the sixth and
seventh Holley factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s best interest finding, she
asserts that termination is not in the best interest of the children because there is
evidence that the children loved her and were bonded to her and because there is
no evidence that she used drugs in their presence. See Holley, 554 S.W.2d at 371–
72. The record certainly shows that the children had a bond with Mother and loved
her, and that she was bonded with and loved them. But the record also shows that
Mother had a pattern and history of drug use, repeatedly failed to submit to drug
testing or failed drug tests, did not continue therapy and counseling after relapse,
19
and did not demonstrate that she could provide a stable and safe home for the
children. Accordingly, Mother’s acts and omissions indicated that the existing
parent-child relationship was not a proper one, which supports the trial court’s best
interest finding. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Upon considering the evidence as it relates to Mother’s actions and
inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future,
the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, Mother’s
lack of parental abilities and stability, we hold that the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that termination of Mother’s
parental rights is in the best interest of the children.
Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s sole issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order.
Susanna Dokupil
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil.
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